NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES 3 3433 08177330 5 \ PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK Volume VII] JULY, 1917 [Number 2 THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES PART I I. THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN WORLD ORGANIZATION 2. FUTURE PAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS A SERIES OF ADDRESSES AND PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AT LONG BEACH, N. Y., MAY 28 — JUNE I, I917 EDITED BY HENRY RAYMOND MUSSEY AND STEPHEN PIERCE DUGGAN PUBLISHED BY THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Columbia University 1 1 6th Street and Broadway, New York Copyright ign, by ike Academy oj Political Science. \i PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE No. I. No. 2. No. 3. No. 4- No. I. No. 2. No. 3- No. 4- No. I. No. 2. No. 3- No. 4- The Proceedings are issued by the Academy as a record of its activities and as a means of giving detailed treatment to special subjects of importance. 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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK Volume VII] JULY, 1917 [Number 2 THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE ^ UNITED STATES PART I I. THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN WORLD ORGANIZATION 2. FUTURE PAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS EDITED BY HENRY RAYMOND MUSSEY AND 1 STEPHEN PIERCE DUGGAN The Academy of Political Science Columbia University, New York 1917 999517A Copyright bv The Academy of Political Science PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES HELD AT LONG BEACH, N. Y. MAY 28— JUNE I, 19 1 7 CONTENTS THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES I THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN WORLD ORGANIZATION PAGE The Future of International Law .... 3 Charles E. Hughes The International Mind : How to Develop It. . 16 Nicholas Mttrray Butler International Arbitration 21 John Bassett Moore A World Court 29 William I. Hull International Legislation and Administration . 36 Alpheus Henry Snow A Parliament of Parliaments 53 Felix Adler Discussion of World Organization . . . .59 Samuel T. Button Lillian D. Wald Moorfield Storey The League to Enforce Peace 65 Hamilton Holt World Liberalism 70 Lijtcohi Colcord Economic Access and Neutralization of Water- ways. 80 J. Russell Smith The United States and the Food Supply of Swit- zerland 87 Paul Ritter Labor as a Factor in the Newer Conception of International Relationships . . . .90 Jane Addams Vi CONTENTS VKQ'B. Socialism and the Terms of Peace . . . .97 Meyer London Suppressed Nationalities and the Consent of the Governed 102 Francis Hackett Liberal England and International Relationships. 107 vS. K. Ratcliffe Annexation and the Principle of Nationality . 112 Stepheji P. Dnggan The New Russia 118 B. E. Shatzky The Democratic Ideal in International Relations. 121 Bainhridge Colby The Wilson-Kerensky Peace Policy . . . .124 William English Walling Discussion OF Small Nationalities . . . .131 Theodore Prince Clarence H . Howard George L. Fox Miran Sevasly * Henry R. S eager The Austrian Problem 139 Charles Pergler Discussion OF Small Nationalities ( C^w//;??/^^) . 146 Paxto7i Hibben Theodore P. Ion Fabian Franklin D. J. Theophilatos * George White lock Democracy AND Open Diplomacy . . . .156 Oscar S. Straus Difficulties of Democratic Control of Diplomatic Negotiations 159 Domicio Da Gama *Introductory remarks of presiding officer. CONTENTS Vij PAGE The Need for a More Open Diplomacy . . .164 Arthur Billiard A Plea for an Uncensored Press . . . .168 Frederick Roy Martin The Value of a Free Press 173 John Temple Graves Discussion of Censorship and Open Diplomacy . 177 Paul U. Kellogg Philip Marshall Brown Dixon Merritt Edward T. Devine Maurice Leon Plans for World Organization 183 James Byrne II FUTURE PAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS Commercial and Financial Interests of the United States in the Caribbean 191 Edwin M. Borchard The Attitude of the United States toward the Retention by European Nations of Colonies in and Around the Caribbean 200 William R. Shepherd The Bases OF AN Enduring American Peace . .214 Henry A. Wise Wood The West Indies 219 * Irving T. Bush Our Relations to Haiti and San Domingo . .220 Oswald Garrison Villard Our Caribbean Policy 226 Philip Marshall Brown Discussion OF THE Caribbean Question . . .231 Albert Bushnell Hart Cyrus F. Wicker * Introductory remarks of presiding officer. X REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR lations. The personnel of the General Committee is given below. At its first meeting the following members of the General Committee were present: Elihu Root, Alton B. Parker, Charles E. Hughes, Adolph Lewisohn, Irving T. Bush, Samuel McCune Lindsay, George A. Plimpton, Henry Raymond Mussey, Wil- liam L. Ransom, William R. Shepherd, Henry L. Stimson, Munroe Smith, George Whitelock, Edward T. Devine, Fred- erick P. Keppel, Oswald G. Villard and Stephen Pierce Duggan. The gentlemen present were enthusiastic in their ex- pressions of belief in the wisdom of undertaking a campaign to create and diffuse the " international mind " as outlined by Professor Lindsay who presided. As the result of the dis- cussion it was decided to hold a Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States during the last week of May at the Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. In order to make the Conference nationally representative, it was decided to invite the co-operation of the American Society of Inter- national Law, the American Bar Association and the United States Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, as the aim of the Conference — the diffusion of a knowledge of international af- fairs among the people of our country — could only be attained by means of the hearty assistance of the press, it was decided to invite representative newspaper editors from different parts of the country to be the guests of the Conference and to par- ticipate in its proceedings. Finally Dr. Lindsay was chosen chairman of the General Committee and authorized to appoint what^er sub-committees would be needed and Professor Duggan was chosen to be director of the Conference. The membership of the sub-committees is given below. The director, upon the request of the Executive Committee at its first session, went to Washington to explain the object of the Conference at the annual meeting of the Board of Directors of the United States Chamber of Commerce. The members of the board were enthusiastically in favor of the Conference and promised that the board would be generously represented at its sessions, but stated that as the Chamber can only be committed to any project by a referendum vote of its mem- REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR XI bers, it could not be associated with the Conference in an offi- cial capacity. The same friendly attitude was adopted by the American Bar Association and it may be noted here that both of these national bodies were liberally represented at the ses- sions of the Conference. The American Society of Inter- national Law heartily agreed to co-operate and the Conference was held under the auspices of that body and the Academy of Political Science. The Program Committee met at once to formulate a program to accompany the letters of invitation to the newspaper editors and other invited guests. It may be relevant to mention here that the program and executive committees held sessions weekly up to the very opening of the Conference. One serious diffi- culty met in oganizing the program definitively was the recall of an agreement to speak made by members of Congress and officials of the departments of the government at Washington. This action on their part was made necessary by the declaration of war against Germany which necessitated the constant pres- ence of those gentlemen in Washington. The outbreak of war also seriously interfered with the acceptance of our invitation by many of the newspaper editors throughout the country who felt that they could not leave their posts at so critical a time when there was such a pressure of business upon them. It is worthy of note, however, that the idea of holding the Con- ference met with a most hearty response from the editors. Practically all of them who were compelled to decline the invitation sent a letter of approval of the Conference, and ex- pressed their determination to attend if circumstances would afterwards permit them. One of the most gratifying features of the Conference was the large number of diplomats present, and addresses were made by the Ambassador from Brazil, the Minister from China, the Minister from Bolivia and the Min- ister from Switzerland. Despite the unfavorable circum- stances occasioned by the outbreak of war, one hundred and forty persons, of whom fifty-three were newspaper and maga- zine representatives, accepted invitations to be the guests of the Conference. In addition to the national organizations al- ready mentioned, invitations were sent to the board of direc- xii REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tors of organizations known to be deeply interested in inter- national affairs. The result was that representatives of The League to Enforce Peace, The World Court League, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The World Peace Foundation, The National Security League, The Wo- man's Peace Party, and the American Geographical Society were present at the sessions of the Conference. The total number of persons registered as members of the Conference was 287. The entire list of invited guests, delegates from or- ganizations and members of the Academy of Political Science who attended is given below, but I cannot refrain from listing here the newspapers and magazines which were represented. The Albany Argus, Albany, N. Y. The Atlanta Constitution, Atlanta, Ga. The Balti?nore Sun, Baltimore, Md. The Beacon, Wichita, Kansas The Burlington Free Press, Burlington, Vt. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Brooklyn, N. Y, The Birmingham Age-Herald, Birmingham, Ala. The Boston Herald, Boston, Mass. The Chautauqua Institute, Chautauqua, N. Y. The Duluth Herald, Duluth, Minn. The Evening Post, Charleston, S. C. The Evening Argus, Montpelier, Vt. The Galveston-Dallas Nezus, Dallas, Texas The Greek National World, New York Le Temps, Paris, France La Revista, New York The Lowell Courier-Citizen, Lowell, Mass. The Manchester Guardian, Manchester, England The Newark Evening News, Newark, N. J. The New York American The Evening Post, New York The Globe, New York The Neio York Herald The New York Mail The Sun, New York The New York Times The New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR Xlii The New York Tribune The World, New York The Pioneer Press and Dispatch, St. Paul, Minn. The Public Ledger, Philadelphia, Pa. The Pittsburgh Dispatch, Pittsburgh, Pa. The Sacramento Bee, Sacramento, Cal. The State Journal, Madison, Wis. The San Antonio Light, San Antonio, Texas The Times-Picayune, New Orleans, La. The Tennessean and American, Nashville, Tenn. It is obvious how representative the newspapers were from the standpoint of geography and influence. But such an enumeration tells but part of the stor3/\ The following news- paper associations were represented at all the sessions of the Conference. The Associated Press The East and West News Bureau The Newspaper Enterprise Association The Noel News Service The Slav Press Bureau The Russian Information Bureau The United Press The most grateful acknowledgments are made to the i\.ssociated and United Press which every evening wired abstracts of the -proceedings of the Conference to the 2700 newspapers through- out the countiy forming those associations. In addition to the daily press, the program committee thought it wise to have representatives of the magazines, par- ticularly the weekly magazines which have always showed an interest in international affairs. The following magazines were represented at the Conference, in almost ever}^ case by an editor. The American Jotirnal of International Laxv The Atlantic Monthly Colliers The Independent Leslie's Weekly The New Republic xiv REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR The Review of Reviews The Survey The World Court Magazine That the efforts of the projectors of the Conference to realize its broad and liberal aim were appreciated by those who at- tended is best shown by a few brief newspaper quotations which are typical of many that have appeared in all parts of the country. In an admirable article that appeared in the Boston Herald of June 1 1, the following statement was made: The program fitted perfectly into the national situation of today, and even a cursory advance examination of subjects and speakers created an impression, later amply confirmed at the sessions of the Confer- ence itself, that sincere effort had been put forth to secure addresses by men of authority upon their respective themes and to obtain the widest variety of points of view. Delegates commented frequently upon the enormous amoimt of labor which the program must have cost and upon the smallness of the mrniber of absentees and substitutes. It was clear from the outset that the delegates had come to Long Beach for business, and the lure of the splendid beach and esplanade detained but few from the sessions as they followed each other, morning, afternoon and night. An enthusiastic article in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle of June 6 states : The distinguishing feature of the Conference was its liberal spirit. The committee in charge took particular pains to have every point of view on every question presented. Every speaker was encouraged to talk right out. Every member of the audience was given a chance to discuss the points raised and to approve or condenm. The result was an unusual amount of keen discussion by the best American ex- perts in law, history and economics, all of which will soon be repro- duced from shorthand notes. While the problems which loomed up were many and serious, it became evident throughout the Conference that an increasing number of Americans are developing what President Butler of Colmnbia, in his address, called the " international mind." The very fact that so many Americans were able to participate in an intelligent discussion of the world's greatest problems proved that thinking Americans are no longer provincial. REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR XV An editorial of the Baltimore Sun of June i concludes as follows : It was with the idea of beginning this educational process on a large scale that the Conference on Foreign Relations was con- ceived by the Academy of Political Science, which was its sponsor. The speakers at this conference are leaders of public thought. They are men of many minds and varying views; they lead in different directions. That does not matter. No agreement upon foreign policies will be reached at the Conference, but trains of thought will be started, ideas will clash against ideas, and discussion of foreign affairs generally will be stimulated. In the course of time, through the newspapers and periodicals, in legislative halls and perhaps in political campaigns, the discussion will reach all classes of the people and the formation of that matured, intelligent public opinion on for- eign affairs, which is all-essential if America is to fill worthily her new place in world politics, will begin. Such, at least, is the hope of the projectors of this conference and all patriotic Americans will be glad to see the hope fulfilled. The statements of individuals concerning the usefulness of the Conference are just as enthusiastic as those of the news- papers. The managing editor of the Lowell Courier-Citizen writes : The Conference seemed to me a most admirable experiment, certain to be stimulative of editorial intelligence in dealing with the prob- lems which are sure to arise as a consequence of the war. The editor of the Reviezv of Reviezvs writes : The interest in the Conference was genuine and well sustained to the end. The sentiments that pervaded it were at once those of practical intelligence and of a high conception of international moral- ity. I am convinced that the publication of the papers will have great importance as we begin to approach the peace-making period. The general secretary of the World Peace Foundation writes : However good conferences are, I am sorry to say I generally reach my limit of appreciation — not to say endurance — on about the third xvi REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR day. But, to my surprise and delight, the conference at Long Beach was increasingly interesting and stimulating to the very end. All things considered, I think it the most satisfactory thing of the kind that I have ever had the good fortune to attend ... I venture to express the hope, which I know is shared by many others, that this is the first of a series of such conferences. I feel that I can best close with a word of emphasis upon the thought contained in the last preceding sentence. Letter after letter has come from those who attended, making the suggestion that the Conference become a periodic affair. And the opinions of the newspapers on this point can best be summed up in the last sentence of the New York Evening Post's edi- torial on the Conference : The Conference should be repeated,- even perhaps made an annual affair for stimulating our imagination as citizens of the world. In conclusion, I beg to express my own gratification at having been permitted to assist in the organization and conduct of the Conference. Sincerely yours, Stephen P. Duggan. COMMITTEES General Committee Samuel McCune Felix Adler J. O. Adler John G. Agar Irving T. Bush Nicholas Murray Butler *Joseph H. Choate James Byrne Edward T, Devine Stephen P. Duggan Cleveland H. Dodge John H. Finley Martin H. Glynn David M. Heyman A. Barton Hepburn David Jayne Hill Charles E. Hughes Paul U. Kellogg Frederick P. Keppel Thomas W. Lamont Adolph Lewisohn Owen R. Lovejoy Sidney E. Mezes John Purroy Mitchel Lindsay, Chairman Ex- Officio John Bassett Moore Henry Morgenthau Henry Raymond Mussey Alton B. Parker George A. Plimpton William L. Ransom Bernard H. Ridder Elihu Root Leo S. Rowe Jacob H. Schiff James Brown Scott Henry R. Seager Edwin R. A. Seligman Albert Shaw- William R, Shepherd Charles H. Sherrill Munroe Smith Henry L. Stimson EUery C. Stowell Willard D. Straight Oswald G. Villard Henry White Executive Committee Samuel McCune Lindsay, Chairman Ex-Officio Nicholas Murray Butler James Brown Scott Henry Raymond Mussey Henry R. Seager Stephen P. Duggan, Ex-Officio * Deceased. xvU xviii COMMITTEES Program Committee Stephen P. Duggan, Chairman Nicholas Murray Butler James Brown Scott Paul U. Kellogg Albert Shaw William L. Ransom William R. Shepherd Entertainment Committee Irving T. Bush, Chairman John G. Agar Henry R. Seager David M. Heyman Ellery C. Stowell Owen R. Lovejoy William R. Shepherd Reception Committee Edwin R. A. Seligman, Chairmnn James Byrne Thomas W. Lamont Edward T. Devine Adolph Lewisohn Frederick P. Keppel George A. Plimpton Willard D. Straight Invitation Committee Charles E. Hughes, Chairman * Joseph H. Choate Alton B. Parker Martin H. Glynn Albert Shaw Henry Morgenthau Willard Straight Oswald G. Villard * Deceased. MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE UPON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELA- TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG BEACH, N. Y., MAY 28— JUNE 1,1917 Abney, John Rutledge, New York Adams, John H., Baltimore, Md. Addams, Jane, Chicago, 111. Adler, Felix, New York Agnew, George B., New York Allen, Charles T., New York Allen, Henry J., Wichita, Kansas Altheimer, Ben, New York Alvarez, Alejandro, Washington, D. C. Andrews, Fannie Fern, Boston, Mass, Arthur, L. Louise, New York Atkins, George, Montpelier, Vermont Babson, Roger W., Wellesley Hills, Mass. Baldwin, Simeon E., New Haven, Conn. Barber, Cora L., Brooklyn, N. Y. Barcos, Julio R., New York Barnes, Charles B., New York Barnes, Edward W., New York Barnes, Stephen G., Burlington, Vermont Barrett, E. W., Birmingham, Ala. Baruch, Emanuel, New York Beach, H. L., San Antonio, Texas Beecher, L. H., Birmingham, Alabama Bernheimer, Charles S., Brooklyn, N. Y. Bestor, Arthur E., Chautauqua, N. Y. Bingham, Stillman H,, Duluth, Minn. Black, Harry A., Galveston, Texas Blankenhorn, H., New York Blymyer, William H., New York Bolden, Richard Manuel, New York Borchard, Edwin M,, New York XXii MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE Harding, Gardner L., New York Hardy, Sarah D. B., New York Hart, Albert Bushnell, Cambridge, Mass, Hart, Mary Putman, Cambridge, Mass. Haviland, Florence Earle, New York Haviland, Marion, New Rochelle, N. Y. Hayden, Herbert Erwin, Brooklyn, N. Y. Helm, Lynn, Los Angelos, Cal. Henry, Francis A., Morristown, N. J. Henry, Philip W,, New York Hershey, Amos S., Bloomington, Indiana Hershey, Mrs. Amos S., Bloomington, Indiana Hewlett, Howard T., Woodmere, N, Y. Hibben, Paxton, New York Hicks, Frederick C, New York Hirsch, Jacob B., New York Hixon, Martha B., New York Hoerner, Mrs. Henry J., Newark, N. J. Holmes, Mary H., Brooklyn, N. Y. Holt, Hamilton, New York Hornbeck, Stanley K., Madison, Wis. Howard, Clarence H., St. Louis, Mo. Howe, Frederic C, New York Howland, Arthur H., Flushing, N. Y. Hull, William I., Swarthmore, Pa. Hughes, Charles E., New York Hyde, Charles Cheney, Chicago, 111. Hyde, Mrs. Charles Cheney, Chicago, 111. Ion, Theodore P., New York lyenaga, T., New York Jackson, Lawrence S., White Plains, N. Y. Johnston, Frank H., New Britain, Conn. Johnson, Marderos D., New York Jones, Richard Lloyd, Madison, Wis. Joy, Edmund Steele, Newark, N. J. Junod, Louis H,, New York von Kaltenborn, Hans, Brooklyn, N. Y. Kane, J. H., New York. MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE xxiH Karlin, Alexander, New York Kellogg, Paul U., New York Kennaday, Paul, New York Kinkead, Eugene, Jersey City, N. J. Kinkead, Mrs. Eugene, Jersey City, N. J, Kirchwey, George W., Forest Hills, N, Y. Knight, Harriet W., New York Knox, Charles S., Concord, N. H. Kohn, Mrs. C. D., Chicago, 111. Koo, Wellington, Washington, D. C. Krane, Daniel G., New York Kratochool, Slavonius, New York LaFontaine, Henri, New York Lake, Emma S., New York Lapouski, B., New York de Lapradelle, A., New York Lasker, Bruno, New York Lasker, Etta, New York Lasker, Fiorina, New York Learned, H. Barrett, Washington, D. C. Leon, Maurice, New York Levy, Joseph M., New York Lewisohn, Alice, New York Lewisohn, Irene, New York Lindsay, Samuel McCune, New York Lindsay, Mrs. Samuel McCune, New York Lisman, F, J., New York Lohness, Mrs. S. A., Long Island, N. Y. London, Meyer, New York London, Mrs. Meyer, New York Lowry, Edward G., Washington, D. C. Luykt, Mrs. N. G. M., New York Maher, A. P., New York Manheim, Viola, New York Mantero, C. Belard, New York Marburg, Louis C, Montclair, N. J. Marburg, Mrs. Louis C, Montclair, N. J. Marburg, Mary H., Montclair, N. J. xxiv MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE Marburg, Theodore Herman, Montclair, N. J. Marburg, William, New York Marden, Philip S., Lowell, Mass. Markham, Edgar, Washington, D. C. Martin, Frederick Roy, New York Martin, George, New York Martin, John, Stapleton, N. Y. Mayer, Gella K., New York Mayer, Max W., New York Mead, George W.. New York Mead, Mrs. George W., New York Mead, Lucia Ames, Brookline, Mass. Meldrim, Peter W., Savannah, Ga. Merrick, Edwin T., New Orleans, La. Merritt, Dixon, Nashville, Tenn. Mitchell, Charles D., New Bedford, Mass. Monroe, Paul, New York Moore, D. D., New Orleans, La. Moore, Frederick, New York Moore, John Bassett, New York Moore, Justin Hartley, New York Muller, Ada H., New York Murray, A. Gordon, New York Mussey, Henry Raymond, Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y. Mussey, Mabel H. B., Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y. McDonald, James G., Bloomington, Ind. McKinley, Margaret, New York McNally, Joseph T., Albany, N. Y. Nairne, Bessie D., Brooklyn, N. Y. Nasmyth, George, Boston, Mass. Nichols, John W. T., New York Noel, John V., New York Nolan, James J., Brooklyn, N. Y. O'Mara, John E., Sacramento, Cal. O'Reilly, G. A., New York O'Reilly, Mary Boyle, New York Overstreet, Harry Allen, New York Parker, Andrew D., New York MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE Parker, William C, New Bedford, Mass. Parsons, Samuel, Cohoes, N. Y. Peck, Annie S., New York Pennington, Joseph P., New York Pergler, Charles, New York Pezet, F. A., New York Philbrook, Mary, Newark, N. J. Pickard, Edward T., New York Plimpton, George A., New York de Polignac, Marquis, New York Pratt, Nathaniel M., New York Prince, Julius, New York Prince, Theodore, New York Ratcliffe, S. K., Manchester, England Riggs, Karrick, New York Ritter, Paul, Washington, D. C. Roberts, George E., New York Rogers, John Jacob, Washington, D. C. Rook, C. A., Pittsburgh, Pa. Rooseboom, M. P., The Hague, Holland Rowe, Leo S., Philadelphia, Pa. Rumely, Edward C, New York Samuel, Samuel, New York Samuel, Mrs. Samuel, New York von Schrader, A., New York Schwartzman, Fanny, New York Schuyler, Livingston R., New Yoak Seager, Henry R., New York Seaver, William N., New York Sedgwick, Ellery, Boston, Mass. Sevasly, Miran, Boston, Mass. Shatzky, B. E., New York Shaw, Albert, New York Shepherd, William R., New York Shepherd, Mrs. William R., New York Simon, Leon C, New Orleans, La. Sioris, P. A., New York Sleicher, John A., New York XXV xxvi MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE Slosson, Edwin E., New York Smith, J. Russell, Philadelphia, Pa. Snow, Alpheus H., Washington, D. C. Soo, Ma, New York Spencer, Charles Worthen, Reno, Nevada Sterne, L. H., New York Stevenson, E. L., New York Storey, Moorfield, Boston, Mass. Stowell, Agnes, Brooklyn, N. Y. Straus, Oscar S., New York Sutton, Charles W., New York St. John, F. C, Richmond Hill, N. Y. Takamine, Jokichi, New York Tatanis, Petros P., New York Taussig, Mrs. Frederick J., St. Louis, Mo. Theophilatos, D. J., New York Thomson, G. F., New York Tomkins, Calvin, New York Tomlinson, B. G., New York Tryon, James L., Portland, Maine Tucker, Henry St. George, Lexington, Va, Turner, Kate E., Brooklyn, N. Y. Van Winkle, Mina C, Newark, N. J. Villard, Oswald Garrison, New York Vintschger, G., New York Wald, Lillian D., New York Walling, William English, Greenwich, Conn. Warbasse, Mrs. James P., New York Waring, T. R., Charleston, S. C. Weil, Lucille, New York Whitelock, George, Baltimore, Md. Whitney, Travis H., New York . Wicker, Cyrus F., New York Willets, Elmore A., Belmont, N. Y. Wilson, George G., Cambridge, Mass. Wood, Henry A. Wise, New York Youmans, George F., Fort Smith, Ark. Zavala, Joaquim Cuadia, Washington, D. C. PROGRAM FIRST SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Monday Evening, May 28, 8:30 o'clock Presiding Officer Samuel McCune Lindsay 1. Address of Welcome Nicholas Murray Butler 2. The Future of International Law Charles Evans Hughes SECOND SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Tuesday Morning, May 29, 10 o'clock The Need of Better Machinery for International Negotiations Presiding Officer Oscar S. Straits 1 . Open Diplomacy : Democratic Control of Diplomatic Nego tiations Domicio da Gama Arthur Bullard 2. Effect of Censorship in International Relations Frederick Roy Martin John Temple Graves Henry A. Wise Wood Discussion : Paul U. Kellogg General Discussion xxviii PROGRAM THIRD SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Tuesday Afternoon, 2 130 o'clock The Attitude of the United States towards World Organization Presiding Officer James Byrne 1. International Arbitration John Bassett Moore 2. A World Court William I. Hull 3. International Legislation and Administration Alpheus H. Snow Discussion: Felix Adler, Samuel T. Duiton, Lillian D. Wald General Discussion FOURTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Tuesday Evening, May 29, 8:30 o'clock The Democratic Ideal in International Relations: What the United States Stands For Presiding Officer George White lock Addresses by Hamilton Holt, Bainbridge Colby ^ Lincohi Col- cord, B. E. Schatzky FIFTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Wednesday Morning, May 30, 10 o'clock The United States and the Caribbean Presiding Officer Irving T. Bush I. Commercial and Financial Interests of the United States in the Caribbean Edwin Borchard PROGRAM Xxix 2. The Attitude of the United States toward the Retention by European Nations of Colonies in and Around the Car- ibbean William R. Shepherd 3. The Relations of the United States to the Republics In and Around the Caribbean Oswald G. Villard PJiilip Marshall Brown Discussion: Albert Bushnell Hart, Cyriis F. Wicker General Discussion SIXTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Wednesday Afternoon, May 30, 2 :30 o'clock Drawing Together the Americas Presiding Officer Samuel McCune Lindsay 1. Commercial and Financial Facilities Roger W. Babson James Carson 2. Intellectual and Social Co-operation Leo S. Rowe Discussion : Peter H. Goldsmith, Isaiah Bowman General Discussion SEVENTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y, Wednesday Evening, May 30, 8:30 o'clock The Future Relations of the United States with Latin America Presiding Officer Albert Shaw 1. From the Latin-American Viewpoint Federico A. Pezet 2. The Monroe Doctrine After the War George G. Wilson 3. Pan-Americanism as a Working Program Alejandro Alvarez XXX PROGRAM EIGHTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Thursday Morning, May 31, lo o'clock National Policy as to Resident Aliens : States Rights AND Treaty Obligations Presiding Officer William R. Shepherd 1 , State Interference with the Enforcement of Treaties James Parker Hall Charles C. Hyde 2. Discrimination with Reference to Citizenship and Land- ownership Toyokichi lyenaga Hans von Kaltenborn Discussion : Sidney Gulick General Discussion NINTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Thursday Afternoon, May 31, 2 : 30 o'clock Newer American Concepts of International Relationship Presiding Officer Henry R. S eager 1. Labor as a Factor in International Adjustments Meyer London Jane Addams 2. Suppressed Nationalities and the Consent of the Governed Francis Hackett 3. Liberal England and International Relationships 5. K. Ratcliffe 4. Annexation and the Principle of Nationality Stephen P. Duggan 5. Economic Access and Neutralization of Waterways y. Russell Smith Discussion : William English Walling, Charles Pergler General Discussion PROGRAM XXxi TENTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Thursday Evening. May 31, 8 : 30 o'clock The United States and the Far East Presiding Officer Samuel McCime Lindsay 1. The New China Wellington Koo 2. American and Japanese Co-operation Jokichi Takamine 3. Neglected Realities in the Far East H. R. Mussey General Discussion ELEVENTH SESSION Chamber of Commerce, New York Friday Morning, June i, 10:30 o'clock Property Rights and Trade Rivalries as Factors in International Complications with Special Refer- ence TO Investments and Concessions Presiding Officer Simeon E. Baldwin 1. Dollar Diplomacy and Imperialism Frederic C. Howe 2. Trade Concessions, Investments, Conflict and Policy in the Far East Stanley K. Hornbeck 3. The Relation of Government to Property and Enterprise in the Americas Charles W. Sutton 4. International Investments George E. Roberts Discussion: H. A. Overstreet THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN WORLD ORGANIZATION I. THE CONTENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL II. MACHINERY ESSENTIAL FOR DEMOCRATIC ORGAN- IZATION THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ^ CHARLES E. HUGHES Former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States THE chief concern of the world at this time is to establish the foundations of international justice. If the world is to be made safe for democracy, it must be a world in which the nations recognize and maintain the supremacy of law. We had thought that we had entered upon a period which was to have as its chief distinction the development of international law, but this war is in truth the negation of all law. No principle has been spared. .Force derides treaties; dethrones law in the interest of expediency; and defying God and man, resorts to unspeakable barbarities which mock the boasts of civilization. What is the prospect? Are we to have a Roman peace — a peace imposed by a dominating state, rising over all, a new empire in which the only law shall be its will? Or is there to be a chance for a world where each state, small and great, shall stand secure in its equality, its independence, its integrity; where compacts between nations are not illusory ; where mutual rights and duties are acknowledged and respected ; where rules for international intercourse and instrumentalities for the peaceful settlement of international controversies are developed and maintained ; where Force becomes the servant of the Law and not its master? This is the vital issue. America's entrance into the war should assure the answer to these questions. We have responded to the call of civiliza- tion, of humanity itself, when, as has well been said, " the whole future of civilized government and intercourse, in par- ticular the fortunes and faith of democracy, have been brought ' Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y.. May 28, 1917. (195) 4 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII into peril." And if we have opportunity to resume the con- struction of the temple of international justice, to build again amid the ruins of past labors, what shall be the method of the undertaking? What shall be our share in it? The calling of this conference to consider this question is evidence that we do not yield to the counsel of despair which would find in the circumstances of the outbreak and of the conduct of this war, the proof of the futility of all endeavor to establish the reign of law. We cannot thus be faithless to our ideals; we cannot thus surrender our trust. Nor, on the other hand, do we make the equal blunder of assuming that there will be such a reaction from the present strife that forthwith an adequate world organization will be easily and immediately accomplished, and peace forever assured. We expect to suc- ceed in this war; but we must not expect that at its conclusion divisive forces will cease to operate, nor can we afford to de- ceive ourselves with paper programs of a Utopian character, ignoring the difficulties which are sure to arise from the con- flicts of national interests and policies. We may cherish an aim; and knowing the direction, we take counsel as to the practicable forward steps. The shattering of past hopes should be an incentive to renewed endeavor, while it must always remain a warning against an easy optimism. The questions which relate to the method of advance may be said to concern : ( i ) the declaration of principles and for- mulation of rules through international conferences; (2) the establishment of suitable instrumentalities of adjudication and conciliation; and (3) the sanction of international law, in- cluding the questions which concern the enforcement of the judgments of international tribunals, or the use of force to maintain peace. The fundamental need is the development of a true body of international law. The labors of jurists will continue to be helpful, and effort will still be made to extract from history, from diplomatic correspondence and official papers, from de- cisions of courts and from standard writers, the evidence of the consent of the nations upon which the rules governing international conduct depend for their authority. But it has (196) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ^ long been evident that this method of development is most un- satisfactory. What rules of controlling importance, determin- ative of serious controversies, can be said to be generally ac- cepted? It seems to be agreed that the most earnest efforts should be made to secure an authoritative and appropriately definite statement of accepted principles, and the formulation of rules to which assent is given, as well as to provide means for such additions and modifications as may from time to time be required. This is the function of the international conference. As was said by M. Leon Bourgeois, with respect to the Hague Conferences : The purpose of the Hague Conference is the juridical organization of international life, the formation of a society of law among the nations. In order that this society may come into being and live, the following conditions are essential : ( 1 ) The universal assent of the nations to the establishment of a truly international system; (2) the acceptance by all of the same conception of the law common to all, of the same bond between the large and the small, since they are all equal in point of consent and responsibility; (3) the precise and detailed application of these principles successively to all fields of international relations in peace as well as in war. The importance of the development of a body of law in this authoritative way must not be overlooked in zealous en- deavor to provide for the judicial determination of inter- national disputes. Courts presuppose laws. They develop the law in the course of judicial decisions, by creating a series of judicial precedents, but they must proceed upon premises and apply established principles. As Mr. Root has pointedly remarked : Any attempt to maintain a court of international justice must fail unless there are laws for the court to administer. Without them the so-called court would be merely a group of men seeking to impose their personal opinions upon the states coming before them. The lack of an adequate system of law to be applied has been the chief obstacle to the development of a system of judicial settlement of in- ternational disputes. (197) 6 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELA TIONS [Vol. VII And he illustrates this by reference to the failure to establish the international prize court, for which provision was made by the Second Hague Conference, in consequence of the failure to ratify the Declaration of London and thus to supply a gen- eral agreement as to the applicable rules, in the absence of which " the necessary basis " for the action of the court was wanting. Perhaps it may be assumed that at the close of the war, and upon the settlement of the terms of peace, prompt ar- rangements will be made for a conference of the nations. And it would be a happy omen for the future if such a conference were to adopt the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations which has recently been formulated by the American Institute of International Law. But this would be only a beginning, albeit an important one, in the formal statement of principles and rules. The matter of chief consequence is not that this or any particular conference should be held, but that the international conference should be recognized as an in- stitution, as the essential organ of international expression in stating and developing international law. Not only should there be conferences at fixed intervals, but provision should be made for the important work pending conferences by which their labors will be facilitated and di- rected. I should refuse, with Sir Frederick Pollock, to take too seriously what he calls the " abundance of starched and frilled ceremonial and elaborate compliments about trifles," and I agree with him as to the importance, if the conference is to be a permanent institution of value, of " a strong stand- ing committee to prepare and guide the business." Further, I should say that the conference is not likely to achieve its end unless all the important nations, certainly all the great powers, are admitted to take part in its deliberations. We are assum- ing a peace that makes possible the development of a true body of law, and in this work all the formative influences should have their proper share. But I agree that if not all the great powers are willing to unite in this work, those who are willing should proceed with conferences of their own. (198) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 Still, the obstacles are very great. The members of the conferences are states, and must act as such, and even the ceremonial and compliments cannot be ignored. The perfect equality of states is a postulate of international law. As Chief Justice Marshall said: "It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone." The conference is not a parliament; it is not, and in the nature of things cannot be, a legislature. There is no Administration, there is no Government, having the carriage of bills, there is no closure, and there are no ma- jorities. Its action, as such, binds the states which give the formal assent contemplated. The growth of international law under such conditions must necessarily be slow, and must be accompanied by the regrettable failure of many admirable proposals. But the necessity of providing rules to meet the many new exigencies which have arisen and will arise, as well as of settling old controversies which leave rules in doubt, and of thus evidencing the consent of the nations, makes the international conference in regular sessions with provisions for the required supplemental and preliminary work between sessions a primary need. The problem is to devise such an organization of the conference, consistent with its nature as a conference of states, as will promote the highest efficiency. If we can provide means for the development of the re- quisite body of law, we may look to the establishment of an international court of justice, as distinguished from plans for the settlement of international disputes through arbitration. We desire to establish international justice, not merely facilities for compromise or diplomatic adjustment. We wish a court of judges, acting in accordance with judicial standards, apply- ing impartially the principles of law, interpreting treaties, conventions and declarations, and thus developing a body of judicial precedents to supplement and complete the work of international conferences, instead of mere arbitrators embrac- ing those who may have been chosen to represent one side or the other. International arbitration may be adapted to many exigencies, and judicial settlements — great as are their advant- (199) 8 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII ages — will not, and should not, altogether displace settlement by arbitration. But we shall not be able to perfect inter- national law without international courts, for all legislation and formulated statements of the law need the aid of the judicial interpreter. Here, again, we encounter the most serious obstacles which we must not overlook in an eager acceptance of the principle of judicial settlement. The analogy found in the work of the Supreme Court of the United States, in deciding controversies between the States of the Union, important as it is, is some- times pressed too far. The Supreme Court is the organ of a nation. It is the judicial power of the United States with which the Supreme Court is vested, and which that court exercises in the determination of controversies between two or more States in accordance with the Constitution. The Supreme Court is not the court of a confederation, or of a mere league of states.^ The States surrendered their own modes of deter- mining controversies between them, and the decision of those controversies which are of a justiciable nature was transferred to the Supreme Court. The limits of this address do not per- mit a discussion of the manner of enforcement of such judg- ments, but it is sufficient for the present purpose to point out that there is behind its judgments the force of national author- ity/ And what is of first importance in connection with this jurisdiction, is the fact that the court draws to its support the great power of national sentiment. Again, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States are nominated by the President, the chosen representative of the people of the United States, who is vested with the executive power of the nation, and they are appointed by the President by and -with the advice and consent of the Senate. There is thus assured, as history shows, a fair representation of the entire country and of all its parts in this highest tribunal. The judges of the court are chosen to serve during good behavior and to receive 1 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S., pp. 80-84. ^ See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S., pp. 318-322. (200) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW g a compensation which cannot be diminished during their con- tinuance in office. This method of selection, and this provision of independence, gives peculiar strength to the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to determine controversies between the States. Further, it may be said that the entrenchment of the Supreme Court in the confidence of the people is yet more largely due to the quality of its work than to anything else. We may hesitate to speculate upon what measure of success the court would have achieved without a Marshall and a Story, and such other eminent judges as Taney, Curtis, Miller, Field and Bradley. The proposed international court cannot have the advantage of being the instrument of a nation or be supported by the sentiment that attaches to a national institution. It cannot have the advantage of the sense of representation which is felt by the people in the case of a national tribunal. And it will be long before an international court can develop that measure of confidence which only work of high quality on the part of its members can create. The difficulties are serious, but they should make us only the more solicitous to take account of the means by which they may be surmounted. In the absence of the national sentiment which gives such effective support to our national tribunal, we must aim at the development of international sentiment. In the days ©f peace we must look to the cultivation of what President Butler has called the " international mind." With- out this, we are likely to be disappointed in the results of inter- national organization, however we labor over mere forms of institutions. Again, while an international court cannot start with a confidence created by work already performed, there is no reason why it should not have the advantage, and in all probability it would enjoy the advantage, of the labors of jurists of the highest international distinction whose demon- strated expertness would commend the work of the court in constantly increasing degree to the favor of the nations, and thus insure its permanence. The action of the First Hague Conference in providing for a permanent international court of arbitration was an im- (201) lO CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII portant although a short step in the desired direction. It was, however, " permanent only in one sense, and that was in the composition of the jurists from the list of whom the arbitra- tors or judges who were to act in each case as it arose should be selected by the parties; " and failing the direct agreement of the parties as to the composition of the arbitration tribunal, each party was to appoint two arbitrators, and these together were to choose an umpire. The " permanent court was really a list, or panel, of judges who might be chosen, if desired." The Second Hague Conference adopted a draft convention for the creation of a judicial arbitration court, but no agree- ment was reached as to the method of appointing judges. As Mr. Choate said, in his review of the work of that conference: Well, there we hit upon an obstacle which there was no overcoming. We were forty-four nations assembled. ... As there could not be a court of forty-four judges, and as Russia and Germany, Great Britain and France and the United States could not agree that every nation was as big as every other, as was claimed by some of these small nations — that Panama was in all respects the equal of Great Britain, and Luxemburg the equal of Germany — no agreement was reached. It was therefore voted that there ought to be such a court ; that the scheme that we had established for its powers, procedure and organization, its sessions and the general theory or law that should be applied to it, was accepted ; and it was referred to the nations to agree, in the best manner they could, upon the number of judges, and the mode of their selection, and that as soon as this was done, the court should be established with the constitution that we had framed for it. I have already mentioned the failure, for the lack of a suitable body of law, to set up the international prize court. Efforts should be addressed, on the conclusion of peace, to the removal of difficulties of this sort and to the establishment at the earliest possible day of a true international court of justice for the decision of justiciable questions; and giving due weight to the differences to which I have called attention, there can be no doubt that the example of the Supreme Court of the United States, and also of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, will be of the greatest aid in this endeavor. (202) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 1 The court thus constituted will naturally determine questions of its own jurisdiction under the provisions for its constitution. It may be assumed that it will not undertake to determine con- troversies which are merely of a political nature and do not involve issues of a justiciable character, that is, which cannot be decided by the application of the principles of law and equity. And to repeat, in the establishment of such a court, regard should be had not to diplomatic or arbitral standards, but to the standards of judicial tribunals. Thus far, I have been considering the means for developing international law, and for the interpretation and application of rules of law. But the purposes, when this war is ended, will reach beyond the function of law, and the aim will be, in every practicable way, to provide safeguards against the re- currence of war. This suggests the advisability of establish- ing international instrumentalities of conciliation which can deal with questions not justiciable in character, and can make recommendations in the interests of peaceful settlement. The function of such a council would be not decision, but suggestion and advice. Its recommendations, in the nature of things, would not be binding. The nations would still be free to act according to their own view of national policy, but the pro- vision of this instrumentality would facilitate reflection, dis- cussion and persuasion in dealing with that large class of ques- tions which are the most frequent occasion of strife. There remains the question whether it is practicable to pro- vide a more definite sanction for international law — whether its rules shall impose obligations backed by force ; or speaking more specifically, whether there shall be a concert to compel resort to tribunals of adjudication and councils of conciliation before beginning hostilities. It has been urged strongly that " the only practical sanction of international law is the public opinion of the civilized world." This public opinion, it is eloquently said, is the international executive. Prophecies with respect to the suffi- ciency of this sanction of public opinion carried greater weight three years ago than they do today. Not only the unex- (203) 12 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII pected, but the unthinkable, has actually happened. Agencies of public opinion throughout the world, the manifold activities of the defenders of peace, the manifest interests of intimate intercourse and expanding civilization, the obviousness of the economic losses involved in war, the wide diffusion of knowl- edge, and the quickening of conscience by myriad appeals — all failed to avert a world war. It is not surprising that men here and abroad should be thinking of some practicable means which in the future may help, at least in some degree, to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe. It may also be said that as against the disposition to break treaties, to override the law, and to enthrone force as its own justification, there is revealed a new determination to establish the sacredness of compact and the obligation which the law imposes. Shall the public opinion which makes for the reign of law and the maintenance of peace fail through lack of competent organization ? Proposals have been made both in England and in this country looking to such an organization. The substance of the proposal, as it stands in this country, is that the signatory powers shall jointly use, forthwith, their economic forces against any of their niunber that refuses to submit any ques- tion which arises to an international judicial tribunal or council of conciliation before issuing an ultimatiim or threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's terri- tory. This proposal has been the subject of vigorous debate. It has, however, drawn to its support a considerable body of opinion because of the well-founded belief that something must be at- tempted in the way of international organization to safeguard rights granted by treaties and conventions, to make effective the rules of international law, and, so far as possible, to pre- vent acts of aggression. In considering the part which the United States should take in connection with the development of international law, and in the endeavor to provide a more adequate and definite sanction (204) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 3 for that law, the question should be approached as a practical one, and with due regard to our national interests and policies. It is not to be dismissed without proper attention to the condi- tions which are likely to obtain when this war has ended. If we are to have international conferences, to declare prin- ciples and to make rules binding upon the nations, the United States will undoubtedly take part in these conferences. It had a highly important part in the two Hague Conferences, and can be counted upon to do its full share in the development of a true body of international law based upon the acceptance of such fundamental principles as are incorporated in the recent Declaration of the American Institute. Further, the United States will undoubtedly use its utmost endeavor to bring about the establishment of a real court of international justice. The entering into an agreement for the submission of justiciable controversies to such a court cannot be said to be an improper delegation of power. Whatever differences of opinion there may be with respect to policy, it would be difficult to point out a satisfactory distinction in prin- ciple between such a submission and the more familiar one of submission to arbitrators. And so far as the proposed instru- mentality of conciliation is concerned, with regard to questions that are not of a justiciable nature, each nation may be ex- pected to reserve the right to deal with the issue ultimately as it pleases. Certainly it would seem that those who have sup- ported the recent treaties of arbitration, such for example as that ratified in the year 1914 between the United States and Great Britain, would be unable consistently to object to a provision for an instrumentality of conciliation as an aid to peaceful settlement. Moreover, if the United States participates in international conferences, if it aids in establishing tribunals of adjudication and councils of conciliation, it will have occasion very carefully to consider whether proposals which would otherwise be suc- cessful in making treaties and conventions effective shall fail because of its refusal to co-operate. I hope that our statesmen will keep an open mind upon this question and will not so far commit themselves in advance that (205) I^ CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. Vll they will be embarrassed in dealing with the conditions which may obtain after the war, so that the United States without prejudice to its essential interests may do its full share in firmly establishing the foundations of international justice. Objections have been raised both upon constitutional grounds and upon reasons of policy, with respect to our joining in a concert looking to the use of force in any contingency. As to the former, it may be said that Congress alone has the power to declare war, and that any agreement made by the United States to co-operate in coercive measures amounting to war would necessarily be subject to the exercise by Con- gress of its unquestioned authority. But this does not mean that the treaty-making power may not, if it is found to accord with national interests and policies, aid in forming an inter- national organization believed to be necessaiy and practicable, although its offer of co-operation in any given contingency must be subject to the well-known conditions which inhere in our constitutional form of government. Congress, indeed, will have all its powers, but its course of action will depend upon the world outlook of the nation, and we should do what we can to promote an enlightened conception of our international responsibility. There should be no disposition to minimize the difficulties which are connected with our traditional policy, or the im- portance of that policy in conserving American interests. It is idle, I believe, to expect that in any conceivable arrangement at the conclusion of this war, this country will abandon the Monroe Doctrine. I shall not attempt at this time to inquire as to the effect of the broad treaties of arbitration which have recently been made, or as to the question whether in all their aspects, and with reference to every possible contingency, they can receive the approval of our judgment. Aside from this, it may well be thought futile to demand a program which would involve an abandonment of what has long been regarded as a fundamental part of our national policy. Nor is this, in my judgment, to be considered a condition essential to our effective participation in an international organization to establish international law and maintain peace. (206) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 5 At the conclusion of the war, it may be assumed that there will be an agreement upon principles which will precede or form the basis for such an organization. The Monroe Doc- trine, as has well been said, " is a national policy that has come to be widely recognized and in large part accepted by European nations." It has been pointed out that while " it is not a part of international law, it might easily become so in the working out of an international order." Is it too much to ex- pect that our historic policy, in its essential features, should be accepted by the nations? And may we not contemplate the working out of plans for an international organization in the belief that this acceptance will in itself conduce to the peace of the world while facilitating our co-operation in its main- tenance ? Should we not at least postpone judgment until we know the conditions upon which we may co-operate, and shall we not at least be hospitable to the thought that America has its obligations to the world? We cannot live unto ourselves. What promise does the future hold if treaties and conventions are made only to be broken? If we can see at all into the future we know that it offers no chance for isolation to the United States. We have vast resources and extraordinary privileges and we cannot shirk our duty to mankind. Self- interest as well as a proper sense of obligation demand that we should aid in rearing the structure of international justice, and certainly that we should not make its establishment im- possible by holding aloof. (207) THE INTERNATIONAL MIND: HOW TO DEVELOP IT^ NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER President, Columbia University FOR two generations it has been a common complaint that the people of the United States took no adequate inter- est in foreign policy and were without any but cursory knowledge of international politics. This judgment has been expressed, often publicly, by successive secretaries of state, by those who have held important diplomatic posts, and by those who, in the Senate of the United States, have seen long service upon the Committee on Foreign Relations. A sort of national self-centeredness together with a feeling of geographic and political isolation have combined to bring about this unfortun- ate state of affairs. It has been unfortunate for two reasons : first, because it marked a serious break with our earlier national tradition ; and second, because it has held back the people and the government of the United States from making the full measure of contribution of which they were capable to the better and closer international organization of the world. One need have but slight acquaintance with the writings and speeches of the Fathers and with the records of the early Congresses to know that, when the government of the United States was young, it was the eager ambition of those who most fully represented it to play a large part in the international life of the world, primarily with the view of advancing those ideas and those principles in which the people of the new American republic believed and to which they were committed. Ben- jamin Franklin was our first great internationalist. Alexander Hamilton, of whom Talleyrand said that he had divined Europe; Thomas Jefferson, whose public service in Europe was 1 Introductory Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Re- lations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 28, IQ17. (208) THE INTERNATIONAL MIND i-j quite exceptional; as well as Chancellor Livingston, John Jay, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay not only knew western Europe, but were known by it. In making endeavor, therefore, to increase the interest of the American people in foreign relationships and in international policy we are but asking them to return to one of the finest and soundest of national traditions. Our national self- absorption has held us back, too, from play- ing an adequate part in the development of that international organization which has long been under way and which the results of the present war will hasten and greatly advance. Despite these facts, and chiefly because of the high character and ability of those who represented the United States at the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the American con- tributions to the deliberations and recommendations of those notable assemblies were most important Indeed, when the record of history comes to be made up, it may be that those contributions will be judged to mark the beginning of a new epoch in the world's history. The Conference which now assembles to consider and dis- cuss the international relations and the international policies of the United States is a beginning and only a beginning of a campaign of education and enlightenment which is to con- tinue until there has been developed among all parts and sec- tions of our land what I ventured some years ago to describe as the " international mind." The international mind is noth- ing else than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which regards the several nations of the civilized world as free and co-operating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing commerce and industry, and in spreading enlightenment and culture throughout the world. It would be as inconsistent with the international mind to attempt to steal some other nation's territory or to do that nation an unprovoked injury or damage, as it would be inconsistent with the principles of ordinary morality to attempt to steal some other individual's purse or to commit an unprovoked assault upon him. The international mind requires that a nation and its government shall freely (209) l8 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII and gladly grant to every other nation and to every other gov- ernment the rights and the privileges which it claims for itself. From this it follows that the international mind is not con- sonant with any theory of the state which regards the state as superior to the rules and restrictions of moral conduct or which admits the view that to some one state is committed the hege- mony of the world's affairs for the world's good. When that doctrine prevails and takes hold of the conviction and the imagination of a great people, an issue is presented that cannot be settled by vote in conference, that cannot be arbitrated by the wisest statesmen, and that cannot be determined by the findings of any court. The authority and the value of each of these modes of procedure is challenged by the very issue itself. Therefore resort must be had to armed force in order to determine whether the international mind, shared by a score or more of independent and self-respecting nations, shall pre- vail or whether the arms of a non-moral, all-powerful, military imperialism shall be stretched out over the whole round world for its government and its protection. It is to determine this issue that the world is now at war. Should the cause of imperialism, by any chance, win this war, the people of the United States would find it quite un- necessary for some time to come to concern themselves with foreign relations and with foreign policy. Those matters would be taken care of for them, by a power that had shown itself strong enough to overcome and to suppress inter- nationally minded men and nations. On the other hand, if, as we confidently hope and believe, the issue of this war is to be favorable to the free self-governing democracies of the world, then the people of the United States must address themselves with redoubled energy and with closest attention to those mat- ,ters of legislation, of administration, and of general public policy which constitute and determine national conduct. The first task of this conference and of every similar conference that may be held hereafter is to drive this lesson home. When this task is undertaken it will speedily appear that our gOA^ernment is not well organized at the moment for the formu- lation and prosecution of eflfective international policies. The (210) No. 2] THE INTERNATIONAL MIND jg division of authority between the national government and governments of the several states raises one set of problems. Action under the treaty-making power of the national govern- ment raises another set of problems, particularly since there is not yet a substantial unanimity of opinion as to the scope and authority of the treaty-making power itself, or as to the proper and effective means which should be at the command of the government of the United States for enforcing among its own people adherence to a treaty obligation into which, through their government, they have solemnly entered. The difficulties with which we shall have to contend are, therefore, not alone difficulties arising from present lack of popular in- formation and present lack of popular interest in international policies, but they are also those which arise from the structure and the operation of our own form of constitutional government. That the old secrecy of diplomatic action has gone forever is a happy circumstance. This secrecy was well suited to the making of conventions between ruling monarchs or reigning dynasties, or between governments which represented only very select and highly privileged classes. It has no place, however, in diplomatic intercourse between democratic peoples. The people themselves must understand and assent to inter- national policies and contracts that are entered upon and executed in their name. Otherwise there can be no assurance that these policies will be executed and these contracts ob- served ; for without foreknowledge on the part of the people of that to which they are committed there can be no successful moral appeal made to them to keep their word and their bond at a later time when an opposition may arise between principle and immediate self-interest. We are assembled, then, to help begin a movement which must not cease until the entire American people are interested in their international relationships, their international position, and their international influence. When that shall have been even measurably accomplished, the people themselves will be quick to bring about such changes in the form of their gov- ernmental structure and in their administrative procedure, as (211) 20 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS will enable them honorably and finely to maintain their place, not as a nation that lives to itself alone, but as a nation that shares with every other like-minded nation the desire and the purpose to improve the lot of mankind everywhere, and to carry into the uttermost parts of the earth those hopes, those principles, and those forms of governmental action that are best adapted to giving man the fullest opportunity to make himself free, and to be worthy of freedom. (212) INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ' JOHN BASSETT MOORE Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law, Columbia University THE subject on which I am to speak is by no means new. For that reason I suppose it ought to be regarded as very uninteresting. I may at once say that I am not acquainted with, and hardly feel capable of formulating, any special device which will certainly assure the preservation of peace among nations. There are certain methods of settling international disputes, which are known as amicable methods, as distinguished from inamicable and forcible methods. The amicable methods are negotiation, mediation and good offices, which I mention to- gether, and arbitration. Negotiation is simply the ordinary method of diplomacy. Mediation stands midway between negotiation and arbitra- tion, and in connection with it I mentioned good offices. We speak of good offices where some third power or powers come between disputants, listen to their complaints, and make sug- gestions and tender advice. Mediation is the formal exercise of good offices. Some- times a tribunal is organized which proceeds with much for- mality, but, whatever the procedure may be, mediation results in a recommendation which the parties to the dispute are at liberty to reject. The third method, that of arbitration, represents the judicial process of settling international disputes. When I say the judicial process, I am not at all unconscious of the fact that we hear a great deal in these days of the " judicial settle- ment " of international disputes, as if it were something en- tirely novel. It is said that heretofore we have had arbitration. ^ Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreifjn Relations of th<.' United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 191 7. (213) 22 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII but that arbitration has failed, and that now we are to have the " judicial settlement " of international disputes. Such statements illustrate the propensity to accept phrases rather than to search for facts. I fancy that the number of those who have had occasion actually to read the decisions of international boards of arbitration is small. There may in- deed be members of the bar who read the decisions of judges for mere pleasure. But, after all, I fancy that we do most of our reading of judicial opinions professionally, more or less under the stress of professional necessity. Now, it has fallen to my lot, in the pursuit of my profes- sional work, to have read practically all the decisions that have ever been rendered by international tribunals, and there are some thousands of them. In fact, I was once so unkind, per- haps I might almost say so cruel, as to inflict them upon my fellow-men by incorporating them in some six large volumes, which should have been printed in twelve instead of six, be- cause the present volumes are too large for the reader's con- venience. When, therefore, I venture, very diffidently, to make a statement in regard to the proceedings of international tribunals, I feel that I know the ground ©n which I stand ; and I venture to assert that the decisions of those international tribunals are characterized by about as much consistency, by about as close an application of principles of law, and by per- haps as marked a tendency on the part of one tribunal to quote the authority of tribunals that preceded it, as you will find in the proceedings of our ordinary judicial tribunals. One can- not study these records without being deeply impressed with that fact, and without discovering how lacking in foundation is the supposition that when we talk of the " judicial settle- ment " of international disputes we are presenting some new device or new method. I have said that a tribunal of arbitration decides. Its pro- ceedings result in the rendering of a judgment which is bind- ing upon the contracting parties. It therefore can be em- ployed where, in many cases, mediation would be ineffective. On the other hand, mediation may be employed in cases which the disputants would be unwilling to submit to a definitive (214) No. 2] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 23 judgment. If I had the time in which to do it, I could point out numerous instances in which the judgments of tribunals of arbitration have been accepted by the parties and loyally carried out, although they imposed terms which it is incon- ceivable that the parties would have accepted upon the mere recommendation of a board of mediators. In other words, if there had been any loophole of escape, the parties would have availed themselves of it, but having agreed to submit the matter to judgment, and to abide by the award, they have done so, loyally and completely. There is another misconception that I should be glad to cor- rect, and that is that there has been great uncertainty in the enforcement of the judgments of tribunals of arbitration. Again I venture to affirm, upon the basis of actual information, that the awards of international boards of arbitration have been ver}^ generally accepted and carried into effect. I do not think I am mistaken when I say that if there has been a tendency during the last few years to question the accuracy and the binding effect of such awards, it has been due chiefly to the unfortunate supposition that no judgment should ever be regarded as final till it has been the subject of review on appeal. Lawyers are too much in the habit of thinking of judicial process as a series of appeals, till they finally get up to a tribunal beyond which nothing can be imagined. But, I venture to repeat that the cases have been few, ver)' few in- deed, in which the awards of international tribunals have not been accepted and loyally carried out. I have said that international arbitration is not a new thing; and I will now go a step further and affirm that the judicial process which it has exemplified is one of which we must avail ourselves in dealing with all human affairs. Within the state it is inconceivable that we should be able to get on for a week or even for a day, vvith any approach to a condition of tranquillity, if we were to abolish the judicial process. We use negotiation, and we use mediation, all the while, in our private affairs as well as in our public affairs, but cases daily arise in which it is necessary to obtain an authoritative decision, and then we invoke the judicial process. We may therefore (215) 24 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII accept it as absolutely certain, that, no matter what kind of a league, or alliance, or other contrivance may be set up in inter- national affairs, we shall be obliged to invoke the process of arbitration, in the judicial sense. Several years ago a scholar named Raeder published, under the auspices of the Nobel Institute, a very interesting work entitled Interttational Arbitration among the Greeks. I have very often seen the statement that, while the Greeks practised what they called arbitration, it was not real arbitration, but something else. But, as a matter of fact, the Greeks had as clear, as intelligent, as precise a conception of the process of international arbitration, in the judicial sense, as exists today, as may be seen by an actual examination of the awards ren- dered by the tribunals employed by them for the determina- tion of disputes between the different states. Later, when the Roman Empire came into existence, with its conceptions of conquest and domination, there was little room for international arbitration ; but, after the decline and fall of the Empire, the states that succeeded it employed the process on an extensive scale, especially under the influence of the Church. As a result, however, of the wars, somewhat miscalled " religious," of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen- turies— I say somewhat miscalled religious, because questions of property, politics and dominion were decidedly interwoven with questions of faith — international arbitration, being an amicable process, practically disappeared. During the eighteenth century thoughts of arbitration be- gan to revive ; and, after the close of the Napoleonic Wars, when the world was worn out with fighting, nations not only talked a great deal about arbitration, but actually employed it on a ver>' large scale, by the adoption of general claims conventions for the settlement of all outstanding questions. Under these conventions or treaties — the words being here interchange- able— all disputes that had ari.sen since a certain date were submitted, without exception, to the decision of arbitrators. During the hundred years that followed the formation of the Constitution, the United States made numerous treaties of that kind; and I should say that the high-water mark of inter- (216) No. 2] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2$ national arbitration, that is, of its actual application, was reached in the case of the award on the "Alabama " claims by the tribunal at Geneva in 1872. This was so, not only because of the nature and magnitude of the questions submitted, but also because, when the United States first proposed arbitration, the British government declined it, on the ground that the questions at issue involved the "honor" of Her Majesty's Gov- ernment, of which, speaking in the approved phrase, it was declared that Her Majesty's Government was "the sole guard- ian." Of course every man and every nation is the " sole guardian " of his or its own " honor " — whatever that may be. But, after thinking the matter over for six or eight years, eminent British statesmen came to the conclusion that perhaps a basis might be found on which this very grave dispute might be submitted to impartial and learned men, wise men, for judicial decision; and in the end there was made the great Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, by which it was pro- vided that the claims generically known as the Alabama claims should be submitted to an arbitral tribunal, which was to sit at Geneva. As I look on my right, I have great pleasure in recognizing an eminent diplomatist, who is also a friend, whose government, that of Brazil, was called upon to appoint one of the five members of that exalted tribunal. The proceedings resulted in the award of $15,500,000 to the United States. This is one of the cases I had in mind when I said that arbitration might be used to obtain a settle- ment which mediation could not effect. For, if the tribunal had been one of mediation, and its members, being thus limited to the exercise of advisory powers, had only recommended the payment of the sum above mentioned, we may believe that the recommendation would have been rejected. We had not then entered the period of " trust " organization, when such sums seem trivial. On the contrary, the draft for the payment of the award was the largest that had ever been drawn, and it is hardly conceivable that, with the feeling then existing over some of the questions covered by the award, a mediatorial recommendation of the payment of $15,500,000 would have been entertained for a moment. (217) 26 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII After the close of the sessions of the Geneva Tribunal, there sprang up a world-wide agitation for the establishment of some general method by which disputes between nations might be referred to arbitration. The success of the Tribunal in peacefully disposing of differences of the gravest character between two great nations caused peoples to feel a certain con- fidence in the process ; and the agitation to which the Geneva Arbitration gave rise may fairly be regarded as having directly contributed to the adoption of the Hague Convention of 1899, establishing what is called the Permanent Court at The Hague. Great things were hoped for from the establishment of that court. But it was followed by a movement which was so con- ducted that its results were, as I am compelled to believe, alto- gether unfortunate. The Hague Convention of 1899, while it did not make arbitration obligatory upon the contracting parties, excepted nothing from the process. Consequently, it did not suggest to the contracting parties pretexts for avoid- ing arbitration if they should be disinclined to adopt it. It is related of a certain general, who pointed out to his troops a way by which they might escape, that, when the enemy ap- peared, they promptly took it. The Hague Convention of 1899 did not obstruct the highway with signposts pointing to avenues of escape, even if it did not profess to compel the traveler to follow the main road. But, there were those who thought we must have something in form obligatory, and in the end what they did was this : They made a so-called obliga- tory treaty which was very widely adopted afterward, because nobody could see any reason for not adopting it, especially if he did not want to arbitrate; a treaty by which it was pro- vided that questions of a " judicial order," or relating to the interpretation of treaties, should be submitted to arbitration, provided they did not affect the " vital interests," the " inde- pendence," or the " honor " of the contracting powers, or " concern the interests of third powers." Evidently, the substance of this treaty or convention is in the exceptions. Just what the fancied obligation embraces I have never been able to detect, even after a somewhat microscopic examination. Remember, the sweeping provisos above quoted (218) No. 2] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2/ are limitations not upon the general obligation to arbitrate; they are limitations upon the agreement to submit only ques- tions of a " judicial order; " and they then proceed to declare that even as to questions of a judicial order arbitration may properly be excluded. What, then, have we left? Nor is this all. If we are to make any progress in the world, we must set up some sort of standard or ideal. Perhaps we may say that after all there are such things as general prin- ciples to which it is important to adhere, because, if we aban- don them, we are left without any means of reckoning, and are reduced to a mere shifty opportunism. The Hague Con- vention of 1899, although not in terms obligatory, did not in effect declare that the contracting parties need not arbitrate any question which they regarded as serious or important. The so-called " obligatory " treaties, in expressly authorizing and justifying the contracting parties in excluding any question which they might be inclined, on grounds of interest or of feeling, to exclude, even though it should be of a " judicial order," discredited international arbitration as a practical measure and placed it among unreal things, which only vision- aries would pursue. This lowering of the standards was not warranted by the facts. I have but one more word to say. In discussing and estimat- ing methods or devices, whether arbitral or otherwise, for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, we must never lose sight of human nature. There exists on the part of men in masses a tendency to endeavor to attain their ends by violence. We observe this tendency all through human history; and, bearing it in mind, and remembering that human dispositions change very slowly, we must watch our own thoughts and in- clinations as well as those of other people. That great inter- preter of the human heart, Robert Burns, admonishes us to keep an eye on our own defects, lest we become " o'er proud." Each people thinks itself not only peaceful, but much more peaceful than any other people. It is a matter of common knowledge that no nation in its own estimation ever wants to fight; it is always some other nation, perhaps even a very small and helpless one, that wants to go to war. The United (219) 28 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS States, we are constantly told, has always longed to arbitrate everything ; and this, in spite of the fact that George Bancroft supposed he was stating the truth, when, in opening the case of the United States in the arbitration of the San Juan Water Boundary, he said : " Six times the United States had received the offer of arbitration on their northwestern boundary, and six times had refused to refer a point where the importance was so great and the right so clear." And when at last the ques- tion was submitted to the German Emperor as arbitrator, we insisted upon and obtained a restricted submission, such as we had previously endeavored to secure. I mention this incident merely as an illustration of the truth of the poet's admonition, that, lest we become unduly self-satisfied, we should keep an eye upon ourselves as well as upon other people. (220) A WORLD COURT' WILLIAM L HULL Professor of History and International Relations, Swarthmore College YOU will recall the words of Wordsworth in speaking of the beginning of the French Revolution : " Bliss was it in those days to be alive, but to be young was very heaven." I feel very much li1<e echoing his words in thus accepting the invitation of this Academy to speak on the subject which has been assigned to me. Bliss is it at any time to talk about the ideal of the world court, and in these days, when the clouds of war are obscuring the horizon of almost every land, it is very heaven to be permitted to discuss with such an assemblage as this the topic of the world court. For, in all seriousness, I believe that the chief present hope of humanity lies in further developing that arbitral process which Professor Moore has just so felicitously outlined for us, into a judicial settlement of international disputes so invariably resorted to and so just that the nations will indeed learn wa»r no more. President Wilson in his address to the United States Senate on the twenty-second of January, 191 7, advocated the de- velopment of the international organization which was begun at the first Conference at The Hague in 1899. Ten weeks later the President led the United States into the Great War with the expressed purpose of assuring the development of that international organization. The nucleus of the organization is the international confer- ence which has thus far held two sessions; but the heart of that nucleus is the international court of arbitration. Agreed upon at The Hague in 1899, on the motion of Great Britain, and under the name of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the international court was put into operation three years later, 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 19 17. (221) 30 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII on the initiative of the United States. Within the dozen years preceding the outbreak of the Great War, the Permanent Court, by means of its tribunals constituted ad hoc, adjudicated fifteen disputes between or among the nations. The parties to these disputes were not only the little fellows in the family of nations, like Venezuela and Belgium. Every one of the eight great powers with the single exception of Austria- Hungary has submitted grievances to it; and some of these grievances have been of grave character or of long standing. The adjudication of at least two hundred and forty inter- national disputes by arbitral tribunals, since the modern his- tory of arbitration began with the Jay Treaty of 1794-5, the fact that not one of the awards rendered in all of these cases has been resisted, and especially the successful operation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, have caused the intellec- tual and moral leaders of the world to realize the possibilities of the world court for the preservation of international peace and the establishment of international justice, and they have determined that the existing judiciary organ shall be steadily developed and its functions greatly improved. With this object in view, four great tasks are being promoted with energy and determination. These are : ( i ) the develop- ment of the court itself; (2) the extension of its jurisdiction; (3) the providing it with sanctions; and (4) the destruction or subordination of its rival. ( I ) For the development of the court itself, the United States delegation to the Second Hague Conference in 1907, under the leadership of the late lamented Joseph H. Choate and Dr. James Brown Scott, proposed the establishment of a tri- bunal, the International Court of Arbitral Justice, which would be a long step in advance from arbitration toward genuine jurisdiction. This court was admirably worked out, and was unanimously agreed upon in all of its details, with the ex- ception of the method of appointing its judges. The problem of providing on a bench of not more than fifteen judges for the absolutely equal representation of each of forty-six sover- eign states has not yet been solved. But the example of the United States in its equality of judicial representation for (222) No. 2] A WORLD COURT 3 1 the forty-eight states of the Union in the Supreme Court with only nine judges, should prove of great cogency in solving this problem at the next Hague Conference. There is a fundamental difference between legislative and judicial representation ; for, although legislative representation may require, as in our Senate, the absolute equality of repre- sentation of sovereign states, or as in our House of Representa- tives, a representation proportioned to population, judicial rep- resentation is not of this mathematical character. Hence the problem of the equal judicial representation of forty-six na- tions in a court of not more than fifteen judges is not the mathe- matical impossibility which it seems to have been regarded, A due regard for languages, legal principles and procedure, and especially for the personnel of the court (rather than numerical equality) are the determining facts in the problem. (2) The extension of the jurisdiction of the International Court was attempted at the Second Hague Conference in 1907 by means of a world treaty of obligatory arbitration, and by a decrease in the exceptions to arbitration, such as cases in- volving independence, national honor, vital interests and the interests of third parties. The attempt along both these lines failed, however, and the vinculum juris in this respect is still a very loose one. During the administration of President Taft in 191 1 general treaties of arbitration were negotiated with Great Britain and France which embodied the principle of the arbitration of all justiciable disputes, and provided for the appointment of an international, or joint high commission which should determine as to the justiciability or non-justici- ability of disputes as they arise. Although these treaties failed of ratification by the United States Senate, they may well serve as the line along which the extension of the juris- diction of the International Court will progress. I have been much impressed with the possibilities of the international commission of inquiry, the desirability and prac- ticability of which was agreed upon at The Hague, and which has been applied successfully in more than one international dispute. If I may depart for a moment from my main theme, I would suggest for your consideration the desirability of ap- (223) 32 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vou VII pointing at this present time an international commission com- posed of representatives of all of the Allied Powers, ourselves included, the function of which shall be, not as in the case of other existing or projected Allied commissions, to ascertain and decide upon the most effective means of carrying on the war, but rather to keep in close touch, and to keep the peoples of the Allied countries in close touch, with the operations of the armies as they progress. It has been said that this is a war of daylight, and that it should not be permitted to become a war of darkness. We know from the experience of the Allied expedition to Pekin, and from the experience of the two Balkan Wars, that there is very grave danger that this war also, even though it be prosecuted by the victorious arms of our own allies, is in real danger of becoming a war of darkness. International commissions of inquiry were appointed after the atrocities had been committed in the Balkans, and we know what horrors their reports re- vealed. Is it not possible to resort to this international device for the prevention of atrocities which seem inseparable from victorious warfare even as prosecuted by the most enlightened of nations, unless it be constantly subjected to pitiless publicity and international control ? It has seemed to me, also, that since the object of this war is the genuine internationalization of the relations of the world, an international commission should be placed in possession of the successive lands as they are occupied by the armies of the victorious Allies. The world would then be in a better position at the end of the war to carry on the internationalizing process, such as that connected, for example, with the possession of Constantinople, than if these lands should be under the control of a single government, or should be in the hands of the vic- torious armies of but one or two of the Allied governments. (3) The Great War, with its accentuation of the "f rightful- ness " of military and naval force, has precipitated the ques- tion of whether the international organization shall be based upon the voluntary system or upon a system of force, in the form either of an alliance of national armaments or of an inter- national police force. There are numerous and able advocates (224) No. 2] A WORLD COURT 33 of each of these three proposals. The Great War itself has developed into an alliance of national armaments for the pur- pose asserted by both parties to the struggle, of securing and preserving peace and justice. Future events will doubtless help to decide the further utility of an alliance of national armaments as the ultimate power behind the international organization and its world court. Meanwhile it remains true that what progress has thus far been achieved has been on the voluntary basis ; that is to say, through the operation of the forces of national honor and good faith, of enlightened national self-interest, and of a national and international public opinion. The United States Supreme Court, also, with its reliance upon these latter forces — in so far as its relations with the states of the Union, as distinguished from individual citizens, are con- cerned— adds the influence of its successful experience to the further development of and reliance upon the voluntary, as opposed to the military or police sanctions of the international court. (4) Finally, both reason and the long experience of history, as well as the painful lessons of the immediate past, have convinced advocates of international organization so widely removed as William Penn and President Wilson that the world court can be neither perfected nor applied with entire success unless and until the national armaments which have grown up so portentously during the past two score years shall be reduced to such dimensions as are requisite for purely national purposes and shall cease to be prepared or resorted to for inter- national purposes. I would like to pause a moment here to quote the words, first, of the founder of Pennsylvania, one of the earliest advo- cates of the international court, who wrote in 1693 : Nor is it to be thought that anyone will keep up such an army after such an empire [that is, such an international organization] is on foot, which may hazard the safety of the rest. However, if it be seen requisite, the question may be asked, by order of the sovereign states, why such an one either raises or keeps up a formidable body of troops, and be obliged forthwith to reform or reduce them; lest anyone by keeping up a great body of troops, should surprise a neigh- (225) 34 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII bor. But a small force in every other sovereignty, as it is capable or accustomed to maintain, will certainly prevent the danger, and vanquish any such fear. It may be the war establishment may be reduced, which will indeed of course follow, or be better employed to the advantage of the public. And if this be called a lessening of their power, it must be only because the great fish can no longer eat up the little ones, and that each sovereignty is equally defended from injuries, and disabled from committing them. Cedant arma togae is a glorious sentwice. Two and a quarter centuries later President Wilson, in his address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, said: It [the freedom of the seas] is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. And the ques- tion of limiting naval armaments opens the Avider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programs of military preperation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation, if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety and equity among the nations if great, preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace, and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind. I am proposing that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an inst-nunent of ag- gression or selfish violence. Here again the experience of the United States, which pro- hibited by its constitution the maintenance of armies and navies on the part of the states of the Union, reinfo.rces the lesson that we cannot prepare for both the military and the judicial settle- ment of international disputes, and expect the method of judicial settlement to be invariably used. As President Lincoln said of the Union in slavery times : "A house divided against (226) No. 2] A WORLD COURT 35 itself cannot stand." In the development of the international organization, it is fundamentally true that the world must de- vote itself wholly either to military preparedness or to judicial settlement, and not attempt to worship both the might of arma- ments and the majesty of the law. It is profoundly true that inter arma silent leges — that amidst the clash of arms, law stands silent, abashed and helpless. Our distinguished chairman this morning drew clearly the distinction between reliance upon force and reliance upon law, and then called attention to the fact that a society (the League to Enforce Peace) has grown up among us which is endeavor- ing to join together these two opposing forces. I must submit for your consideration this question : Is it possible to bring about such a union and expect the marriage to be a happy and prosperous one ? We were told, also, that the distinguishing feature of German Kultur is the reliance of the German people upon the element of force as the very foundation of every phase of their civiliza- tion. Eternal vigilance, I believe, is the price here as else- where of liberty. Both in our own republic during the Great War, and in the later development of the international organi- zation, I trust that we shall beware of introducing within the body politic of our own nation, or within the international organization of the future, the virus of the supremacy of mili- tary force even though it is offered with the promise of peace. We fear the Greeks, even though they come bearing gifts in their hands. (227) INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION ^ ALPHEUS HENRY SNOW Washington, D. C. A SURVEY of international politics discloses two great facts. The first is, that the nations have always re- fused to consider any plan for instituting an inter- national government endowed with physical force. The second is, that the nations, by the Hague Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, ratified by prac- tically all of them, besides establishing the judicial part of an international organization, legitimized and recommended inter- national conciliation of disputant or belligerent nations by any nation not engaged in the dispute, through good offices and mediation, and also recommended the institution of commis- sions of inquiry by disputant nations to settle the dispute as agencies of international conciliation. This second fact is of profound importance; for the Con- vention for Pacific Settlement is, so far as it goes, a written constitution of the society of nations. By it the united nations instituted an international judicial organ, the Permanent Court of Arbitration; and certain administrative organs an- cillary to the court, the Permanent Administrative Council and the International Bureau. By it mediating nations, and com- missions of inquiry instituted by disputant nations, were re- cognized as international conciliative agencies in the particu- lar case. By it the processes of action of these international agencies and organs were prescribed. By the Draft Con- vention for a Judicial Arbitration Court — otherwise called the Permanent Court of xA.rbitral Justice — the Second Hague Con- ference instituted an additional international organ and pre- 1 Address delirered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science in co-operation with the American Society of International Law, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 191 7. (228) LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION 37 scribed its processes; and when the nations agree concerning the manner of selecting the judges of this new international court and thus put the Draft Convention into effect, the Draft Convention will in fact form an additional part of the Con- vention for Pacific Settlement. The Convention for Pacific Settlement is, however, an incomplete written constitution, be- cause it fails to institute any international legislative organs or processes whatever, and because the administrative organs instituted by it, being only ancillary to the judicial organ, are inadequate for general international administrative purposes. In spite of the incompleteness and inadequacy of the Con- vention for Pacific Settlement, however, the fact that it exists, as the substantially unanimous act of all nations, is perhaps the most momentous circumstance in human history. When the substantially unanimous ratification of this convention was completed, in the summer of 1907, the nations ceased to be a mere unorganized community, and became an organized volun- tary and co-operative society and union for judicial purposes — a verband, as the German writers describe it; ^ or a con- sociation, as we might call it. The nations were not ready, at the time of the Hague Con- ferences, to consider the question of an improved arrangement for international legislation and administration. It was not even discussed in 1899 or in 1907. The ten years that have nearly elapsed since the Second Hague Conference have, how- ever, been years of wonderful development and progress. This universal war has clarified many things that before were un- seen or seen only darkly. The question of making an improve- ment in international legislation and administration is now one of practical politics. It is clear that such an improvement must occur through the amendment and revision of the Con- vention for Pacific Settlement so as to add to it the proper in- stitutions for international legislation and administration, con- sistent with the existing judicial, administrative and concilia- tive institutions established by it and conforming to the general 1 See Der Staatenverband der Haager Konferenzen, by Professor Walther Schiicking of the University of Marburg, published in 1912. (229) 38 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII spirit of the convention and the fundamental principles on which it is based. The first question is, ought an international administrative body to be itself empowered to use physical force to control the nations; that is to say, ought a physical-force international government to be Instituted by the nations to govern them for the commom purposes? If the nations delegate to a physical- force government the power to govern them, they must also delegate to it the power to tax for the common purposes and the power to raise, support and wield an international army, navy and police. The power to tax, as has been well said, is the power to destroy. The question whether a physical- force international govern- ment is politically practicable as tending to just government, almost answers itself in the negative; since all the nations have persistently, unanimously and recently refused even to con- sider such a form of government. Yet, as such an international government is advocated by many, it will be desirable to analyze the reasons why it is impracticable, and to satisfy our- selves that these reasons are permanent and unchangeable. All plans for such an international government fall into one of three classes : They are plans for international govern- ment by one nation ; or by a league of nations ; or by a body of men delegated by the nations, with power to raise, support and wield an international army, navy and police. An inter- national government consisting of one nation would be neces- sarily autocratic, since a nation is necessarily endowed with physical force and cannot be legally limited. The only limita- tions upon the powers of a nation which are possible are self- limitations imposed by the nation upon itself ; which, from the standpoint of political science, are no limitations. Moreover, the only nation which could, as a matter of practical politics, be the constituted international autocrat would be one which was already the de facto international autocrat by reason of its control of the seas, the international trade routes, and the regions inhabited by weak or backward peoples, and which was so favorably located as to be able successfully to weaken all its rivals by playing as sure winner in the diplomatic and military game of the balance of power. (230) No. 2] LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION 39 A league of nations is, like a nation, endowed with physical force and is incapable of constitutional limitations ; and if such a league were to institute itself as the international govern- ment, it would have to be, already, collectively, the de facto international autocrat. There being no possibility of constitu- tional limitation as respects either the internal or the external relations of the league, it would necessarily develop an in- visible government of its own, which would be the autocrat of the league and of the world. This invisible government would necessarily be a body of men, or the one nation which at the moment happened to be the de facto and actual autocrat of the world. If the nations, without disarming, were to appoint a body of persons with governmental powers for the common purposes and endow this body with physical force, the result would be to increase the possibilities of war without establishing an efficient international government. If the nations were to dis- arm and delegate powers of government for the common pur- poses to a body of persons, at the same time endowing this body with physical force, they would destroy themselves as nations and become states of a universal federal state. Such self-abnegation on the part of the nations, if conceivable as a matter of practical politics, would, however, be of no avail, since a federal state thus established would be found to be inefficient as a means of preserving international order and peace. The federal state, if attempted to be applied where the requisites for its operation do not exist, establishes an auto- cracy of a majority necessarily ignorant of its own needs or the needs of the minority, which is the worst and most hope- less of all autocracies. The two requisites for the successful existence of a federal state have been proved to be, first, that it shall include a territory every part of which is contiguous with every other part or is so situated and populated that it may be regarded as appurtenant for political purposes ; second, that it shall contain a population which is highly civilized and homogeneous and which is under an economic pressure to co-operate as an economic unit. Where these two conditions (231) AQ CONFERENCE OxN FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII do not exist, the federated states and peoples are necessarily ignorant of the local conditions of one another and are swayed by their local interests, so that the majority vote of their repre- sentatives is necessarily determined by the play of the local interests against each other. Such a situation means either government by an assembly which is autocratic through ignor- ance, or an invisible government which is autocratic as being without constitutional limitations. On account of the realiza- tion of this danger of the federal-state plan of government, if extended beyond the regions in which the necessary condi- tions exist, the proposal for converting the British Empire into a federal state, promoted by the Imperial Federation League from 1885 to 1895, was rejected by the people of Great Britain, and by the people of the British dominions, colonies and de- pendencies. For the same reason, the people of the United States rejected the proposal to incorporate the Philippines into an enlarged American federal state. Taking the world together, with its diverse nations and peoples, the conditions for uniting the nations and their peoples into a federal state are lacking not only at the present time, but undoubtedly for all time to come. If, therefore, the nations were to attempt to institute any kind of international government endowed with physical force, they would inevitably be instituting an international auto- cracy. It would be indispensable that in any constitution of the society of nations, there should be an express constitu- tional prohibition, denying physical force to any part of the organization — legislative, administrative, or judicial ; and also a prohibition denying the power of taxation in any form or under any guise whatever, since a body which can tax can endow itself with physical force. The object of these prohibitions would be, however, only to prevent the international body delegated by the nations from becoming autocratic, and it would doubtless be needful that the international body should exercise certain international police powers in certain exceptional cases. Therefore it would be necessary to provide, by way of exception, that these prohibi- tions should not prevent the nations from making grants to the (232) No. 2] LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION 41 international body, by special international agreements, of police or taxing power, or both, within international areas or internationalized districts designated by these international agreements, where the local circumstances were such that it would be certain that no resistance would be made to the inter- national police except by individuals or by small unorganized bodies of individuals.. But, though thus substantially deprived of physical force, the international body which any constitution of the society of nations must necessarily institute of course must not be deprived of force, since all government involves the use of force. It could be, and undoubtedly ought to be endowed with persuasive force. Persuasion is a force which is utilizable and every day utilized, with increasing ef- fectiveness, by all governments, but which, like all forces, has the possibility of use for good or for evil. An in- ternational body, delegated by the nations, could use per- suasion to induce the nations either to co-operate in order and peace, or to compete with one another in disorder and war. By coatrolling the physical force of some of the nations, it could terrorize and enslave other nations or produce interminable war and anarchy. Such a power must be carefully safe- guarded by constitutional limitation, so that it may be effec- tive and yet not dangerous. The international body, in order to be effective, must exer- cise scientifically organized, informed and applied persuasion. This implies conciliation by expert, informed and aggressive action. The international body must not sit still and wait for the nations to ask it to act. It must investigate and inform itself, must formulate counsel on the facts discovered by in- vestigation, and must do everything proper to induce the na- tions to accept and follow its counsel. A body endowed with the power of conciliation uses real force and superior force; for it uses psychical force; and psychical force, being the creator, user and destroyer of physical force, is necessarily superior and major force. The international conciliative body, in order to be effective, must be pervasive. It must therefore have in each nation a (233) 42 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII permanent branch or delegation. Doubtless the internationcd body would appoint the members of each national delegation, subject to confirmation by the nation through its executive government or its legislature. Doubtless also the members of each national delegation would be removable by the inter- national body. The international conciliative body, in order to be effective, must be armed by the nations with the weapon of publicity, so that it may create and wield, or correct, public sentiment in favor of its righteous counsel. The power to publish its counsel and support it by statement of facts and by argument, might, and probably would, require that it should be granted a means of publication controlled by itself. The international body, in order not to be dangerous, must use its power of persuasion exclusively for conciliation to induce co-operation. It must appeal to self-interest, seen in the light of the interests of all concerned. There must be an entire absence of threats, secret pressure, or other form of terroriza- tion. Partisan politics must never be allowed to influence its personnel or work, or that of its delegation in any nation. Its independence and impartiality must be absolute, and should be jealously prized and guarded by the people. It should be impossible in the future for any conferences to be held when secret treaties exist affecting the objects discussed, unknown not only to the nationals of the countries involved, but to the very parliaments themselves, as has been the case in the past. The fundamental work of the inter- national body must be, through its delegation in each nation, to instruct the masses concerning the international status, the situation of their own nation, the attitude of their own national administration toward international affairs and the reasons for and against it, as clearly and definitely as is com- patible with the public interest; so that public opinion, instead of being swayed by ignorance, by prejudice or by local self- interest, will be sound and enlightened and a source of strength in any crisis. Conciliation necessarily involves the acceptance and promul- gation of democracy, republicanism and co-operation; that is, (234) No. 2] LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION 43 in a word, the two great commandments of the New Testa- ment It implies government by consent, since conciliation by the government and consent by the governed are correlative. The philosophy which it must inevitably act upon and incul- cate, if it acts logically, is the philosophy of co-operation — that each man and each nation can gain more by voluntarily co-operating with all others in utilizing the forces of nature for human development and by participating equitably in the common product, than is possible by isolated or competitive action. The principle of conciliative direction of the international acts and relations of nations by international agencies, is the fundamental principle on which the Convention for Pacific Settlement is based. The first part of that convention is devoted to " good offices and mediation ; " the second to " arbitration." " Good offices and mediation " are merely diplomatic terms to express two elements of the whole pro- cess of international conciliation. Though the convention, as has been said, creates no general international agency of inter- national conciliation, nevertheless by its legitimation and ap- proval of good offices and mediation by one nation as respects disputes between other nations, and by its recommendation to disputant nations to institute commissions of inquiry for the settlement of the dispute as international conciliative agencies, it recognizes international conciliation as a proper and feasible means of directing international action. The establishment of means for international legislation and administration by con- ciliation, therefore, would not require the nations to accept a new principle. It would only be the carrying-out to its logical conclusion of a principle which they have already accepted. The problem of bringing about efficient international legislation and administration is that of formulating a scheme of international legislation and administration based on the accepted principle of international conciliation, which shall be acceptable to the nations as being for their general and particular self-interest; and of fitting this scheme into the present scheme of inter- national adjudication and national conciliation established by the Convention for Pacific Settlement, so as to expand that (235) 44 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII convention into a complete written constitution of the society of nations. The proper organs of an international political body for effecting international legislation and administration by con- ciliation would not, it seems, be a legislature and an executive exactly in the sense in which we use these terms, but would resemble what in our large civic associations and our busi- ness trusts (and, indeed, in nearly all associations of a purely voluntary and co-operative character) we call an executive committee and a general committee. The body corresponding to an executive committee might be called the ordinary international directorate, and the one corres- ponding to a general committee, the superintending inter- national directorate. The ordinary directorate would, through its members, aided by such subordinate committees and expert assistants as might be found necessary, and by the local delegations in each nation, do the continuous administrative work of conciliation — making investigation of facts, formulat- ing its counsel on the facts as ascertained, and doing every- thing proper, short of using physical force, to induce the adoption of the counsel by the national governments concerned. The superintending directorate, meeting occasionally or periodically, would, as chief administrative, superintend the administrative action of the ordinary directorate by formulat- ing different counsel in particular cases, and would also act legislatively by laying down general rules applicable to gen- eral classes of international activities. These general rules would be primarily for the guidance of the ordinary director- ate in its conciliative work. Incidentally they would be for the guidance of the nations and their people in the classes of international activities to which the rules would relate. The ordinary directorate would doubtless be more effective if it were to be an appointive body. The members might be appointed by a body corresponding to the Permanent Admin- istrative Council established by the Hague Conferences, or by the superintending directorate. The superintending director- ate would doubtless be most efificient if it were to be a repre- sentative body. The system adopted in the United States of (236) No. 2] LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION 45 having a Senate and a House of Representatives, the one representing the nations as equals, and the other representing districts of equal population, would seem to be applicable. The composition of the membership of the directorates would be a matter of prime importance. There would doubtless need to be stringent rules determining the eligibility of persons to membership in either directorate, particularly in the or- dinary directorate. The use of conciliation as a governing force so as efficiently to direct the action of masses of men, by their own consent, into activities which are to their self-interest and also to the interest of all, is expert work of the highest character. No one should be eligible to such an official station who is not naturally endowed with great intellect and conscientiousness, and who has not added as much as pos- sible to his natural powers by education, by study and research, by travel enlightened by knowledge of languages, and by actual experience in government. Under an international conciliative directorate, international legislation would be effected, as at present, by the conventional enactments of conferences of all nations ratified by the separate nations, or by the fixation of international custom through coinciding treaty and diplomatic action of many nations ; but in addition it would be effected by the general rules laid down by the superintending directorate for the guidance of the or- dinary directorate, by the ordinary directorate in following its own precedents of counsel, and by uniform national legislation and treaty action respecting international matters, this uni- formity being brought about by the conciliative action of the international directorate. Each nation would be regarded as having not only exclusive powers of government within its own borders and over its own purely internal activities, and over all its citizens and corporations as respects their international activities, but also concurrent full powers of government with all other nations over the high seas, and concurrent limited powers of government over the international trade routes, natural and artificial, and over all regions held as dependencies by any one nation. The international directorate and the na- tional legislatures and treaty-making organs, acting uniformly (237) 46 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII in international affairs, would all together constitute the inter- national legislature. International conferences for framing rules of international law, subject to ratification by the nations, might also be held, if deemed advisable. The international administration would be conducted by the two directorates and the executives of the different nations; the latter enforcing, each upon its own nationals and corpora- tions, in a uniform manner recommended by the international directorate, the international legislation enacted in manner above described. The international administrative would thus be composed of the international directorate and the particular national executive engaged in enforcing a particular act of international legislation. The present Permanent International Court of Arbitration, and the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice already agreed to in principle by the Second Hague Conference, would remain as the supreme judicial organs of the society of nations; their decisions being advisory and being reported by the respective courts to the ordinary directorate so that it might secure their enforcement through conciliation of the nations concerned. Doubtless in the long run international district courts would be established in correspondence with the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice, each district comprising one large nation or a group of smaller nations. These district courts might have final jurisdiction in non-constitutional cases in which the rights involved were really those of individual nationals of different nations, subject to certiorari from the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice. The Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice might have appellate jurisdiction over the district courts in constitutional cases between individual nationals of different nations, and exclusive jurisdiction in suits between nations involving strictly national rights as distinct from the rights of individual nationals. The nations would of course remain at liberty to settle their disputes by arbitration conducted by arbiters of their own choice, if they saw fit. The primary power which would need to be delegated to the international directorate would be the power to bring about, through conciliation applied to national governments so as to (238) No. 2] LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION 47 induce uniform national legislation and treaty action, the in- ternationalization and freedom of the high seas and of the in- ternational trade routes, including international railroads, canals, straits, sounds and rivers. This would involve a con- ciliative direction of international trade, finance, intercourse and migration. Power might also be delegated to the inter- national directorate to bring about, by the same conciliative ac- tion, a more or less complete internationalization of backward countries held as dependencies of separate nations; such inter- nationalization to be effected by each nation holding depend- encies adopting a more or less open-door policy, determined in each case by the local circumstances of each dependency, as respects concessions for internal improvements and for carry- ing on manufacturing, mining, trade, transportation and bank- ing in these countries ; the ultimate goal being the equalization of economic opportunity among all the nations. The exceptional cases in which the police and taxing power, or the police power alone, might properly be granted to the international directorate would, it seems, be of three kinds. First, if a district were provided as the seat of international direction, the international directorate would necessarily have the power of local police and local taxation within the district; second, if the high seas, as an international area by reason of being the common property of all nations, were to be freed from national naval vessels as the result of destructive inven- tions and the successful working of the international director- ate, the international directorate might be granted authority to patrol the sea routes for police purposes; and, third, if zones or districts bordering on straits, canals or rivers were internationalized by special international agreement, the inter- national directorate might be granted authority to maintain a police patrol within the internationalized zone or district. The whole directorate, composed of the ordinary director- ate and the superintending directorate, together with the international courts, — which might be called the general international directorate, — would be financially supported in the same manner as is the present international body located at The Hague. The Convention for Pacific Settle- (339) ^3 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII ment provides that the expenses of the present Hague organi- zation " shall be borne by the signatory powers in the pro- portion fixed for the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union." The convention establishing the Universal Postal Union actually fixes the proportions to be paid. Doubt- less no better system could be devised at the present time. The safeguards around the international directorate would be primarily, the substantial denial of power to use physical force, which would carry with it a denial of general taxing power; secondarily, the requirements that in its action it should deal exclusively with the national governments ; that it should use conciliation and persuasion exclusively; that it should be composed of experts and superintending experts ; that it should have a specific sphere of powers relating to the seas as the common property of all nations, to the international trade routes as subject to the common use of all nations, and to colonies and dependencies as subject to a qualified common use by all nations ; and, thirdly, the provision that it should never be reduced to the necessity of begging money from the nations or asking protection from any nation, but should be assured, in advance and permanently, by an agreement of all nations, an adequate and dignified support, and perhaps also an ap- propriate seat of international direction exclusively gov- erned by itself. It is incumbent on the United States to see to it, so far as may be in its power, that no international directorate is ever established except under a written constitution delegating care- fully limited powers and ratified by all, or at least two-thirds of the nations ; and that the written constitution shall be plainly such on its face — not merely in substance, but also in form. It is incumbent also upon the United States to see to it that this constitution shall contain a plain and distinct recognition of the universal and fundamental principles which lie at the basis of all orderly and peaceful society. The insistence of Americans on written constitutions is not a mere American idiosyncrasy. Written constitutions are a vital and essential part of the American system, regarded as a universal system. By the Declaration of Independence, the American people com- (240) No. 2] LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION ^g mitted themselves to maintenance of the proposition, as a uni- versal and self-evident truth, that all men are equally the creatures of a common Creator, and that there are therefore certain rights of every human being, of which he cannot by his own action deprive himself, which arise from the nature of man as a spiritual being and from the equal endowment of each man by his Creator with the attributes of life, the will to live, and the desire for happiness, which are common to all ; so that these fundamental and universal rights exist antecedent to and independent of every government, however great and powerful. This fundamental and necessary limitation upon the power of all governments requires recognition by all gov- ernments through a written constitution ; and since all the sub- ordinate rights of individuals established by governments must be derived from and consistent with these fundamental rights, written constitutions are also necessary in order to enable the people governed so to frame their government and so to limit and safeguard it, by general declarations, by specifications of powers, and by prohibitions, that it will certainly respect and secure the fundamental principles which underlie all human society and the fundamental rights of individuals and nations based on these fundamental principles. Therefore it would be necessary that the written constitution of the society of nations establishing the international direc- torate should contain a declaration of the universal and fun- damental principles of all human action and relationship such as is contained in the first sentence of the second paragraph of the preamble of the Declaration of Independence; a declara- tion of the fundamental rights and duties of nations, such as that which has been adopted by the American Peace Society and the American Institute of International Law; a declara- tion of the objects of the constitution, modeled upon the preamble of the Constitution of the United States ; and also, if possible — after the provisions instituting the different parts of the general international directorate, defining their com- position and the relations of one to the other, and determining the sphere of jurisdiction of the whole directorate and each of its parts by a specification of powers — a bill of rights demo- (241) 50 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII cratizing and republicanizing the relations between the gov- ernment of each nation and the people of the nation by estab- lishing prohibitions, absolute or conditional, upon certain forms of governmental action found by experience to be injurious or destructive to liberty. The institution of such an international directorate as has been above proposed would not disturb any of the existing agencies or processes by which international activities and relations are now directed. The nations would retain their ministries of foreign affairs, their ministries in charge of dependencies, their diplomatic and consular officers and their courts functioning in international cases. The judicial tri- bunals and the administrative arrangements ancillary to them, established by the Hague Conferences, would be unchanged. Upon the present international mechanism the international directorate would be superposed as a means of bringing all the existing agencies and processes into co-operation and harmony. The international directorate proposed would be but an application on a universal scale of the system which nearly all nations having dependencies have found necessary in the man- agement of their colonial empires. The Privy Council and the Council for India in Great Britain, and the colonial coun- cils of the European nations, which, under the ministries for the colonies and dependencies, manage the colonial empires of these respective nations, are in principle interstate directorates, holding together widely separated countries, diverse in race, climate and civilization, by methods which are essentially con- ciliative. Though these interstate directorates are backed by the physical force of the nation, physical force has been found to be inapplicable in holding dependencies to nations except when used sparingly and scientifically in aid of conciliation, and in many cases to be wholly inapplicable. The superin- tending directorate in colonial empires is in process of evolu- tion, and in one or more of them will doubtless soon be a fact. The problem of holding together the widely separated nations of the world, diverse in race, climate and civilization, is clearly analogous to the problem of managing colonial empires. The only difference is, that the international directorate must be a (242) No. 2] LEGISLA TION AND ADMINISTRA TION 5 i delegated body, instituted by all the nations, which shall be of and for them all, and shall carry the principles of democracy and republicanism into international relations.^ The plan proposed would, of course, not be a panacea for all international ills. Each nation would continue to be free and independent. It would reject or accept the counsel of the international directorate according as it thought its self-interest demanded. Secret treaties and other forms of intrigue, and excessive national armaments to support the intrigues, would doubtless continue to go on. Domination of the seas, of the international trade routes and of the backward countries by individual nations or by a league or leagues of nations, would no doubt continue to be attempted. Invisible international government, in democracies and monarchies, would undoubt- edly continue to be the dream of political, financial and trad- ing syndicates, and to have a more or less stable de facto exist- ence. Attempts would probably be made to pervert the inter- national directorate to selfish national ends. Therefore war would continue to be possible. But a means would have been provided for the gradual abolition of all these abnormal pro- cesses and agencies and for the limitation, by the free act of the separate nations, of the excessive national armaments which make these abnormal processes and agencies possible. Ex- cessive national armaments will be limited by the voluntary act of each nation when it ceases to be for the self-interest of each nation to maintain an excessive armament. When an international organization, by its successful operation, has made some part of a nation's armament unnecessary and there- fore excessive, the nation will, as a matter of common sense and economic necessity, scrap the part which is excessive, and release the capital and labor for productive employment. Limitation of national armament in any other manner is, it would seem, impossible. In this manner it may be possible. 1 Cf. The Administration of Dependencies, by the author of this article, pp, 527-530, 578-604, as respects the management of colonial empires by direc- tive councils and superintending directive bodies, and the applicability of the directorate form of government in political aggregations where the federal-state form is inapplicable. (243) C2 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII That some such international conciliative directorate as has been suggested, exercising legislative and administrative as well as judicial direction of the nations as respects international matters, must sooner or later be established, would seem to be beyond doubt. Destructive inventions have made the strong nations and the weak nations almost equally strong and equally defenseless. Constructive inventions have enabled all men and nations to share equally in the common necessities of life and in the common knowledge. All the races of men are rapidly becoming equal in physique and intelligence, and equally cog- nizant of their fundamental rights. The proper time to begin the institution of the new system would seem to be the present moment. The questions of na- tional existence and boundaries which are now the obstacles to peace, are almost entirely questions incidental to the rival ambitions of great powers. As things now are, small nations occupying strategic positions on international trade routes can- not be allowed independent existence within boundaries deter- mined by the principles of nationality and equality of national right and opportunity. These small nations m«st, under the present system, be given such boundaries and allowed such privileges as are consistent with the political and economic policies of the nation or group of nations which for the moment holds the balance of power and dominates the particular inter- national trade routes on which these small nations are situated. So long as there is no international direction to modify and gradually to supplant the present system of the balance of power, that system will remain, involving all the great powers in the struggle for world power, and leaving the small and strategically important nations in a condition of perpetual un- certainty as respects their boundaries, their privileges and even their national existence. A conclusion of the war which should determine, according to the exigencies of the balance of power, the relations of the great powers to each other and the privileges and boundaries of smaller nations, would greatly complicate the future. Such a peace, as laying the foundation for a greater war in the future, might prove a worse calamity than the war itself. The most certain assurance against a (244) No. 2] LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION 53 peace of this kind would seem to be a unanimous agreement between the great powers, entered into during the war, accept- ing the principle of an international conciliative direction after the war. Once such an agreement were signed, it would be possible for the great powers, in the treaty of peace, with safety to each and all and without loss of dignity to any, to adjust properly the relations of each to the other and to determine scientifically and fairly the questions concerning the exist- ence, rights and boundaries of the smaller nations and the claims of the nationalities which are aspiring to nationhood, A treaty of peace so made would form a sound basis for the future orderly and peaceful co-operative development of all nations, and would greatly simplify the work of the inter- national directorate which would be formally instituted after the war through a constitutional convention of all nations. (245) A PARLIAMENT OF PARLIAMENTS ^ FELIX ABLER Leader, Ethical Culture Society, New York I HAVE in mind a suggestion somewhat analogous to the plan of international legislation and administration just set before us, though less comprehensive. To discuss intelligently the elaborate plan of Mr. Snow, it would be neces- sary to study it in detail. But before hearing his paper I had in mind the idea of a parliament of parliaments, a kind of super-parliament to be elected by the different parliaments of the world. The understanding would be that each of the na- tional delegations to the parliament of parliaments would con- sist of persons representing the different social groups within the nation — laborers, manufacturers, merchants, scientists etc., to the end that the relations of people to people should be re- moved from the control, at least the exclusive control, of the diplomatic agents who have hitherto administered foreign affairs, and that these relations should be placed in the hands of the people themselves. I happened to be in London some time before the outbreak of the war, and there I gained a distinct impression of the tense feeling existing between England and Germany, and also of the very promising efforts that were being made in important quarters to bring about a more friendly attitude of mind. I cannot help thinking that if a parliament of this kind had existed, if there had been some such international conference body, the war might have been averted. I agree with Mr. Snow that the use of physical force should be denied the inter- national congress, that it should depend entirely on the moral force it can exercise. I am convinced that this force is bound to be exceedingly great. If such a body had been assembled 1 Discussion at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 191 7. (246) A PARLIAMENT OF PARLIAMENTS 55 before the war; if English workingmen could have been brought face to face with German workingmen, English mer- chants with German merchants ; if they had had the opportun- ity to talk matters out, instead of negotiating through second- ary diplomatic channels; if the people who must "pay the piper " had come together and directly' faced each other, we might have been spared this terrible catastrophe. So the first suggestion is a parliament or international conference, to con- sist of national delegations, including representatives of the different social groups within each nation. These delegations need not number more than twenty-five or thirty persons each. The entire body would not be unmanageably large. Our par- liaments and congresses at present consist of five to six hun- dred members. The next point I wish to speak of is that besides preventing controversies from reaching the acute stage, a parliament of parliaments, an elixir of parliaments such as is here proposed, would properly undertake the important function of inter- national legislation — a function that is apt to be minimized whenever a court or a league to enforce peace is offered as the principal remedy. I cannot persuade myself that the development of inter- national law can safely be intrusted to a court. I speak with due diffidence in the presence of distinguished jurists, but it seems to me as a layman that it is the court's affair not to make but to interpret law, and that the law should be made by the people. Professor Moore, in his remarks on the judicial func- tion of arbitration bodies, alluded pointedly and with some pride to the fact that they had been accustomed to base their decisions on precedent. But is not this the very circumstance that would seem to make them unfit to take over the function of international law making? For the world today is con- fronted by problems such as Grotius and Vattel did not have to meet. The international legislator today will have to deal with new situations to which precedent affords no parallel, and in dealing with which reliance on precedent will be a hindrance rather than a help. There are the great questions of colonial expansion, of the freedom of the seas, of the open door with (247) c6 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII regard to backward races — not indeed the " open door " through which all the exploiters of Europe and America can enter on equal terms, but the open door of opportunity for those backward races themselves, so that they may be reasonably pro- tected in the effort to develop along the lines of their own capacities and their own gifts. An international legislature would have to address itself to all these great problems of the relations of people to people, not only of the civilized peoples of the world to the less civil- ized, of those civilized in some directions and less civilized in others, but of the civilized world at large to the infant races. We have been told that in Africa during the last century ten million of the natives fell victims to the civilizing solicitude of the white race. It is such conditions as these that cry loudly for a change of mental attitude — ^yes, for a change of heart on our part. And I for one do not see how reliance can be placed either upon a league to enforce peace, if such a league be indeed practicable, or upon a mere court to establish the kind of inter- national law which the world needs and which the world court shall administer and interpret. There is one other point upon which I wish to dwell for a moment. It is that perhaps not sufficient attention has been paid to the psychology of peace and war. How will it avail us to construct ingenious devices, courts, legislatures and the like, without penetrating somewhat deeper and considering the psychic factors that operate in the minds of nations, the mo- tives to which we can appeal in the interests of peace? We know well the psychic factors that breed war — national pride, economic greed and the like. These hostile forces, these en- genderers of hate, have been fully described. But what are the psychic factors upon which we can rely as our allies in binding up the wounds of nations, and conciliating their enmities? We are accustomed to speak of " The Allies " just now. I want to speak of those spiritual allies upon whom above all we must depend, to whom above all we must appeal after the Great War shall have burned itself out. Now I hope that you will not think me too idealistic if I say that it is after all a spiritual factor that we must rely upon — not self-interest, not even (248) No. 2] A PARLIAMENT OF PARLIAMENTS 57 pity or sympathy, for both self-interest and pity have failed us in the hour of need. Just before the war it was con- fidently prophesied that there never could be another war, because of the economic injury which the victor would sustain as well as the vanquished. And then the war came to mock these prophecies. Nor will pity suffice as a deterrent; for have not individuals and whole nations, in an ecstasy of self-sacrifice, been willing to forget the suiferings they inflict on others in view of the burden of suffering which they are prepared to accept for themselves ? No ; it is the moral factor upon which we must depend, however slowly the world may be educated up to it; and by the moral factor I mean simply the idea con- tained in the word " right." The fundamental question to my mind is. How can we bring it about that the unequal nations, the nations that are actually unequal, that is superior in numbers, in wealth, in civilization or what counts as such — that these nations, I say, shall regard little Belgium and little Persia and little Greece as their equals? Herein lies the very essence of the problem — ^how to make the actually unequal, the superior, admit the equality of those who yet in some sense, namely morally, are their equals. Now the answer in the case of nations is the same as in the case of individuals. An individual is my equal, though he be inferior in wealth or intelligence, because of his moral per- sonality, because he has certain rights which I am bound to respect. And these rights, when analyzed, come to the simple proposition that he has the right of a moral personality, the right of self-development, because there is in him something that is worth developing. In other words, the conception of right reduced to its lowest terms involves the idea that every human being has something to contribute, something that the world cannot do without, something that mankind cannot af- ford to miss. Now apply the same thing to Belgium and Persia and Greece. There is something in each of these nations, a type of civiliza- tion, a type of culture, to be developed, which is worthy of the respect and admiration of the rest. They are the equals of the greatest countries because there is something in them unlike (249) 58 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS that which these greater countries have produced or can pro- duce, which yet humanity at large has an interest in con- serving, and where it is latent, in educing. This is what I mean by the moral factor — the factor of right. And in order to make that effective, I recur once more in closing my remarks to the parliament of parliaments. Assume that a state of war is about to be declared, the purpose being to violate the prin- ciple of right. Germany is about to violate Belgium's rights, Russia and England are about to violate Persia's rights. The parliament of parliaments is convoked, the nations sit in great conclave. Little Belgium and little Persia stand up in the per- sons of their national delegations, and, speaking with their own voice, and with that impressiveness, that constraining effect that belongs to the moral nature when it finds utterance, Belgium and Persia will declare their rights, and the nations sitting around will say, " Well done; we approve." And then there will be a true world opinion in favor of Belgium and in favor of Persia, and the mighty nations that attempt to violate those rights will not succeed in doing so, because a true and genuine world opinion such as does not exist at present will stand in the way, a bar they cannot overleap. The President has spoken of world opinion, but at this moment there is no such thing. There is the opinion of the Central Powers and the opinion of the Allied Powers — mutu- ally contradictory. What we need is a body like the parlia- ment of parliaments to generate a world opinion, a genuine world opinion; and one, which, when it has once gained ex- pression, no nation on earth will be strong enough to resist. (250) WORLD ORGANIZATION DISCUSSION ^ Mr. Samuel T. Dutton^ Secretary, World Court League : Before the outbreak of the Great War, the United States had shown much interest in a possible federation of the world. Many statesmen, publicists, preachers and writers had proclaimed the importance and the necessity of making an end of war by organizing the nations into some sort of a world state, which should gradually come to possess legislative, executive and judicial functions. What is known as the peace movement centered in the idea. The Interparliamentary Union composed of delegates from the several legislative bodies of the world seemed to prefigure a more official body which should have power to legislate in the interest of a united world. The ideal of world organization was reflected in all the national peace congresses prior to the war. The Lake Mohonk Con- ference on Arbitration has justly been given the credit for developing the truth that a large percentage of international differences may be disposed of by methods of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. The several peace societies and foundations, established for the purpose of educating the people to the conception of permanent peace, have recognized that there must be federation of states. Then there has been the important work of the American Peace Society, the Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, and the International Law Association. The published reports and documents of these scholarly and thoroughly representative bodies have discussed repeatedly the requirements for international govern- ment, such as a world court, the codification of international law, and the means of making treaties more effective. Dr. Adler's proposition for a parliament of parliaments has in it much of merit. If he intends to imply that such a parliament is to be made up of members selected from other parliaments, there may be some difficulties in the way. No world parliament would be sat- isfactory whose personnel was not representative of the highest and most able statesmanship of every nation. There should be no letting down from the standard of the Second Hague Conference, 1 At the afternoon session, May 29. (250 60 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII If there were time, it might be shown that the influences leading to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were generated in the United States, and it is well known that our American delegates to the second conference, especially the late Joseph H. Choate and Dr. James Brown Scott, secured the unanimous approval of the Court of Arbitral Justice. If it had been possible to harmonize the opinions and ambitions represented in the Conference respecting the methods of organizing the court, the history of international relations during the past ten years might have been different from what it has been. As indicative of the trend of events, let me refer to the record of fifteen cases successfully settled by the Hague Tribunal, and to the thirty treaties negotiated by President Wilson and Secretary Bryan, twenty of which are already in force, providing for the employment of commissions of inquiry and for delay, with agreement not to de- clare war or begin hostilities while investigation is in progress. These were a few of the events attaching to the peace movement prior to the war. This movement was obnoxious to some, just as every great reform is opposed by people who seem to be decent and not wanting in intelligence. Indeed there are those who seem to be honest in believing that war is such a blessing that it ought not to be interfered with or entirely abolished. Nevertheless it appears from facts that the minds and consciences of leading Americans were committed to judicial methods and to some kind of international co-operation. How about the people? Here, as always, there ex- isted indifference, apathy and ignorance. The everyday life of men and women is too absorbing. They buy and sell ; they marry, raise children, struggle to pay their debts and try to amuse themselves. No, the preachers and reformers wanted a better order, but the masses had not been effectively reached. But the real question is, How will the United States feel and how will she act after the war? Speaking guardedly, believing, as I trust we all do, that we are waging a righteous war and that we must not waver or falter until the end is reached, we may expect an awakening of the popular mind to the need of a new world order. We can hardly hope that the war will be popular. Seriousness of purpose and determination will increase, but anxiety, dread and sorrow will increase still faster. The common man cannot contemplate with composure the increase of his taxes from four to tenfold. Some of course will be made rich ; many will be made poor and will suffer. If the war continues for two or three years, the futility and horror of such conflicts will be brought home to the hearthstones of the people (252) No. 2] WORLD ORGANIZATION 6l as never before. I predict that as a result, there will be an unprece- dented longing that the nations be brought into some kind of a league, that at least a society of nations be formed for the piurpose of securing and maintaining peace. The President has spoken for the nation in favor of the new order, using such broad generic terms as will not embarrass us when the time comes to act. The propaganda of the League to Enforce Peace has aroused much interest. While it has seemed to many that the emphasis was misplaced. Professor Taft and his associates have sounded the call to action in such a manner as to arrest the attention of many representative people. The World Court League believes that judicial settlement sustained by public opinion must be the central aim in any scheme of world organization. Just as the Su- preme Court of the United States is the tribunal of last resort for forty-eight empires on this continent, and its decisions have been ac- cepted without the use of force of any kind, so it is thought by many that a court of nations, by the dignity of its position and the majesty of its purpose, will compel respect and obedience. We can now see two leagues enforcing peace with effects which are deadly and damn- ing, viewed in the light of civilization. After the war, when all Europe is prostrated, when every home is in mourning, when the United States has poured forth her blood and her treasure in the cause of liberty and democracy, may we not ex- pect that there will be a new and stronger demand for world organ- ization to the end that justice, which has been dragged from her high place, may be re-enthroned, and that public opinion, which has been the sheet anchor of civilization at all times, may operate with irresist- ible power to make and to keep peace? The international mind which is being developed by the Great War, is susceptible of still further development, first, into international public opinion, growing out of knowledge and experience. The next logical stage of development would be an international will founded upon a universal sense of justice and a determination that unrighteous and cruel wars should forever cease. Miss Lillian D. Wald^ Head Worker, Henry Street Settlement, New York: So distinguished a scholar as Professor John Bassett Moore has said that after all we have to deal with human nature, and therefore I am not reluctant to bring a very brief contribution from the experience of those who are just folks. Mr. Moore also gave us a slight suggestion, quoting from a poet, that there was danger of (253) 62 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII people being over-proud. There is danger of being over-proud as to what we may do, and how we may appear also. I recall some years ago passing a little modest Chinese laundry. I had been accus- tomed to nodding good-morning to the two Chinese in that laimdry ; one day there was only one, and I said to him, " Where is the other one?" He replied, " Him in hospital; Chlistian gentleman hit him on head." That part of the United States that I know most intimately is, in a small way, practically a world organization, in so far as organization is meant to enable people to get together. I have never found that there was much difficultiy in fusing the individuals of peoples of very diverse nationalities when they have been linked by ties that are re- lated to their conunon life, their jobs, their children, their art, their heroes, their cost of living, or their rent. When thoughtful social workers are engaged in the so-called Americanizing process, they have been most careful to abstain from what might be called " spread- eagleism," or the more shallow expressions of patriotism. On the other hand they have endeavored to show how alike are the ideals of democracy and patriotism the world over. They have indeed tried to make Americanism evident to these people, to show them that Gar- ibaldi, Mazzini, Tolstoy, and Abraham Lincoln were the heroes of all and belong to all ; and I might say that that is in contrast to a rather absurd attempt on the part of some people who believe that love for country can be built only upon the argument that this country is better than others. Good Americans must mean good democrats, if there is any in- spiration in the word, and good democrats clasp hands the world over. The people themselves know and understand that America is resourceful and original, but we shall have to relinquish our leader- ship in democracy to Russia unless our wise men and women devise means and methods for a world organization that rests upon inter- national understanding of the people. This imderstanding and organization should not be made obscure by diplomatic technicalities of language. It should be spoken and understood by the simplest in all the land. There are no frontiers between people of honest thought and understanding. There are ties that exist and have existed, that have been expressed not only by the people and the understanding of the people who live together in the great cosmopolitan cities, but by the great scientific interna- tional societies, by the international organizations of arts, of medi- cine and of trade. Moreover, we have got to get into the daily habit (254) No. 2] WORLD ORGANIZATION 63 of thinking internationally, in terms of brotherhood. Perhaps if we do that we shall have to sacrifice some of our excessive nationalis- tic vocabulary ; we shall have to educate ourselves up to international- ism ; to rewrite our elementary histories ; to study the work of the ex- perts who are trying to perfect the machinery for world organization. If we are really in earnest, if we really mean what we say, then it will not be so difficult for the experts to devise the proper machinery. Mr. Moorfield Storey, Boston, Massachusetts: We all sympa- thize with the ideals which have been suggested to us this afternoon, but this is a practical problem, and I want to call attention to some very practical considerations. Nations in the abstract seem very much alike. What we are dealing with is something like sixty-eight millions of Germans who believe in morality and right, but who be- lieve th^t their culture is so far superior to the civilization of all other nations that they have a right to impose it by force upon their neigh- bors. We are dealing with Austrians, and we are dealing with Turks. It is suggested that there should be a congress of nations, that into that congress, if it is to succeed, the nations must all come with the common purpose of finding some way by which they can live together in peace. It will not do to have come into that con- gress Germany, Austria, Turkey, Bulgaria, not informed with that common purpose, not desiring to find a way to peace, but endeavoring to find some way to construct a new concert of nations which may enable them to force their culture upon their neighbors. Bear that in mind. Now, we cannot reach the German nation very easily, but we can reach our own. We can perhaps have some influence on the public opinion of this country. It is pleasant to stand here and speak of little Belgimn and little Greece and little Serbia and all the other small nations that exist on the other side of the water ; it is pleasant for us to preach the doctrine that those small nations are to be treated as our equals, and that we are fighting to give to them in the parlia- ment of nations every right that belongs to Russia or to Germany or to ourselves ; but the first step that we must take if we are to influ- ence other nations is to set our own house in order. We must preach by example as well as by precept. It will not do for us to preach about the independence of little Belgium, little Greece or little Ser- bia, if we are to be met with the question, " What are you doing with the little Philippines and Porto Rico and Haiti and San Domingo and Panama and Colombia?" If in that parliament of nations, we (25s) 64 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS say to Germany, " Your culture is not so far superior to that of England that you have the right to impose it upon France and Belgiimi," shall we not be met with the reply, " Well, is your culture so far superior to that of other nations that you have a right to im- pose it on the Philippines?" I read the other day in the Saturday Evening Post an elaborate article pointing out that we must organize China on our side, that we must send our exploiters into China, that we must have all the resources of that country under our control. I did not recognize in that article any suggestion that the Chinese should govern our country, or have any right to labor except in a latmdry, that they should have any right, indeed, even to escape the assault of the " Chlistian gentleman." But it is not only the people living entirely outside our own nation, it is not only our weak neighbors that we must consider, but it is our own fellow-citizens living here in our states, our colored fellow- citizens — ^men who, under our Constitution, have every right belong- ing to the highest in this country, which rights are yet denied to them. We know it. How could we, in this parliament of nations, assert the independence of the poor and the weak — the right of every man to think for himself and of every nation to think for itself, if we cannot in our own states protect men against being lynched, if we have not public opinion in this country to assert the rights of our own colored citizens? This is a practical question that comes home to every American citizen. Before we undertake to lay down the law to Germany, before we undertake to talk about this parliament of the world, which is to observe the rights of the weakest and the poorest nations in Europe, let us clear our own skirts. Let us make up our minds that when that parliament is established we will go into it with clean hands, prepared by our own record and our own example. Only under these conditions can we influence the nations on the other side of the Atlantic. May I add just one word with reference to education? A state- ment was made this afternoon that our children are trained so that they are ignorant of international matters. Teachers in colleges and schools should consider the teaching of foreign languages, history, political and social economy, and should teach so as to cultivate the international mind. If the people will support such forward move- ments, the charge made this afternoon against our educational system will not long be supported by the facts. (256) THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE ^ HAMILT@N HOLT Editor, The Independent THE President of the United States in his war message said that there were two purposes for which we were fighting: one, to make democracy safe on earth; the other, to substitute co-operation for competition in international affairs. He added that we have no quarrel with the German people as such, but only with the government which, for the time being at least, represents them. Over one hundred years ago the great German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, said in his essay on eternal peace, " We never can have eternal peace until the world is politically organ- ized, and it never will be possible to organize the world poli- tically until the peoples and not the kings rule." He added, " We have got to rid ourselves of that feeling of hatred and hostility that so many of us cherish against other races and other peoples and other creeds and other nations." Thus you see that the philosophy of probably the greatest of modern philosophers and the statesmanship of our great president ab- solutely coincide. Both say that the peace for which the world ought to work is a peace based on three things, good-will, democracy, and the political organization of the world. The idea of the League to Enforce Peace, perhaps the one constructive idea that has been born out of this war's universal destruction, was first given to the world at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, on June 17, 191 5, on the very spot where the United States of America was born. It may be that the little group of men who met there on that hot June day started a movement that will eventually lead to the united nations, just as their forefathers in the same place started a movement which led to the formation of the United States. 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 191 7. (257) 66 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII The idea of a world federation or a league of nations is as old as recorded history. We see it in the visions of prophets, poets, priests and philosophers from the beginning of time down to the present. We see glimmerings of it in the Greek philo- sophy; we see it in the Bible; Dante had the thought. Sir Thomas More expressed the complete idea of a world organi- zation in his Utopia, and William Penn and Benjamin Frank- lin and a host of others had their own theories. There have been actual attempts to form these federations, though I think I shall disagree with Mr. Snow, who said there had been no successful attempts. The Achaean League and the Amphictyonic Council have come down to us from ancient times. Then there is the great design of Henry IV, which you can read about in the Memoirs of the Due de Sully. Even the two ententes or alliances which brought about this war were also alliances for peace and defense. These loose organizations have generally become leagues of oppression as much as leagues of peace, and consequently have begotten counter-leagues. There have been closer federations of small states into large states like the Swiss Confederation, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, the United States of America and the British Empire, Federations have suc- ceeded, while confederations have generally failed. Possibly our best hope is to make the idea of the league universal, not against some other league, but against the common enemy of mankind, which is war. As far as I know, Mr, Andrew Carnegie was the first man who ever used the words " League of Peace," in his address to the students of St, Andrew's University in 1905, Mr. Richard Bartholdt, the president of the American Group of the Interparliamentary Union, proposed the same thing at Brussels in 1906. Seiior Ordonez, the ex-president of Uruguay, at the Second Hague Conference, actually intro- duced a proposition for the federation of the nations of the earth. Mr. Roosevelt, in his Nobel Prize address at Chris- tiania in 1910 proposed that there should be a league of peace maintained by force if necessary. (258) No. 2] THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 67 After the war broke out, at the suggestion of Mr. Theodore Marburg, of Baltimore, a group of political scientists, from Harvard and Yale and Johns Hopkins and Princeton and Columbia were invited to meet and discuss this problem. In the course of our discussions we received a questionnaire from a group in England headed by Mr. Bryce, who were working on the same idea. The work of the Englishmen helped us to put our ideas in order, and we agreed on a tentative plan, which was laid before a wider group consisting of such dis- tinguished men as President Lowell of Harvard University, ex-President Taft and Alton B. Parker. Then we agreed upon four propositions which have since become the basis of the League to Enforce Peace, and put out our program in Independence Hall, Philadelphia. Our committee on foreign organization got in touch with the foreign governments; first Mr. Asquith and Earl Grey of England came out in our favor; then M. Briand of France. At our first annual meeting in Washington, Mr. Wilson was pres- ent and made his epochal address. By that time we had re- sponses from other governments; even von Bethmann-Hollweg said, " We not only believe in this movement, but we should like to lead." Then President Wilson asked the Allies if they would join such a league, and all ten of them said they were ready to do it. Since then Switzerland and Spain and the Scandinavian countries have come in, so practically the work of the league has already been established. The responsible men in office have endorsed this idea. Five state legisla- tures have endorsed our program, and we have organized in every state of the Union except one. Twelve governors are chairman of our state committees, and we have behind the movement the leaders in almost all walks of life in this country. It is the only idea that has grown. The first principle is that the nations shall join a league and shall settle in a court all justiciable disputes. Is there anything radical in that? We have already done it again and again, especially in the Alabama case, which Professor Moorfe said was the high-water mark in arbitration. Second, we propose a council of conciliation to which all (259) 68 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII non- justiciable questions shall be referred for investigation and report. Mr. Bryan actually got the same thing through in thirty-odd treaties. Third, we propose that the signatory powers shall forthwith use their economic and military forces against any member that goes to war before taking its case either to the court or council. The fourth proposal is that the nations shall meet at stated intervals to make international law for themselves. The only thing that some persons object to is in the third article. The nations before they go to war must take their disputes to the court or council of conciliation, on pain of hav- ing all the other nations attack them. Observe that we do not say that we shall enforce the judgment of the court or council of conciliation, but only that we shall enforce a reference to that council before a nation goes to war. There are four stages in the development of international organization. The first is the creation of international ma- chinery by which reason can be enthroned on earth ; the second is the agreement to use that machinery ; the third is the putting of a sanction behind reference to the tribunals established ; the fourth is the putting of a sanction behind the decisions of the courts and the councils. The Hague movement has taken us into the first stage. Almost everyone in this country is ready to go to the second stage. The League to Enforce Peace pro- poses to go to the third stage, and compel the nations to submit their quarrels before they fight. The English group have gone farther and have suggested that the decisions should be sup- ported by force. We are perfectly willing that the decisions should be supported by force, but we do not think the United States would go into any such league. If the Monroe Doctrine should go before a court and be decided against the United States, we might then see all the other nations use their force to overthrow it. So as a matter of practical politics we think we had better not enter a league on such a basis. People have objected to the use of force in international relations ; but force is the universal fact on earth, and in the international realm we are more backward than anywhere else. Yet though we have been unable to abolish force in the state or (260) No. 2] THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE 69 nation, there are those who think we can abolish war in inter- national affairs. They say that force is war, that warfare is always bad, and that we commit a paradox if we make war to stop war. But as Bentham observes, peace is so important that it is right to fight, if necessary, to get peace. Moreover, there are two kinds of force — martial force and police force. The problem is how to eliminate martial force and have police force because the policeman acts not ex parte, but on the basis of reason enthroned in law. Since force has to be used everywhere on earth, the thing is to put force on the side of righteousness, at least for the present, and then go on, of course, cultivating the spirit of philanthropy, and good-will, in the hope that we shall have to use force less and less as time goes on. Let me say in conclusion that it seems to be the destiny of the United States to lead in this movement. The United States is the greatest league to enforce peace known to history. It is also a demonstration of the fact that all the peoples of the earth can come here and live in peace under one form of government. The chief value of our government is its de- monstration of the kind of government under which the peoples can live peaceably. Every president of the United States has advocated peace through justice. Cannot Woodrow Wilson, if he has the courage, the statesmanship — we know he has the vision — when this great world war is over, do for the world something similar to what George Washington did for our states when the Revolutionary War was over? If we learn nothing from this war, we have got to go back to competition in armament, and that means that the armaments go up until we come to the next great war. On the other hand, if we succeed, the tendency will be to have the armaments go down. We must have the universalization of the Monroe Doctrine by making every democracy safe and protected against subversion of its government. We have now to choose between the Europeanization of America and the Americanization of the world. (261) WORLD LIBERALISM^ LINCOLN COLCORD Public Ledger, Philadelphia WE are living today at the close of one era and at the beginning of another. The world has changed over- night, has changed radically and irrevocably, and can never again be the same world. Old gods are falling from their pedestals; new gods are rising on every hand. The change will be more complete and fundamental than the change which followed the French and American Revolutions, be- cause today all the forces of western civilization and all the hopes of human society seem to be involved in the struggle, because we understand better now than we did a hundred years ago the significance of such factors in the problem as labor and capital, the meaning of industrialism and even of democracy, and because we have a clearer sense of the relation of these factors to history and war. Thus the change will be deep, searching and constructive. And yet it may not be remark- ably apparent, for it will be a change mainly of ideas. In fact, do epochal changes in society ever become immediately ap- parent in the physical life of humanity ? One era merges into another, the scale ascends or descends by slow gradations, and the day after the revolution is very much like the day before. See how naturally man takes to industrialism, and gives up his age-long grip on the soil. See how easily he shifts from a simple pioneer environment to one of great complexity. He did not notice when the whole world changed. The turning- points in history escape the eye of the contemporary generation. They are as hard to visualize as is the hour of death to the healthy man. Only the watchers at the beside, the historians of the future, can state the exact hour when an era breathed 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, Long Beach, N, Y., May 29, 1917, For introductory remarks at this session, see page 154. (262) WORLD LIBERALISM 71 its last, or are able to comprehend the vastness of the change from life to death, from the thing which was to the thing which is no more. So a great era is passing, and we must look sharply if we are to grasp the true import of events. We who are in this room tonight, unless we fall in the war, shall in all probability have the magnificent experience of living in two worlds — of being born and reared and educated and of establishing our lives in one world, and of finishing out our work in another and a quite different world, a world as yet unborn. We shall have the inestimable privilege of helping to create this different new world, for it is to be born out of the ideas of men and out of their fierce love for truth and brotherhood. And the best news I know is that new and untried men shall have a hand in this undertaking, and that in the crash of the old order and the temporary freedom of the human spirit from traditions of organization, ideas may stand out in their real importance, and the true statesmanship of visionaries may come into its own. I have faith to believe that we shall see something practical accomplished yet, after the disastrous unpracticality of our promoters and organizers, and some sound progress at last, after all the false progress of recent generations. " The world is not bad," writes Madame Breshkovsky from Siberia; " it is only young, and comes from one degree of comprehension to a higher one." We stand face to face today with a civil war of western civili- zation. Nations of the same stock, of common root traditions, of fairly equal grades of social development, are busily and efficiently engaged in destroying one another. How did it happen? What does it mean ? Does it mean, in its whole ap- plication, the fight of democracy against autocracy? Does this explanation entirely cover the ground? The argument will not bear a candid analysis. It is unnecessary to go into detail, for the conquests of democracies are written on every page of history ; it is sufficient only to point out that the United States has not hesitated in the past to acquire territory by force of arms, and that she did not pause in her career of expansion until she had fulfilled her territorial destiny. Perhaps the (263) 72 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII day of predatory policies has gone by, and the democracies of the world will never again seek expansion by conquest. We hope that this is true ; although we shall need to see a demo- cracy willing to give up conquests in the cause of international welfare, before the ideal has been strictly proved. But we are speaking of the origins of the war, of the state of democracy before the great awakening. We are trying to grasp this elusive secret of international discord, this strong and constant force which runs through the life of democracies as well as of autocracies, which excites their rivalries, which drives them into encroachments and discriminations, which steadily tends to turn and defeat the aspirations of mankind for liberty, free- dom, equality, fraternity, and which, in short, obscures those very purposes for which democracy itself was first called into being. So the trouble plainly comes down to the fact that we can- not yet have found the true democracy. We are too apt to think of democracy as a modern ideal, as a fixed and achieved political entity. There has always been a measure of demo- cracy in human society; democracy is as old as man. The savage had it in elemental form, when he elected the natural leader as headman of the tribe. Real autocracy first came in with barbarism, with the growth of wealth and a simple form of industrialism. Through this development struck the Greek idea, the first definite conception of a republican state, an idea sound and philosophic up to the limits of human experience. But now, with less intellect, perhaps, but with more experience, we are able to see that the Greek idea was lacking in the deep- est fundamental, that it had no adequate conception of the equality and brotherhood of man. Then came the Christ figure, bringing its new message, almost the only new message which mankind has received in the last two thousand years — the message that the last shall be first, that the stone which the builders rejected shall become the head of the corner, that the secret of life is love — democracy again, in full expression now, for democracy is far more a religion than a political philosophy. Since that day, we have been striving to catch up with this great new message; and little by little as we have advanced, (264) No. 2] WORLD LIBERALISM 73 industrialism, beginning in the primitive arts and extending down through the long period of simple handicraft, always making wealth and contemporary with one form or another of autocracy, and always charged with the potential force of a gigantic new autocracy that should at length suddenly be loosed upon the world — industrialism, like a forbidding shadow, has kept ahead of us and clouded the way. Coming down to the time of the French Revolution, we tried with one bound to leap the gulf that divided us from the living truth, but found that we had not strength enough, and allowed our- selves to be led astray by the fascinating figure of Napoleon. A little later America seemed for a while destined to outstrip the danger; but strangely enough, through no apparent fault of ours, her purposes, too, became lost before long in the com- mon obscurity of new and inexplicable developments. How heavy this shadow has been upon us for the last half-century, we are only now beginning dimly to appreciate. For it is dur- ing this period that science has finally won the long battle with nature, and industrialism has burst upon the world with its full force and inevitability, with its frightful capacity for dis- aster, and with its unique and splendid promise of deliverance. The first two items already have been fulfilled; the last remains for us to realize. If we fail now, the world fails, and human- ity fails. Today Russia has spoken, and in her utterance gathers the whole significance of the war. Through the splendid Russian Revolution, the French Revolution has at last come into its own ; and hand in hand with America, Russia now stands ready to take the next step onward for democracy. I have said that it is difficult to determine the historic value of contemporary events ; but perhaps the factors are different today — perhaps our enlightenment is greater, or perhaps the events are more stupendous. However this may be, I think there can be no doubt that, even if it were to fail for its own generation as did the French Revolution, history will mark the Russian Revo- lution as the end of our old era and the beginning of our new. The great world war through which we are passing has suddenly precipitated many problems which only a few years (265) 74 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELA TIONS [Vol. VII ago were safely held in solution. It becomes fairly evident that an era of acute industrialism has taken western civiliza- tion unawares, and swamped a financial structure created in non-industrial times. The trouble centers in the banking system, in the manipulation of credits. The overturn which industrialism has brought about in modern society is precisely this: that the center of actual government has to a consider- able extent shifted from legislatures and executives and other embodiments of the principle of sovereignty, into the hands of new agencies, whose powers have not yet been properly defined or understood. For the main function of government ought to be to direct the creative energies of the nation. The new agencies in modern life into whose hands industrialism has given this important governmental function are such as those that control the source and manipulation of credits, or that control the source and distribution of news. Broadly speak- ing, the banks and the newspapers today possess the power measurably to foster or impede the creative energies of the community. But the banks and the newspapers are operated on a basis of private ownership, in the interest of a special class of in- vestors. This is the whole disastrous anomaty. The enormous new wealth of industrialism centers in private institutions which control its distribution to fresh enterprise, and in this way important governmental functions have become vested in agencies whose objects are the benefit of a special class rather than of the whole community. Bankers have only to make money for their stockholders. Thus they tend to mani- pulate credits along conservative lines. They bolster safe and established concerns, discourage expenditures for improve- ments, and frown upon new enterprise and daring ambition. Newspapers, run to make money, almost universally mani- pulate the news in furtherance of those agencies which guaran- tee them the largest immediate returns. All these forces, working on a highly industrialized society, exercise an indirect conservatism which is part of the average man's daily educa- tion, and a direct conservatism which is in essence a govern- mental function, and which throughout the world of business (266) No. 2] WORLD LIBERALISM 75 tends to blanket initiative and deaden the creative energies of the community. The predatory possessive faculties of man are emphasized at the expense of all his higher spiritual qualities. In this set of influences lies the main support for that spirit of imperialism which animates western civilization, alike in autocracy and in democracy. The same conservative agencies which refuse to foster improvement in method and equipment, to develop the community internally to its full creative power, constantly look abroad to new territory, to non-industrialized lands, for the fulfilment of their reactionary financial dreams. Under the pressure of tightening home markets, there is al- ways the lure of big and safe money in the undeveloped regions of the world. The whole system, with privilege in its pocket at home, depends for its life upon expansion, upon conquest of foreign opportunities. It cannot remain at rest; no human force can remain at rest. To expand naturally at home, it would be obliged to free the creative energies of the commun- ity, and that would automatically destroy its special privilege. The final step is obvious: foreign opportunity, once secured, must be cemented by sovereignty, and the home government is called upon to run up the flag. Here we have in brief outline the primary cause of any trade war, of any manifestation of imperialism. There is no reason why nations cannot peacefully compete in trade in the markets of the world. It need not hinder their development. They could easily enough expand in trade beyond their geo- graphical boundaries, and control the markets of the world by the measure of their energy and creative ability, rather than by resort to arms. Why must they be aggressive ? Where in all theory or practice is there justification for the belief that the spirit of nationalism and the spirit of conquest go hand in hand? WTiy cannot strong nationalisms live side by side, highly competitive and yet in perfect harmony? How have we fallen into the notion of thinking that competition in trade is a thing to fight over, while competition in the arts and sciences is a thing to agree upon? What hinders us from agreeing as well over competition in trade ? We have already (267) ^^ CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII answered these questions. Nothing stands in the way of true internationalism but an archaic tradition and a reactionary financial system, with their control of news and education and the free springs of industrial life. Internationalism is not by any means un-nationalism ; the true internationalism can never be anything but an equable agreement between nationalisms. From now on we are to live in a world of work and organization. Those nations which, man for man, are not willing to work so hard or to organize so efficiently as their neighbors, will inevitably die an economic death. Tariff walls, wars, even victories will not sustain them. Nothing will sustain them but the true spirit and energy of work, which means an injection of free creative impulses into an order of industrialism which western civilization has al- lowed to grow mainly on the material side. This brings us directly to a consideration of modern demo- cracy. The chief trouble with modern democracy has been the fear of executive authority. This fallacy gained credence after the French Revolution, was written into the American Constitution, and has lasted even until today. Political free- dom has been confounded with freedom from definite author- ity. Liberty has been confounded with lack of discipline. Political systems have grown and thriven on this tradition ; and it has been only within the last few decades that the people have discovered that in denying authority to their elected execu- tives, they have created a far worse power than the one they feared — a vague, indefinite autocracy, that could not be either found or made responsible. Since that discovery, the people have dashed frantically in this direction and that, in search of their lost liberties; they have tried various reforms and panaceas with no results; but all the while the unconscious development of democracy has proceeded soundly along the lines of centralization of executive power. And now the war has brought the question to an issue, and executive authority is seen in its real and normal perspective, as a simple applica- tion of life to government. There is nothing inherently unsocial in the principle of authority. Authority is life itself, the source of energy and (268) No. 2] WORLD LIBERALISM 77 achievement, the secret of social organization. When a piece of work is too big for the authority of the individual, thea he must delegate it. Government is delegated authority. It is only when authority is not sure of itself, when it has been ex- ceeded or usurped, that it becomes a menace to society. This is what we mean by autocracy. But delegated and responsible authority cannot be too strong. Authority is natural leader- ship; men have it by virtue of personality. The problem for democracy is not to limit authority, but to find its natural leaders and give them rein. They will not come forward un- less they are free to act. Free authority is the true servant of the people, whereas circumscribed authority is an in- sidious autocrat. The hereditary autocrat is closely circum- scribed, both by tradition and by fear; he is free to act only in one direction. Between a delegated authority and an heredi- tary authority there lies all the difference between democracy and autocracy. The only power strong and free enough to cut through the mesh of modern industrialism, to stand up against the conservatism of wealth, to control the spirit of privilege and imperialism, is the people's power, the power of a dele- gated authority. The true democracy does not aim to standardize human nature, but rather to sharpen its differentiations. It does not aim to pull its leaders down, but rather to exalt its leader- ship. Why be so inconsistent? This is the way we live. This is what individualism means. Democracy means it, too, if it means anything. All else is merely canting phrase or political humbug. The highest, farthest aim of the true demo- cracy must be to make all men aristocrats, artists in life, lovers of truth and reason, and searchers for enlightenment. For only the true aristocrat can be the true democrat. He alone is wise and generous enough both to govern and to submit to government. The war has organized democracy. And now they are talking of a trade war after the war. False democrats are looking back with longing eyes to the recent era of industrial disorganization and social inefficiency, and loose thinkers everywhere are catching up the cry. They are telling us that (269) 78 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII democracy will never be able to retain its organization beyond the period of the war, that in fact it should not retain it, and that if we do not prepare by tariff pacts and discriminations against the future, Germany will soon be again winning the fight for trade. Is it possible that this is all that we have learned? Are human freedom and liberty to be bought only at the price of in- efficiency? Must democracy always prove inadequate in time of crisis, and temporarily assume the forms of autocracy for her salvation? Shall she allow herself to be placed in the dishonorable position of taking over her competitor's organi- zation to crush her competitor, so that she may return in safety to her former state of disorganization? How does such un- sound doctrine gain a hearing? How are men willing to con- fess such poverty of ethics ? No, democracy is to hold what she had gained, and in the war after the war win on her merits, or not win at all. She is to win through organization, not in spite of it. She is to win through trade and industrialism, through their wonderful pos- sibilities of leisure and enlightenment when they shall be utilized for the benefit of the whole community, and through the new birth of the arts which Is certain to follow these late dark ages of democracy. Literally, there is no escape for her on the economic field. If you crush your competitor, a new competitor arises. The Idea has got abroad, the virtues of the organized state have been shown to the world. It Is for democracy to surround and encompass this idea, to make these virtues her own. There can be no danger so long as her organization remains In the control of delegated authority. This, I submit, is world liberalism ; I cannot see the problem in any other light. Let the democracies find their true states- men, let them subject their organization to natural leadership, and their leaders will attend to the organization of the world. I believe that this is to be the trend of the future. The war has searched out the vitals of democracy, and now America Is about to stand the test. Some of the methods of the adminis- tration may be open to question ; some of the daily events at Washington may be fit subject for criticism and disapproval; (270) No. 2] WORLD LIBERALISM 79 but I think there is no doubt that over and above such transi- tory matters, the President's larger policies already have emerged. History will remember these, and forget the rest. It is no light thing that America in this great crisis has found a leader able to seize hold of the future, to grasp the inevitable — a man who has come through much thought and study to a willingness to accept authority, who dares to overturn the en- tire tradition of American foreign policy, who has at last thrown the United States into the affairs of Europe, and who is at the same time one of the most uncompromising liberals the world has ever seen. (271) ECONOMIC ACCESS AND NEUTRALIZATION OF WATERWAYS ^ J. RUSSELL SMITH Professor of Industry, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania NATIONS are perishing fos the want of geographic imagination — imagination wide enough to compre- hend and act upon the fact that we live in a world as well as in a country. Economic access and neutralization of waterways is a half-idea. The whole idea is a league to enforce peace. From Adam Smith's day the fabric of economic theory has been the division of labor. It has revolutionized industry; it has revolutionized trade; it has revolutionized war. It is the application of division of labor to war that has made it so terrible. This same division of labor, by increasing our goods, has helped to a manifold increase in the numbers of men in the western world, and it holds the possibility of again multiplying our number and our comfort many fold. This has come about through the regional division of labor and ocean trade, giving the men of one place access to the resources of all the world. We have spent a century building up a world trade and a world interdependence, until finally it has got to the point where not only our comfort, but actually our physical life de- pends upon continued access to the sea and lands oversea. Witness Belgium where with access to the sea cut off the population is saved from starvation only by the charity of gov- ernments and individuals working through the highly organ- ized Commission for Relief in Belgium, depending upon the future for its pay. The fate of Belgium would come even more quickly to New England under the plan of conquest laid down by the German general staff, which is to cut America into two 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 31, 1917. (272) NEUTRALIZATION OF WATERWAYS 8l parts along the natural defense lines made by the Potomac, the Susquehanna, the Hudson, and Lakes George and Champlain. Grant continued trade, as of 191 3, and the population of our western world can yet increase several times over. But it all depends on access to the sea and sea trade. This means that access to the sea and peaceful trade is the greatest thing in the world, for upon analysis the object of everything is a chance to live, a chance to live a more abundant life. If one life is precious, ten lives are more so, ten million much more so, and one hundred million yet ten times more so. This possibility of more numerous lives and the more abundant life has come to us through modern science with trade and economic access to a temporarily neutralized sea. It must be perman- ently accessible and permanently neutral. Block a people off from the sea, and they perish. Two generations hence, with increased numbers, they would perish yet more quickly. Therefore the preservation of the life of peoples and the utili- zation of this earth as the home of man depends upon the un- interrupted flow of goods across the sea, the world highway which connects the many parts of the world and makes it one. A people should have no more question about their access to the sea than a New York store has about access to the street. And any particular nation should have no more control of the sea than the store has of the street, namely, the power to go and come freely and to treat all others properly and equally. How shall this economic access be guaranteed? How shall the waterways remain open and neutral? There is but one answer. It must be done by government, and governments act through force. We have been depending upon a flimsy thing called international law, which upon a real testing proves to be but a pious wish like the Golden Rule, upon which no people depends, but seeks its guarantee rather in statute, in government, in organization, all resting eventually upon force — the force of the policeman, which merges by indistinguish- able grades into the force of armies. The disillusionment of the world in the discovery that inter- national law was but a scrap of paper, accompanied by the in- dubitable proof that we had to have access to the sea or starve, (273) $2 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII has brought into the foreground of present politics that which, three years ago, was a distant dream, namely, the demand for world government, some world authority capable of making laws that nations must obey. We have suddenly discovered that this world, unified by a world's trade, upon which the very life of some peoples and the comfort and independence of all depend, must have a ruler, and the question now is, shall the ruling power be a nation acting with the irresponsible power of a despot, or shall the rule be exercised in the better way — by agreement of all, acting through some kind of international government or super-state? This much-desired step is, after all, but a natural next step in a world where government is one of the universal habits. Government has been gaining ground of late. Witness the United States. In 1789 thirteen independent nations became one nation, and peace has prevailed save during the period of the Civil War from 1861 to 1865, when certain parties tried to break up the league by appealing to armies rather than to votes. Italy, which was recently a group of independent king- doms, has become one kingdom. Germany, which was a group of states of various sizes and kinds, has become one empire, a belated follower of France and of the United Kingdom in the process of unification. We need but one more step in the unification, and seven or eight powers can keep the peace in the world as easily as the United States keeps the peace among the forty-eight states of this country. Despite this progress of government, and this hope of peace, we must not forget that anarchy, tempered by the proverbially short-lived and impotent gentlemen's agreements, is yet the present basis of international relationships. We hope to ban- ish it by the threat or use of irresistible yet just force exercised as the result of deliberation. We must not deceive ourselves by thinking that such a plan of peace-keeping can work by being limited merely to the neu- tralization of the sea. That might be satisfactory for the United States, for Japan, for England — countries that sit se- curely in the midst of the seas — but what of France or Holland, Germany or Austria, countries that can be menaced alike from land and sea? (274) No. 2] NEUTRALIZATION OF WATERWAYS 83 War is now the struggle of whole peoples, not the combat of champions. The line between the civil and the military is in an economic sense impossible to draw. Even a child can make munitions of war, and a contract Chinese laborer might be of more aid than the most characteristic of nationals. The giving to a nation such as Germany free commercial access to the sea might mean that she is strengthened for land operations in which all the cruelties of encroachment, of tyranny, of eon- quest and of subjugation may be practised. Therefore the neutralization of the sea has a qualitative aspect. It is open to those who obey international law; otherwise they must be imprisoned at home within their own boundaries. Access to the sea must at certain times and under certain conditions be denied to certain countries whose actions on the sea itself might be absolutely harmless. If, for example, we grant that the attack upon Belgium was a violation of world good manners, that the attack upon Serbia was another, the guaran- tors of the neutral sea must deny the offending countries access to the world sea until they have been brought to terms, which is therefore a land and a sea operation, an application of world government to the culprit through the full-fledged and perhaps cyclopean military operations of a league to enforce peace. Such operations, enforcing such a concept, bear sur- prising resemblance to the present situation in which almost the entire world is trying to defend itself and also France and Belgium against what seems to the rest of the world an unwarranted attack closely analogous to the depredations which strong and conscienceless animals have for ages been making against weaker and relatively defenseless animals. The sea, therefore, cannot be considered by itself. Economic access to the sea and the neutralization of the sea are parts of the concept of world government which must include both land and sea if the nations of the world are ever to come to the point where they can settle down in peace and feel as free from attack by one another as do the present states of the American Union. This is an ideal for which men of intelligence must work by the propagation of ideas, and which they must later firmly and continuously uphold by a league of peace armed and (275) 84 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII ready to fight to the point of holding in awe those who menace its peace. That plan is identical with the method followed within every American state and every civilized nation — but the units here are individuals and non-military corporations, while the league to enforce peace must deal with the much more truculent unit, the nation or even alliances of nations. It is a peculiar fact that such a league of peace will be peaceful just as long as its members are resolutely warlike, and not divided into nearly equal camps. The nation which is sure it has to fight the rest of the world will keep the peace. Hence the importance of public opinion. If some strong nation is uncertain as to world opinion, it might be willing to under- take a war for its own ends. Granting that Germany started this war (as most of us believe she did) it is reasonably safe to assert that she thought she was dealing with a chaotic dis- united world that she could conquer piece by piece. It is scarcely to be supposed that the German administration would have precipitated or permitted war had it been able to fore- see the world aligned against it as at the present moment Therefore the object of American public policy at this time should be to bring the world to such a condition that any nation starting a war unauthorized by the group would find itself the enemy of a world even more hostile than that in which Ger- many at present finds herself. The alternative of the past — anarchy and right of conquest armed by modern science and industry — is so dreadful that it should drive a thinking people into such concerted action. Granted such a guaranteed peace, the human race can pro- ceed to develop industries and society along the lines dictated by natural factors, especially climate. History and scientific investigation seem to agree that this line of natural develop- ment should be the clustering of urban and semi-urban manu- facturing populations in great numbers in regions of good commercial access and wholesome and stimulating climate such as western Europe, the eastern United States, and the shores of the north Pacific. From the centers of population there will be a huge trade with regions less favored by location, resources or climate, but able under conditions of order to produce vast (276) No. 2] NEUTRALIZATION OF WATERWAYS 35 quantities of food and raw material to exchange with the re- gions of concentrated manufacturing population. It is to the economic and perhaps to the social advantage of the race to make more regions like Massachusetts or Connecticut, which cannot feed themselves one month in the year. But this fact of dependence shows how vital to human affairs is the establish- ment of order in the world and of access to the world high- way— the sea. As to order, the examples of Haiti and San Domingo are most opportune. By the Monroe Doctrine they have been protected from foreign conquest. By the interventions of the United States forces, they have been protected from some of the extremes of internal disorder — private conquest from with- in. The so-called republics of Haiti and San Domingo have been through a course of treatment that is strikingly analogous to that of a delinquent family in any well-ordered municipality. They are excellent exhibits for the world organizer. The example of Haiti needs but to be extended to another hemi- sphere, made somewhat more judicial, and the small nation is protected from both conquest and chaos. The adoption and enforcement of such a policy, with the removal of the right of national conquest, would make easy and natural its corollary, namely, free access to the sea for the landlocked peoples. Here again we need only to spread to all the world practices already working to complete satisfaction in America. With the lust of world dominion under control, and free commercial access to the sea guaranteed, Germany has no more need of Holland and Belgium than Canada has of New England in January when her trade goes out through Boston and Portland, or than the United States has of Ontario and Quebec in June when our trade goes so freely down the St. Lawrence, Just as the street or the country highway Is open to all in- dividuals in a modem community, so must the sea be open to all nations, the members of the world community. Just as the individual has the right by condemnation to buy an outlet to the policed and protected public road, so must the land- locked nation have the right to untaxed outlet to this all-im- (277) 86 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS portant sea. The security of the outlets to the sea for Switzer- land and Serbia, for Russia and Canada, whether railroads, canals, or Dardanelles, should be as much the military concern of all nations as is the personal safety of the chairman of a meeting the concern of his audience if he should be physically attacked by one or more individuals. The extension of government until it is as wide-reaching as trade is the great task that economic development has imposed on human intelligence at this time. Intelligence must mobilize itself. (278) THE UNITED STATES AND THE FOOD SUPPLY OF SWITZERLAND ^ PAUL RITTER Minister from Switzerland to the United States I CAME to this conference to listen to its deliberations, and to extend a farewell to old friends and acquaintances made during my eight years of service as representative of the Helvetian Republic. But I cannot lose this opportun- ity of calling your attention to a matter of vital importance to my country. I have been asked in this very room if the food question was really of vital importance to Switzerland and if many of the American exports into Switzerland were really re-exported to Germany, as has frequently been stated in the American newspapers. That question gains significance when you remember that there is an embargo bill just now before Congress. In answer, I shall take the liberty of reading into the record part of a statement which appeared some days ago in the Journal of Commerce, from the pen of Mr. Eugene Suter, a patriotic Swiss merchant living in New York : The proposed amendments of the embargo section of the eas- pionage bill portend disaster to my native country, Switzerland, as their enactment would condemn that country to starvation. It can- not be the intention of the sponsors of that bill, much less the will of this great sister republic, to bring about the destruction of an innocent, peace-loving people for the mere sake of enforcing the complete isolation of Germany. Switzerland's very existence is dependent on her ability to trade with all belligerents. She has with great difficulty satisfied England and France of this necessity. Lengthy and repeated conferences with British and French commissions finally resulted in an under- standing of this, her present position. The agreement reached with 1 Address delivered at the National Conference an Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 191 7. (279) 88 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELA TIONS [Vol. VII these countries, which has been in force since the early days of the war and which was modified from time to time to cope with new conditions, is ample proof and constitutes a full recognition by the Allies of that fundamental necessity. The United States may have a right to demand that Switzerland stop her dealings with Germany, if she will see to it that Switzer- land is supplied from here with such indispensable materials as coal and iron, neither of which the Swiss can obtain at present from any- where else but Germany. Without these supplies Switzerland can- not exist, and as long as she must procure them from Germany she needs must furnish some of her own products, mostly milk and cheese, in exchange. The extent of this exchange between Switzerland and Germany has been limited to a minimimi, and even so, the arrangement means a great hardship to the Swiss people, as they have to sacrifice their own comforts in order to fill their most urgent requirements in raw materials. All imports and exports are closely supervised by the Swiss Import Trust, (Societe Suisse de Surveillance), a government organization whose duty it is to see to it that the agreements with the Allies are strictly observed. Under its control practically every pound of imported merchandise is accounted for. No goods find their way into Switzerland without its sanction. And needless to say, authority is granted only upon proof of absolute necessity. The deliberations now taking place in the Senate over this em- bargo bill disclose misunderstandings of Switzerland's position, and the passage of any of the proposed amendments would be nothing short of an indictment of an innocent and already severely tried people. It would deny the right of existence to a nation whose ideals resemble most those of the United States. It would seal the fate of the oldest of all republics, of the very country which has the exclusive right to the claim of parentage of democracy; it would annihilate the six-century old champion of independence and liberty. Few people over here seem to know what the Swiss have done in the way of offering relief to war sufferers on both sides. True char- ity hates publicity, and it never has been said of the Swiss that they advertise such deeds. I mention this merely because I think that a better knowledge of what is actually going on in Switzerland would help to correct a wrong impression which is being created by the American press through the dissemination of reports that the Swiss republic is helping Germany, because some theorists in Washington have come to the conclusion that this must be so since that country (280) No. 2] THE FOOD SUPPLY OF SWITZERLAND 89 has become such a heavy purchaser in the American market. If Switzerland buys five times as much wheat from the United States today as before the war, it is simply because she can can no longer get the other four-fifths from Russia and Rumania, as she did formerly. Giving Switzerland a chance to present her side of the case will serve a double purpose; it will avert a great disaster and it will reinstate a friendly but misjudged country to its rightful place. In conclusion, let me add that I have felt much at home in this assembly, not oftly on account of its proceedings, but also on account of the Red Cross flag draped on the walls. The Red Cross in the white field is nothing but the reversion of the national Swiss flag, the white cross in the red field. The emblem of the red cross was chosen when the society was founded in Geneva half a century ago by the Swiss citizen, Henri Dunant. For us Swiss, the Christian cross means char- ity, the white signifies the immaculate eternal snow on the crest of our natural mountain strongholds, and the red means the blood Switzerland has shed and will shed, if necessary, for the maintenance of that highest treasure of true democracy — liberty. (281) LABOR AS A FACTOR IN THE NEWER CONCEP- TION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS ' JANE ADDAMS Hull-House, Chicago MAY I begin by re-stating my subject? Owing doubt- less to the general illiteracy of Chicago, a telegram reached me in such a state of confusion that I thought I had been invited to speak on Labor as a Factor in the Newer Conception of International Relationships. This combination of a sub-title with the leading title of course, was very long, but it seemed to me no more complicated than everything else which pertains to the vexed problems of inter- national readjustments. With your permission I will keep it. I shall not undertake to speak for organized labor, because as you well know, the more than twelve million men the world around who are organized into trade unions, hold their national conventions annually and for many years have maintained the custom of sending fraternal delegates from one national con- vention to another. Trade unionists are, I believe, a great fac- tor in forming newer conceptions of international life, and al- though they, like other men in this day and generation have been swept from all other ties by a strong nationalistic loyalty and are in many cases fighting against each other, they still hold their common body of doctrines and their mutual inter- ests. Many of them believe they will eventually become re- united upon the basis of a broader conception of international- ism. They are taking care of themselves, but I should like to speak for a few moments for that other very large body of unorganized labor, ordinarily designated as "immigrant labor," which is manifested every year in large migrations of men from one country to another. Those of us who know Italians ^ Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 31, 1917. (282) LABOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 91 hear many stories of their compatriots who go every winter to South America. By the simple device of crossing the equa- tor after they have garnered their own crops, they avoid the cold in both hemispheres and are always earning money. You easily recall the Ruthenians, who go every year into Germany to gather the crops there, and many other migrations which I need not enumerate. I will only remind you of our own immigration figures; that in 1914 something more than a million immigrants entered the United States and during the same year a very few less than half a million returned to their own countries. At times an Italian can go from Chicago to Napks for $26.60, and if his children are little enough to go free, it is often cheaper for him to take his family back to Naples for the winter than to pay a coal bill in Chicago. Of course in this mobilization of labor, many men are engaged on an itinerant basis, without reference to the standard of living in any country, although a recent proposition that Chinese men and their families should be brought into Mon- tana and other western states, in order to supply the shortage of labor due to the war, was rejected on the ground that the American standards of living might be permanently lowered. The result of this constant migration of labor is a network of personal acquaintance and kindly relationship on an inter- national basis, which, I imagine, none of you adequately real- izes, unless you have seen men who hare been divided for centuries by language and religion, fusing together in the mar- velous way we constantly see in the settlements. So far as labor is mobilized and annually crosses from one side of the world to the other, there is doubtless forming at the very base of society a new conception of international relations. I should like to draw your attention to the fact brought out earlier at this conference, that by no means all of this migrating labor is free labor. We were told, at one of the sessions, of the indentured labor in the West Indies; at an- other, the speaker referred to ten million black men who had lost their lives, exploited by Europeans in South Africa. This tragedy was a result of the same sort of ruthless exploita- tion as has been applied to the rubber workers in the Congo, (283) 92 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII or to the diamond workers in the Kimberly mines. There has, however, come into the minds of many persons dur- ing the past few years, in regard to this exploitation of labor going on all over the world, a belief that such labor is en- titled to protection, and that when certain bodies of men liable to exploitartion live under governments that are not able to give it to them, adequate protection should be provided on an international basis. Why should not labor in a country like South Africa be put under international protection exactly as publicists are recommending that certain sections of the globe which seem to afford so much temptation to rival nations that they cannot stay out of them, should be thus protected? You remember that Mr. Lippmann has urged that certain specified localities should have international commissions to take them in charge, because apparently their resources, unprotected by a stable government of their own, were too much for human greed to withstand — or shall I say plain human nature, instead of human greed? International commissions for special pur- poses are not without precedent, and some of them have been maintained in the face of many difficulties. As you know, an international commission has continued even throughout this devastating war to take charge of the conrunerce of the Danube, as the big river flows past belligerent states. Other specialized international commissions have been sug- gested. Professor Hull advocated at this conference that one should be appointed now to sit throughout the rest of this war, in order to take charge of the conquered lands, at least so far as lands conquered by the Allies are concerned. He con- tended that it would be much easier at the end of the war to dispose of these lands in an equitable manner, if they were be- ing administered by an international commission, than if they were held by the particular nations which had made the con- quest. If the German colonies which are now held in South Africa by the British could be taken over by a special com- mission until the war was ended, and an international confer- ence on terms of peace could decide what to do with them, that in itself would be a great gain. (284) No. 2] LABOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 93 Might we not propose a similar intemation£il commission for the protection of labor which is now under governments too feeble to offer protection or which is so migratory that it can- not properly be protected by any one government? What would be more natural than to begin the new international morality, so sorely needed, with that simple impulse to protect the weak which, we are told, was the beginning of individual morality, as the defense of women and children in the tribe was the beginning of the national morality of which we are now so proud ? Beginning naturally with defenseless labor, such international commissions might in time even take care of other things beside labor. At the present moment it seems absurd, does it not, that it is impossible to build a railroad to Bagdad, to provide corridors to the sea for landlocked states, or to secure warm-water harbors for Russia, without involving the world in war? Many of us believe that this war, as so many other wars, is not so much the result of quarrels between na- tions, as of an unsuccessful endeavor to obtain through war that which could not be obtained in times of peace because no inter- national machinery had been provided through which we might solve world problems which had become intolerable and un- bearable. We are told that in all civilized nations statesmen are longing for some sort of international organization which will enable them to take care of complicated situations sure to arise during the coming years, as they have arisen in the past. Why might not statesmen begin with international protection to simple people whose labor is constantly exploited? There are three great human instincts or tendencies, ex- hibited in striking degree by laborers, organized as well as unorganized, which I believe will in the long run result in finer conceptions of internationalism. The first, the Russian peasant BondereflF defines as the instinct for " bread labor." The peasants all over the world magnify and consider obliga- tory that labor on the ground which is destined to feed a man, his family and his neighbors and, so far as he is able, all the people on the face of the earth. When our committee from the Women's Congress at The Hague was in Austria-Hungary in 191 5, we were continually told stories — which we received (28s) 94 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII with a grain of salt because related by Austrians — of Russian soldiers who throughout the spring had been made prisoners easily because they had heard that war prisoners in Austria were working upon the land. The Russian soldiers had said to their captors that now that spring had come they must get back to work, and that they would like to be made prisoners at least long enough to put the seed into the ground. Such stories may have been exaggerated, but certainly they are not alien to the temperament of the Russian peasant, who believes that " bread labor " is his sacred duty, and who, longing to go on with it, regards war as an interruption of the main business of his life. There is another characteristic of human nature which I be- lieve counts in the same direction — ^that which Professor Veblen has designated as the instinct of workmanship. Mr. Wells has recently told us that this war is a destructive and dispersive industrialism, which has taken the place of the constructive and accumulative industrialism with which we are all so familiar. Accepting this definition, it is of course an open question how long mechanics will be able to go on with this reversal of the experiences of a lifetime, how long they can continue to defy and outrage the training they have received as apprentices. One of the British commissioners told us a few weeks ago, of having been sent on a committee to France in order to take out of the trenches skilled mechanics who were much needed in the munitions factories at Sheffield. He said that the response on the part of the men in the trenches was very touching and im- pressive. The fighting mechanics were hungry for " the feel of tools" in their hands; they longed to lay down their muskets in order to take up the implements to which they had been so long wonted. The English commissioner did not challenge the patriotism of these mechanics, who were quite ready to fight on to the end of the war, if it was so ordered ; but he was much impressed with their eagerness to return to a more normal life and to use again the implements to which their very nerves and muscles had become accustomed. Is not the instinct of workmanship a genuine factor in human exist- ence, and one that should not be underrated in a world of internationalized industry? (266) No. 2] LABOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 95 There is still a third characteristic which those of us who have lived with humble people realize is highly developed among them. It is difficult to describe, and I put it much too baldly, when I call it a certain reverence for food. Food is the precious stuff which men live by, that which is obtained with difficulty at every step in a long and toilsome journey; it is the cherished thing which they have seen come into the house in small and often insufficient quantity since they were children, until it has come to have for them almost the sacra- mental quality of life itself. There is among simple people everywhere a revulsion against the destruction of food. In the peasant's dread of war, there is a passive resistance to the reduction of the food supply, because a peasant well knows that when a man is fighting he is not producing food, and that he and his family and all the rest of the world may be in danger of starvation. This comes to have the strength of a conscien- tious deterrent in some minds. I was in Paris during the Boer War of 1900, and one morning I found the street in front of the studio in which I was living filled with an excited group of French men and women. The cause of their feeling was a re- port in a morning's newspaper in regard to the destruction of food in South Africa, which at one stage of the war, as you recall, became part of the compaign ; grain was systematically burned, as were the bodies of cattle, which were piled high and covered with kerosene. Such destruction seemed to the thrifty French impossible of belief — a horror almost beyond the horror of the loss of life to which they had grown some- what accustomed during the war. The need of feeding the young, which the workman is obliged to think about all the time if he is to rear his family at all, goes back to primitive times when men's lives depended upon their ability to gamer the harvest. In the present dis- ordered state of the world's food supply and in the interruption of the orderly exchange of those commodities upon which the whole world has come to depend, the fear of famine has re- turned into the world with many other primitive and half-for- gotten fears. This concern for the common food suppl}^ may prove a factor in what I should like to believe is at least the (287) 96 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS beginning of a basic conception of international life. The hope comes to me sometimes that in these dark days when men are being thrown back to their earliest and most primitive experiences there may be an opportunity to lay over again the old foundations of morality. The instinct to protect the men who are being exploited to the point of extinction is certainly very similar to that instinct which led the tribe to protect its weakest members. If we are forced to exchange food with our alien enemies, it might be analogous to those first interchanges between tribe and tribe, when a shortage of food became the humble beginning of commerce and exchange. Such a con- ception of international relationship may be sound not only because it is founded upon genuine experience, but because it reaches down into the wisdom of the humble. I hope I have not stretched the use of the word " labor." We have long been accustomed to think of labor as organized by skilled men ; but after all, there is a great deal of labor in the world, of hard, unremitting toil, carried on by men who are totally untrained, many of whom have no opportunity to attain to a higher standard of life except as it is assured to them through some sort of governmental action. Such a beginning of a newer conception of international relations and more basic international ties, is totally unlike the mid-Victorian notion of organizing the world through a conference of wise men, quite unlike some of the newer plans which are being put forward and for many of which I have the keenest sympathy ; but whatever new international organi- zations may be consummated, it is not impossible that the inter- national morality upon which their usefulness depends, will begin, as individual morality has begun, with the simple func- tion of protecting the weak and of feeding those who are hungry. (288) SOCIALISM AND THE TERMS OF PEACE ^ MEYER LONDON Congressman, Twelfth District of New York I INTEND to speak about intelligent labor, labor with a philosophy, the sort of philosophy that is known throughout the world as socialism. I shall speak of socialism as a factor in international adjustment. One of the great scholars of socialism said some fifty years ago that the salvation of the world will come when the labor- ing class and the intellectual class reach an understanding and unity. I believe that the emancipation of the world will come when the laboring class will become the intellectual class of the world. I use the word labor in the broadest possible sense. It takes in the bricklayer, the architect, the professor (some professors), the minister (very few of them) — men who do useful service to the community. The socialists had a definite attitude on this subject of international peace and international relations, and before this world catastrophe, in all the parlia- ments of the world, they protested against the maintenance of large armaments, against the imperialists, against annexation, against the chauvinist, against false patriotism and a false con- ception of national honor. They everywhere taught that re- ligion and the ethics of religion were absolutely worthless un- less applied to life. They maintained the doctrine that it is wrong to have two codes of ethics, a Sunday code for the church, where men listen to the Sermon on the Mount, and a week- day code which involves a defiance of every principle of the Sunday code. While some of them in this crisis of the world have taken a course of action that appears contrary to their well-settled philosophy, throughout the world they dream 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 191 7. (289) q8 conference on foreign relations [Vol. VII and hope today, and soon they will begin to fight to bring about universal peace. What is the foundation of the universal peace that they talk about? First of all, they would eliminate the theory of national honor which in most cases is identical with na- tional pride. They proceed upon the theory that a nation's honor cannot be injured by another nation; that a nation can dishonor itself by committing a dishonorable act, but that it cannot be dishonored by others. They proceed upon the theory that every nation, small or great, no matter how small its territory, or how limited the group that composes it, has the same rights, and should enjoy the same rights that are now enjoyed by the largest nations. It is rather interesting that the higher stages of civilization were reached by nations when they were numerically small. Greece, ancient Judea, in modern times England, produced their highest and noblest literature when their population was smaller than that of one of the smallest states of the Union. The Scandinavian countries in recent times have produced an incomparable liter- ature. Greatness and bigness are not the same thing. Every nation, no matter how small or great, is entitled to the same rights according to the attitude of labor, and when the Presi- dent of the United States in his recent proclamations to the world announced that every nation, whether small or great, should be permitted to travel its own life-course unhindered, untrammeled and unafraid, he but stated a fundamental prin- ciple of our socialist philosophy. We believe that the main- tenance of armaments is the greatest source of danger to the world, and that this sacrifice of lives that we are witnessing today, this whirlpool of blood which is also accompanied by a whirlpool of words from statesmen, philosophers and diplo- mats— that this sacrifice will be in vain unless it results in a universal agreement for the abolition of armaments. All the numerous codes that the diplomats and lawyers may devise will snap at the first moment of serious conflict if the nations are permitted to maintain large armies. I have heard some of our great statesmen, among them former President Taft, advocating — and this idea is supported (290) No. 2] SOCIALISM AND THE TERMS OF PEACE gg by a good many statesmen abroad — a league to enforce peace. In his scheme Mr. Taft draws a distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable disputes; in justiciable disputes the decision of the court is to be final, while in non-justiciable disputes the court is to act as a mere negotiator or a mere medi- ator. The theory of non-justiciable disputes is based upon a false conception of national honor, the false idea that one nation may be dishonored, insulted or offended by another. In private life, when I am offended by somebody, I avoid him. In international life the only way to punish a nation which offends against the accepted code of right is to isolate that nation from communication with the rest of the world. Fundamentally and in the main, the address of the President delivered on January 22, 191 7, before the Senate of the United States, expressed the philosophy of that part of labor through- out the world that is intelligent. In pursuance of that philo- sophy several efforts have been made since the beginning of the war to bring about an international conference. There were two conferences in Switzerland; there is a conference now planned for Stockholm. Of course it would be improper for me to criticize the refusal of our State Department to grant permission to three American socialists to attend that Stock- holm Conference; but I must say a word about it. Let us assume the worst, that the Stockholm Conference has been engineered by the Germans; still it is absurd to prohibit British and French and American socialists from having their say at that international peace conference. Let us not become the leaders of reaction. See what hap- pened in France. The French socialists did their duty as men and as socialists when they supported the French government, which meant the French people, in defending French territory against attack. When the question of the Stockholm Con- ference first came up, the French socialists took the position that they would not confer with the German Social-Demo- crats so long as there were German soldiers on French territory. That precluded the holding of the conference dur- ing the war. Later they decided to participate. Why, then, should we prevent the socialists of the world from coming to- (291) lOO CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII gether and hearing the truth from honest men, so that Frenchmen, Germans, Englishmen and Scandinavians may- exchange views and tell the truth to one another? It seems to be the only way to learn the truth. Why cannot a conference of honest men, who mean what they say, come together, whether at Stockholm or Petrograd or anywhere else? It is particularly essential now, in order to help along the struggle of democracy in that great land of sorrow, Russia. It is highly important that the British and French and American socialists should go to the Russian so- cialists and say, " Stand with us ; hold on a little while longer, fight along with us, and we will settle this world trouble, and settle it on terms which will insure universal peace." Did any of the American papers ever tell you what was going on in Russia? Were you not astonished when the revo- lution broke out ? Today there are people childish enough even to believe that the revolution was a sudden breaking forth of un- controlled forces and that there was no real cause for it. A year ago, in the Duma, Professor Miliukoff, now respected all over the world, said that there is a level below which a nation can- not sink without losing the right of membership among the civilized peoples of the world, and that the policy which was being followed by the autocracy would destroy Russia. Not a word of this was heard in the American press. In Russia particularly the socialist element has asserted itself, and has shown its strength. Do not be frightened by it, you business men. You perhaps have the idea that the Russian socialists want to take away from you what you have, and turn it over to the masses. Nothing of the sort; the Russian socialists realize that they cannot bring about a social revolution in a day. They are students and scholars; they know that progress is a slow and painful thing. In the world of international relations they are determined to fight for no false end. They want peace without annexation and without pun- ishment for any people. They want to restore Belgium to the Belgian people, Poland to the Poles; they want to settle the question of Alsace-Lorraine on a basis which shall insure (292) No. 2] SOCIALISM AND THE TERMS OF PEACE joi future peace to the world ; they want to secure the rights of the smaller nationalities, of Serbia, of Montenegro, of every little group of people throughout the world. Socialism, or labor with a philosophy, labor with a faith in a better future for mankind, believes in a peace which will secure to the individ- ual group and to the individual nation the same right that every intelligent man and woman wants to see secured to the humblest human being in every civilized community. (293) SUPPRESSED NATIONALITIES AND THE CON- SENT OF THE GOVERNED ^ FRANCIS HACKETT Editor, The New Republic MANY of us look forward to the time when warlike nationality will be as discreditable as warlike reli- gion. On this account I dislike even to mention the word nationality. It is a word with an unfortunate insistence on a single aspect of human particularization. It lays most of its emphasis on the differences between man and man, and it suggests an extreme pleasure in disparaging comparisons. For the most part, the particularization of nationality comes to be a social nuisance, as well as an act of supererogation. Every healthy citizen has a nationality, just as he has an in- hereHt perfume, but he has no great need to insist on either. And nationalism is the poorest of social programs. Rather it is no program at all, but wherever justified, the prelude to a program, having about the same relation to a creative activity as the establishment of a minimum wage. Nationalism, in- deed, is a way of expressing the need for a spiritual minimum wage. And yet we are here to consider the emphasized na- tionality of oppressed groups, and the degree in which the nationalist claims of these groups may be held paramount. It is not a question of our personally electing to sharpen the dif- ferences between man and man. It is simply a question of our accepting differences that already have been murderously sharpened, and of considering what might possibly be done about them. The small nationalities that suggest the word oppression are those unhappy nationalities which have a recent imperialized ^ Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 31, 1917. (294) SUPPRESSED NATIONALITIES IO3 history. It is not Switzerland or Holland or Sweden or Nor- way or Denmark that one regards as oppressed, even though these little states are now clubbing together to issue forlorn moral injunctions against the deluge. In their distinctiveness these small nationalities may seem questionable to persons who want to hurry up standardization; but the real problem is not presented by such self-governing terrier nations, but by the groups that have been impounded by empire. In connection with oppression we think offhand of Belgium, of Poland, of Finland, of the Balkan states, of Ireland, of Schleswig-Hol- stein and of Alsace-Lorraine — and if we are particularly lachrymose and sympathetic, of the prospectively oppressed smallish nationality of Ulster. It is in regard to the national- ist claims of such balked and persecuted peoples that it is ad- visable to take thought Now that we are allied with a menagerie of other nations in a vast confused war, it might be palatable to include na- tionalism with democracy and the rest of it, with addenda about the libertarian importance of violating Mexico to run a railroad from Texas to the Canal. But it is simpler not to up- set the issue by a prolonged reference to our allies or their vague beneficent intentions toward small nations. Considering what Russia has done to Poland and Finland and Persia, and Japan to Korea and China, and England to Persia and the Boer republics and Ireland, there need be no haste to prepare the fatted calf. The espousal of national issues that was proclaimed by Mr. Asquith at the beginning of this war was the ordinary ritual of edifying liberalism. It was not realistic. So long as great empires require eminent domain, and small nationalities lie in their path, the overriding of small nationalities is going to be imperative, and assurances will be as empty as widowers' vows. The only world in which small nationalities could possibly be guaranteed safety would be a world in which every empire had resigned self-preference and every government had be- come democratized. Just so long as economic self-preference and undemocratic governments obtain, it is insincere nonsense to talk of small nations' rights under public law. That kind (295) I04 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII of law is public only in the sense that it is vociferated. It has no bottom in consent and no domicile in the ordinary circum- stances of international rivalry. The complete alteration of those familiar circumstances is the first preliminary to any talk about small nations' rights that is not merely the whang of the liberal tuning-fork. Military necessity is the supreme consideration in the pres- ent anarchistic world, and no small nationality can hope to have any powers that might jeopardize the security of a larger state. The subjection of every such small nationality is the first requirement of empire. It may easily lead to oppression. It usually does. But however the world at large may deplore it, there can be no effective way of stopping it while the plea of " military necessity " has weight. There is no use disguis- ing the fact that one of the appropriate features of the present international scheme is the ruthless oppression of small na- tionalities, or else the complementary exorbitance by such small nationalities, when they in turn see a chance to squeeze. If there ever was a general relinquishment of imperial designs, no small group would be forced to look on an empire's diffi- culty as its own opportunity. The present scheme of things, however, gives the greatest inducement to a small nation to profit by recalcitrance and to a large nation to resort to brutal- ity. In the end, as we know, the likelihood of brutality is con- siderable, and once a large nation starts out on the road of coercion, monstrosity becomes the order of the day. Imperial aggrandizement is the other purpose that small nationalities are required to serve. The very processes by which an empire undertakes to subject the people for military reasons are processes that can be, and usually are, turned to bureaucratic and commercial profit. Long after the military reason is forgotten, the plunderous reason remains, and na- tionalism is discovered by the members of the ruling race to be a pernicious small-mindedness. " Backwardness " is the excuse that the aggrandizers always find for going ahead where they can make no point of military necessity or na- tional honor. There is undoubtedly such a thing as back- wardness, the failure in weak and primitive groups to organ- (296) No. 2] SUPPRESSED NATIONALITIES IO5 ize and co-operate. But the imperialistic remedy for back- ward nations is somewhat too reminiscent of Little Red Rid- ing Hood. In the situation it is difficult, if not a travesty of political science, to talk of the consent of the governed. Whatever the governed may desire, in their condition of military subjection and organization for profit they can obtain nothing that really resembles political independence. There is no reason in na- ture, for example, why an Englishman should govern an Irishman. It is, on the face of it, one of the most foolish pieces of intrusion that the world has ever seen. Yet there can be no question of complete Irish independence at the present time, or so long as English security demands a military subjection of Ireland. There are Irishmen who think the incapacitation of England is the way out for Ireland, and who expect in that fashion to attain the freedom which England now trembles to allow. But who is so childlike as to forget that another bene- ficent empire would immediately come along to take Ireland under its wing if only as a juvenile delinquent? The hope for Ireland abides precisely where the hope for all small nationali- ties is abiding, in a peace by the terms of which all imperial- isms will be heroically neutralized. Americans may not think that this concerns us, but there is no reason on earth to suppose that it does not. When military necessity requires it we are just like every one else; we are under no special natural obligation to solicit the consent of the governed. It is not merely that we have asserted our eminent domain over Colombia, and put Haiti and Santo Domingo and Nicaragua in their place, but we have practised and do practise oppression ourselves in regard to the Indian and the Negro, whenever it suits us. Don't let us forget that within a few days fifteen thousand Americans at Memphis gathered together to burn a black human being at the stake, and that as he was burning men fought each other to hack off his ears, and later carried his bloody head in triumph into the city of Memphis, and there flung it and his severed foot into the mud of the streets. Incidents like this show the oppression that almost any American community can promptly precipi- (297) I06 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS tate. The temper of this incident is the temper of all inter- national hideousness, even though the incident be not strictly institutional. Where the small nationality can be so handled that its par- ticularism is not prejudicial to the empire requiring its sub- ordination you get the miracle which Australia and Canada and South Africa have presented. There you have the sub- ordinate groups accepting on their own account the military necessity of the whole. To procure this result, however, there must be no economic manipulation of the subject people by a protected and privileged alien class. The agents of govern- ment in such communities must accept the idea of military necessity, but they must be representative of the people they govern, and spring from their ranks; and if they are represen- tative in this degree there will be none of that discrepancy be- tween governors and governed which has made Ireland and still makes Ireland the skeleton at every British love feast. The degree to which the governed are consulted is the de- gree to which government is worth the support of the common man. That is the faith which the founders of this country knew to be incompatible with the concessionaire attitude of England, which the Russian people know to be incompatible with czarism, and which all of us know to be incompatible with Prussification. That does not mean of course that minorities may behave like the familiar office associate who will either have his way or resign. It is a faith that there cannot be a disastrous discrepancy of purposes if all groups are honestly consulted and the social deal is openly carried out. In respect to small nationalities, however, it is my belief that they cannot be honestly consulted so long as governments look to aggran- dizement by warfare, or so long as white races look to self- pensioning at the expense of colored folk. Those of us here who are not the parasites of the ruling class ought to consider this when we talk of the rights of small nationalities. There can be no such rights in a world where men go hankering after isles in the Caribbean and already talk of exacting blood -money for the blood that their brothers are about to shed. (298) LIBERAL ENGLAND AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS ^ S. K. RATCLIFFE Editor, Sociological Review ; American Correspondent, Manchester Guardian IF there is one circumstance which makes me realize my great fortune in being allowed to address this conference, it is that I am asked to follow my friend, Mr. Francis Hackett. I should not be surprised if he felt a kind of mali- cious satisfaction in my having to speak after him, for he real- izes that I am the only delegate at this conference belonging to the nation whose policy he has so vividly characterized. He knows also that I am one of those associated with " the cus- tomary ritual of edifying liberalism," and too many of my edi- torials have sounded " the whang of the liberal tuning-fork." I belong to that section of English opinion which was con- verted thirty years ago to the principle of self-government for Ireland. While I do not think that England has done its best to settle the Irish problem, what I do say is that those in England who have been convinced that there was only one solution for the Irish problem have not been assisted as they should have been, either by their own leaders or by the leaders of opinion in Ireland, to do their best to get the thing out of the way. We have a dual complaint against those Irish pa- triots who have been urging their own countrymen toward the home-rule solution. The first is that they themselves have been given over so largely to the keeping alive of international recriminations, and to that violent kind of nationalist agitation of which Mr. Hackett so accurately spoke. Secondly, they, like ourselves, have failed to deal directly with the problem within the problem. Instead of looking at Ulster and facing the facts of that small, exclusive, and fanatical community, ^ Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 31, 19 17. (299) I08 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII they acted as though it didn't exist. It was our business to understand what Ulster was, and what Ulster meant, what Ulster would take and would not take; it was their business to persuade Ulster with regard to the future of Ireland. In this connection I am reminded of a jibe of Mr. Hackett's as to the British treatment of the Boer republics. The fact I believe, that the world first of all remembers about the Boer republics is that after we had made an aggressive war upon them, we did our best to redeem the past. Here is a story you may like to have. When the subject of the future of the Boer republics which had been incorporated in the British Empire was being considered, the then Liberal prime minister, Campbell-Bannerman, was talking with a distin- guished Canadian statesman. He spoke about the great pres- sure that was being brought to bear upon him in reference to delay in the granting of self-government to the Boers, and asked, " What is your advice? " The Canadian statesman said: "In 1837 Canada was in revolution. You trusted us. Have you ever had any reason to regret that action? Do the same for South Africa, and you will have the same result and the same response." Campbell-Bannerman said, " By God, I will ! " — and he did it. As a result, we have had South Africa in this war lined up with the older self-governing colonies of Great Britain, and the disruption of the British Empire has been averted. Now, I submit that the policy fin- ally adopted in imperial affairs by Great Britain is apt to embody the moral judgment of the people. It was so in Canada; it was so in India, after the horrors of the mutiny; and it was so in the treatment of the Boer republics after that protracted and disastrous Boer War. We come out right in the end, although, as your papers are always telling you, we may make every imaginable blunder in the process.. It would be impossible for an Englishman addressing an American audience in these days to refrain from saying a word in regard to the relations between the two countries, and especially the change that has come during the last few weeks and months, with the Russian Revolution and the entry of the United States into the European conflict. It was impossible (300) No. 3] LIBERAL ENGLAND 109 before this for anyone to speak with complete sincerity about the line-up of the freer nations of the world against a military menace. It is now possible for us to do it. The change means for you that that old national detachment of yours is over. Under the pressure of irresistible forces we in England gave up our splendid isolation, of which the newspapers used to be so proud. You have had to re-read, as in the modern world we have to re-read, every scripture of the older time — the Monroe Doctrine and the Farewell Address of George Wash- ington. You have had to learn that citizenship in a modem state implies world citizenship ; and if I may quote a fine sen- tence of a great American woman who has spoken this after- noon, our hardest problem is that of learning to live in a world becoming conscious of itself. To an Englishman, perhaps the most striking fact of the moment is that, while America and England are allies for the first time, they are not yet friends. There is an amount of misunderstanding, and I think a feel- ing of hostility, betw^een the two peoples such as an English- man does not understand until he comes to this country. We are told that a good deal of it is due to the teaching of history in your schools. Too many Americans assume that we English are still in the position of George III and his ministers, that we have not moved since the eighteenth century. You do not, I think, realize that most English children are taught one chapter of our imperial history from the American point of view; are made to realize that the rulers of England were wrong and the inhabitants of the thirteen colonies were right. The point is of real significance. We could not have been where we are today if it had not been for the lesson, unpleasant in its origin, which we were obliged to learn from you in 1776. It is, of course, the liberal and democratic England which is at one with you in your social and international aims. It is true that there is a small section of persons in England opposed to those aims. If you doubt it, turn to the recent numbers of a once-famous weekly journal, The Saturday Review. You will find there articles which say in effect, " We have been told over and over again that the war is to be fought for the establishment of liberal principles, but surely it is for some- (301) no CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII thing greater than that " — which reminds me of the old Calvin- ist woman who said, " Yes, the Universalists believe that all mankind will be saved, but we look for better things." Now, what we are hoping is that the peoples of the two countries may be able to help one another, and I feel that they may do so in three ways, among others. First, in that struggle for social justice which goes on whether there is war or peace throughout the world. You know and we know that it is a struggle which has to be kept up unremittingly, and with a vigilance which must never be allowed to drop. When you are learning from England's mistakes, pray take this to heart: that our experience with regard to the conditions of industry has brought an overwhelming demonstration of the belief that you must establish the most liberal of all possible condi- tions of work and pay and leisure. It may be that one of the benefits of the war situation will be to demonstrate the truth of a thing which the people would not believe before upon the kind of proof that we were then able to bring, but which they cannot refuse to accept now because of the overpowering evi- dence that is placed befere them. Secondly, we can be of mutual service with regard to our responsibilities to colonies and subject peoples. I am not now speaking of places like Ireland. We hope you may be able to help us toward a better way in the handling of subject peoples than that which we have followed hitherto ; and perhaps, in re- turn, we can help you to make the right kind of convincing reply to those imperialists who were laying before you yester- day so fascinating a program of aggression and exploitation. Thirdly, and above everything, we hope that the new co-operation will be of mutual assistance in regard to the great international problems. When we were discussing the other day the question of secret diplomacy and its unfortunate results, I had a feeling that one important matter was being overlooked, namely, the extraordinary caste supremacy of the diplomatic community. No youth in England can even get a nomination to the diplomatic service unless his people are in a position to allow him an annual income of two thousand dol- lars. That is to say, before he begins to enter, he must be (302) No. 2] LIBERAL ENGLAND HI approved as a member of the ruling caste, with certain special privileges in regard to maintenance. This fact alone, I think, will illustrate the extraordinary, and as it seems to me, deplor- able circumstance that the work of the people abroad is being done by representatives who are remote from them, who are cut off from the common folk, the workers, from those who know the realities of life, as far as the Brahmin in India is cut off from the multitude. One of the first things we shall have to do in the making of a world reorganization will be to see that the tasks of embassies and consulates are committed to men of the right kind, men who are not separate from the real interests and aspirations of the people. Finally, it is of little use for us to be repeating the Presi- dent's phrase about the world being made safe for democracy, unless we can do something to help President Wilson embody that great affirmation in the actual work of international policy. If I may express the disappointment of an Englishman as he looks upon what has been happening since the great change in Russia and the entry of the United States into the war, I should say that somehow the right things have not always been emphasized. What we want is that the peoples of the Central Empires should be made to realize that when we of the people say that this is not a war for extermination, we are down upon the fundamental facts. Nor should we be afraid of liberty. Our strength will be all the greater if we remember that dis- cussion is of the essence of democracy; and if we remember that there is a relation of the conscience to the state which we cannot override except at our peril. Only by remembering in stress the things we say wa believe in times of peace can we come out of the struggle; and we shall come out of it in ways that we cannot now possibly foresee. William Morris' John Ball tells us truly that men fight and get something different from what they fight for, so that others who follow them have to fight for the same reality under another name. That is the condition of the eternal struggle. Let us make sure that what we are fighting for is something that can be embodied in an enduring society in which men and women can live and labor and bring their lives to fruition. (303) ANNEXATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY ^ STEPHEN P. DUGGAN Professor of Education, College of the City of New York A PRINCIPLE that is at present receiving much emphasis as a necessary basis for a durable peace is that of no annexations. It is frequently stated as no compulsory annexations. This brief paper is an attempt to show the rela- tion between annexation and the principle of nationality in the organization of a durable peace. I am not here to discuss the nature of nation, of nationality, and of nationalism as against any other concept of current political thinking such as internationalism. I am here to ex- press the belief that one lesson emphatically taught by history is that human development is best aided when people are poli- tically organized so as to secure the greatest degree of national unity, and if possible to prove from the facts of history that when international adjustments have been made which violated the principle of nationality they have always been temporary and have been broken at the first opportune moment. National- ism and democracy are the twin children of the French Revo- lution. Bursting upon a continent organized upon the dynastic principle, neither of these political principles was understood and both were bitterly opposed. For a century and a quarter they have struggled for recognition and have not yet com- pletely attained it. This paper is concerned primarily with the principle of nationality, and it will be helpful to relate briefly the history of its demand for recognition. As has been stated already, national unity was one of the forces let loose by the French Revolution. It was not fully appreciated even by its authors, and Napoleon fell because 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreigrn Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 31, 1917- (304) THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY II3 he could not withstand the strong national feeling that his aggression had awakened in the peoples of Europe outside France. Every European international congress that has been held since the French Revolution has flouted it — the Congress of Vienna in 181 5, the Congress of Paris in 1856, and the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The result has been that the periods intervening between these congresses have been periods of revolution and war undertaken largely to upset the arrange- ments made at them and to secure the acceptance of nationality as a principle of international organization. The history of Europe for two generations after the Treaty of Vienna is the history of the attempt upon the part of the peoples of western Europe to destroy the provisions of that treaty which were framed to prevent the attainment of national unity. The his- tory of Europe since the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 is the history of a movement on the part of the peoples of eastern Europe, especially of Austria-Hungary and the Balkan peninsula, to destroy its provisions in order to realize their national unity. Today the principle of nationality is stronger than it ever has been. Two centuries ago the Polish national state was de- stroyed and its territory divided among its despoilers. But nationality survived, and one of the greatest problems con- fronting European statesmen today is the reconstruction of Poland as a national state. For almost four centuries after the Turks entered Europe, Greek, Serb and Bulgar were so en- slaved that they apparently disappeared from human history. Certainly western Europe was astonished to learn during the Crimean War that there was such a people as the Bulgars. Yet Greek, Serb, Bulgar and Ruman emerged from their slav- ery and obscurity during the nineteenth century, revived their national cultures, and during the past generation have made progress as national states which has been the astonishment of students of European history and politics. History shows, moreover, that it makes no difference how international arrangements violate the principle of nationality ; if they violate it, they cannot stand. Such arrangements will be destroyed if they force together peoples of different national- ity just as surely as if they forcibly separate people of the (30s) 114 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII same nationality. The powers of Europe by the Treaty of Vienna of 1815 united Holland and Belgium into one state. The union lasted but fifteen years, being broken by the revolt of the Belgian people in 1830. On the other hand, the powers by the Treaty of Paris of 1856 denied the request of the people of Moldavia and Wallachia to be permitted to unite into a national state. Three years later the two provinces united into the national state of Rumania despite the powers. More- over, even the kind of treatment accorded to a people does not operate to weaken the principle of nationality. The harshness shown to the people of Posen by the Prussian government has only deepened their devotion to Polish nationality. And the mild and just treatment granted to Norway by Sweden did not suffice to satisfy the Norwegian national spirit which demanded and secured independence almost a century after Norway was handed over to Sweden by the Treaty of Vienna. Not only is the principle of nationality stronger than it ever was before, but it is today the strongest single force operating in international affairs. No appeal to any so-called higher principle prevails against it. The basis of socialist organiza- tion in the European countries in 191 3 was that the workers of all countries had more in common than had the workers of any one country with the other classes of that country. But when the great crisis came in 19 14, the socialists of each country were found arrayed with the capitalists of their country against the socialists and capitalists of another nation. The socialists of France and Germany were first and above all Frenchmen and Germans respectively. And the Great War has certainly in- tensified the spirit of nationalism in all countries, great and small. One of the problems that we are discussing at this conference is the rights of small nations. In view, therefore, of the vitality and intensity of the principle of nationality to- day as in the past, would it not be futile for the statesmen of Europe to decide upon international readjustnients based upon any scheme which would prevent the realization of that principle? The realization of the principle of nationality does not neces- sarily involve the question of annexation. The suppressed (306) No. 2] THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY Ug nationalities are in almost all cases asking merely for autonomy. Few Irishmen expect or hope for the absolute independence of Ireland — they want home rule. The Czechs of Bohemia would always have been loyal subjects to the Hapsburgs had they been permitted freely to develop their national culture and ideals within the empire. The Finns ask neither for independence nor for territorial accretion, but merely that the promise be kept which was made by Alexander I to Finland in 1815 that its constitution and laws should remain inviolate. In all these cases there exists no national state, no independent Ireland, Bohemia or Finland to which Irishmen, Czechs, or Finns who are suppressed in neighboring states can look for redemption. But in any case where a people is divided, part of them living in an independent national state and the remainder in a territory which is sub- ject to another state, the latter territory is sure to be considered terra irredenta. That is the condition of the Balkans. Seven million Rumanians live in the independent state of Rumania, but more than three million live in Bukovina and Transylvania, where they have been subjected to the harshest kind of treat- ment by their Magyar rulers. As long as this condition con- tinues there will be a Rumania irredenta and a potential powder magazine in southeastern Europe. Again, there are more Serbs unwilling subjects of the Austro- Hungarian monarchy than there are Serbs in independent Serbia. When the brave people of Bosnia and Herzegovina risked their all in a revolt against their Moslem rulers in 1876 they revolted not only for freedom but for annexation to what they considered their mother country, Serbia, and when the European statesmen at the Congress of Berlin outrageously violated the principle of nationality by handing over Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria- Hungary, they committed an act of statecraft which contained in it the germ of the present terrible catastrophe. Similarly, when upon the d<emand of Austria-Hungary the new state of Albania was created in 191 2, northern Epirus inhabited wholly by Epirote Greeks was included in it. But the Epirotes revolted and demanded annexation to their kins- men in Greece. Poor Greece could not disobey the mandate (307) Il6 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII of the powers, but the powers have so far been unable to compel the Epi rotes to remain under Albanian sovereignty, just as they were unable to compel the Cretans to remain under Turkish sovereignty. Surely the history of the past hundred years justifies us in believing that if any general congress of the European powers attempts at the close of the war now raging a territorial reor- ganization in violation of the principle of nationality, such at- tempt will fail. The reorganization will not last. How then can a territorial reorganization be undertaken to realize the prin- ciple of nationality? Only by the plebiscite, by vote of the people in the territories concerned. Even the plebiscite will not result in the perfect realization of the principle of national- ity. There will be islets of alien peoples in some of the re- deemed national states whose rights and interests must be safe- guarded. It must be evident however that the realization of the principle of nationality means either the extinction or the reor- ganization of one great state of Europe, viz., Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary is a standing invitation to war and has caused more wars and uprising during the nineteenth century than any other state of Europe, simply because it is organized in viola- tion of the principle of nationality. When the Hapsburg dominions were reorganized according to the Ausgleich of 1867, Austria and Hungary were placed upon an equal foot- ing and it was understood that the Germans and the Hun- garians in their respective parts of the Dual Monarchy should have absolute control of the destinies of the other nationalities which make up the populations of those parts. That control has been used to suppress any attempt upon the part of the subject nationalities to develop their national cultures or ideals. Owing to the exigencies of the political situation, Austria has vacillated between a policy of repression and one of relative leniency, but Hungary has followed a consistent policy of harsh repression. Were the plebiscite permitted at the close of the war it can hardly be doubted that the people of Trieste and the Trentino would vote for annexation to Italy, the people of Transylvania for annexation to Rumania, and the greater part of the South Slavs to Serbia. It is possible that the Bohemians (308) No. 2] THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY II7 and the Slavs of the north would be willing to remain in the Hapsburg monarchy if it were reorganized upon the federal instead of the dual principle. The principle of nationality makes for peace. The political philosophy dominant in the eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth century regarded a new nation as an intruder, whose motives and activities were suspected. Today it is regarded as one of the family who has passed through the period of tutelage, who has attained his majority and who has the right of living his life according to his own beliefs while maintaining the friendliest relations with the other members of the family. Only when permitted freely to develop in that way can a nation make its best contribution to human welfare, and every nation has some distinct contri- bution to make. (309) THE NEW RUSSIA ^ B. E. SHATSKY Director, Russian Information Bureau, New York THE year 191 7 means just the same thing for Russia that the year 1776 meant for the United States. The New Russia is born now, the sister republic of the United States. I wish to say to you that the idea of a separate peace is absolutely repudiated in Russia. Knowing very well the spirit of the Russian government, knowing the spirit of the great Russian democracy, I can positively assure you that no separate peace is possible. Let me give you some illustra- tions. At the time the great reactionary prime minister, Sturmer, was also appointed minister of foreign affairs, I had a conversation with Mr. Guchkoff, who, as you know, was the first revolutionary minister of the army and navy in the Russian cabinet, and asked him, " What will the Moderates do if Sturmer succeeds in his policy of concluding a separate peace with Germany? " The Moderate Guchkoff answered me in his firm low voice, " In that case, it will be necessary to raise against the Czar not only the voice, but also the hand." I remember also a conversation with Rodzianko, the president of the Duma, before my departure from Russia. He said to me, " Tell the Americans that Russia will fight for ten years if it is necessary ; we will not cease from this struggle until the cause of democracy is won." That is the opinion of the Moderate- Liberals in Russia. The Radicals, led by Prof. Miliukoff, formerly minister of foreign affairs, have the same leaning. You may say that the new minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Teretschenko, holds other opinions ; but I can assure you that before my departure, I also saw Mr. Teretschenko and he was 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 1917. (310) THE NEW RUSSIA I ig enthusiastically for the cause of the Allies. It will be enough to add that Mr. Teretschenko was the chairman of the Kiev branch of the War Industrial Committee, and I am certain that he would never have accepted the post of minister of for- eign affairs if he were not convinced that it was necessary for the efficient prosecution of the war. As for the socialists, only yesterday I received the text of a speech by Tscheidze, leader of the Russian Socialist-Democratic party, made before the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, representing the forces of the Russian democracy. He said to them : If the Germans think that we shall help them in this great struggle they are terribly mistaken. Until the German workers are through with the Hohenzollems, we can do nothing with them. The great struggle will be decided at just that time when the workers in Ger- many throw oiT the yoke of the military and junker clique. You now know what is the feeling of the working classes. Perhaps you think the peasants of Russia are of another opin- ion. Just three weeks ago there was held in Petrograd a meet- ing of the representatives of all the Russian peasants, and eight hundred voices against twenty proclaimed the necessity of efficient prosecution of the war against Germany. Now you can see the viewpoint of the peasants in Russia. Army delegations from the front also see the awful necessity of con- tinuing the war with Germany. I do not know a single re- sponsible political man in Russia who is on the side of a separ- ate peace with Germany. I can say that emphatically. What, then, is the policy of the great Russian democracy? There is a great desire for a general peace as soon as the con- ditions permit it. Does that mean that the Russian demo- cratic forces will try to persuade the western democracies to conclude a general peace immediately ? Certainly not. They understand very well that this struggle is so great, and that the sacrifices have been so enormous, that this war cannot end by any kind of compromise; and they understand very well that there is just one solution possible, and that is to make Germany a democratic country. What have the Russian democratic (3") I20 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS forces to say on this subject? They proclaim a slogan of no annexations and no indemnities, as you read in the newspapers. That is not true. The position of the Russian democratic forces is that there must be no forced annexations, and no punitive indemnities. You understand, that is quite another matter. The monarchy in Germany has always been trying to con- vince the German people that they are striving for national existence as against a great national disruption, and the demo- cratic forces in Russia want to assure the German people that in the event of their becoming a democratic people and putting an end to autocracy in Germany, there will be no danger for the German people as the German people. The principle of no forced annexation means that no territory will be given to any country without the consent of the people in the territory in- volved. That is quite a democratic principle, and I take the liberty of saying that this policy is in accordance with the policy outlined by your great statesman, President Woodrow Wilson. In conclusion, I am perfectly sure that the will of the people will prevail, and that the league to enforce peace, about which you have spoken today so much, is a practicable solution of the problems. I am certain that no sacrifices are too great for the accomplishment of this end for which the American and the Russian people will be responsible. I want to say that Russia has already lost more than a million men who were killed, not counting the many wounded and prisoners of war. If you will remember that every one of this great number was a source of support for five or six or seven people, you can imagine for yourselves how great is the ocean of blood and sadness in Russia; but I say that no sacri- fices are too great for the task which we have in hand. I am perfectly sure that those great democracies, the Russian and the American, will go hand in hand in performing this task, and that the duty will be fulfilled. (312) THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ^ BAINBRIDGE COLBY New York THE supreme concern of mankind is justice. This is the aspiration of democracy, not only in its internal but in its international relations. Justice not only demanded for ourselves but freely accorded to others. This is the keynote of President Wilson's epoch-making ap- peal to the nations of the world. This immortal address con- stitutes not only a satisfactory declaration of the principles for vv'hich we entered the Great War, but it is the latest and most authentic expression of the spirit of democracy. The in- violability of treaties, respect for nationality, the right of de- N'elopment along self-evolved and national lines, obedience to the promptings of humanity, in other words, international justice — these are the salients of his definition of democracy's aims and of the democratic ideal in international relations. But nations are animated not only by theories but by con- ditions. And it is well for us to remember that a nobly defined ideal does not necessarily meet or vanquish a robust and per- sistent condition. The issue of the Great War is familiarly de- fined as between autocrac}- or militarism on the one hand, and democrac}' on the other. But militarism or even autocracy, odious as they are, are only different lines of approach to, or treatment of underlying conditions in the world. I think it may fairly be said that the ailment which afflicts the world is economic and not exclusively political. The trouble with the highly industrialized nations of the temper- ate zone is that they cannot produce what they need to consume, and they cannot consume what they need to produce. The populations of the industrial nations are steadily growing. 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Ix)ng Beach. N. Y., May 29, 191". 122 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII The nations of western Europe in a century have doubled their population. Germany is adding a million per annum to her population, and the United States even more. The nations of western Europe cannot produce the means required for their subsistence. They have not the agricultural basis which yields them their requirements in food and raw materials. These in- dispensables of national life must be obtained beyond their borders. They must, in other words, be purchased, and the means necessary to the purchase are manufactured products, which must greatly exceed in amount what the domestic mar- ket of the producing nation can absorb. From this universal need of nations, i. e., food and raw materials on the one hand, and a market for products on the other, arises the value of colonial possessions, particularly in the unexploited and highly productive regions in the tropics and the orient. These regions are in large part peopled by nations whose titles to the lands they hold are unassailable, yet the people are lacking either in industry or ambition, and the productive possibilities of their lands are incapable of realization unless the popular energies are marshaled and directed and even supplemented by the more progressive and colonizing nations. The world needs their produce, the life of Europe demands their raw materials, and mere rights of nations can with diffi- culty make a stand against necessities that are so imperious. There has thus arisen an economic imperialism, of which, strange to say, the most democratic of nations are the most conspicuous examples. England throughout the world, France in Africa and the East, are deeply conscious of the relation to their industrial vigor of colonial expansion. Economic advantage seems to follow in the wake of politi- cal control. It is the mother country which builds the railroads in the colonies, controls port privileges, fixes tariffs and se- cures to her nationals the out-distancing advantages which make alien competition impossible. Theoretically this may not be true, but in practice it is uniformly true. Of Algeria's ex- portations seventy-nine per cent are to France, and eighty- five per cent of her imports come from France. (314) No. 2] THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 1 23 As the industrial nation grows in population, the pressure upon her means of sustenance increases, her need of raw ma- terials grows greater, and she turns a ranging eye throughout the world for the means of satisfying this internal pressure. Here is the motive of wars, here is the menace to world peace. And it is with reference to this condition, prevalent throughout the world, that we must determine the attitude of democracy in its international relations. This economic pressure is but beginning to be felt in the United States, but its premonitory symptoms are already seen. It is only a question of time when our complacent sense of security will give way to a realization that our vast agricultural basis is not vast enough to sustain our even vaster industrial development. We shall then feel, if not so acutely as sister nations in the east, at least as truly, the need of expanding markets and enlarged sources of raw materials, if not of food. The spiritual aims of democracy, so perfectly defined by the President, will have to encounter the imperious economic necessities which drive all nations, which cannot be stayed, and which refuse to be silenced. The freedom of the seas, respect for international boundaries, observance of treaties, obedience to international law, recognition of the dictates of humanity — in short, all the aims which animate America and her allies in this great war, do not in and of themselves contain the promise of a complete tranquillization of the world. To end wars requires that the sources of international friction should be reached. The repression of barbarism, the punishment of ruthlessness, constitute a sufficient but only an immediate ob- jective of the world's struggle. It is, of course, the primary undertaking of civilization, and once achieved, our thought and our effort must go forward in aims that are more far reaching. Our goal must be the destruction of the economic root of war — in other words, to establish an economic, not only a political, internationalism, a community of interests, even if qualified and incomplete, among geat nations. The Ameri- can policy of the open door in colonial administration must find acceptance in the world if mankind is to emerge from the perennial menace of war. (31S) - THE WILSON-KERENSKY PEACE POLICY ' WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING THIS morning the German and Austrian socialists once more gave out their peace terms, which are practically identical with those they issued in 191 5- Note first of all that both factions have the same program. Pro-German socialists have repeatedly tried to make us believe that there was some difference in this respect between the minority and the pro-Kaiser majority. Now, at last, that confusing mis- statement is done for. Next, note that these terms are strangely identical with those of the various socialist parties and factions in Russia, America and neutral countries that were most voci- ferous in support of the original Stockholm Conference — in the form in which it was approved by the German government. What are these German terms? ( 1 ) No annexations or territorial transfers, even when de- sired by the inhabitants. Lorraine is to remain German ; Ar- menia is to remain Turkish. (2) No indemnities for war expenses, or even for the vast damage wantonly done in Belgium, Serbia and Poland. (3) Freedom of the seas as already defined by the German government. (4) Certain specially difficult questions are to be left, unde- fined, to an early peace conference — as demanded by Beth- mann-HoUweg in his so-called peace move last December. These are not the peace terms of the British Labor party, nor of the French labor unions, nor of either faction of the French Socialist party. The French are sending delegates to the preliminary meeting at Stockholm, but they explicitly state that have not agreed to attend general meetings of the Stock- holm Conference. Moreover, they have made conditions, 1 Discussion at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 31, 1917. (316) THE WILSON-KERENSKY PEACE POLICY 125 as the press cables expressly state — also a private cable I have just received. These conditions are (i) that peace must as- sure the rights of peoples as well as the liberties of nations, and (2) that it must be a democratic peace, based upon govern- ment by democratic parliaments elected by universal suffrage — which would mean, practically, that Kaiserism must go. Soon after the beginning of the present war. President Wilson began to formulate certain international principles — acceptable to the overwhelming majority of Americans — which should guide us as far as we are able to influence the con- clusion of the present war. These principles, as the President demonstrated, are a natural outgrowth of our best American traditions. I wish to point out that this internationalism is identical with the internationalism of the majority of the ad- vanced popular parties throughout the world, identical, for example, with the internationalism of the great Socialist- Populist Peasant party which is now dominating Russia and finding expression in the most powerful member of the new Russian ministry, Kerensky. The European cables speak cor- rectly of the Wilson-Kerensky peace policy. America awoke to the practical importance of the popular internationalism of Europe, when the newest Russian govern- ment adopted the peace formula of " no annexations, no in- demnities," and called upon the Entente for a revision of their peace terms in this sense. Let us review briefly the attitude of American and European internationalism toward these and the other leading planks of this new peace program. Kerensky explains that " no annexations " means no forcible annexations against the will of the inhabitants. Territorial changes, however, are to take place, when the inhabitants de- mand it. President Wilson was equally explicit in his address to the belligerents on December 18, when he demanded that not only the small states but also " the weak peoples " should be made secure from wrong and violence. President Wilson also spoke in that address of coming " territorial changes and re- adjustments." Thus the internationalists represented by Presi- dent Wilson, like the internationalists represented by Kerensky, reject both interpretations of the " no-annexation " policy that (317) 126 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII would make it serve the purposes of aggressive nationalism in- stead of aiding the progress of internationalism, namely, the claim that this policy prohibits all territorial changes, and the claim that it demands freedom of development for existing nations only and not for subject nationalities and peoples who wish either to be independent or to transfer their allegiance. Kerensky, who speaks not only for the party that represents eighty per cent of the Russian people, but also for all the so- cialist internationalism of Europe that is not demonstrably un- der German influence or pressure, interprets the phrase " no indemnities " as meaning " no punitive or improper indemni- ties." The attempt is not to be made to force the German nation, staggering under its own war burdens, to pay the war expenses of its enemies ; the German governmental principle applied by Bismarck against France in 1871 is not to be used against Germany. But the damage done by German armies will be paid for by somebody. Are the innocent Belgians to pay for all the colossal levies put upon them, for the vast amount of property taken from the country^ and the still greater amount of property destroyed? Is it physically possible for the impoverished Serbians or the Poles to rehabilitate their country? Kerensky considers these as proper indemnities for Germany to pay. He would probably also include indemni- ties for deliberate work of destruction in France. President Wilson has pointed out in his address to the Senate on April 2, referring to submarine destruction, that " property can be paid for." He goes on to state: "We seek no in- demnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacri- fices we shaJl freely make." That is, we do not seek to make Germany pay any part of our war expenses. This does not mean that we abandon all financial claims for American prop- erty wrongfully destroyed by submarines, nor that we seek no indemnities for others. In fact, there is an unmistakable im- plication the other way. A third plank in the President's platform scarcely leaves room for argument. All Russian revolutionists and Euro- pean socialists not under mental influence or physical pressure from Germany share our demand for the liberation of the Ger- (318) No. 2] THE WILSON-KERENSKY PEACE POLICY I27 man people and the world from Prussian autocracy. They agree with the President that the very "existence of autocratic governments" makes permanent peace impossible, because, as the President says, " no autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it [the league of nations] or observe its covenants." Indeed, the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has accused the German army of blindly following the Kaiser and destroying revolutionary Russia. The council not only calls upon the Germans to imitate the Russian example, to revolt and overthrow their emperor, but clearly implies that the war must continue until this is accomplished. But has not the new Russian government adopted a policy differing from ours and President Wilson's on the question of freedom of the seas? If Constantinople, in some way not yet described, is to be internationalized, the Germans, including the German socialists, demand with undeniable logic that the same principle should be applied at Suez and Panama. In his ad- dress of January 22 Mr. Wilson demanded freedom of the seas " in practically all circumstances " as well as " a direct outlet for every great people to the highways of the sea." But he added that the freedom of the seas is " a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments," which in turn " opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programs of military preparation." No influential section of American opinion has expressed a willingness that the great sea powers should take such a radi- cal step toward naval disarmament as would be involved in the neutralization of the Panama and Suez Canals — unless or until the great land powers take an equally radical step to- ward the disarmament of land armies or the surrender of some equally great military advantage. Indeed, nearly all pacifists have always recognized hitherto that sea power is essentially and necessarily less militaristic than land power. Moreover, the war has shown that Constantinople would not be effectively neutralized with Turkey and Germany ten, twenty or thirty miles away — a fact which all Russians have been painfully taught by the war. When Russia says she does (319) 128 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII not desire to annex Constantinople, but only to see it inter- nationalized, she does not mean that it is to be left practically in the power of Turkey or Germany — although this is the sine qua non of peace to every political party of any conse- quence in Germany, even including the socialist minority, and excepting only the handful of actual revolutionists, whose lead- ers are mostly in jail. So there is little prospect that Russia will support Germany's demand for a " freedom of the seas," or partial naval disarmament on the part of her democratic allies not accompanied by similar measures of land disarma- ment on the part of autocratic enemies. Russian internationalism, and European internationalism, aside from the pseudo-internationalism of the German social- ists and their followers, is identical — point by point — with the new American internationalism voiced by Woodrow Wilson. The so-called international socialist conference that was to have been called at Stockholm, on the other hand, was to have been almost entirely in the hands of socialist groups that have openly and repeatedly endorsed the peace policy of the German socialist minority led by Haase, Kautsky and Bernstein. Ac- cording to Huysmans, secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, the Dutch socialists who called the conference ac- cepted as a preliminary common ground for the delegates to meet upon, the point of view of Wilson and Kerensky. This is a complimentary recognition of the fact that the Wilson- Kerensky view is the strongest in the world today, and will win in the end. But as a matter of fact nearly all the delegates at Stockholm have already expressed themselves as favoring the peace policy of the German minority. This policy is the opposite of Kerensky's and President Wilson's in every essen- tial particular. The President, as well as Kerensky, says that there can be no peace with an undefeated autocracy ; the German socialists, while realizing that the Kaiser is taking full advantage of the fact that the Russian Revolution took place during the war, are agreed that there is to be no German revolution until after the war. The President wishes the world to be made safe for democracy, which, as he said in his war speech to the (320) No. 2] THE WILSON-KERENSKY PEACE POLICY 129 Senate, is menaced by " the existence of autocratic govern- ments." Hillquit has assured us, and correctly, that the in- ternal problems of nations were not to be touched upon by the Stockholm Conference. President Wilson has demanded that the weaker people be made secure from wrong and violence. The Russian Council of Labor Deputies demands the " free development of nationalities," and even the American Socialist party at one time demanded as a condition precedent to the close of the present war that " all countries under foreign rule be given political independence if demanded by the inhabitants of such countries." The American party is now following the German Socialists' lead in restricting this to a demand for a free development of nations only. This would leave the peo- j'.le of Alsace-Lorraine, German Poland, Armenia, Syria, and the Italian, Rumanian, and Ukranian parts of Austria under a foreign yoke as at present, regardless of the wishes of the inhabitants. It must be understood that there is absolutely no difference between the two leading German socialist factions as regards peace terms. Both factions are in favor of the " no annexa- tion, no indemnities " formula in the narrow sense in which it was originally used when the Germans invented it in the summer of 191 5. Both want the French, Serbians, Poles and Rumanians to pay for the destruction done in their own coun- tries. Both are opposed to the right to independence of sub- ject nationalities, races and peoples; both are opposed to mak- ing the overthrow of German autocracy a condition of peace. Now what does all this latest peace talk amount to, in a few words ? Practically all the pacifists are demanding immediate peace " negotiations," or an " early " peace. The German chancellor has already demonstrated to the satisfaction of nearly all non- Germans that this would mean peace based on the war map, i. e., a peace that, in one form or another, cashed in Germany's military victories and strategic advant- ages. The Zimmerwald Conference, held two years ago in Switzerland and endorsed by the American Socialist party and nearly all the other organizations supporting the Stockholm Conference, definitely demanded immediate peace " regardless of the strategic situation." (321) I30 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS As Opposed to this, President Wilson, in his war address of April 2, has pledged the American people to the definite de- feat of the German government. This does not mean that Germany, as at present organized, must be " destroyed," " crushed " or " vanquished." It does mean that this " war for democracy " (for that is what it has become, whatever it was at the outset) must be prosecuted " to a successful conclusion." (322) SMALL NATIONALITIES DISCUSSION 1 Mr. Theodore Prince, New York city : I should like the privi- lege of expressing some conclusions that I have reached, in a meas- ure, from the deliberations of the past few days. In the first place, I protest vigorously against the note of satisfaction that greeted Mr. London's criticism of the President for refusing passports to certain representatives delegated to attend the Stockholm Conference. All of us believe in honest criticism, but it must be constructive ; it must look to the future and not to the past. We cannot aid the nation by indulging in controversies over matters of importance which have been decided by those who are in charge of the momen- tous policies of this country. They have decided that it is not for the interests of the country to have any special sect, society or class attend an unauthorized conference to discuss the weighty questions involved in a peace settlement. We must respect that decision; for we are at war, and we must mobilize our criticism as well as our forces; we must fight and hit as hard as we can. We must hurl an avalanche and overwhelm the foe. Anything that may help in that task is good ; anything that impedes it, is bad. I do not mean that the President of the United States or his ad- visers are above criticism ; but a democracy, in conceding to its execu- tive for the war period such autocratic powers of management as are necessary to ultimate success, must not neutralize its beneficent effect by indiscriminate criticism. Criticism to be useful must direct its forces to those matters that are in the making, and that can by con- structive criticisms be shaped for the advantage of all. Then and then only, as Mr. London said, will the opposition of today be the wisdom of tomorrow. In my opinion it is proper to criticize the present tax program of the government; for that is not yet finally determined. The present generation will have a sufficiently heavy burden to bear without loading on its back that which future genera- tions should carry. It is also appropriate to criticize the contem- plated military plan by which (so far as is disclosed) we are to raise only five hundred thousand men during the first year. If the enemy 1 At the afternoon session, May 31. (323) 132 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII knows that a million to two million men are in training, ready to go to the firing line, the moral effect will be greater than the mere increase in actual man power, I cite these instances as an example of what I consider fair material for criticism, stimulation and agitation, of current opinion directed towards a constructive course of action now pending, as befits a government of free people. I have also been impressed with the freedom with which the speakers in these meetings have condemned the policy of our allies, particularly Great Britain. These nations are now our allies in a great and noble cause. Since we have pledged ouj fortunes and our lives to them, ought we not to give them our faith and confidence? Here again I contend for the right of criticism in such matters as will advance our common cause ; just as I have suggested criticism of our government and its president, in the same spirit I would raise an issue with our allies. This brings me to my third point, namely, that while we are loyally for war, we should be as loyally for peace. We have heard of the spirit of good-will and democracy as the only thing that will insure an international arrangement or status whereby peace ean be universally secured. But in all these discussions good-will and democracy are apparently forces to be exerted after the end of the war. Why this procrastination? Great Britain, France and Belgium have borne the brunt of this fight, and are exhausted economically, physically and mentally; we cannot expect them to think much about peace and good-will. The United States, on the other hand, fresh, buoyant and elastic, has not yet felt the horror of millions of lives sacrificed. We can give our allies military and economic aid ; but even more im- portant, we can give them spiritual help. Why should we not now before this reign of ruin overwhelms us, influence our allies toward a settlement based on good-will ? This is in no sense a pacifist doc- trine ; on the contrary, we must and should fight with all the energy that our vigor and resources allow. Yet can we not at the same time insist upon a spirit of condonement which must essentially lie at the basis of any settlement? The Central Powers naturally must main- tain firmly their proud demands in the face of the Allies' grim de- termination to crush them. Is it not fair to assume that Germany and her allies may take a different point of view if we and our allies indicate to them by our spirit that good-will is uppermost in our minds despite the vigor of our onslaught? This would be in line with all our traditions. A half -century ago we fought a war of ruin and devastation with our own brothers; it (334) No. 2] SMALL NA TIONA LI TIES 1 3 3 ended in condonement, not humiliation : it was the sheathing of the sword that brought the war to a close. That war was fought with full knowledge of the problems of re- ccmstruction that would have to be faced after the war, and this war also should be fought with a clear idea of the reconstruction that must come after the war is won. In fact, the war will not have terminated until complete adjustment among the nations shall have taken place. It was that spirit that animated our great leader who gave up the richest and most precious of our country's possessions, and like him we should fight and fight and keep on fighting, but bear in our hearts his great spirit and love for humanity, his " charity for all, and malice towards none." Mr. Clarence H. Howard^ St. Louis, Missouri: I do not feel that I can return home without expressing to those who have con- ducted this conference my thanks for their service in bringing to- gether this assemblage of people from all over the world to discuss our international relations. Throughout our discussions, I have been impressed with the idea that what we need is fellowship — a com- prehensive, vital force, always finding expression in the Golden Rule. Fellowship has for its purpose the uniting and bringing together of all nations. Fellowship enriches and purifies character. Fellow- ship has for its chief foundation-stone co-operation. It has no ele- ment of racial or other prejudice or jealousies. By its very nature, it cannot exist alone, but requires all mankind to share it. Fellow- ship establishes the brotherhood of man. It belongs to no race, nation or color. We can find no solution of international difficulties except in a genuine spirit of fellowship. Mr. George L. Fox : I wish to show that Ireland is not oppressed by England. I object in the strongest way to seeing Ireland spoken of in that way unless you say that Porto Rico and the Philippines are oppressed by the United States. The Sinn Fein Irish Americans form probably not more than one-fifth of the Irish Americans of this country, but because they control almost all the Irish-American papers they have exercised a much greater influence on popular opinion than their numbers warrant. They hold, in the words of Francis Hackett, that the Irish " have long suffered at the hands of England mean and multiple infamies, more callous, more sustained and more fundamental than any which Austria threatened to Serbia." To show how far these words vary from the truth, I wish to point (325) 134 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII out certain results that would have flowed from the success of the Easter Rebellion in Dublin. First, the innocent aged poor, over seventy, many of whom are women, helpless and decrepit, would have lost their old-age pensions, and would have been reduced to extreme want if not to starvation and death. The population of Ireland is one-tenth of that of Great Britain, but one-fifth of the old-age pen- sioners live in Ireland. Two-thirds of the people in Ireland over seventy years old are old-age pensioners ; this will make all Americans understand how brutally Great Britain oppresses Ireland. Since 1911, when the old-age pension law included the aged in the poor- house, the burden of support of the aged poor in Ireland has been largely transferred from the backs of the local taxpayer in Ireland, known there as the rate-payer, to the backs of the income-tax payers of the United Kingdom, comparatively few of whom are found in Ire- land outside of Ulster and Dublin. Here we see another instance of the monstrous tyranny of Great Britain over Ireland. Second, a successful rebellion in Ireland would have resulted in colossal robbery in connection with the ownership of the land. During the last half -century there has been a gradual transfer of land in that country in small parcels to the tenant farmer who tills it, and who in the course of sixty years on payment of annual rent will own it in fee. That has been effected thus far by using the money of the tax-payers of Great Britain, who advance the money, and hold a mortgage running for fifty or sixty years, on the land as security. The amount thus far advanced for that purpose approaches the sum of half a billion of dollars, with the land pledged under solemn con- tract as security for payment of interest and principal in annual in- stallments. What would that mortgage have been worth in all areas where the sovereignty of the so-called Irish Republic had sup- planted the sovereignty of Great Britain? Third, there would have taken place in Ireland one of the worst financial crises and periods of suffering known since the famine. Trade would have been destroyed, commerce would have been at a standstill, and thousands of laborers would have been out of work and crying for bread. Ireland for the last two years has been pros- perous, and the market and prices of her agricultural products have enormously improved. Ever since the latter part of the twelfth century, England has been her best market. This trade, which is the breath of life to Ireland, the promoters of the Easter Rebellion proposed to destroy and alienate so far as they could. At one stroke they would have cut down the value of farms and farm products, wherever they could get their will into force. (326) No. 2] SMALL NATIONALITIES 1 35 MiRAN Sevasly^ Chairman, Armenian National Union of Amer- ica: If the existence of Austria has been a standing menace to the peace of Europe, as Professor Duggan stated in his remarkable address on nationalities, so has the existence of Turkey, ever since the day the European powers allowed the Turks to supplant the cross with the crescent at Constantinople. The outcome of this great war should be the restoration to nations of their lost heritage. The country stretching from the Black Sea to Arabia and from the Mediterranean to the Caucasus is under the heel of the worst despot- ism the world has ever known. In this country, which covers an area double the size of Germany, there still live the remnants of sev- eral historic races like the Greeks, Armenians, Syrians and Hebrews. I shall deal briefly with the claims of these nationalities. The Armenians should be allotted all the territory from the Ar- axes River to the Cilician Gates, including the coast of Alexandretta. There were about three million of them stretching over a vast extent of land included withua the provinces mentioned in Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty of 1878. No other people in the Near East is so capa- ble of appreciating the progress and civilization of the West and is so worthy of American and European support and sympathy. De- scended from the great Aryan race, with an historical monument of forty centuries, a language, a literature and a national democratic church of their own, with an indomitable energy and enterprise, the Armenians are destined to be the pioneers of civilization and pro- gress in Asia Minor, and one of the living elements that can regen- erate a country which the destructive hands of the Ottoman hordes have turned into a desert. They are fit partners in world democ- racy. In this international conflagration, when the very existence of small nationalities is at stake, the case of the Armenians of Turkey stands out more strongly than that of any other race ; for the whole- sale butcheries, massacres and unheard-of deportations to which they have been subjected during these last two years in Asia Minor and wherever the Turks held sway over them, have exposed the remnants of that race to complete annihilation and extinction. The Armenians have always displayed, as Byron puts it, the virtues of peace, and the Young Turks, who apparently adopted the policy of settling the Armenian question by exterminating the Armenians, took advantage of their peaceful and pacific proclivities to give the finishing touch to the policy inaugurated by Sultan Hamed. (327) 136 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII The Armenians are heartily desirous of seeing the restoration of peace and good-will among the nations as soon as possible, but they cannot believe in a peace which would be tantamount to dupery. They believe in a durable peace, a peace under the effective guarantee of a committee of nations; they believe that to secure tliis, adven- turous militarism must be curbed. This problem the congress after the war will have to consider and finally solve. A system will have to be evolved out of the present international anarchy by which the rights of nations shall be respected; only in such a system can the Armenians find security for their future existence and wel- fare, so that they may fulfil their destiny in the concert of the pro- gressive nations of the earth. To the south of Alexandretta, to the confines of Palestine, and from Beirut to Damascus, lies the country known as Syria and the Lebanon, peopled by heterogeneous races of Semitic and Aryan origin, speaking many languages. Ever since the time of the Crusa- ders, France has exercised a sort of protectorate over this region, and in 1864 a French expedition to the Lebanon was sent to protect them against the onslaught of the Druses. France should organize her protectorate over this country, after the fashion of Tunis. The territory stretching from the Sea of Marmora to the Gulf of Pamphylia is peopled chiefly by Greeks. More than a million Greeks live in this territory. Greece should have all the western Asia Minor coast and a hinterland of about one hundred and fifty miles to de- velop. Then Magna Graecia, the dream and goal of her patriots and martyrs, will have been fulfilled. What, then, will become of the Turks? The Turks will not be expelled from any territory, but will prosper and develop under the aegis of the different races among whom decadent Turkey is to be divided. The Turk has justified his reputation of being an unspeaka- ble master, but he may become a useful servant as soon as he transfers his allegiance to a foreign ruler. The Turks, however, may be rele- gated to the province extending from the western limits allotted to Ar- menia on the east and the eastern boundary of the Greek hinterland on the west, with Iconiiun as the capital. Iconitmi is the seat of the danc- ing dervishes, whose founder, Jelaledine, was the prophet of the Turks before they embraced the Mahomedan religion. He dissemin- ated pantheistic ideas and broad liberalism. Turkish decadence began when, in the sixteenth century the Turks abjured Jelaledine, and made of Turkey a theocracy, drying up in the Turkish soul the splendid ideas and thoughts disseminated by the adepts of Jelaledine. (328) No. 2] SMALL NATIONALITIES 1 37 By transferring their capital to Iconium, the Turks will be brought into contact with the expounders of these ideas, and Iconivun vmder European control may become the center of tolerance and progress. I cannot close without saying a few words about Palestine. At the close of this European conflagration the Jews, I believe, should be restored to the country of their sires, where the descendants of the prophets may develop in contentment and peace. The Jews will be squeezed in between the French protectorate in Syria and the English protectorate of Egypt and Arabia, but they will have a vast hinter- land in the direction of Mesopotamia, of ancient Nineveh and Baby- lon ; here they may prosper and expand. To sum up, the powers should observe a self-den)ring ordinance for themselves as far as possible in the solution of these questions ; the principle of nationality should be respected and the different autono- mous states or annexed territories should be organized on historic and ethnological grounds. Only thus will a lasting peace be secured. Professor Henry R. Seager/ Columbia University: This con- ference is drawing toward its close, and it is beginning to be possible to appraise its value. It was projected before we entered the war, and since that event some of our friends have gone so far as to think that it should not have been held, on the ground that we should now devote all our thought and energy to the defeat of Germany. I agree that we should devote all our thought and energy to the defeat of our enemy, but is it not that very fact that is making this conference so valuable at this time — and makes it such an impor- tant contribution to the part this country may play in the war? In the prize ring the way to defeat the enemy is by the knockout blow. Lloyd George, in one of his eloquent appeals, suggested that was the method by which this war should be ended. It was not very long ago that our own President suggested a very different method, a peace without victory. Events are moving so rapidly that, con- fident as we are of the outcome of the war, few of us would now venture a prediction as to just how it will end. Is it not certain, how- ever, that one thing that will contribute greatly toward a more speedy ending is the reformulation of the war aims of the Allies? Such a restatement has been made necessary by our entry into the war, and even more by the Russian Revolution. I have no way of knowing how soon that reformulation may be expected, but as intelligent 1 Introductory remarks as presiding officer at the afternoon session, May 31. (329) 1 3$ CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS citizens we all know that this is receiving the earnest consideration of our leaders at Washington, and of our allies. What I want to say with emphasis is that this conference is making an important contribution in illuminating aspects of the world situation which must be taken into account in that reformulation. When its terms are decided upon, we all know, from our knowledge of the President, that they will be such as to command the enthusiastic support of the democratically minded the world over. The way in which it will hasten the end of the struggle is by sounding the death knell of the hope on the part of Germany of a separate Russian peace, by solidifying public opinion in this country to the most vigorous pos- sible prosecution of the war, and finally by adding momentum to the rising tide of discontent in Germany, which will in time convince the German government that its defeat is inevitable. No session is better calculated to contribute material for this reformulation than that of this afternoon. (330) THE AUSTRIAN PROBLEM ^ CHARLES PERGLER Vice-President, Bohemian National Alliance of America IT has become almost axiomatic that in order to organize the world for a permanent peace, the suppressed na- tionalities must be freed; that no government not based upon the consent of the governed should be tolerated. To speak of the liberation of suppressed nationalities means to speak of Austria-Hungary, a state concerning which Mr. Ramsay Muir recently said that its history may be epitomized in the statement that it is a constant struggle against the realization of the principle of nationality. The Austrian, or Hapsburg, policy of suppression of non- German nationalities began prior to the Thirty Years War. The original Austrian confederation was a free union of Austria proper, Bohemia and Hungary. These nations saw in this federation a stronger barrier against the menacing Turk- ish aggression. The centralizing policy of the dynasty led to a Bohemian revolt in 1619, the deposition of Ferdinand the Second as king of Bohemia, and the election of Frederick the Elector Palatine as king of Bohemia. But the Czech nobility was defeated in the battle of White Mountain in 1620, and since then a regime of terror and Germanization reigned in Bohemia. At the same time, the Hapsburgs unlawfully and by violence suppressed the ancient rights of Bohemia. The ruthless Hapsburg policy of extermination of the best element in Bohemian national life is best illustrated by the fact that when the Peace of Westphalia was concluded, Bohemia was little better than a desert with about eight hun- dred thousand impoverished inhabitants, while prior to the war she was a prosperous country with more than three mil- 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 31, 191 7. (330 I40 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII lion inhabitants. At one time, in the middle of the eighteenth century, it seemed that Czech national life had come to an end. The policy of Germanization seemed to be successful. Austria-Hungary not only always opposed the legitimate ambitions of her own nationalities, but probably because of this very home policy, her foreign policy was ever dictated by a desire to smother elsewhere tendencies aiming at the liber- ation of subject nationalities and their unity in national states. Whoever fought for the right of any nationality to develop freely became an enemy of the Austrian state. When, in the third decade of the nineteenth century, the Greeks rose against the Turks, they found one of their worst enemies in the Austrian government. Greek independence was recognized only as a result of the insistence of the Allies of today — Russia, France and England. It is an interesting fact that President Monroe, in his message formulating the doctrine which now bears his name, also advocated the recognition of Greek independence, so that when we speak of the Allies of today we can properly add the United States of America. When, in the thirties, the Belgians rose against the domina- tion of the Dutch, it was again Austria assisted by Prussia which was ready to put down their movement with the sword ; and the freedom of Belgium then, as now, was defended by the Allies of today — England and France. The whole histoiy of the movement for the liberation and unity of Italy is a history of wars against Austria. Italy owes its liberation not only to the heroism of its own sons, but to the armed support of France and the diplomatic assistance of England. For a long time Austria was the enemy of German unity, which was made possible only after the defeat of Austria by Prussia in 1 866. But the continuous opposition of Austria to the principle of nationality may perhaps best be seen in her attitude toward the Balkan nationalities, and especially the Serbs. The Haps- burgs, when the Turks were forced to give up their conquests, did not liberate the Rumanians and Serbs, but simply annexed to the empire a large part of the lands inhabited by them in the hope of extending their dominion as far as Saloniki and the ^gean Sea. The erection of new independent national (332) No. 2] THE AUSTRIAN PROBLEM I4I States in the Balkans was not in accord with imperialistic aspir- ations, and Austria-Hungary developed into as dangerous an enemy of freedom for the Balkan nations as Turkey ever was. The main reason why Austria was unsuccessful in her policy of penetration in the Balkan peninsula is to be sought in the rivalry of Russia, which, related to the Balkan nations both by blood and religion, pursued a policy directly opposed to that of Austria. While Austria was the enemy of independence for the Balkan nations, Russia favored the erection of independent states in the peninsula, and as a matter of fact every Russian victory over the Turks was followed by the creation of such an independent state. It would, of course, be naive to claim that Russia did not have in mind the extension of her own influence, but it cannot be gainsaid that Russian understand- ing of Russian interests was consistent with freedom for op- pressed Slav nations, while Austria saw her interests only in opposition to their liberation. The crimes of Austria against the principle of nationality culminated in the infamous attack upon Serbia. This little country, strengthened by two victorious Balkan wars, formed a strong barrier against the Austro- German Drang nach Osten. The rise of the Serbian state of course created a desire on the part of Austrian Southern Slavs for national unity; Austria feared Serbia would become the Piedmont of the Balkans. For this reason Austria sought to destroy independent Serbia. Under the Austro-Hungarian settlement {Ausgleich) of 1867, the Magyars were granted independence. This settle- ment is such that one half of the empire is under the domina- tion of a German minority, while in the other the Magyars are supreme. And it is time for the world to realize that the Magyars are not the chivalrous nation they pretend to be. Their rule does not differ from Turkish in kind ; it differs very little in degree. Hungary has more than twenty million inhabitants; only nine million of these are Magyars, while the rest are Slovaks, Rumanians, Germans, Ruthenians, Serbs, Croatians and Slo- venes. But the government is wholly in the hands of the Magyar nobility, which has a more complete sway in Hungary (333) 142 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII than nobility has anywhere else in Europe. There are scarcely a million voters in Hungary, yet during the lives of men now living there has never been a Hungarian election that was free from violence and corruption, and that was conducted without the aid of soldiery. Seventy per cent of the land of Hungary is in the hands of the nobility, and as a result Hungary is a land of chronic hunger. Under such Asiatic regime there live three million Slovaks, a branch of the Czech nation, a people subjected to the most violent persecution, a people that is not permitted to have a single secondary school. The Slovak press is being systema- tically persecuted. Under Magyar rule freedom of the press for non- Magyar nationalities is the remotest of dreams. This is a condition that prevailed in times of peace; even then it cried to heaven for a remedy ; but since the war broke out the situation of non- German and non-Magyar nationalities in Austria-Hungary beggars description. The meager right to use the Czech language in administrative offices in Bohemia has been abolished, and the so-called German state language {Staatsprache) de facto established. For instance, on rail- roads even the humblest laborer cannot obtain any kind of a position unless he has command of the German language. Political persecution knows no bounds. The government actu- ally dictates to the newspapers what they may or may not publish, and even provides them with articles which they must print, or else suffer temporary or permanent suspension. " Home rule all around " is not the way out of the Austro- Hungarian labyrinth. A consideration of the following fig- ures will show that conclusively. The whole population of the empire is 52,000,000; 28,000,000 in the Austrian half of the monarchy; 22,000,000 in the Hungarian part; and 2,000,- 000 in Bosnia- Herzegovina. According to the latest census, that of 1 910, the population of Austria is divided as follows: Germans, 9,950,225; Czechs, 6,435,983; Poles, 4,967,984; Ruthenians, 3,518,854; Slovenes, 1,252,940; Serbo-Croats, 783,334; Italians, 768,432. The Germans, although number- ing not quite ten millions, control the destinies of the nine- teen millions of non-Germans. In Hungary, according to the (334) No. 2] THE AUSTRIAN PROBLEM I43 same census, there are 10,050,575 Magyars; 3,949>032 Ruman- ians; 2,937,434 Germans; 1,967,979 Slovaks, 2,939,638 Serbo- Croats; 472,587 Ruthenians. It should of course be remembered that the official census is grossly inaccurate, and misrepresents matters in favor of the Germans and Magyars. For instance, there is little doubt that there are almost 8,000,000 Czechs, and almost 3,000,000 Slovaks. In any event, the Germans and Magyars together do not exceed 20,000,000, and rule over 32,000,000 of Slavs and Latins, who in this war are forced to fight the battles of their oppressors. Does not this recital furnish sufficient proof that the very existence of Austria is a negation of the principle of national- ity? If there is to be permanent peace, if, to paraphrase one of President Wilson's statements to the Senate, the world's life is to be stable, if the will is not to be in rebellion, if there is to be tranquillity of spirit, and a sense of justice, of freedom and of right, the Austro-Hungarian state must go, even as the Turk must be driven from Europe. " Home rule all around " would be possible only if the dual monarchy should be pre- served in its entirety; but this would presuppose a continued violation of the principle of nationality and the right of the nations to choose the sovereignty which is to rule over them. The Italians have a claim to the Trentino and a part of the Adriatic coast; the Rumanians claim Transylvania, the Serbs are entitled to Bosnia-Herzegovina; Croatia and Dalmatia should form with Serbia and Montenegro an independent Jugo- slav state, and the Poles should be united with Russian Poland. These claims cannot be disregarded, but if they are duly observed, as they should be, the Czecho-Slovaks will be iso- lated, hopelessly outnumbered by Germans and Magyars in a smaller Austria, which will continue to co-operate with Ger- many in her imperialistic endeavors and constitute a founda- tion for another attempt to realize the Middle Europe scheme. The only solution of the problem appears to be the joining of the fragments of those races, which already have their na- tional state, to the parent races ; the creation of an independent Bohemian state; of an independent Hungary, reduced of (335) 144 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII course to its proper ethnical boundaries, permitting the Aus- trian Germans, in the purely German provinces of Austria, to decide their own destinies. They could either form an inde- pendent state or else be absorbed into the German Empire. This arrangement, by the way, would not strengthen Germany as some claim, since it must be remembered that if the principle of nationality is carried out to its logical conclusion, Germany will lose at least a part of Alsace-Lorraine and Schleswig- Holstein, as well as Poland, so that w^hat she may gain on the one hand she will lose on the other. Moreover, the present stand of Germany against the whole world is made possible because she has control of the 32,000,000 Slavs and Latins within the Austrian empire; once these peoples are liberated, Germany will lose this reservoir of human material ; she will be correspondingly weakened, and her imperialistic designs will be thwarted. The future Czecho-Slav state will have a population of more than 12,000,000, of whom 10,000,000 are Czecho-Slovaks. It goes without saying that the rights of the minority would have to be protected, although the fact is that the Slav races have never been known for their attempts to impose their language and culture upon other peoples. This seems to be exclusively the trait of the Germans, who couple their designs of economic penetration with a policy of denationalization of the people of the territories they control, or intend to control. From an economic point of view, Bohemia will have an as- sured future, for she possesses all the natural resources neces- sary to an economically self-sustaining state. While she may not have an outlet to the sea, the example of Switzerland shows that a port is not specially necessary for an independent state. Again, the principle laid down by President Wilson as to econ- omic rights of way for landlocked states would apply to Bohemia, as well as to the need of Russia to obtain access to a warm-water port. Bohemia, owing to her geographical position, and being a limk between western Europe and the eastern Slav world, is destined to be of great political and economic importance. The fact that Bohemia was able for many centuries to oppose Germanization, that she had not suc- (336) No. 2] THE AUSTRIAN PROBLEM 1 45 cumbed, although surrounded on all sides by powerful enemies, is the best proof of her capacity to oppose the pan- German plans of expansion toward the east in the future, and to serve as a bulwark of permanent peace. The federal formula has become wholly inapplicable to Austria-Hungary. The rise of the spirit of nationality is equi- valent to a death-warrant for Austria. The longer the execu- tion is delayed, the longer we shall have a condition which the President described as the ferment of whole populations fight- ing subtly and constantly against a rule not founded upon the affections or convictions of mankind. It is gratifying that official circles in this country seem to have recognized the necessity of dismembering Austria-Hun- gary if German imperialistic aims are to be thwarted, if Middle Europe, with its consequent enslavement of whole populations, is not to remain a fact, if permanent peace is to prevail. A dispatch from Washington, dated May 26, indicates that an agreement was reached with the British and French war mis- sions insuring harmonious action of the United States with the Allies for the dismemberment of Austria- Hungary, this in- cluding the constitution of an independent Bohemia and the restoration of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, with Transyl- vania to be given to Rumania, Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia, and the Trentino and Trieste to Italy. This is a pro- gram which means freedom for the suppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary and which will completely satisfy the American principle denying the right of existence to govern- ments lacking the consent of the governed; for Czechs and Slovaks, by a solemn manifesto issued in Paris in November 191 5, call for the erection of an independent Bohemian state; the Italians are hoping for the day when Italia Irredenta will be redeemed; the Rumanians expect the war to bring free- dom to their brethren still suffering under Magyar oppression, and the South Slavs of Austria pray for a united Jugoslavia. This is not a policy of annexations, but simply a policy of justice. In this program the administration deserves the sup- port of all people who think clearly and are not in the grip of obsolete formulas. It is an American program. (337) SMALL NATIONALITIES DISCUSSION 1 Mr. Paxton Hibben, Former Associated Press Correspondent in Athens: I have just come from Greece, where I have been for the past twenty months. If you had any idea of the extent to which five censors are operating between here and Athens, you would perhaps have reached the same conclusion that I do, that the American people are not only uninformed about the conditions in Greece, but woefully misinformed. We are prone to confuse in our minds democracy with the govern- mental form of republicanism. A country is called a republic — China, for example — and we at once leap to the conclusion that it must be a democracy. One party in a country declares for a republic — as in Russia today — and at once we are all in sympathy with that party, which we feel must stand for democracy. Yet it may stand for anarchy. Today in Greece a handful of astute politicians have set up a self- styled republican form of government in rebellion against the con- stitutional government of Greece. They represent no consent of the Greek people — ^but they represent the interests of several great powers. Therefore they are protected and financed, and it is possi- ble that they may be officially recognized by the great powers whose interests they serve. The Greeks of constitutional Greece are co- erced and starved, and their territory is seized by force by foreign powers. We, who fight the war for democracy, stand by and see this done because it is done in the name of a republic. The name is the thing! Call Venizelos, the revolutionary leader in Greece, a president, and he may lay waste the whole of Greece with no other sanction than the bayonets of our allies. Let some historian discover that Nero was a president, not an imp er at or, and the burning of Rome will be looked upon as a Fourth of July celebration. It is for this reason that there is such grave significance in the President's declarations ; first, " That governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no other powers should be supported by the thought, purpose or power of the family of nations." This is, I take it, the charter of democracy as we conceive democracy. Now, second, its guarantee: "That the community of interest and power upon which peace must hereafter (338) SMALL NATIONALITIES 147 depend imposes upon each nation the duty of seeing to it that all in- fluences proceeding from its own citizens meant to encourage or assist revolution in other states should be sternly and effectually sup- pressed and prevented." Without this guarantee, not only is democ- racy not safe, but the *' rights and liberties of small nations " are lost the moment it is found to the advantage of a larger and richer state to finance revolution in a small nation with a view to control- ling the army, the commerce or even the territory of that small nation, through a new government to be imposed upon the small nation with or without the consent of the governed. We either fight this war for " the rights and liberties of small na- tions " or we do not We are carrying the standard of democracy, or we are not. It is futile to give voice to rhetoric*; in this war, people believe deeds, not words. It is waste of breath to teU the German people that we are at war with their imperial government because we are convinced that it does not represent the consent of the governed, if we wink at the suppression by our allies of a government which does represent the consent of the governed. The Germans convict us of hypocrisy at once. They laugh at our pretensiorks to defend " the rights and liberties of small nations." I am referring to the case of Greece. I have just come from Greece, where I have spent very nearly two years, and I know what I am talking about. There is a constitutional government in Greece which ninety per cent of the people of Greece support. I know that they support it, for I have seen them support it by force of arms against the armed forces of three great powers. I have seen them bear hunger and death from starvation in their support of this govern- ment. It is not material whether the Greeks have an elective mon- archy or a republic as their government. It is, however, not only material, but it is the acid test of the sincerity of our declarations of our intentions in this war that the Greeks shall have whatever government they may decide, without outside interference, is the government they desire. Any other basis of decision in the Greek question is a basis of the interest of other states than the Hellenic state. Any other influence save that of absolute freedom of choice is an influence, in the words of President Wilson, proceeding from the citizens or still worse the governments of interested states, meant to encourage and assist revolution in the Hellenic state. As such it should be " sternly and effectually suppressed and prevented." I cannot see that it makes one whit of difference whether the sym- pathies of King Constantine are with the Germans or not. One of (339) 148 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII the ideals of civilization for which we are fighting this war is that every people has a right to decide its own destinies, iincompelled by anyone — our enemies, our allies or ourselves. And unless we see that the people are allowed to exercise that right in complete freedom, we are mere phrasemakers in our declaration that we fight for the " rights and liberties of small nations." The Greeks have the right to decide whether they wish to enter the war or not. It took us two years and a half to decide. The Greeks must be protected in their right to decide their course without coer- cion, I am not going to mince matters. They are being coerced today. They are being starved today. The truth about their situ- ation is being suppressed by an interested censorship. Civil war has been sowed in their country, not by Greeks, but by greater powers, our allies. From what I have seen in Greece I have no hesitation in saying that the revolutionary forces in that country are so far from representing the consent of the governed that the revolution could not last a week, were it not for the support of foreign cannon and the foreign money that has been poured into the coffers of the revo- lutionists by our allies. It was by such foreign influence that the liberties of Hungary were destroyed in 1849. It was by such methods that Poland was dra- gooned into submission in 1830 and 1863. It was by outside pres- sure that the home Tule of the Czechs was defeated in 1848. We may as well look the facts in the face. If democracy is to be made safe as a result of this war, it is we, the people of the United States, and we alone, who must do it. Nothing in the history of the nations of modern Europe, either of our enemies or our allies, indicates that any element save that of national interest will dictate the terms of peace or the conditions in Europe which may follow the war. With the exception of ourselves and the Japanese and the Italians, perhaps, not one important nation is fighting for anything but life. The cause of democracy is in our hands, and ours alone. I have one word to add. Since the thirtieth of last September, there has been a virtual blockade of Greece, and since the first of December there has been an absolute blockade of Greece. I do not know how the Greek people live today, but I know that they have put all their effort into sowing their fields, into planting enough wheat and barley to see them through the war. I know that in a month these harvests in Thessaly will be ripe, and the people of Greece, who have been starving for six months, will have a chance to live again. I saw yesterday a despatch from London saying that the revolution- (340) No. 2] SMALL NATIONALITIES 1 49 ists were insisting upon marching to Thessaly and seizing this grain which belongs to the people of Greece. Let me tell you one thing, that the Allies should not allow the revolutionists to seize this grain which was planted by the Gieeks of old Greece for their own liveli- hood. If they do, you will see a thing wliich might well have taken place in the days of old Greece. You will see the people of Greece burn their crops before they will turn them over to those who have raised their hands against them, I have no interest one way or the other in the matter of who rules Greece, King Constantine or Venizelos, but I have that interest which all of us ought to have who love freedom and the right of peoples to decide their own destinies — I have that interest in the matter of al- lowing Greece to decide what she wants, and not the English or the French or the Germans or the Austrians or anyone else. Dr. Theodore P. Ion, formerly Professor of International Law, Boston University Law School: I shall just touch on three points. The first point is that the Greek nation could not have existed with- out the help of the three great powers of Europe — Great Britain, France and Russia. By a special treaty signed in 1832 these great powers granted independence to Greece, and by the terms of the protocol of 1830 those three powers had the right to send troops to Greece. The second point is this : When the great powers of Europe inter- vened in Greece in 1863, because the Greeks on account of their dem- ocratic views, had sent away their king, the powers suggested to Greece that she elect a Prince of Denmark, who became George I. By the Treaty of 1866, these same powers guaranteed to Greece a constitutional government. The great question that has been raised in Europe is whether King Constantine has violated that constitution. In March 1915 Venizelos was in favor of intervention by Greece on the side of the Allies. He asked the king to call a crown coimcil, that is, a council of the former prime ministers, and he submitted to this council the proposal that Greece form an alliance with the pow- ers against Germany. Every one of the former prime ministers was personally opposed to Venizelos, yet all agreed that Greece ought to join with the Allies. The only exception was a pro-German, who thought Greece ought to lean toward Germany and Austria; never- theless he advised the king that since Venizelos was the leader of the majority, it was the duty of the king to allow the cabinet to carry out his policies. I may say that under the Greek constitution all (341) I CO CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII powers are derived from the people, and the king has no right to impose his own personal will or to direct the policy of the country. The king did not agree with the policy of Venizelos, and because of the disagreement Venizelos resigned. The king called to power another politician, and an election followed m the month of June 1915. During a three months campaign the catchword of the op- ponents of Venizelos was: " Vote for Venizelos, and you go to war; vote for the king's policy, and you do not go to war." Upon that issue Venizelos again came in with a great majority. After many delays Venizelos was again made prime minister in August 1915. Nevertheless Constantine refused to enter the war. In October 1915 the question became acute. Bulgaria mobilized, and Venizelos demanded of the king that Greece mobilize, in fulfilment of her treaty with Serbia. After much bickering, the king yielded, Venizelos re- mained in power, and Greece mobilized. When Bulgaria was about to attack Serbia, Venizelos spoke in the legislature, explaining the treaty with Serbia, and indicating that Greece would stand by Serbia even though it brought her into conflict with German troops. It was the latter statement that provoked the king, and he asked Venizelos to resign again. This Venizelos did. Under these con- ditions the people were still with Venizelos. I should like to explain the Greco-Serbian treaty in a few words. That treaty was signed on the eve of the Second Balkan War, be- tween Greece and Serbia against Bulgaria. Venizelos, fearing that Bul- garia was going to attack, had tried to conclude a treaty with Serbia. After some hesitation, Serbia submitted a draft treaty, providing that in case of attack by a third power, the allies should jointly defend their respective territories. Greece objected that this third power might be Austria, and Serbia replied that such was the case. None the less Greece finally signed the treaty. Now it was well known that if Austria attacked Serbia, Russia would take the side of the latter, and in that European war the natural position of Greece would be with the Allies. That argument was used by Venizelos in the cabinet council presided over by the king. Therefore, when Greece signed the treaty she knew perfectly well that it would apply to a general European war, although the king and his party and cabinet ministers had many times said that it referred to a Balkan war only. I am ashamed to say that Greece has shamefully violated her treaty obligations with Serbia. When I say Greece, I mean of course, not the people but the king, who, on account of his German tendencies and opinions, prevented the Venizelos government from carrying out its treaty obligations. (342) No. 2] SMA LL NA TIONA LI TIES 1 5 i The third point is, why should the Allied Powers coerce Greece? I omit the question of the treaty, which was one grievance against Greece. Besides that, the Allies discovered that the Greek govern- ment was helping Germany. It was offering Germany submarine bases in many parts of Greece. It surrendered the important fort- ress of Rupel to the Bulgarians for the purpose of allowing them to get around the Allied army, and expel it from Saloniki. In that case there is no doubt that Austria would have gone to Saloniki, which would have been lost to Greece. That is the reason why the Greek people not only were not displeased with the occupation of Saloniki by the Allies, but so grateful that Kitchener and Senator Cochin were received with great honors, the latter being oft'ered the citizen- ship of Athens. If the people were against the Allies, why should they offer the citizenship to Senator Cochin? These, then were some of the reasons that justified the blockading of Greece by the Allies. Mr. Fabian Franklin^ New York: We have heard from two gentlemen who in some sense represent Greece, one by birth and one by recent residence. I do not pretend to know anything more about the Greek situation than everyone is bound to know from the daily press; but as Americans we are interested in this matter in a some- what broader way than concerns any question of truth or veracity. Mr. Hibben began by saying that we had been prevented from hearing the truth on account of the intervention of five censorships. I cannot recall that he availed himself of the opportunity to correct our ignorance by stating a single fact except his own conviction that ninety per cent of the Greek people were with Consitantine. He said he had seen the Greek people standing behind their king. We know what that means ; it depends on the people who are seen standing be- hind the king, or on the predilection of the man who makes the state- ment. Every one of us knows that Venizelos was considered the idol of the Greek people, was elected by a great majority, went out of power, again submitted to election, and was triumphantly returned. Here was a nation in which, under a government whose constitu- tionality neither Constantine nor anybody else denies, Venizelos was elected in the first place, and then triumphantly re-elected on the specific war issue. There was an immense national sentiment ex- pressed in favor of the course he stood for. Constantine uncon- stitutionally reversed this decision. Under these conditions, at the crucial moment of a war which was going to determine the destiny of the world, the Allies stood confronted with the fact that the (343) 152 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII government of Greece was in the hands of persons inimical to their interests, and in their opinion, faithless to the Serbian treaty. Should the Allies, confronted with that situation, hare left the government in the hands of a monarch opposed to them? Mr. Hackett spoke somewhat sarcastically of all this talk about small nations, and referred to the insincerity of those who do not practise what they preach. In that respect the Declaration of In- dependence is the greatest outrage ever committed since the world began ; for half the people who signed the Declaration of Indepen- dence were slave-holders. Yet we meant what we said in the Declar- ation of Independence. We did not live up to it any more than we live up to the Sermon on the Mount, but we tried to, and finally we did. The question is not whether the Allied nations are perfect, not even whether England has been perfect in its treatment of Ireland, but what is to be the outcome of the position they take. Ask your- selves whether it would be better if the Declaration of Independence had never been written, because it contains that declaration that all men are created equal. Mr. D. J. Theophilatos^ New York : Speaking in the House of Commons on May 10, Mr. Bonar Law stated that the Greek king has the support of the majority of the Greeks who bear arms. The Greeks who bear arms are the voters of Greece; Mr. Bonar Law's statement is therefore virtually a candid admission that the majority of the Greek people do not want a dictatorship under Venizelos, but do support the constitutional government of Greece under King Constantine. Just what has the government of King Constantine done to incur the wrath and the measures of coercion applied by the defenders of the rights and liberties of small nations to the Hel- lenic people? First, on the occasion of the third Austrian invasion of Greece's ally, Serbia, in the fall of 1915 the constitutional Greek government took the stand that the Greco-Serbian treaty, being of purely Balkan scope, did not require Greece to destroy herself by coming — futilely, let it be added — to the aid of Serbia. I emphasise the fact that this was the third invasion of Serbia, because on the two previous occa- sions when Serbia was invaded, Venizelos was prime minister of Greece, and as prime minister held that the Greco-Serbian treaty did not require Greece to come to the aid of her ally Serbia in any save a purely Balkan conflict. No one in Greece except Venizelos main- tains that the Greco-Serbian treaty required Greece to destroy herself (344) No. 2] SMALL NATIONALITIES I53 in the fall of 1915, and even Venizelos himself maintains this thesis only as a purely political argument, when it is a policy for whose failure he need not take tlie consequences. One further point, however, in the matter of this treaty. Treaty ot no treaty, King Constantino was ready in the fall of 1915 as he had been in the spring of that year, to fight against Bulgaria or Turkey or both, under the conditions laid down by the Greco-Serbian treaty it- self—that is, with Serbia in a position to confront the Bulgarians with 150,000 men. Unfortunately, Serbia's greater allies had left her virtually without assistance so that she was in no position to fulfil her part of this contract. King Constantine was so ready to fulfil Greece's part that he was willing to have France and Great Britain take over Serbia's share and supply the required 150,000 men. This they agreed to do, and Serbia therefore refused to make a sep- arate peace with Austria. Greece mobilized to be ready to add her strength to that of France and Great Britain in defense of Serbia. Then what? France and Great Britain actually sent to Saloniki not 150,000 men but 38,000, and the British portion of this insignifi- cant force was without orders to leave Saloniki for Serbia, nor did it ever march into Serbia. Had Greece entered the war at that time, she too would have been crushed by the German impact. Serbia would not have been aided, nor would the Allied cause have been forwarded; but, on the contrary, Germany would have had 50,000 square miles of Greek territory to add to her conquests. So much for the the Greco-Serbian treaty. Now for the allegation that King Constantine has violated the Greek constitution. That is not the most liberal charter in the world; the Greeks themselves complained bitterly of its illiberality when Great Britain, France and Russia forced it upon the Hellenes in 1832, and they have liberalized it many times since, on their own initiative and without either the assistance or the prompting of the so-called protecting powers. But even today the king of the Hellenes cannot violate it, because article twenty nine of the document itself definitely states : " The person of the king is irresponsible and inviolable, and his ministers are responsible." The charge is that King Constantine violated the fundamental charter of Greek liberties by dismissing Venizelos as prime minister in October 1915. Article thirty one of the Greek constitution reads: " The king appoints and dismisses his ministers." The king was deliberately endowed with this power with the idea that he should exercise it on occasions when he felt that his ministers did not repre- sent the will of the Hellenic people, as in this very instance. (345) 154 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII On the other hand, article ninety nine of the Greek constitution reads: "No foreign army may be admitted to the Greek service with- out a special law, nor may it sojourn in or pass through the state." Yet on September 21, 1915, Venizelos, then prime minister of Greece, invited a foreign army to " sojovirn in the state," without the authori- zation of either the Boule of the Hellenes or of the constitutional sovereign of Greece — and Sir Edward Grey, in an official declaration in the House of Commons has stated that Venizelos did so. There is one other point. It is true that France, Great Britain and Russia aided Greece to gain her independence. So did the United States; but the United States does not demand on that ac- count the right to administer our internal affairs, to override our courts, to appoint our police commissioners, to censor our letters within our own coimtry, to control our railways and our ports. The exercise of such powers is not compatible with the independent sovereignty of any country, large or small. These things are being done in Greece today — in the name of democracy! It is against just such action on the part of the Allies that we Greeks, loyal to our constitutional gov- ernment, protest to America, the champion of the rights and liberties of small nations. George Whitelock,^ American Bar Association: I do not mean to attempt elucidation of the great problems under dis- cussion at this remarkable conference. Whatever I say at this juncture must be in the nature of personal observation. I must confess that I have had a great sense of hopelessness about the whole project of amicable international adjustments. A number of per- sonal incidents abroad in the last ten years had confirmed my sense of despair. I attended a meeting of the International Law Asso- ciation ten years ago in Berlin, and was a guest at luncheon in a private house, where the German oak was sympathetically inter- twined with the roses of England in compliment to British members of the association, guests on that occasion. The expressions of amity and good-will on the part of our host were charming and con- vincing. But when at a business meeting of the association he pro- tested, in what I conceived an eloquent speech, against the hard feel- ing then developing in Prussia against Great Britain, the sporadic applause by the Prussians was the first note of warning to me of the impending conflict. 1 Introductory remarks as presiding officer at the evening session, May 29. (346) No. 2] SMALL NATIONALITIES 1 55 Two years afterward I was in Budapest at another meeting of the same association. The then Prince of Bulgaria was there for con- ference with the late Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary concerning the proclamation of himself as czar of Bulgaria. The purpose of the prince's visit was unknown. I sat opposite him at the opera, and after studying him for four hours, said to myself, " You will never do anything in this world" — so dull he seemed. But within a few days I saw him at Sofia on his return home, and within a week he had proclaimed himself czar. Thiis opened the wonderful drama which was staged thereafter in the Balkan peninsula, a drama whose final act is the tremendoiis war now prevailing in Europe. Then five years ago I went to Paris, where I met a friend who had once declared his determination to devote the rest of his life to the cause of international peace. On this occasion he told me of the ef- fective arrangements being made among the different nations of the world to ensure the success of the cause. He was convinced that there would never be another great outbreak of war. His was not the vision of the prophet. Two years later I prepared an address for delivery in September 1914 before the International Law Association at The Hague. It was actually printed, but the contemplated meeting in the Peace Pal- ace was abandoned and an angry cannonade was resounding across the border on the date fixed for my address. And so I have felt despondent about the whole subject. The war is actually upon us; that war has made the eternal topics once more current. We are back again to consideration of fundamental psychological truths. War and its avoidance is one of those topics. Whatever may have been my past sense of hopelessness, the words of wisdom and moderation to which I have listened at this meeting, like the sense of patriotism here prevalent, are full of encouragement for the future. It is time to shake oil the old American apathy and indifference to the affairs of the world beyond the seas. We are beginning to do it now. It is our function to help America realize that the day of apathy is gone ; that we too are in the gigantic struggle ; that we are a part of the great world, and may never again cease so to be. President Butler has truly said that we must learn to give up the habit of parochial thought, and think internationally. That is the lesson we are acquiring. When we have paid the premium of vast sacrifice on the battlefields of Europe for the insurance of American safety in future; when we have secured that safety by paying the last full measure of devotion, then our people will realize their place in the world and their responsibility to humanity. (347) DEMOCRACY AND OPEN DIPLOMACY^ OSCAR S. STRAUS Former Ambassador, Member of the Permanent Court at The Hague THE two subjects of the morning, open diplomacy, and the effect of censorship in foreign relations have a very close relationship to each other. I should prefer to entitle our subject, the need for closer relationship between the machinery of diplomacy and the will of the people. Mahan, who has written so learnedly and ably on force in international relationships, makes an antithesis between law and war. Those words describe briefly the great issue of the present world conflict whether future relationship shall be controlled by the powers of war or of law. The league to enforce peace, instead of making force and law the opponents of each other, would utilize the powers now employed in war to sustain law. The possibility of doing this will depend on how this war ends. The world cannot be safe for democracy so long as there exists one dominant or potent power under the guidance of rulers who recognize no moral obligations in international relationship. This conception is by no means new. On the contrary, it is the original imperialistic conception. In other words, it is purely and simply the doctrine of might. In this imperialistic philosophy of nations, there is no room for the recognition of any moral standard in international relation- ship. This philosophy, in its logical conclusion, leads either to world domination by a single state or to international anarchy. It is because in international relationships imperial- ism to a considerable extent continued to dominate, that we find the standard of morals between nations is so far below the same standard within nations, that we find within nations 1 Introductory Address delivered at the morning session of the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 19 17. (348) DEMOCRACY AND OPEN DIPLOMACY 157 a well-ordered system of civil society, and between nations so large an element of anarchy. This element of anarchy is especially to be noted in the low standard of morals which justified the conclusion of secret treaties between separate nations, in direct conflict with general treaties made by groups of states at the end of wars involving many countries. I refer for illustration to the Congress of Westphalia after the Thirty Years War, the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars, and the Congress of Berlin after the Turco-Russian War. The various plans for main- taining the peace of Europe broke down, first, because Euro- pean nations concealed their international engagements from the people, and second, because the international standards were such that it was not regarded as contrary to public morals for individual states to make separate treaties in direct conflict with the treaties negotiated at such congresses. The world will never be safe for democracy or for any other form of government, so long as the diplomacy of states is under the cloak of secrecy and concealment. When the chief states of the world were ruled by autocratic governments, ambassadors were sent from one nation to the other, not so much for the purpose of promoting friendly rela- tions, but more for the purpose of international spying. That has never applied to America. American diplomacy, because of its directness and openness, was often not seriously regarded; it was styled " shirt-sleeve " diplomacy. We followed that method because it was in consonance with our democratic ideals and because we were little concerned with the intrigues of European states. John Hay defined the policy of our diplo- macy as governed " by the Golden Rule and the Monroe Doc- trine." It has ever been purely mutual and defensive. Let us hope that as a result of this war it will be possible, as the President has said, to form " a partnership of demo- cracies " — a league or concert of nations. One condition of such a partnership must be good faith. In order to insure good faith there must be no secret treaties; no treaty should become effective until confirmed by the representatives of the people. The United States was the first country to establish (349) I eg conference: on foreign relations this principle by providing in its Constitution that no treaties should be binding until confirmed by the Senate, which in practice makes the Senate part of the treaty-making power. It is true that treaties are often considered in secret session, but if we are to have open diplomacy, the secret sitting of the Senate, even when dealing with treaties, will have to be abolished. It is not the machinery of diplomacy which is so much in need of reconstruction as the method of employing the machin- ery. The method should be democratized so that the people, through their chosen representatives, may have a voice in making, confirming or rejecting their country's international engagements and policies. This method is possible only among democracies. Even among democracies it will fail unless the constituent nations forming the partnership observe good faith. The observance of good faith would in a large measure be safeguarded if parliamentary ratification should be made a prerequisite to the validity of treaties and no treaties should be effective until they had been transmitted to all the other members forming the partnership. (350) DIFFICULTIES OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS' DOMICIO DA GAMA Ambassador from Brazil to the United States THE current notion that diplomacy is the art of gravely disguising facts under pleasant words is one of many careless definitions composing the precarious fund of popular wisdom. Indeed public opinion seems to thrive on general impressions and to like vagueness. The explanation of this taste for bold and unconfirmed assertions may be that vagueness encourages discussion, and discussion, not action, is one of the characteristics of democracy, of which public opinion is an essential element. Another pleading for the ill-defined and vague notions that encumber our minds came from the brilliant pen of Prevost-Paradol, when he wrote that " asses alone have only clear ideas," Now, I do not wish to cast a reflection upon the mental conditions of those who make public opinion, but it seems to me that they are too assertive, although their assertions are not less hazy and uncertain than mere guesses. Notwithstanding its constant changes, public opinion is the foundation of popular wisdom, and this leads us to be- lieve that popular wisdom is built upon error, upon unverified impressions, creations of desire and imagination. This brief aggressive preamble does not express the re- sentment of a diplomat against the popular misconception of his role and character in the comedy of world politics. On the contrary, I rather enjoy this occasion of making a few re- marks, very few and cautious, upon diplomacy as it is sup- posed to be, as it is in reality^, as it should be. It is certainly better to charge anonymous public opinion with errors of judgment than to slight the philosophical mind of our friends. 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 191 7. (351) l6o CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII And besides if there were no errors to point out, there would be no occasion for assemblies of the wise and thoughtful, no speeches full of good doctrine, no exchange of ideas about the solution of problems of common interest like those studied at this conference. Many years ago I heard that master of elo- quence, Emilio Castelar, say that from the oratorical point of view the world was becoming too good, since there were only petty evils left to be attacked in fiery outbursts of rhetori- cal indignation. He certainly died too soon, as the present times might have shown him that the dragon of iniquity is still alive and rampant among men. He would also rejoice in the number of defenders that justice and right have found all over the world, among whom the hosts of diplomacy make such a brave array. And this brings me to the point that in time of need diplo- macy may also assume the fighting mood and dare to face facts and even to call them names, an attitude not wholly in accord- ance with the popular conception of diplomatic dealings. It appears on the contrary that, being on the first line of national defense, the diplomats were the first to shoot. The exchange of courtesies of the battle of Fontenoy of old was not observed this time ; they started pelting each other with hard truths, that hurt sometimes but are seldom deadly missiles. Was this an infraction of the rule that places the diplomats among the cau- tious and courteous professional liars? No, indeed. The rule for the diplomatic agent is to speak the truth, his word being deemed sufficient to engage his government's responsibility. Truly there are some among the diplomats who permit them- selves to disguise the truth, alleging either self-defense or reasons of state, invoking that antiquated and odious theory that the end justifies the means, claiming a moral code for states different from the one binding individuals together. We know by experience the harm brought upon the world by such a strange combination of the spirit of Machiavelli, Talleyrand and Bismarck, mixed and amalgamated into a Jesuitism with- out charity. And I wonder if it would not be advisable to include in the program of the next peace conference the adop- tion of an international code of honor for the diplomatic (352) No. 2] DIFFICULTIES OF DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY i5i career, one of its rules disqualifying for the service those who might bring into it their personal habits of insincerity and deceit. We might be deprived of the collaboration of some able men who cannot play politics if they have to play fair; but then we owe to the countries we represent the sacrifice of brilliancy to seriousness and dignity, and the nations would be better served if all their agents abroad were as jealous of their personal credit as any broker at the stock exchange, or a lawyer before the courts of justice. Of course I have in mind some whom such an international code would prevent from sitting with us around a table in con- ference, although we should be glad to hav^e them on the other side of a house of congress as adversaries. The reason is obvious. Representatives of parties eventually contribute to- ward the welfare of the country by the dispute of power, but to conquer power is their first and principal objective ; repre- sentatives of governments in collective conferences or in separ- ate negotiations seek agreements that, by conciliating different interests through mutual concessions, promote good feeling between their countries and develop the spirit of international association around a common work, that to be durable must be devoid of personalism and built upon realities. This is why able lawyers and capable political men often fail in diplomacy ; they cannot resist the force of habit of winning cases or the temptation of carrying a point in a debate on an international issue. There is a well-known phrase about diplomatic vic- tories that should be written on the walls of the rooms where diplomats meet, if only as a reminder that they need to refrain from putting themseh-es and their petty ambitions ahead of the countries they represent, and the common interests that it is their mission to foster. One should not conclude that these warnings against per- sonal impulses in diplomatic transactions somehow justify the popular discredit of diplomacy as an instrument of progress and betterment in international relations. We might as well condemn engineering or medicine because some bridges fell or some people died through the ineptitude of builders or physi- cians. And undoubtedly more lives pass and more piles (353) 1 62 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII crumble through incapacity of doctors and engineers, than treaties fail by lack of proper care at the hands of diplomatic agents. Only, failures in diplomacy are more remarked, as they are transactions involving national interests and the future of the parties engaged. When we consider the importance of the stakes and the complexity of the game, playing against men, not against natural forces, the wonder is that there are so many good players in diplomacy. In fact they are di- rected from home and seldom are authorized to " use their own judgment " — a prestigious" phrase that fills the man with elation, although it never carries him very far — but informa- tion of the conditions, an eye for opportunity, and an un- prejudiced mind in dealing with other men, are precious fac- tors for the successful conclusion of a diplomatic transaction. I know that I am inscribed upon your program to speak about open diplomacy : democratic control of diplomatic negotiations, and I also know that you do not expect me to take the suggestive theme literally, and discuss it to ex- haustion. Your courteous attention should not be taxed to that extent. I will therefore only say that my experience of the subject does not encourage the hope that such control may ever become effective. There is indeed an open diplomacy for the people, through the press, when, as the saying is, we " play to the galler}^" The democratic influence upon that kind of diplomacy is only indirect. One might call it elec- toral, or magnetic — mysterious, anyhow, not open in design, dealing in expectations. Needless to say that results are of less importance in such cases; notoriety is what matters. I suppose that nobody cares for this kind of open diplomacy that easily turns into publicity and means self-advertising. The other, the real thing, does not bear much publicity while in course of preparation, if it is to make headway. Representa- tive regimes are based upon confidence. The practical rule of the division of offices and convergence of efforts would be impossible without trust. Advices coming from every quarter would paralyze any action that is not resolved to tear away fears and apprehensions from outside. Philosophically, the man of action should be deaf, because philosophical minds are (354) No. 2] DIFFICULTIES OF DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY 163 inclined to consider and weigh every objection, and the time for action is lost in consideration. There is the story of Buridan's ass to illustrate vividly the deadly equilibrium of a scrupulous mind. The other day I asked a five-year-old child with whom I am relearning life why he did not run both ways, and he promptly replied : " Because that would stop me and I want to run." A wise diplomat could not say better. Perhaps, if he had an essentially conciliatory mind, he would stop to think and try to run both ways, thus losing time and prestige. This is not intended to justify secretive diplomacy, which is or should be a thing of the past, when " high reasons of state " stopped curiosity or real patriotic interest at the door of the chancelleries. An exchange of trust is more in the spirit of democracy. Truly, discretion must be used in trust- ing, at the risk of admitting grades in a democracy. But, even if only temporarily and by representation, the will of the people has to be expressed and responded to through a limited number of advisers. By reducing this number to the moderate proportions of a council of state, we may expect an increase in executive efficiency, without impairing the prin- ciple of representative government. A measure taken in coun- cil cannot be held up to reproach as arbitrary, if that council constitutionally is an organ of national life. Nothing pre- vents the creation of such a national body unless it is the need of an amendment in our federal constitution to that effect. Through it, the democratic control of diplomatic negotiations would be insured and the responsibility of the executive shared with other organs of the will of the people. Diplomatic acts would not be open to public discussion while in preparation, but the negotiations would not be secret. And, who knows? perhaps the diplomatic agents whose functions are misunder- stood by the public and their own governments, to the extent of their being often made mere commercial agents with addi- tional facilities for information — perhaps the diplomats, find- ing recognition and support in public opinion, would finally be able to raise diplomacy to the standing and dignity to which it is entitled, being, as it is, the first line of national defense. (355) THE NEED FOR A MORE OPEN DIPLOMACY' ARTHUR BULLARD Washington, D. C. THERE is no question more important for the future peace of the world than the devising of means by which the will of the people may be made more directly and immediately dominant in foreign relations. I have read pretty extensively the advocates of the old-fashioned secret diplomacy. I find that most of their arguments in favor of undemocratic diplomacy come under two heads. The first is purely technical, and is well summed up in the early chapters of Mr. Lippmann's Stakes of Diplomacy. He points out with considerable force the difficulty of consulting the people in the rapidly moving affairs of foreign policy. While his argument on this point is a serious one, others have urged the same view in the form of the reductio ad absurdum. They have said that it is per- fectly impossible to consult every man in the street. Of course, those of us who are seriously interested in this question of democratizing our diplomacy are not advocates of any such absurdity. It is a question, like all human questions, of more and less. What we are urging, is not that our diplomacy should be absolutely democratic, but that it should be more democratic than it is. This argument of the technical difficulties in making the will of the people effective in foreign policy is the one argument which I have most often met, but there is another argument against open diplomacy, which might be called the President's argument. A great many things happen in foreign affairs which would, if generally known, stir the spirit of war. I be- lieve that the President had a profound desire to keep us out of war, and that he therefore kept from the public a knowledge 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Scieace, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 1917. (356) THE NEED FOR MORE OPEN DIPLOMACY 165 of many things which would have been immediately resented. He tried, I believe, by the use of discretion in regard to foreign relations, to preserve a spirit of peace, feeling that the stirring- up of the people would lead to war; but the answer to that is obvious — that even such guarding of the people from the spirit of war has not kept them out of war. Those two are the only serious arguments against democratic control which I have encountered. I do not believe that those arguments are the reasons. I think that the reason why our diplomacy here in America, as in the democracies of Europe, continues to operate along the old monarchic lines, is primarily one of inertia. It started that way, and nobody has changed it. It is almost amusing to read today the diplomatic corres- pondence of the world, and find what an antique tone, what an antique phraseology, has come down to us from the old days, and no one has brought it up to our modern standards. The democratization of life does not follow any uniform course. In every nation you can find out how in some aspects it is more democratic than other nations and in some aspects much less democratic. In all the democratic governments that new movement started by the great revolution has been slowest of all in penetrating the foreign office. Since the great revolution and the liberalizing of the world, forward-looking men have been interested primarily in internal affairs. The democratization which has been engrossing all thoughtful men is democratization of industry, and it is typi- cal that the liberals of the world were surprised by this war. They had been so interested in their internal problems that they did not give proper attention to their neighbors. To me that fact suggests the one hope of a better future growing out of this war. Never again in our generation will the liberals of the world be indifferent to foreign affairs. The invasion of the world has not been merely geographic; it has not been merely the overflowing across frontiers. All of our life has been invaded from the outside, all of our pet projects, all of the things for which we have been striving have been attacked from without. We have got to watch be- yond the border, and if we do, if we put the same ardor for (357) l66 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII better things into our international relations which we have been expending in this effort to improve our internal conditions, the machinery will form itself. After all it is not so much a change in machinery as a change in spirit that we need We must, and I believe that we will be interested. There is one other reason, as distinguished from argument, for secrecy in diplomacy. It is not the greatest reason, but it strongly dominates the minds of some people who are op- posed to any reform in our diplomatic methods ; and that is, the privilege of secrecy. It is a matter that we have had to fight out in our business life. Many business deals are easier to effect if you don't have to tell anybody about them. In our industrial life we have had a constant fight for more and more publicity ; we have discovered that it is not for the common weal to allow our large corporations, our large insurance companies, to operate in secrecy. Just so we shall have to insist, and as we become more democratic we shall insist, upon publicity in regard to foreign affairs. It is too important, it touches too intimately our own lives, for us to be indifferent about it. Interest means publicity. It is not only the wicked, however, who love darkness; it is also the slothful and the inefficient. There are a great many persons in the foreign offices of the world who would retire to private life if such publicity were introduced as I would like to see, and some of those persons who feel their own position rather precarious under such circumstances are among the strongest advocates of diplomatic secrecy. We cannot have efficiency unless we have responsibility, and it is a common- place in diplomatic discussion today that innumerable mis- takes have been made by diplomatic agents on both sides; but the proper ones have not been retired to private life because they have been guarded by the veil of secrecy. Of course the very foundation of any democratic control in diplomacy, as in every other branch of politics, must be demo- cratic understanding. It is not any change in the laws, nor any change in the rules governing the State Department which will bring about this better understanding. There must be a getting together, an intensive and persistent education ; the (358) No. 2] THE NEED FOR MORE OPEN DIPLOMACY iQj people must know about these things. We have already gone a long way from the provincialism of ten years ago. More people in the United States are interested in the world today than were ever interested before. Now, the government should stimulate this interest. Such conferences as this seem to me one of the greatest things that could be done for this cause of democratic control. People must understand the issue. The State Department must introduce itself to the public. It really is not beneath its dignity. The other departments in the government have done it, and the questions involved in the work of the State Department are not much more intricate than those involved in the work of the Department of Agricul- ture, which is a good example of how the departments can take the people into their confidence in regard to their work. We ought to know as much about the State Department and its problems and policies as we do about the other departments. One of the most interesting books on war that I have ever read is that of von Clausewitz. It is all centered around one idea. Von Clausewitz is constantly coming back to the state- ment that war is a movement through a resistant medium. He pictures one type of general who makes a fine and intricate plan, and then does not carry it through, because of friction. Von Clausewitz lists all sorts of things as friction, such as bad roads, unexpected rain, misinformation. The plan, he declares, is only the smallest part of the work of a great general ; such a general is the man who can grit his teeth and force his plan through the resistant medium. The same necessity for forcing plans through exists in time of peace. Life itself is movement through a resistant medium, and this is certainly as true of this campaign for democratic control of diplomacy. The friction which must be overcome is in some cases a sincere belief that it is unwise to trust the people; in some cases it is rank stupidity. If we are going k) win this campaign for democratic control, it has got to be by gritting the teeth and pegging away against the resistance. It will not do for us simply to discuss a proper method of diplomacy ; we have got to have the will to force it through. (359) A PLEA FOR AN UNCENSORED PRESS ' FREDERICK ROY MARTIN Assistant Manager, Associated Press WE may now turn from diplomatic discussion to news- paper crudities, and discuss the subject which, gauged by hours, has taken more time in Washing- ton since the declaration of war than any other. The House of Representatives is discussing it this morning and probably will be discussing it tomorrow morning. I am confident that nothing will be added to the plea for a liberal censorship that John Milton made several centuries ago. The morning topic, the need of better machinery for international negotiations, may properly include a discussion of censorship, though I ap- proach it with a plea for the minimum censorship, and hence the least possible machinery. The punster's observation that the only ship whose loss we need not mourn is the censorship, expresses the view, not only of many progressive journalists, but of many thoughtful statesmen. Eliminating from consideration the publication of strictly military or naval movements over which all recognize the need of censorship in war time, an impressive if not a convinc- ing argument may be made that that government feels that a censorship is most valuable which has the most to conceal. President Wilson's argument that " there are some newspapers which cannot be relied upon to suppress information whose publication can be an injury " can be accepted without con- tradiction as a reason for censorship if it be assumed that " injury " means detriment to military or naval progress. It was merely unfortunate perhaps, that at about the same time when the President issued the statement, the newspapers should have been told by the Department of State, or rather, through ^ Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 191 7. (360) A PLEA FOR AN UNCENSORED PRESS 169 the Committee on Public Information, that " The Department of State" — I am again quoting — "considers it a dangerous service to the enemy to discuss differences of opinion between the Allies and difficulties with neutral countries," and they added — I try to measure my words — with childish innocence, that " speculation about possible peace is another topic which may possess elements of danger, as peace reports may be of enemy origin, put out to weaken the combination against Germany." That suggestion of the State Department caused the cabinet, in its fight for unlimited censorship, to lose the sympathy of its last newspaper supporter in the city of New York, as that newspaper gave up the fight this morning. If the cabinet carried that through, you could not hold this conference. Our State Department surely could not imagine a press that would not speculate about a possible peace; at least the Hohenzollerns have not suppressed such discussion in Germany, and surely the Romanoffs did not succeed. We may, perhaps, pass this cautionary suggestion of the State Department as ill digested — it must be. Granted that a military censorship in war time is necessary, what further restriction of the press is desirable? I venture to assert that no additional precautions are desirable. I sar- castically express the hope that men holding public office will not announce that they have discovered some startling de- stroyer of submarines, and make other absurd statements. Up to date it seems to me that the greatest indiscretions committed in publicity since we declared war, were made in a speech in the Senate by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions, and by a gentleman who has the distinction of being the head of one of our advisory committees in the national defense movement. I presume to maintain then, that further regula- tion than military needs require is most likely to be injudicious. The veil of secrecy creates mistrust, and that chancellery is most generally believed which seeks to conceal the least. Such statements seem absurdly simple when made. May I state a few instances of some possible interest? When Great Britain in the first year of the war appointed a diplomatic rep- (361) I70 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII resentative to the Vatican, the censor — the censor then was like the Queen in Alice in Wojiderland — "Off with their heads! ", or like the censor in Barrie's play, dressed in black and carrying an axe, but saying nothing — the censor instructed the British press that