NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES 3 3433 08177330 5 \ PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK Volume VII] JULY, 1917 [Number 2 THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES PART I I. THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN WORLD ORGANIZATION 2. FUTURE PAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS A SERIES OF ADDRESSES AND PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AT LONG BEACH, N. Y., MAY 28 — JUNE I, I917 EDITED BY HENRY RAYMOND MUSSEY AND STEPHEN PIERCE DUGGAN PUBLISHED BY THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Columbia University 1 1 6th Street and Broadway, New York Copyright ign, by ike Academy oj Political Science. \i PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE No. I. No. 2. No. 3. No. 4- No. I. No. 2. No. 3- No. 4- No. I. No. 2. No. 3- No. 4- The Proceedings are issued by the Academy as a record of its activities and as a means of giving detailed treatment to special subjects of importance. 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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK Volume VII] JULY, 1917 [Number 2 THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE ^ UNITED STATES PART I I. THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN WORLD ORGANIZATION 2. FUTURE PAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS EDITED BY HENRY RAYMOND MUSSEY AND 1 STEPHEN PIERCE DUGGAN The Academy of Political Science Columbia University, New York 1917 999517A Copyright bv The Academy of Political Science PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES HELD AT LONG BEACH, N. Y. MAY 28— JUNE I, 19 1 7 CONTENTS THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES I THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN WORLD ORGANIZATION PAGE The Future of International Law .... 3 Charles E. Hughes The International Mind : How to Develop It. . 16 Nicholas Mttrray Butler International Arbitration 21 John Bassett Moore A World Court 29 William I. Hull International Legislation and Administration . 36 Alpheus Henry Snow A Parliament of Parliaments 53 Felix Adler Discussion of World Organization . . . .59 Samuel T. Button Lillian D. Wald Moorfield Storey The League to Enforce Peace 65 Hamilton Holt World Liberalism 70 Lijtcohi Colcord Economic Access and Neutralization of Water- ways. 80 J. Russell Smith The United States and the Food Supply of Swit- zerland 87 Paul Ritter Labor as a Factor in the Newer Conception of International Relationships . . . .90 Jane Addams Vi CONTENTS VKQ'B. Socialism and the Terms of Peace . . . .97 Meyer London Suppressed Nationalities and the Consent of the Governed 102 Francis Hackett Liberal England and International Relationships. 107 vS. K. Ratcliffe Annexation and the Principle of Nationality . 112 Stepheji P. Dnggan The New Russia 118 B. E. Shatzky The Democratic Ideal in International Relations. 121 Bainhridge Colby The Wilson-Kerensky Peace Policy . . . .124 William English Walling Discussion OF Small Nationalities . . . .131 Theodore Prince Clarence H . Howard George L. Fox Miran Sevasly * Henry R. S eager The Austrian Problem 139 Charles Pergler Discussion OF Small Nationalities ( C^w//;??/^^) . 146 Paxto7i Hibben Theodore P. Ion Fabian Franklin D. J. Theophilatos * George White lock Democracy AND Open Diplomacy . . . .156 Oscar S. Straus Difficulties of Democratic Control of Diplomatic Negotiations 159 Domicio Da Gama *Introductory remarks of presiding officer. CONTENTS Vij PAGE The Need for a More Open Diplomacy . . .164 Arthur Billiard A Plea for an Uncensored Press . . . .168 Frederick Roy Martin The Value of a Free Press 173 John Temple Graves Discussion of Censorship and Open Diplomacy . 177 Paul U. Kellogg Philip Marshall Brown Dixon Merritt Edward T. Devine Maurice Leon Plans for World Organization 183 James Byrne II FUTURE PAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS Commercial and Financial Interests of the United States in the Caribbean 191 Edwin M. Borchard The Attitude of the United States toward the Retention by European Nations of Colonies in and Around the Caribbean 200 William R. Shepherd The Bases OF AN Enduring American Peace . .214 Henry A. Wise Wood The West Indies 219 * Irving T. Bush Our Relations to Haiti and San Domingo . .220 Oswald Garrison Villard Our Caribbean Policy 226 Philip Marshall Brown Discussion OF THE Caribbean Question . . .231 Albert Bushnell Hart Cyrus F. Wicker * Introductory remarks of presiding officer. X REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR lations. The personnel of the General Committee is given below. At its first meeting the following members of the General Committee were present: Elihu Root, Alton B. Parker, Charles E. Hughes, Adolph Lewisohn, Irving T. Bush, Samuel McCune Lindsay, George A. Plimpton, Henry Raymond Mussey, Wil- liam L. Ransom, William R. Shepherd, Henry L. Stimson, Munroe Smith, George Whitelock, Edward T. Devine, Fred- erick P. Keppel, Oswald G. Villard and Stephen Pierce Duggan. The gentlemen present were enthusiastic in their ex- pressions of belief in the wisdom of undertaking a campaign to create and diffuse the " international mind " as outlined by Professor Lindsay who presided. As the result of the dis- cussion it was decided to hold a Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States during the last week of May at the Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. In order to make the Conference nationally representative, it was decided to invite the co-operation of the American Society of Inter- national Law, the American Bar Association and the United States Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, as the aim of the Conference — the diffusion of a knowledge of international af- fairs among the people of our country — could only be attained by means of the hearty assistance of the press, it was decided to invite representative newspaper editors from different parts of the country to be the guests of the Conference and to par- ticipate in its proceedings. Finally Dr. Lindsay was chosen chairman of the General Committee and authorized to appoint what^er sub-committees would be needed and Professor Duggan was chosen to be director of the Conference. The membership of the sub-committees is given below. The director, upon the request of the Executive Committee at its first session, went to Washington to explain the object of the Conference at the annual meeting of the Board of Directors of the United States Chamber of Commerce. The members of the board were enthusiastically in favor of the Conference and promised that the board would be generously represented at its sessions, but stated that as the Chamber can only be committed to any project by a referendum vote of its mem- REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR XI bers, it could not be associated with the Conference in an offi- cial capacity. The same friendly attitude was adopted by the American Bar Association and it may be noted here that both of these national bodies were liberally represented at the ses- sions of the Conference. The American Society of Inter- national Law heartily agreed to co-operate and the Conference was held under the auspices of that body and the Academy of Political Science. The Program Committee met at once to formulate a program to accompany the letters of invitation to the newspaper editors and other invited guests. It may be relevant to mention here that the program and executive committees held sessions weekly up to the very opening of the Conference. One serious diffi- culty met in oganizing the program definitively was the recall of an agreement to speak made by members of Congress and officials of the departments of the government at Washington. This action on their part was made necessary by the declaration of war against Germany which necessitated the constant pres- ence of those gentlemen in Washington. The outbreak of war also seriously interfered with the acceptance of our invitation by many of the newspaper editors throughout the country who felt that they could not leave their posts at so critical a time when there was such a pressure of business upon them. It is worthy of note, however, that the idea of holding the Con- ference met with a most hearty response from the editors. Practically all of them who were compelled to decline the invitation sent a letter of approval of the Conference, and ex- pressed their determination to attend if circumstances would afterwards permit them. One of the most gratifying features of the Conference was the large number of diplomats present, and addresses were made by the Ambassador from Brazil, the Minister from China, the Minister from Bolivia and the Min- ister from Switzerland. Despite the unfavorable circum- stances occasioned by the outbreak of war, one hundred and forty persons, of whom fifty-three were newspaper and maga- zine representatives, accepted invitations to be the guests of the Conference. In addition to the national organizations al- ready mentioned, invitations were sent to the board of direc- xii REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tors of organizations known to be deeply interested in inter- national affairs. The result was that representatives of The League to Enforce Peace, The World Court League, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The World Peace Foundation, The National Security League, The Wo- man's Peace Party, and the American Geographical Society were present at the sessions of the Conference. The total number of persons registered as members of the Conference was 287. The entire list of invited guests, delegates from or- ganizations and members of the Academy of Political Science who attended is given below, but I cannot refrain from listing here the newspapers and magazines which were represented. The Albany Argus, Albany, N. Y. The Atlanta Constitution, Atlanta, Ga. The Balti?nore Sun, Baltimore, Md. The Beacon, Wichita, Kansas The Burlington Free Press, Burlington, Vt. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Brooklyn, N. Y, The Birmingham Age-Herald, Birmingham, Ala. The Boston Herald, Boston, Mass. The Chautauqua Institute, Chautauqua, N. Y. The Duluth Herald, Duluth, Minn. The Evening Post, Charleston, S. C. The Evening Argus, Montpelier, Vt. The Galveston-Dallas Nezus, Dallas, Texas The Greek National World, New York Le Temps, Paris, France La Revista, New York The Lowell Courier-Citizen, Lowell, Mass. The Manchester Guardian, Manchester, England The Newark Evening News, Newark, N. J. The New York American The Evening Post, New York The Globe, New York The Neio York Herald The New York Mail The Sun, New York The New York Times The New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR Xlii The New York Tribune The World, New York The Pioneer Press and Dispatch, St. Paul, Minn. The Public Ledger, Philadelphia, Pa. The Pittsburgh Dispatch, Pittsburgh, Pa. The Sacramento Bee, Sacramento, Cal. The State Journal, Madison, Wis. The San Antonio Light, San Antonio, Texas The Times-Picayune, New Orleans, La. The Tennessean and American, Nashville, Tenn. It is obvious how representative the newspapers were from the standpoint of geography and influence. But such an enumeration tells but part of the stor3/\ The following news- paper associations were represented at all the sessions of the Conference. The Associated Press The East and West News Bureau The Newspaper Enterprise Association The Noel News Service The Slav Press Bureau The Russian Information Bureau The United Press The most grateful acknowledgments are made to the i\.ssociated and United Press which every evening wired abstracts of the -proceedings of the Conference to the 2700 newspapers through- out the countiy forming those associations. In addition to the daily press, the program committee thought it wise to have representatives of the magazines, par- ticularly the weekly magazines which have always showed an interest in international affairs. The following magazines were represented at the Conference, in almost ever}^ case by an editor. The American Jotirnal of International Laxv The Atlantic Monthly Colliers The Independent Leslie's Weekly The New Republic xiv REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR The Review of Reviews The Survey The World Court Magazine That the efforts of the projectors of the Conference to realize its broad and liberal aim were appreciated by those who at- tended is best shown by a few brief newspaper quotations which are typical of many that have appeared in all parts of the country. In an admirable article that appeared in the Boston Herald of June 1 1, the following statement was made: The program fitted perfectly into the national situation of today, and even a cursory advance examination of subjects and speakers created an impression, later amply confirmed at the sessions of the Confer- ence itself, that sincere effort had been put forth to secure addresses by men of authority upon their respective themes and to obtain the widest variety of points of view. Delegates commented frequently upon the enormous amoimt of labor which the program must have cost and upon the smallness of the mrniber of absentees and substitutes. It was clear from the outset that the delegates had come to Long Beach for business, and the lure of the splendid beach and esplanade detained but few from the sessions as they followed each other, morning, afternoon and night. An enthusiastic article in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle of June 6 states : The distinguishing feature of the Conference was its liberal spirit. The committee in charge took particular pains to have every point of view on every question presented. Every speaker was encouraged to talk right out. Every member of the audience was given a chance to discuss the points raised and to approve or condenm. The result was an unusual amount of keen discussion by the best American ex- perts in law, history and economics, all of which will soon be repro- duced from shorthand notes. While the problems which loomed up were many and serious, it became evident throughout the Conference that an increasing number of Americans are developing what President Butler of Colmnbia, in his address, called the " international mind." The very fact that so many Americans were able to participate in an intelligent discussion of the world's greatest problems proved that thinking Americans are no longer provincial. REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR XV An editorial of the Baltimore Sun of June i concludes as follows : It was with the idea of beginning this educational process on a large scale that the Conference on Foreign Relations was con- ceived by the Academy of Political Science, which was its sponsor. The speakers at this conference are leaders of public thought. They are men of many minds and varying views; they lead in different directions. That does not matter. No agreement upon foreign policies will be reached at the Conference, but trains of thought will be started, ideas will clash against ideas, and discussion of foreign affairs generally will be stimulated. In the course of time, through the newspapers and periodicals, in legislative halls and perhaps in political campaigns, the discussion will reach all classes of the people and the formation of that matured, intelligent public opinion on for- eign affairs, which is all-essential if America is to fill worthily her new place in world politics, will begin. Such, at least, is the hope of the projectors of this conference and all patriotic Americans will be glad to see the hope fulfilled. The statements of individuals concerning the usefulness of the Conference are just as enthusiastic as those of the news- papers. The managing editor of the Lowell Courier-Citizen writes : The Conference seemed to me a most admirable experiment, certain to be stimulative of editorial intelligence in dealing with the prob- lems which are sure to arise as a consequence of the war. The editor of the Reviezv of Reviezvs writes : The interest in the Conference was genuine and well sustained to the end. The sentiments that pervaded it were at once those of practical intelligence and of a high conception of international moral- ity. I am convinced that the publication of the papers will have great importance as we begin to approach the peace-making period. The general secretary of the World Peace Foundation writes : However good conferences are, I am sorry to say I generally reach my limit of appreciation — not to say endurance — on about the third xvi REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR day. But, to my surprise and delight, the conference at Long Beach was increasingly interesting and stimulating to the very end. All things considered, I think it the most satisfactory thing of the kind that I have ever had the good fortune to attend ... I venture to express the hope, which I know is shared by many others, that this is the first of a series of such conferences. I feel that I can best close with a word of emphasis upon the thought contained in the last preceding sentence. Letter after letter has come from those who attended, making the suggestion that the Conference become a periodic affair. And the opinions of the newspapers on this point can best be summed up in the last sentence of the New York Evening Post's edi- torial on the Conference : The Conference should be repeated,- even perhaps made an annual affair for stimulating our imagination as citizens of the world. In conclusion, I beg to express my own gratification at having been permitted to assist in the organization and conduct of the Conference. Sincerely yours, Stephen P. Duggan. COMMITTEES General Committee Samuel McCune Felix Adler J. O. Adler John G. Agar Irving T. Bush Nicholas Murray Butler *Joseph H. Choate James Byrne Edward T, Devine Stephen P. Duggan Cleveland H. Dodge John H. Finley Martin H. Glynn David M. Heyman A. Barton Hepburn David Jayne Hill Charles E. Hughes Paul U. Kellogg Frederick P. Keppel Thomas W. Lamont Adolph Lewisohn Owen R. Lovejoy Sidney E. Mezes John Purroy Mitchel Lindsay, Chairman Ex- Officio John Bassett Moore Henry Morgenthau Henry Raymond Mussey Alton B. Parker George A. Plimpton William L. Ransom Bernard H. Ridder Elihu Root Leo S. Rowe Jacob H. Schiff James Brown Scott Henry R. Seager Edwin R. A. Seligman Albert Shaw- William R, Shepherd Charles H. Sherrill Munroe Smith Henry L. Stimson EUery C. Stowell Willard D. Straight Oswald G. Villard Henry White Executive Committee Samuel McCune Lindsay, Chairman Ex-Officio Nicholas Murray Butler James Brown Scott Henry Raymond Mussey Henry R. Seager Stephen P. Duggan, Ex-Officio * Deceased. xvU xviii COMMITTEES Program Committee Stephen P. Duggan, Chairman Nicholas Murray Butler James Brown Scott Paul U. Kellogg Albert Shaw William L. Ransom William R. Shepherd Entertainment Committee Irving T. Bush, Chairman John G. Agar Henry R. Seager David M. Heyman Ellery C. Stowell Owen R. Lovejoy William R. Shepherd Reception Committee Edwin R. A. Seligman, Chairmnn James Byrne Thomas W. Lamont Edward T. Devine Adolph Lewisohn Frederick P. Keppel George A. Plimpton Willard D. Straight Invitation Committee Charles E. Hughes, Chairman * Joseph H. Choate Alton B. Parker Martin H. Glynn Albert Shaw Henry Morgenthau Willard Straight Oswald G. Villard * Deceased. MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE UPON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELA- TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG BEACH, N. Y., MAY 28— JUNE 1,1917 Abney, John Rutledge, New York Adams, John H., Baltimore, Md. Addams, Jane, Chicago, 111. Adler, Felix, New York Agnew, George B., New York Allen, Charles T., New York Allen, Henry J., Wichita, Kansas Altheimer, Ben, New York Alvarez, Alejandro, Washington, D. C. Andrews, Fannie Fern, Boston, Mass, Arthur, L. Louise, New York Atkins, George, Montpelier, Vermont Babson, Roger W., Wellesley Hills, Mass. Baldwin, Simeon E., New Haven, Conn. Barber, Cora L., Brooklyn, N. Y. Barcos, Julio R., New York Barnes, Charles B., New York Barnes, Edward W., New York Barnes, Stephen G., Burlington, Vermont Barrett, E. W., Birmingham, Ala. Baruch, Emanuel, New York Beach, H. L., San Antonio, Texas Beecher, L. H., Birmingham, Alabama Bernheimer, Charles S., Brooklyn, N. Y. Bestor, Arthur E., Chautauqua, N. Y. Bingham, Stillman H,, Duluth, Minn. Black, Harry A., Galveston, Texas Blankenhorn, H., New York Blymyer, William H., New York Bolden, Richard Manuel, New York Borchard, Edwin M,, New York XXii MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE Harding, Gardner L., New York Hardy, Sarah D. B., New York Hart, Albert Bushnell, Cambridge, Mass, Hart, Mary Putman, Cambridge, Mass. Haviland, Florence Earle, New York Haviland, Marion, New Rochelle, N. Y. Hayden, Herbert Erwin, Brooklyn, N. Y. Helm, Lynn, Los Angelos, Cal. Henry, Francis A., Morristown, N. J. Henry, Philip W,, New York Hershey, Amos S., Bloomington, Indiana Hershey, Mrs. Amos S., Bloomington, Indiana Hewlett, Howard T., Woodmere, N, Y. Hibben, Paxton, New York Hicks, Frederick C, New York Hirsch, Jacob B., New York Hixon, Martha B., New York Hoerner, Mrs. Henry J., Newark, N. J. Holmes, Mary H., Brooklyn, N. Y. Holt, Hamilton, New York Hornbeck, Stanley K., Madison, Wis. Howard, Clarence H., St. Louis, Mo. Howe, Frederic C, New York Howland, Arthur H., Flushing, N. Y. Hull, William I., Swarthmore, Pa. Hughes, Charles E., New York Hyde, Charles Cheney, Chicago, 111. Hyde, Mrs. Charles Cheney, Chicago, 111. Ion, Theodore P., New York lyenaga, T., New York Jackson, Lawrence S., White Plains, N. Y. Johnston, Frank H., New Britain, Conn. Johnson, Marderos D., New York Jones, Richard Lloyd, Madison, Wis. Joy, Edmund Steele, Newark, N. J. Junod, Louis H,, New York von Kaltenborn, Hans, Brooklyn, N. Y. Kane, J. H., New York. MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE xxiH Karlin, Alexander, New York Kellogg, Paul U., New York Kennaday, Paul, New York Kinkead, Eugene, Jersey City, N. J. Kinkead, Mrs. Eugene, Jersey City, N. J, Kirchwey, George W., Forest Hills, N, Y. Knight, Harriet W., New York Knox, Charles S., Concord, N. H. Kohn, Mrs. C. D., Chicago, 111. Koo, Wellington, Washington, D. C. Krane, Daniel G., New York Kratochool, Slavonius, New York LaFontaine, Henri, New York Lake, Emma S., New York Lapouski, B., New York de Lapradelle, A., New York Lasker, Bruno, New York Lasker, Etta, New York Lasker, Fiorina, New York Learned, H. Barrett, Washington, D. C. Leon, Maurice, New York Levy, Joseph M., New York Lewisohn, Alice, New York Lewisohn, Irene, New York Lindsay, Samuel McCune, New York Lindsay, Mrs. Samuel McCune, New York Lisman, F, J., New York Lohness, Mrs. S. A., Long Island, N. Y. London, Meyer, New York London, Mrs. Meyer, New York Lowry, Edward G., Washington, D. C. Luykt, Mrs. N. G. M., New York Maher, A. P., New York Manheim, Viola, New York Mantero, C. Belard, New York Marburg, Louis C, Montclair, N. J. Marburg, Mrs. Louis C, Montclair, N. J. Marburg, Mary H., Montclair, N. J. xxiv MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE Marburg, Theodore Herman, Montclair, N. J. Marburg, William, New York Marden, Philip S., Lowell, Mass. Markham, Edgar, Washington, D. C. Martin, Frederick Roy, New York Martin, George, New York Martin, John, Stapleton, N. Y. Mayer, Gella K., New York Mayer, Max W., New York Mead, George W.. New York Mead, Mrs. George W., New York Mead, Lucia Ames, Brookline, Mass. Meldrim, Peter W., Savannah, Ga. Merrick, Edwin T., New Orleans, La. Merritt, Dixon, Nashville, Tenn. Mitchell, Charles D., New Bedford, Mass. Monroe, Paul, New York Moore, D. D., New Orleans, La. Moore, Frederick, New York Moore, John Bassett, New York Moore, Justin Hartley, New York Muller, Ada H., New York Murray, A. Gordon, New York Mussey, Henry Raymond, Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y. Mussey, Mabel H. B., Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y. McDonald, James G., Bloomington, Ind. McKinley, Margaret, New York McNally, Joseph T., Albany, N. Y. Nairne, Bessie D., Brooklyn, N. Y. Nasmyth, George, Boston, Mass. Nichols, John W. T., New York Noel, John V., New York Nolan, James J., Brooklyn, N. Y. O'Mara, John E., Sacramento, Cal. O'Reilly, G. A., New York O'Reilly, Mary Boyle, New York Overstreet, Harry Allen, New York Parker, Andrew D., New York MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE Parker, William C, New Bedford, Mass. Parsons, Samuel, Cohoes, N. Y. Peck, Annie S., New York Pennington, Joseph P., New York Pergler, Charles, New York Pezet, F. A., New York Philbrook, Mary, Newark, N. J. Pickard, Edward T., New York Plimpton, George A., New York de Polignac, Marquis, New York Pratt, Nathaniel M., New York Prince, Julius, New York Prince, Theodore, New York Ratcliffe, S. K., Manchester, England Riggs, Karrick, New York Ritter, Paul, Washington, D. C. Roberts, George E., New York Rogers, John Jacob, Washington, D. C. Rook, C. A., Pittsburgh, Pa. Rooseboom, M. P., The Hague, Holland Rowe, Leo S., Philadelphia, Pa. Rumely, Edward C, New York Samuel, Samuel, New York Samuel, Mrs. Samuel, New York von Schrader, A., New York Schwartzman, Fanny, New York Schuyler, Livingston R., New Yoak Seager, Henry R., New York Seaver, William N., New York Sedgwick, Ellery, Boston, Mass. Sevasly, Miran, Boston, Mass. Shatzky, B. E., New York Shaw, Albert, New York Shepherd, William R., New York Shepherd, Mrs. William R., New York Simon, Leon C, New Orleans, La. Sioris, P. A., New York Sleicher, John A., New York XXV xxvi MEMBERS AND GUESTS IN ATTENDANCE Slosson, Edwin E., New York Smith, J. Russell, Philadelphia, Pa. Snow, Alpheus H., Washington, D. C. Soo, Ma, New York Spencer, Charles Worthen, Reno, Nevada Sterne, L. H., New York Stevenson, E. L., New York Storey, Moorfield, Boston, Mass. Stowell, Agnes, Brooklyn, N. Y. Straus, Oscar S., New York Sutton, Charles W., New York St. John, F. C, Richmond Hill, N. Y. Takamine, Jokichi, New York Tatanis, Petros P., New York Taussig, Mrs. Frederick J., St. Louis, Mo. Theophilatos, D. J., New York Thomson, G. F., New York Tomkins, Calvin, New York Tomlinson, B. G., New York Tryon, James L., Portland, Maine Tucker, Henry St. George, Lexington, Va, Turner, Kate E., Brooklyn, N. Y. Van Winkle, Mina C, Newark, N. J. Villard, Oswald Garrison, New York Vintschger, G., New York Wald, Lillian D., New York Walling, William English, Greenwich, Conn. Warbasse, Mrs. James P., New York Waring, T. R., Charleston, S. C. Weil, Lucille, New York Whitelock, George, Baltimore, Md. Whitney, Travis H., New York . Wicker, Cyrus F., New York Willets, Elmore A., Belmont, N. Y. Wilson, George G., Cambridge, Mass. Wood, Henry A. Wise, New York Youmans, George F., Fort Smith, Ark. Zavala, Joaquim Cuadia, Washington, D. C. PROGRAM FIRST SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Monday Evening, May 28, 8:30 o'clock Presiding Officer Samuel McCune Lindsay 1. Address of Welcome Nicholas Murray Butler 2. The Future of International Law Charles Evans Hughes SECOND SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Tuesday Morning, May 29, 10 o'clock The Need of Better Machinery for International Negotiations Presiding Officer Oscar S. Straits 1 . Open Diplomacy : Democratic Control of Diplomatic Nego tiations Domicio da Gama Arthur Bullard 2. Effect of Censorship in International Relations Frederick Roy Martin John Temple Graves Henry A. Wise Wood Discussion : Paul U. Kellogg General Discussion xxviii PROGRAM THIRD SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Tuesday Afternoon, 2 130 o'clock The Attitude of the United States towards World Organization Presiding Officer James Byrne 1. International Arbitration John Bassett Moore 2. A World Court William I. Hull 3. International Legislation and Administration Alpheus H. Snow Discussion: Felix Adler, Samuel T. Duiton, Lillian D. Wald General Discussion FOURTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Tuesday Evening, May 29, 8:30 o'clock The Democratic Ideal in International Relations: What the United States Stands For Presiding Officer George White lock Addresses by Hamilton Holt, Bainbridge Colby ^ Lincohi Col- cord, B. E. Schatzky FIFTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Wednesday Morning, May 30, 10 o'clock The United States and the Caribbean Presiding Officer Irving T. Bush I. Commercial and Financial Interests of the United States in the Caribbean Edwin Borchard PROGRAM Xxix 2. The Attitude of the United States toward the Retention by European Nations of Colonies in and Around the Car- ibbean William R. Shepherd 3. The Relations of the United States to the Republics In and Around the Caribbean Oswald G. Villard PJiilip Marshall Brown Discussion: Albert Bushnell Hart, Cyriis F. Wicker General Discussion SIXTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Wednesday Afternoon, May 30, 2 :30 o'clock Drawing Together the Americas Presiding Officer Samuel McCune Lindsay 1. Commercial and Financial Facilities Roger W. Babson James Carson 2. Intellectual and Social Co-operation Leo S. Rowe Discussion : Peter H. Goldsmith, Isaiah Bowman General Discussion SEVENTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y, Wednesday Evening, May 30, 8:30 o'clock The Future Relations of the United States with Latin America Presiding Officer Albert Shaw 1. From the Latin-American Viewpoint Federico A. Pezet 2. The Monroe Doctrine After the War George G. Wilson 3. Pan-Americanism as a Working Program Alejandro Alvarez XXX PROGRAM EIGHTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Thursday Morning, May 31, lo o'clock National Policy as to Resident Aliens : States Rights AND Treaty Obligations Presiding Officer William R. Shepherd 1 , State Interference with the Enforcement of Treaties James Parker Hall Charles C. Hyde 2. Discrimination with Reference to Citizenship and Land- ownership Toyokichi lyenaga Hans von Kaltenborn Discussion : Sidney Gulick General Discussion NINTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Thursday Afternoon, May 31, 2 : 30 o'clock Newer American Concepts of International Relationship Presiding Officer Henry R. S eager 1. Labor as a Factor in International Adjustments Meyer London Jane Addams 2. Suppressed Nationalities and the Consent of the Governed Francis Hackett 3. Liberal England and International Relationships 5. K. Ratcliffe 4. Annexation and the Principle of Nationality Stephen P. Duggan 5. Economic Access and Neutralization of Waterways y. Russell Smith Discussion : William English Walling, Charles Pergler General Discussion PROGRAM XXxi TENTH SESSION Hotel Nassau, Long Beach, N. Y. Thursday Evening. May 31, 8 : 30 o'clock The United States and the Far East Presiding Officer Samuel McCime Lindsay 1. The New China Wellington Koo 2. American and Japanese Co-operation Jokichi Takamine 3. Neglected Realities in the Far East H. R. Mussey General Discussion ELEVENTH SESSION Chamber of Commerce, New York Friday Morning, June i, 10:30 o'clock Property Rights and Trade Rivalries as Factors in International Complications with Special Refer- ence TO Investments and Concessions Presiding Officer Simeon E. Baldwin 1. Dollar Diplomacy and Imperialism Frederic C. Howe 2. Trade Concessions, Investments, Conflict and Policy in the Far East Stanley K. Hornbeck 3. The Relation of Government to Property and Enterprise in the Americas Charles W. Sutton 4. International Investments George E. Roberts Discussion: H. A. Overstreet THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN WORLD ORGANIZATION I. THE CONTENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL II. MACHINERY ESSENTIAL FOR DEMOCRATIC ORGAN- IZATION THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ^ CHARLES E. HUGHES Former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States THE chief concern of the world at this time is to establish the foundations of international justice. If the world is to be made safe for democracy, it must be a world in which the nations recognize and maintain the supremacy of law. We had thought that we had entered upon a period which was to have as its chief distinction the development of international law, but this war is in truth the negation of all law. No principle has been spared. .Force derides treaties; dethrones law in the interest of expediency; and defying God and man, resorts to unspeakable barbarities which mock the boasts of civilization. What is the prospect? Are we to have a Roman peace — a peace imposed by a dominating state, rising over all, a new empire in which the only law shall be its will? Or is there to be a chance for a world where each state, small and great, shall stand secure in its equality, its independence, its integrity; where compacts between nations are not illusory ; where mutual rights and duties are acknowledged and respected ; where rules for international intercourse and instrumentalities for the peaceful settlement of international controversies are developed and maintained ; where Force becomes the servant of the Law and not its master? This is the vital issue. America's entrance into the war should assure the answer to these questions. We have responded to the call of civiliza- tion, of humanity itself, when, as has well been said, " the whole future of civilized government and intercourse, in par- ticular the fortunes and faith of democracy, have been brought ' Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y.. May 28, 1917. (195) 4 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII into peril." And if we have opportunity to resume the con- struction of the temple of international justice, to build again amid the ruins of past labors, what shall be the method of the undertaking? What shall be our share in it? The calling of this conference to consider this question is evidence that we do not yield to the counsel of despair which would find in the circumstances of the outbreak and of the conduct of this war, the proof of the futility of all endeavor to establish the reign of law. We cannot thus be faithless to our ideals; we cannot thus surrender our trust. Nor, on the other hand, do we make the equal blunder of assuming that there will be such a reaction from the present strife that forthwith an adequate world organization will be easily and immediately accomplished, and peace forever assured. We expect to suc- ceed in this war; but we must not expect that at its conclusion divisive forces will cease to operate, nor can we afford to de- ceive ourselves with paper programs of a Utopian character, ignoring the difficulties which are sure to arise from the con- flicts of national interests and policies. We may cherish an aim; and knowing the direction, we take counsel as to the practicable forward steps. The shattering of past hopes should be an incentive to renewed endeavor, while it must always remain a warning against an easy optimism. The questions which relate to the method of advance may be said to concern : ( i ) the declaration of principles and for- mulation of rules through international conferences; (2) the establishment of suitable instrumentalities of adjudication and conciliation; and (3) the sanction of international law, in- cluding the questions which concern the enforcement of the judgments of international tribunals, or the use of force to maintain peace. The fundamental need is the development of a true body of international law. The labors of jurists will continue to be helpful, and effort will still be made to extract from history, from diplomatic correspondence and official papers, from de- cisions of courts and from standard writers, the evidence of the consent of the nations upon which the rules governing international conduct depend for their authority. But it has (196) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ^ long been evident that this method of development is most un- satisfactory. What rules of controlling importance, determin- ative of serious controversies, can be said to be generally ac- cepted? It seems to be agreed that the most earnest efforts should be made to secure an authoritative and appropriately definite statement of accepted principles, and the formulation of rules to which assent is given, as well as to provide means for such additions and modifications as may from time to time be required. This is the function of the international conference. As was said by M. Leon Bourgeois, with respect to the Hague Conferences : The purpose of the Hague Conference is the juridical organization of international life, the formation of a society of law among the nations. In order that this society may come into being and live, the following conditions are essential : ( 1 ) The universal assent of the nations to the establishment of a truly international system; (2) the acceptance by all of the same conception of the law common to all, of the same bond between the large and the small, since they are all equal in point of consent and responsibility; (3) the precise and detailed application of these principles successively to all fields of international relations in peace as well as in war. The importance of the development of a body of law in this authoritative way must not be overlooked in zealous en- deavor to provide for the judicial determination of inter- national disputes. Courts presuppose laws. They develop the law in the course of judicial decisions, by creating a series of judicial precedents, but they must proceed upon premises and apply established principles. As Mr. Root has pointedly remarked : Any attempt to maintain a court of international justice must fail unless there are laws for the court to administer. Without them the so-called court would be merely a group of men seeking to impose their personal opinions upon the states coming before them. The lack of an adequate system of law to be applied has been the chief obstacle to the development of a system of judicial settlement of in- ternational disputes. (197) 6 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELA TIONS [Vol. VII And he illustrates this by reference to the failure to establish the international prize court, for which provision was made by the Second Hague Conference, in consequence of the failure to ratify the Declaration of London and thus to supply a gen- eral agreement as to the applicable rules, in the absence of which " the necessary basis " for the action of the court was wanting. Perhaps it may be assumed that at the close of the war, and upon the settlement of the terms of peace, prompt ar- rangements will be made for a conference of the nations. And it would be a happy omen for the future if such a conference were to adopt the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations which has recently been formulated by the American Institute of International Law. But this would be only a beginning, albeit an important one, in the formal statement of principles and rules. The matter of chief consequence is not that this or any particular conference should be held, but that the international conference should be recognized as an in- stitution, as the essential organ of international expression in stating and developing international law. Not only should there be conferences at fixed intervals, but provision should be made for the important work pending conferences by which their labors will be facilitated and di- rected. I should refuse, with Sir Frederick Pollock, to take too seriously what he calls the " abundance of starched and frilled ceremonial and elaborate compliments about trifles," and I agree with him as to the importance, if the conference is to be a permanent institution of value, of " a strong stand- ing committee to prepare and guide the business." Further, I should say that the conference is not likely to achieve its end unless all the important nations, certainly all the great powers, are admitted to take part in its deliberations. We are assum- ing a peace that makes possible the development of a true body of law, and in this work all the formative influences should have their proper share. But I agree that if not all the great powers are willing to unite in this work, those who are willing should proceed with conferences of their own. (198) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 Still, the obstacles are very great. The members of the conferences are states, and must act as such, and even the ceremonial and compliments cannot be ignored. The perfect equality of states is a postulate of international law. As Chief Justice Marshall said: "It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone." The conference is not a parliament; it is not, and in the nature of things cannot be, a legislature. There is no Administration, there is no Government, having the carriage of bills, there is no closure, and there are no ma- jorities. Its action, as such, binds the states which give the formal assent contemplated. The growth of international law under such conditions must necessarily be slow, and must be accompanied by the regrettable failure of many admirable proposals. But the necessity of providing rules to meet the many new exigencies which have arisen and will arise, as well as of settling old controversies which leave rules in doubt, and of thus evidencing the consent of the nations, makes the international conference in regular sessions with provisions for the required supplemental and preliminary work between sessions a primary need. The problem is to devise such an organization of the conference, consistent with its nature as a conference of states, as will promote the highest efficiency. If we can provide means for the development of the re- quisite body of law, we may look to the establishment of an international court of justice, as distinguished from plans for the settlement of international disputes through arbitration. We desire to establish international justice, not merely facilities for compromise or diplomatic adjustment. We wish a court of judges, acting in accordance with judicial standards, apply- ing impartially the principles of law, interpreting treaties, conventions and declarations, and thus developing a body of judicial precedents to supplement and complete the work of international conferences, instead of mere arbitrators embrac- ing those who may have been chosen to represent one side or the other. International arbitration may be adapted to many exigencies, and judicial settlements — great as are their advant- (199) 8 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII ages — will not, and should not, altogether displace settlement by arbitration. But we shall not be able to perfect inter- national law without international courts, for all legislation and formulated statements of the law need the aid of the judicial interpreter. Here, again, we encounter the most serious obstacles which we must not overlook in an eager acceptance of the principle of judicial settlement. The analogy found in the work of the Supreme Court of the United States, in deciding controversies between the States of the Union, important as it is, is some- times pressed too far. The Supreme Court is the organ of a nation. It is the judicial power of the United States with which the Supreme Court is vested, and which that court exercises in the determination of controversies between two or more States in accordance with the Constitution. The Supreme Court is not the court of a confederation, or of a mere league of states.^ The States surrendered their own modes of deter- mining controversies between them, and the decision of those controversies which are of a justiciable nature was transferred to the Supreme Court. The limits of this address do not per- mit a discussion of the manner of enforcement of such judg- ments, but it is sufficient for the present purpose to point out that there is behind its judgments the force of national author- ity/ And what is of first importance in connection with this jurisdiction, is the fact that the court draws to its support the great power of national sentiment. Again, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States are nominated by the President, the chosen representative of the people of the United States, who is vested with the executive power of the nation, and they are appointed by the President by and -with the advice and consent of the Senate. There is thus assured, as history shows, a fair representation of the entire country and of all its parts in this highest tribunal. The judges of the court are chosen to serve during good behavior and to receive 1 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S., pp. 80-84. ^ See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S., pp. 318-322. (200) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW g a compensation which cannot be diminished during their con- tinuance in office. This method of selection, and this provision of independence, gives peculiar strength to the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to determine controversies between the States. Further, it may be said that the entrenchment of the Supreme Court in the confidence of the people is yet more largely due to the quality of its work than to anything else. We may hesitate to speculate upon what measure of success the court would have achieved without a Marshall and a Story, and such other eminent judges as Taney, Curtis, Miller, Field and Bradley. The proposed international court cannot have the advantage of being the instrument of a nation or be supported by the sentiment that attaches to a national institution. It cannot have the advantage of the sense of representation which is felt by the people in the case of a national tribunal. And it will be long before an international court can develop that measure of confidence which only work of high quality on the part of its members can create. The difficulties are serious, but they should make us only the more solicitous to take account of the means by which they may be surmounted. In the absence of the national sentiment which gives such effective support to our national tribunal, we must aim at the development of international sentiment. In the days ©f peace we must look to the cultivation of what President Butler has called the " international mind." With- out this, we are likely to be disappointed in the results of inter- national organization, however we labor over mere forms of institutions. Again, while an international court cannot start with a confidence created by work already performed, there is no reason why it should not have the advantage, and in all probability it would enjoy the advantage, of the labors of jurists of the highest international distinction whose demon- strated expertness would commend the work of the court in constantly increasing degree to the favor of the nations, and thus insure its permanence. The action of the First Hague Conference in providing for a permanent international court of arbitration was an im- (201) lO CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII portant although a short step in the desired direction. It was, however, " permanent only in one sense, and that was in the composition of the jurists from the list of whom the arbitra- tors or judges who were to act in each case as it arose should be selected by the parties; " and failing the direct agreement of the parties as to the composition of the arbitration tribunal, each party was to appoint two arbitrators, and these together were to choose an umpire. The " permanent court was really a list, or panel, of judges who might be chosen, if desired." The Second Hague Conference adopted a draft convention for the creation of a judicial arbitration court, but no agree- ment was reached as to the method of appointing judges. As Mr. Choate said, in his review of the work of that conference: Well, there we hit upon an obstacle which there was no overcoming. We were forty-four nations assembled. ... As there could not be a court of forty-four judges, and as Russia and Germany, Great Britain and France and the United States could not agree that every nation was as big as every other, as was claimed by some of these small nations — that Panama was in all respects the equal of Great Britain, and Luxemburg the equal of Germany — no agreement was reached. It was therefore voted that there ought to be such a court ; that the scheme that we had established for its powers, procedure and organization, its sessions and the general theory or law that should be applied to it, was accepted ; and it was referred to the nations to agree, in the best manner they could, upon the number of judges, and the mode of their selection, and that as soon as this was done, the court should be established with the constitution that we had framed for it. I have already mentioned the failure, for the lack of a suitable body of law, to set up the international prize court. Efforts should be addressed, on the conclusion of peace, to the removal of difficulties of this sort and to the establishment at the earliest possible day of a true international court of justice for the decision of justiciable questions; and giving due weight to the differences to which I have called attention, there can be no doubt that the example of the Supreme Court of the United States, and also of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, will be of the greatest aid in this endeavor. (202) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 1 The court thus constituted will naturally determine questions of its own jurisdiction under the provisions for its constitution. It may be assumed that it will not undertake to determine con- troversies which are merely of a political nature and do not involve issues of a justiciable character, that is, which cannot be decided by the application of the principles of law and equity. And to repeat, in the establishment of such a court, regard should be had not to diplomatic or arbitral standards, but to the standards of judicial tribunals. Thus far, I have been considering the means for developing international law, and for the interpretation and application of rules of law. But the purposes, when this war is ended, will reach beyond the function of law, and the aim will be, in every practicable way, to provide safeguards against the re- currence of war. This suggests the advisability of establish- ing international instrumentalities of conciliation which can deal with questions not justiciable in character, and can make recommendations in the interests of peaceful settlement. The function of such a council would be not decision, but suggestion and advice. Its recommendations, in the nature of things, would not be binding. The nations would still be free to act according to their own view of national policy, but the pro- vision of this instrumentality would facilitate reflection, dis- cussion and persuasion in dealing with that large class of ques- tions which are the most frequent occasion of strife. There remains the question whether it is practicable to pro- vide a more definite sanction for international law — whether its rules shall impose obligations backed by force ; or speaking more specifically, whether there shall be a concert to compel resort to tribunals of adjudication and councils of conciliation before beginning hostilities. It has been urged strongly that " the only practical sanction of international law is the public opinion of the civilized world." This public opinion, it is eloquently said, is the international executive. Prophecies with respect to the suffi- ciency of this sanction of public opinion carried greater weight three years ago than they do today. Not only the unex- (203) 12 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII pected, but the unthinkable, has actually happened. Agencies of public opinion throughout the world, the manifold activities of the defenders of peace, the manifest interests of intimate intercourse and expanding civilization, the obviousness of the economic losses involved in war, the wide diffusion of knowl- edge, and the quickening of conscience by myriad appeals — all failed to avert a world war. It is not surprising that men here and abroad should be thinking of some practicable means which in the future may help, at least in some degree, to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe. It may also be said that as against the disposition to break treaties, to override the law, and to enthrone force as its own justification, there is revealed a new determination to establish the sacredness of compact and the obligation which the law imposes. Shall the public opinion which makes for the reign of law and the maintenance of peace fail through lack of competent organization ? Proposals have been made both in England and in this country looking to such an organization. The substance of the proposal, as it stands in this country, is that the signatory powers shall jointly use, forthwith, their economic forces against any of their niunber that refuses to submit any ques- tion which arises to an international judicial tribunal or council of conciliation before issuing an ultimatiim or threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's terri- tory. This proposal has been the subject of vigorous debate. It has, however, drawn to its support a considerable body of opinion because of the well-founded belief that something must be at- tempted in the way of international organization to safeguard rights granted by treaties and conventions, to make effective the rules of international law, and, so far as possible, to pre- vent acts of aggression. In considering the part which the United States should take in connection with the development of international law, and in the endeavor to provide a more adequate and definite sanction (204) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 3 for that law, the question should be approached as a practical one, and with due regard to our national interests and policies. It is not to be dismissed without proper attention to the condi- tions which are likely to obtain when this war has ended. If we are to have international conferences, to declare prin- ciples and to make rules binding upon the nations, the United States will undoubtedly take part in these conferences. It had a highly important part in the two Hague Conferences, and can be counted upon to do its full share in the development of a true body of international law based upon the acceptance of such fundamental principles as are incorporated in the recent Declaration of the American Institute. Further, the United States will undoubtedly use its utmost endeavor to bring about the establishment of a real court of international justice. The entering into an agreement for the submission of justiciable controversies to such a court cannot be said to be an improper delegation of power. Whatever differences of opinion there may be with respect to policy, it would be difficult to point out a satisfactory distinction in prin- ciple between such a submission and the more familiar one of submission to arbitrators. And so far as the proposed instru- mentality of conciliation is concerned, with regard to questions that are not of a justiciable nature, each nation may be ex- pected to reserve the right to deal with the issue ultimately as it pleases. Certainly it would seem that those who have sup- ported the recent treaties of arbitration, such for example as that ratified in the year 1914 between the United States and Great Britain, would be unable consistently to object to a provision for an instrumentality of conciliation as an aid to peaceful settlement. Moreover, if the United States participates in international conferences, if it aids in establishing tribunals of adjudication and councils of conciliation, it will have occasion very carefully to consider whether proposals which would otherwise be suc- cessful in making treaties and conventions effective shall fail because of its refusal to co-operate. I hope that our statesmen will keep an open mind upon this question and will not so far commit themselves in advance that (205) I^ CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. Vll they will be embarrassed in dealing with the conditions which may obtain after the war, so that the United States without prejudice to its essential interests may do its full share in firmly establishing the foundations of international justice. Objections have been raised both upon constitutional grounds and upon reasons of policy, with respect to our joining in a concert looking to the use of force in any contingency. As to the former, it may be said that Congress alone has the power to declare war, and that any agreement made by the United States to co-operate in coercive measures amounting to war would necessarily be subject to the exercise by Con- gress of its unquestioned authority. But this does not mean that the treaty-making power may not, if it is found to accord with national interests and policies, aid in forming an inter- national organization believed to be necessaiy and practicable, although its offer of co-operation in any given contingency must be subject to the well-known conditions which inhere in our constitutional form of government. Congress, indeed, will have all its powers, but its course of action will depend upon the world outlook of the nation, and we should do what we can to promote an enlightened conception of our international responsibility. There should be no disposition to minimize the difficulties which are connected with our traditional policy, or the im- portance of that policy in conserving American interests. It is idle, I believe, to expect that in any conceivable arrangement at the conclusion of this war, this country will abandon the Monroe Doctrine. I shall not attempt at this time to inquire as to the effect of the broad treaties of arbitration which have recently been made, or as to the question whether in all their aspects, and with reference to every possible contingency, they can receive the approval of our judgment. Aside from this, it may well be thought futile to demand a program which would involve an abandonment of what has long been regarded as a fundamental part of our national policy. Nor is this, in my judgment, to be considered a condition essential to our effective participation in an international organization to establish international law and maintain peace. (206) No. 2] FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 5 At the conclusion of the war, it may be assumed that there will be an agreement upon principles which will precede or form the basis for such an organization. The Monroe Doc- trine, as has well been said, " is a national policy that has come to be widely recognized and in large part accepted by European nations." It has been pointed out that while " it is not a part of international law, it might easily become so in the working out of an international order." Is it too much to ex- pect that our historic policy, in its essential features, should be accepted by the nations? And may we not contemplate the working out of plans for an international organization in the belief that this acceptance will in itself conduce to the peace of the world while facilitating our co-operation in its main- tenance ? Should we not at least postpone judgment until we know the conditions upon which we may co-operate, and shall we not at least be hospitable to the thought that America has its obligations to the world? We cannot live unto ourselves. What promise does the future hold if treaties and conventions are made only to be broken? If we can see at all into the future we know that it offers no chance for isolation to the United States. We have vast resources and extraordinary privileges and we cannot shirk our duty to mankind. Self- interest as well as a proper sense of obligation demand that we should aid in rearing the structure of international justice, and certainly that we should not make its establishment im- possible by holding aloof. (207) THE INTERNATIONAL MIND: HOW TO DEVELOP IT^ NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER President, Columbia University FOR two generations it has been a common complaint that the people of the United States took no adequate inter- est in foreign policy and were without any but cursory knowledge of international politics. This judgment has been expressed, often publicly, by successive secretaries of state, by those who have held important diplomatic posts, and by those who, in the Senate of the United States, have seen long service upon the Committee on Foreign Relations. A sort of national self-centeredness together with a feeling of geographic and political isolation have combined to bring about this unfortun- ate state of affairs. It has been unfortunate for two reasons : first, because it marked a serious break with our earlier national tradition ; and second, because it has held back the people and the government of the United States from making the full measure of contribution of which they were capable to the better and closer international organization of the world. One need have but slight acquaintance with the writings and speeches of the Fathers and with the records of the early Congresses to know that, when the government of the United States was young, it was the eager ambition of those who most fully represented it to play a large part in the international life of the world, primarily with the view of advancing those ideas and those principles in which the people of the new American republic believed and to which they were committed. Ben- jamin Franklin was our first great internationalist. Alexander Hamilton, of whom Talleyrand said that he had divined Europe; Thomas Jefferson, whose public service in Europe was 1 Introductory Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Re- lations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 28, IQ17. (208) THE INTERNATIONAL MIND i-j quite exceptional; as well as Chancellor Livingston, John Jay, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay not only knew western Europe, but were known by it. In making endeavor, therefore, to increase the interest of the American people in foreign relationships and in international policy we are but asking them to return to one of the finest and soundest of national traditions. Our national self- absorption has held us back, too, from play- ing an adequate part in the development of that international organization which has long been under way and which the results of the present war will hasten and greatly advance. Despite these facts, and chiefly because of the high character and ability of those who represented the United States at the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the American con- tributions to the deliberations and recommendations of those notable assemblies were most important Indeed, when the record of history comes to be made up, it may be that those contributions will be judged to mark the beginning of a new epoch in the world's history. The Conference which now assembles to consider and dis- cuss the international relations and the international policies of the United States is a beginning and only a beginning of a campaign of education and enlightenment which is to con- tinue until there has been developed among all parts and sec- tions of our land what I ventured some years ago to describe as the " international mind." The international mind is noth- ing else than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which regards the several nations of the civilized world as free and co-operating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing commerce and industry, and in spreading enlightenment and culture throughout the world. It would be as inconsistent with the international mind to attempt to steal some other nation's territory or to do that nation an unprovoked injury or damage, as it would be inconsistent with the principles of ordinary morality to attempt to steal some other individual's purse or to commit an unprovoked assault upon him. The international mind requires that a nation and its government shall freely (209) l8 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII and gladly grant to every other nation and to every other gov- ernment the rights and the privileges which it claims for itself. From this it follows that the international mind is not con- sonant with any theory of the state which regards the state as superior to the rules and restrictions of moral conduct or which admits the view that to some one state is committed the hege- mony of the world's affairs for the world's good. When that doctrine prevails and takes hold of the conviction and the imagination of a great people, an issue is presented that cannot be settled by vote in conference, that cannot be arbitrated by the wisest statesmen, and that cannot be determined by the findings of any court. The authority and the value of each of these modes of procedure is challenged by the very issue itself. Therefore resort must be had to armed force in order to determine whether the international mind, shared by a score or more of independent and self-respecting nations, shall pre- vail or whether the arms of a non-moral, all-powerful, military imperialism shall be stretched out over the whole round world for its government and its protection. It is to determine this issue that the world is now at war. Should the cause of imperialism, by any chance, win this war, the people of the United States would find it quite un- necessary for some time to come to concern themselves with foreign relations and with foreign policy. Those matters would be taken care of for them, by a power that had shown itself strong enough to overcome and to suppress inter- nationally minded men and nations. On the other hand, if, as we confidently hope and believe, the issue of this war is to be favorable to the free self-governing democracies of the world, then the people of the United States must address themselves with redoubled energy and with closest attention to those mat- ,ters of legislation, of administration, and of general public policy which constitute and determine national conduct. The first task of this conference and of every similar conference that may be held hereafter is to drive this lesson home. When this task is undertaken it will speedily appear that our gOA^ernment is not well organized at the moment for the formu- lation and prosecution of eflfective international policies. The (210) No. 2] THE INTERNATIONAL MIND jg division of authority between the national government and governments of the several states raises one set of problems. Action under the treaty-making power of the national govern- ment raises another set of problems, particularly since there is not yet a substantial unanimity of opinion as to the scope and authority of the treaty-making power itself, or as to the proper and effective means which should be at the command of the government of the United States for enforcing among its own people adherence to a treaty obligation into which, through their government, they have solemnly entered. The difficulties with which we shall have to contend are, therefore, not alone difficulties arising from present lack of popular in- formation and present lack of popular interest in international policies, but they are also those which arise from the structure and the operation of our own form of constitutional government. That the old secrecy of diplomatic action has gone forever is a happy circumstance. This secrecy was well suited to the making of conventions between ruling monarchs or reigning dynasties, or between governments which represented only very select and highly privileged classes. It has no place, however, in diplomatic intercourse between democratic peoples. The people themselves must understand and assent to inter- national policies and contracts that are entered upon and executed in their name. Otherwise there can be no assurance that these policies will be executed and these contracts ob- served ; for without foreknowledge on the part of the people of that to which they are committed there can be no successful moral appeal made to them to keep their word and their bond at a later time when an opposition may arise between principle and immediate self-interest. We are assembled, then, to help begin a movement which must not cease until the entire American people are interested in their international relationships, their international position, and their international influence. When that shall have been even measurably accomplished, the people themselves will be quick to bring about such changes in the form of their gov- ernmental structure and in their administrative procedure, as (211) 20 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS will enable them honorably and finely to maintain their place, not as a nation that lives to itself alone, but as a nation that shares with every other like-minded nation the desire and the purpose to improve the lot of mankind everywhere, and to carry into the uttermost parts of the earth those hopes, those principles, and those forms of governmental action that are best adapted to giving man the fullest opportunity to make himself free, and to be worthy of freedom. (212) INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ' JOHN BASSETT MOORE Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law, Columbia University THE subject on which I am to speak is by no means new. For that reason I suppose it ought to be regarded as very uninteresting. I may at once say that I am not acquainted with, and hardly feel capable of formulating, any special device which will certainly assure the preservation of peace among nations. There are certain methods of settling international disputes, which are known as amicable methods, as distinguished from inamicable and forcible methods. The amicable methods are negotiation, mediation and good offices, which I mention to- gether, and arbitration. Negotiation is simply the ordinary method of diplomacy. Mediation stands midway between negotiation and arbitra- tion, and in connection with it I mentioned good offices. We speak of good offices where some third power or powers come between disputants, listen to their complaints, and make sug- gestions and tender advice. Mediation is the formal exercise of good offices. Some- times a tribunal is organized which proceeds with much for- mality, but, whatever the procedure may be, mediation results in a recommendation which the parties to the dispute are at liberty to reject. The third method, that of arbitration, represents the judicial process of settling international disputes. When I say the judicial process, I am not at all unconscious of the fact that we hear a great deal in these days of the " judicial settle- ment " of international disputes, as if it were something en- tirely novel. It is said that heretofore we have had arbitration. ^ Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreifjn Relations of th<.' United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 191 7. (213) 22 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII but that arbitration has failed, and that now we are to have the " judicial settlement " of international disputes. Such statements illustrate the propensity to accept phrases rather than to search for facts. I fancy that the number of those who have had occasion actually to read the decisions of international boards of arbitration is small. There may in- deed be members of the bar who read the decisions of judges for mere pleasure. But, after all, I fancy that we do most of our reading of judicial opinions professionally, more or less under the stress of professional necessity. Now, it has fallen to my lot, in the pursuit of my profes- sional work, to have read practically all the decisions that have ever been rendered by international tribunals, and there are some thousands of them. In fact, I was once so unkind, per- haps I might almost say so cruel, as to inflict them upon my fellow-men by incorporating them in some six large volumes, which should have been printed in twelve instead of six, be- cause the present volumes are too large for the reader's con- venience. When, therefore, I venture, very diffidently, to make a statement in regard to the proceedings of international tribunals, I feel that I know the ground ©n which I stand ; and I venture to assert that the decisions of those international tribunals are characterized by about as much consistency, by about as close an application of principles of law, and by per- haps as marked a tendency on the part of one tribunal to quote the authority of tribunals that preceded it, as you will find in the proceedings of our ordinary judicial tribunals. One can- not study these records without being deeply impressed with that fact, and without discovering how lacking in foundation is the supposition that when we talk of the " judicial settle- ment " of international disputes we are presenting some new device or new method. I have said that a tribunal of arbitration decides. Its pro- ceedings result in the rendering of a judgment which is bind- ing upon the contracting parties. It therefore can be em- ployed where, in many cases, mediation would be ineffective. On the other hand, mediation may be employed in cases which the disputants would be unwilling to submit to a definitive (214) No. 2] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 23 judgment. If I had the time in which to do it, I could point out numerous instances in which the judgments of tribunals of arbitration have been accepted by the parties and loyally carried out, although they imposed terms which it is incon- ceivable that the parties would have accepted upon the mere recommendation of a board of mediators. In other words, if there had been any loophole of escape, the parties would have availed themselves of it, but having agreed to submit the matter to judgment, and to abide by the award, they have done so, loyally and completely. There is another misconception that I should be glad to cor- rect, and that is that there has been great uncertainty in the enforcement of the judgments of tribunals of arbitration. Again I venture to affirm, upon the basis of actual information, that the awards of international boards of arbitration have been ver}^ generally accepted and carried into effect. I do not think I am mistaken when I say that if there has been a tendency during the last few years to question the accuracy and the binding effect of such awards, it has been due chiefly to the unfortunate supposition that no judgment should ever be regarded as final till it has been the subject of review on appeal. Lawyers are too much in the habit of thinking of judicial process as a series of appeals, till they finally get up to a tribunal beyond which nothing can be imagined. But, I venture to repeat that the cases have been few, ver)' few in- deed, in which the awards of international tribunals have not been accepted and loyally carried out. I have said that international arbitration is not a new thing; and I will now go a step further and affirm that the judicial process which it has exemplified is one of which we must avail ourselves in dealing with all human affairs. Within the state it is inconceivable that we should be able to get on for a week or even for a day, vvith any approach to a condition of tranquillity, if we were to abolish the judicial process. We use negotiation, and we use mediation, all the while, in our private affairs as well as in our public affairs, but cases daily arise in which it is necessary to obtain an authoritative decision, and then we invoke the judicial process. We may therefore (215) 24 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII accept it as absolutely certain, that, no matter what kind of a league, or alliance, or other contrivance may be set up in inter- national affairs, we shall be obliged to invoke the process of arbitration, in the judicial sense. Several years ago a scholar named Raeder published, under the auspices of the Nobel Institute, a very interesting work entitled Interttational Arbitration among the Greeks. I have very often seen the statement that, while the Greeks practised what they called arbitration, it was not real arbitration, but something else. But, as a matter of fact, the Greeks had as clear, as intelligent, as precise a conception of the process of international arbitration, in the judicial sense, as exists today, as may be seen by an actual examination of the awards ren- dered by the tribunals employed by them for the determina- tion of disputes between the different states. Later, when the Roman Empire came into existence, with its conceptions of conquest and domination, there was little room for international arbitration ; but, after the decline and fall of the Empire, the states that succeeded it employed the process on an extensive scale, especially under the influence of the Church. As a result, however, of the wars, somewhat miscalled " religious," of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen- turies— I say somewhat miscalled religious, because questions of property, politics and dominion were decidedly interwoven with questions of faith — international arbitration, being an amicable process, practically disappeared. During the eighteenth century thoughts of arbitration be- gan to revive ; and, after the close of the Napoleonic Wars, when the world was worn out with fighting, nations not only talked a great deal about arbitration, but actually employed it on a ver>' large scale, by the adoption of general claims conventions for the settlement of all outstanding questions. Under these conventions or treaties — the words being here interchange- able— all disputes that had ari.sen since a certain date were submitted, without exception, to the decision of arbitrators. During the hundred years that followed the formation of the Constitution, the United States made numerous treaties of that kind; and I should say that the high-water mark of inter- (216) No. 2] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2$ national arbitration, that is, of its actual application, was reached in the case of the award on the "Alabama " claims by the tribunal at Geneva in 1872. This was so, not only because of the nature and magnitude of the questions submitted, but also because, when the United States first proposed arbitration, the British government declined it, on the ground that the questions at issue involved the "honor" of Her Majesty's Gov- ernment, of which, speaking in the approved phrase, it was declared that Her Majesty's Government was "the sole guard- ian." Of course every man and every nation is the " sole guardian " of his or its own " honor " — whatever that may be. But, after thinking the matter over for six or eight years, eminent British statesmen came to the conclusion that perhaps a basis might be found on which this very grave dispute might be submitted to impartial and learned men, wise men, for judicial decision; and in the end there was made the great Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, by which it was pro- vided that the claims generically known as the Alabama claims should be submitted to an arbitral tribunal, which was to sit at Geneva. As I look on my right, I have great pleasure in recognizing an eminent diplomatist, who is also a friend, whose government, that of Brazil, was called upon to appoint one of the five members of that exalted tribunal. The proceedings resulted in the award of $15,500,000 to the United States. This is one of the cases I had in mind when I said that arbitration might be used to obtain a settle- ment which mediation could not effect. For, if the tribunal had been one of mediation, and its members, being thus limited to the exercise of advisory powers, had only recommended the payment of the sum above mentioned, we may believe that the recommendation would have been rejected. We had not then entered the period of " trust " organization, when such sums seem trivial. On the contrary, the draft for the payment of the award was the largest that had ever been drawn, and it is hardly conceivable that, with the feeling then existing over some of the questions covered by the award, a mediatorial recommendation of the payment of $15,500,000 would have been entertained for a moment. (217) 26 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII After the close of the sessions of the Geneva Tribunal, there sprang up a world-wide agitation for the establishment of some general method by which disputes between nations might be referred to arbitration. The success of the Tribunal in peacefully disposing of differences of the gravest character between two great nations caused peoples to feel a certain con- fidence in the process ; and the agitation to which the Geneva Arbitration gave rise may fairly be regarded as having directly contributed to the adoption of the Hague Convention of 1899, establishing what is called the Permanent Court at The Hague. Great things were hoped for from the establishment of that court. But it was followed by a movement which was so con- ducted that its results were, as I am compelled to believe, alto- gether unfortunate. The Hague Convention of 1899, while it did not make arbitration obligatory upon the contracting parties, excepted nothing from the process. Consequently, it did not suggest to the contracting parties pretexts for avoid- ing arbitration if they should be disinclined to adopt it. It is related of a certain general, who pointed out to his troops a way by which they might escape, that, when the enemy ap- peared, they promptly took it. The Hague Convention of 1899 did not obstruct the highway with signposts pointing to avenues of escape, even if it did not profess to compel the traveler to follow the main road. But, there were those who thought we must have something in form obligatory, and in the end what they did was this : They made a so-called obliga- tory treaty which was very widely adopted afterward, because nobody could see any reason for not adopting it, especially if he did not want to arbitrate; a treaty by which it was pro- vided that questions of a " judicial order," or relating to the interpretation of treaties, should be submitted to arbitration, provided they did not affect the " vital interests," the " inde- pendence," or the " honor " of the contracting powers, or " concern the interests of third powers." Evidently, the substance of this treaty or convention is in the exceptions. Just what the fancied obligation embraces I have never been able to detect, even after a somewhat microscopic examination. Remember, the sweeping provisos above quoted (218) No. 2] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2/ are limitations not upon the general obligation to arbitrate; they are limitations upon the agreement to submit only ques- tions of a " judicial order; " and they then proceed to declare that even as to questions of a judicial order arbitration may properly be excluded. What, then, have we left? Nor is this all. If we are to make any progress in the world, we must set up some sort of standard or ideal. Perhaps we may say that after all there are such things as general prin- ciples to which it is important to adhere, because, if we aban- don them, we are left without any means of reckoning, and are reduced to a mere shifty opportunism. The Hague Con- vention of 1899, although not in terms obligatory, did not in effect declare that the contracting parties need not arbitrate any question which they regarded as serious or important. The so-called " obligatory " treaties, in expressly authorizing and justifying the contracting parties in excluding any question which they might be inclined, on grounds of interest or of feeling, to exclude, even though it should be of a " judicial order," discredited international arbitration as a practical measure and placed it among unreal things, which only vision- aries would pursue. This lowering of the standards was not warranted by the facts. I have but one more word to say. In discussing and estimat- ing methods or devices, whether arbitral or otherwise, for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, we must never lose sight of human nature. There exists on the part of men in masses a tendency to endeavor to attain their ends by violence. We observe this tendency all through human history; and, bearing it in mind, and remembering that human dispositions change very slowly, we must watch our own thoughts and in- clinations as well as those of other people. That great inter- preter of the human heart, Robert Burns, admonishes us to keep an eye on our own defects, lest we become " o'er proud." Each people thinks itself not only peaceful, but much more peaceful than any other people. It is a matter of common knowledge that no nation in its own estimation ever wants to fight; it is always some other nation, perhaps even a very small and helpless one, that wants to go to war. The United (219) 28 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS States, we are constantly told, has always longed to arbitrate everything ; and this, in spite of the fact that George Bancroft supposed he was stating the truth, when, in opening the case of the United States in the arbitration of the San Juan Water Boundary, he said : " Six times the United States had received the offer of arbitration on their northwestern boundary, and six times had refused to refer a point where the importance was so great and the right so clear." And when at last the ques- tion was submitted to the German Emperor as arbitrator, we insisted upon and obtained a restricted submission, such as we had previously endeavored to secure. I mention this incident merely as an illustration of the truth of the poet's admonition, that, lest we become unduly self-satisfied, we should keep an eye upon ourselves as well as upon other people. (220) A WORLD COURT' WILLIAM L HULL Professor of History and International Relations, Swarthmore College YOU will recall the words of Wordsworth in speaking of the beginning of the French Revolution : " Bliss was it in those days to be alive, but to be young was very heaven." I feel very much li1032 Ruman- ians; 2,937,434 Germans; 1,967,979 Slovaks, 2,939,638 Serbo- Croats; 472,587 Ruthenians. It should of course be remembered that the official census is grossly inaccurate, and misrepresents matters in favor of the Germans and Magyars. For instance, there is little doubt that there are almost 8,000,000 Czechs, and almost 3,000,000 Slovaks. In any event, the Germans and Magyars together do not exceed 20,000,000, and rule over 32,000,000 of Slavs and Latins, who in this war are forced to fight the battles of their oppressors. Does not this recital furnish sufficient proof that the very existence of Austria is a negation of the principle of national- ity? If there is to be permanent peace, if, to paraphrase one of President Wilson's statements to the Senate, the world's life is to be stable, if the will is not to be in rebellion, if there is to be tranquillity of spirit, and a sense of justice, of freedom and of right, the Austro-Hungarian state must go, even as the Turk must be driven from Europe. " Home rule all around " would be possible only if the dual monarchy should be pre- served in its entirety; but this would presuppose a continued violation of the principle of nationality and the right of the nations to choose the sovereignty which is to rule over them. The Italians have a claim to the Trentino and a part of the Adriatic coast; the Rumanians claim Transylvania, the Serbs are entitled to Bosnia-Herzegovina; Croatia and Dalmatia should form with Serbia and Montenegro an independent Jugo- slav state, and the Poles should be united with Russian Poland. These claims cannot be disregarded, but if they are duly observed, as they should be, the Czecho-Slovaks will be iso- lated, hopelessly outnumbered by Germans and Magyars in a smaller Austria, which will continue to co-operate with Ger- many in her imperialistic endeavors and constitute a founda- tion for another attempt to realize the Middle Europe scheme. The only solution of the problem appears to be the joining of the fragments of those races, which already have their na- tional state, to the parent races ; the creation of an independent Bohemian state; of an independent Hungary, reduced of (335) 144 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII course to its proper ethnical boundaries, permitting the Aus- trian Germans, in the purely German provinces of Austria, to decide their own destinies. They could either form an inde- pendent state or else be absorbed into the German Empire. This arrangement, by the way, would not strengthen Germany as some claim, since it must be remembered that if the principle of nationality is carried out to its logical conclusion, Germany will lose at least a part of Alsace-Lorraine and Schleswig- Holstein, as well as Poland, so that w^hat she may gain on the one hand she will lose on the other. Moreover, the present stand of Germany against the whole world is made possible because she has control of the 32,000,000 Slavs and Latins within the Austrian empire; once these peoples are liberated, Germany will lose this reservoir of human material ; she will be correspondingly weakened, and her imperialistic designs will be thwarted. The future Czecho-Slav state will have a population of more than 12,000,000, of whom 10,000,000 are Czecho-Slovaks. It goes without saying that the rights of the minority would have to be protected, although the fact is that the Slav races have never been known for their attempts to impose their language and culture upon other peoples. This seems to be exclusively the trait of the Germans, who couple their designs of economic penetration with a policy of denationalization of the people of the territories they control, or intend to control. From an economic point of view, Bohemia will have an as- sured future, for she possesses all the natural resources neces- sary to an economically self-sustaining state. While she may not have an outlet to the sea, the example of Switzerland shows that a port is not specially necessary for an independent state. Again, the principle laid down by President Wilson as to econ- omic rights of way for landlocked states would apply to Bohemia, as well as to the need of Russia to obtain access to a warm-water port. Bohemia, owing to her geographical position, and being a limk between western Europe and the eastern Slav world, is destined to be of great political and economic importance. The fact that Bohemia was able for many centuries to oppose Germanization, that she had not suc- (336) No. 2] THE AUSTRIAN PROBLEM 1 45 cumbed, although surrounded on all sides by powerful enemies, is the best proof of her capacity to oppose the pan- German plans of expansion toward the east in the future, and to serve as a bulwark of permanent peace. The federal formula has become wholly inapplicable to Austria-Hungary. The rise of the spirit of nationality is equi- valent to a death-warrant for Austria. The longer the execu- tion is delayed, the longer we shall have a condition which the President described as the ferment of whole populations fight- ing subtly and constantly against a rule not founded upon the affections or convictions of mankind. It is gratifying that official circles in this country seem to have recognized the necessity of dismembering Austria-Hun- gary if German imperialistic aims are to be thwarted, if Middle Europe, with its consequent enslavement of whole populations, is not to remain a fact, if permanent peace is to prevail. A dispatch from Washington, dated May 26, indicates that an agreement was reached with the British and French war mis- sions insuring harmonious action of the United States with the Allies for the dismemberment of Austria- Hungary, this in- cluding the constitution of an independent Bohemia and the restoration of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, with Transyl- vania to be given to Rumania, Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia, and the Trentino and Trieste to Italy. This is a pro- gram which means freedom for the suppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary and which will completely satisfy the American principle denying the right of existence to govern- ments lacking the consent of the governed; for Czechs and Slovaks, by a solemn manifesto issued in Paris in November 191 5, call for the erection of an independent Bohemian state; the Italians are hoping for the day when Italia Irredenta will be redeemed; the Rumanians expect the war to bring free- dom to their brethren still suffering under Magyar oppression, and the South Slavs of Austria pray for a united Jugoslavia. This is not a policy of annexations, but simply a policy of justice. In this program the administration deserves the sup- port of all people who think clearly and are not in the grip of obsolete formulas. It is an American program. (337) SMALL NATIONALITIES DISCUSSION 1 Mr. Paxton Hibben, Former Associated Press Correspondent in Athens: I have just come from Greece, where I have been for the past twenty months. If you had any idea of the extent to which five censors are operating between here and Athens, you would perhaps have reached the same conclusion that I do, that the American people are not only uninformed about the conditions in Greece, but woefully misinformed. We are prone to confuse in our minds democracy with the govern- mental form of republicanism. A country is called a republic — China, for example — and we at once leap to the conclusion that it must be a democracy. One party in a country declares for a republic — as in Russia today — and at once we are all in sympathy with that party, which we feel must stand for democracy. Yet it may stand for anarchy. Today in Greece a handful of astute politicians have set up a self- styled republican form of government in rebellion against the con- stitutional government of Greece. They represent no consent of the Greek people — ^but they represent the interests of several great powers. Therefore they are protected and financed, and it is possi- ble that they may be officially recognized by the great powers whose interests they serve. The Greeks of constitutional Greece are co- erced and starved, and their territory is seized by force by foreign powers. We, who fight the war for democracy, stand by and see this done because it is done in the name of a republic. The name is the thing! Call Venizelos, the revolutionary leader in Greece, a president, and he may lay waste the whole of Greece with no other sanction than the bayonets of our allies. Let some historian discover that Nero was a president, not an imp er at or, and the burning of Rome will be looked upon as a Fourth of July celebration. It is for this reason that there is such grave significance in the President's declarations ; first, " That governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no other powers should be supported by the thought, purpose or power of the family of nations." This is, I take it, the charter of democracy as we conceive democracy. Now, second, its guarantee: "That the community of interest and power upon which peace must hereafter (338) SMALL NATIONALITIES 147 depend imposes upon each nation the duty of seeing to it that all in- fluences proceeding from its own citizens meant to encourage or assist revolution in other states should be sternly and effectually sup- pressed and prevented." Without this guarantee, not only is democ- racy not safe, but the *' rights and liberties of small nations " are lost the moment it is found to the advantage of a larger and richer state to finance revolution in a small nation with a view to control- ling the army, the commerce or even the territory of that small nation, through a new government to be imposed upon the small nation with or without the consent of the governed. We either fight this war for " the rights and liberties of small na- tions " or we do not We are carrying the standard of democracy, or we are not. It is futile to give voice to rhetoric*; in this war, people believe deeds, not words. It is waste of breath to teU the German people that we are at war with their imperial government because we are convinced that it does not represent the consent of the governed, if we wink at the suppression by our allies of a government which does represent the consent of the governed. The Germans convict us of hypocrisy at once. They laugh at our pretensiorks to defend " the rights and liberties of small nations." I am referring to the case of Greece. I have just come from Greece, where I have spent very nearly two years, and I know what I am talking about. There is a constitutional government in Greece which ninety per cent of the people of Greece support. I know that they support it, for I have seen them support it by force of arms against the armed forces of three great powers. I have seen them bear hunger and death from starvation in their support of this govern- ment. It is not material whether the Greeks have an elective mon- archy or a republic as their government. It is, however, not only material, but it is the acid test of the sincerity of our declarations of our intentions in this war that the Greeks shall have whatever government they may decide, without outside interference, is the government they desire. Any other basis of decision in the Greek question is a basis of the interest of other states than the Hellenic state. Any other influence save that of absolute freedom of choice is an influence, in the words of President Wilson, proceeding from the citizens or still worse the governments of interested states, meant to encourage and assist revolution in the Hellenic state. As such it should be " sternly and effectually suppressed and prevented." I cannot see that it makes one whit of difference whether the sym- pathies of King Constantine are with the Germans or not. One of (339) 148 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII the ideals of civilization for which we are fighting this war is that every people has a right to decide its own destinies, iincompelled by anyone — our enemies, our allies or ourselves. And unless we see that the people are allowed to exercise that right in complete freedom, we are mere phrasemakers in our declaration that we fight for the " rights and liberties of small nations." The Greeks have the right to decide whether they wish to enter the war or not. It took us two years and a half to decide. The Greeks must be protected in their right to decide their course without coer- cion, I am not going to mince matters. They are being coerced today. They are being starved today. The truth about their situ- ation is being suppressed by an interested censorship. Civil war has been sowed in their country, not by Greeks, but by greater powers, our allies. From what I have seen in Greece I have no hesitation in saying that the revolutionary forces in that country are so far from representing the consent of the governed that the revolution could not last a week, were it not for the support of foreign cannon and the foreign money that has been poured into the coffers of the revo- lutionists by our allies. It was by such foreign influence that the liberties of Hungary were destroyed in 1849. It was by such methods that Poland was dra- gooned into submission in 1830 and 1863. It was by outside pres- sure that the home Tule of the Czechs was defeated in 1848. We may as well look the facts in the face. If democracy is to be made safe as a result of this war, it is we, the people of the United States, and we alone, who must do it. Nothing in the history of the nations of modern Europe, either of our enemies or our allies, indicates that any element save that of national interest will dictate the terms of peace or the conditions in Europe which may follow the war. With the exception of ourselves and the Japanese and the Italians, perhaps, not one important nation is fighting for anything but life. The cause of democracy is in our hands, and ours alone. I have one word to add. Since the thirtieth of last September, there has been a virtual blockade of Greece, and since the first of December there has been an absolute blockade of Greece. I do not know how the Greek people live today, but I know that they have put all their effort into sowing their fields, into planting enough wheat and barley to see them through the war. I know that in a month these harvests in Thessaly will be ripe, and the people of Greece, who have been starving for six months, will have a chance to live again. I saw yesterday a despatch from London saying that the revolution- (340) No. 2] SMALL NATIONALITIES 1 49 ists were insisting upon marching to Thessaly and seizing this grain which belongs to the people of Greece. Let me tell you one thing, that the Allies should not allow the revolutionists to seize this grain which was planted by the Gieeks of old Greece for their own liveli- hood. If they do, you will see a thing wliich might well have taken place in the days of old Greece. You will see the people of Greece burn their crops before they will turn them over to those who have raised their hands against them, I have no interest one way or the other in the matter of who rules Greece, King Constantine or Venizelos, but I have that interest which all of us ought to have who love freedom and the right of peoples to decide their own destinies — I have that interest in the matter of al- lowing Greece to decide what she wants, and not the English or the French or the Germans or the Austrians or anyone else. Dr. Theodore P. Ion, formerly Professor of International Law, Boston University Law School: I shall just touch on three points. The first point is that the Greek nation could not have existed with- out the help of the three great powers of Europe — Great Britain, France and Russia. By a special treaty signed in 1832 these great powers granted independence to Greece, and by the terms of the protocol of 1830 those three powers had the right to send troops to Greece. The second point is this : When the great powers of Europe inter- vened in Greece in 1863, because the Greeks on account of their dem- ocratic views, had sent away their king, the powers suggested to Greece that she elect a Prince of Denmark, who became George I. By the Treaty of 1866, these same powers guaranteed to Greece a constitutional government. The great question that has been raised in Europe is whether King Constantine has violated that constitution. In March 1915 Venizelos was in favor of intervention by Greece on the side of the Allies. He asked the king to call a crown coimcil, that is, a council of the former prime ministers, and he submitted to this council the proposal that Greece form an alliance with the pow- ers against Germany. Every one of the former prime ministers was personally opposed to Venizelos, yet all agreed that Greece ought to join with the Allies. The only exception was a pro-German, who thought Greece ought to lean toward Germany and Austria; never- theless he advised the king that since Venizelos was the leader of the majority, it was the duty of the king to allow the cabinet to carry out his policies. I may say that under the Greek constitution all (341) I CO CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII powers are derived from the people, and the king has no right to impose his own personal will or to direct the policy of the country. The king did not agree with the policy of Venizelos, and because of the disagreement Venizelos resigned. The king called to power another politician, and an election followed m the month of June 1915. During a three months campaign the catchword of the op- ponents of Venizelos was: " Vote for Venizelos, and you go to war; vote for the king's policy, and you do not go to war." Upon that issue Venizelos again came in with a great majority. After many delays Venizelos was again made prime minister in August 1915. Nevertheless Constantine refused to enter the war. In October 1915 the question became acute. Bulgaria mobilized, and Venizelos demanded of the king that Greece mobilize, in fulfilment of her treaty with Serbia. After much bickering, the king yielded, Venizelos re- mained in power, and Greece mobilized. When Bulgaria was about to attack Serbia, Venizelos spoke in the legislature, explaining the treaty with Serbia, and indicating that Greece would stand by Serbia even though it brought her into conflict with German troops. It was the latter statement that provoked the king, and he asked Venizelos to resign again. This Venizelos did. Under these con- ditions the people were still with Venizelos. I should like to explain the Greco-Serbian treaty in a few words. That treaty was signed on the eve of the Second Balkan War, be- tween Greece and Serbia against Bulgaria. Venizelos, fearing that Bul- garia was going to attack, had tried to conclude a treaty with Serbia. After some hesitation, Serbia submitted a draft treaty, providing that in case of attack by a third power, the allies should jointly defend their respective territories. Greece objected that this third power might be Austria, and Serbia replied that such was the case. None the less Greece finally signed the treaty. Now it was well known that if Austria attacked Serbia, Russia would take the side of the latter, and in that European war the natural position of Greece would be with the Allies. That argument was used by Venizelos in the cabinet council presided over by the king. Therefore, when Greece signed the treaty she knew perfectly well that it would apply to a general European war, although the king and his party and cabinet ministers had many times said that it referred to a Balkan war only. I am ashamed to say that Greece has shamefully violated her treaty obligations with Serbia. When I say Greece, I mean of course, not the people but the king, who, on account of his German tendencies and opinions, prevented the Venizelos government from carrying out its treaty obligations. (342) No. 2] SMA LL NA TIONA LI TIES 1 5 i The third point is, why should the Allied Powers coerce Greece? I omit the question of the treaty, which was one grievance against Greece. Besides that, the Allies discovered that the Greek govern- ment was helping Germany. It was offering Germany submarine bases in many parts of Greece. It surrendered the important fort- ress of Rupel to the Bulgarians for the purpose of allowing them to get around the Allied army, and expel it from Saloniki. In that case there is no doubt that Austria would have gone to Saloniki, which would have been lost to Greece. That is the reason why the Greek people not only were not displeased with the occupation of Saloniki by the Allies, but so grateful that Kitchener and Senator Cochin were received with great honors, the latter being oft'ered the citizen- ship of Athens. If the people were against the Allies, why should they offer the citizenship to Senator Cochin? These, then were some of the reasons that justified the blockading of Greece by the Allies. Mr. Fabian Franklin^ New York: We have heard from two gentlemen who in some sense represent Greece, one by birth and one by recent residence. I do not pretend to know anything more about the Greek situation than everyone is bound to know from the daily press; but as Americans we are interested in this matter in a some- what broader way than concerns any question of truth or veracity. Mr. Hibben began by saying that we had been prevented from hearing the truth on account of the intervention of five censorships. I cannot recall that he availed himself of the opportunity to correct our ignorance by stating a single fact except his own conviction that ninety per cent of the Greek people were with Consitantine. He said he had seen the Greek people standing behind their king. We know what that means ; it depends on the people who are seen standing be- hind the king, or on the predilection of the man who makes the state- ment. Every one of us knows that Venizelos was considered the idol of the Greek people, was elected by a great majority, went out of power, again submitted to election, and was triumphantly returned. Here was a nation in which, under a government whose constitu- tionality neither Constantine nor anybody else denies, Venizelos was elected in the first place, and then triumphantly re-elected on the specific war issue. There was an immense national sentiment ex- pressed in favor of the course he stood for. Constantine uncon- stitutionally reversed this decision. Under these conditions, at the crucial moment of a war which was going to determine the destiny of the world, the Allies stood confronted with the fact that the (343) 152 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII government of Greece was in the hands of persons inimical to their interests, and in their opinion, faithless to the Serbian treaty. Should the Allies, confronted with that situation, hare left the government in the hands of a monarch opposed to them? Mr. Hackett spoke somewhat sarcastically of all this talk about small nations, and referred to the insincerity of those who do not practise what they preach. In that respect the Declaration of In- dependence is the greatest outrage ever committed since the world began ; for half the people who signed the Declaration of Indepen- dence were slave-holders. Yet we meant what we said in the Declar- ation of Independence. We did not live up to it any more than we live up to the Sermon on the Mount, but we tried to, and finally we did. The question is not whether the Allied nations are perfect, not even whether England has been perfect in its treatment of Ireland, but what is to be the outcome of the position they take. Ask your- selves whether it would be better if the Declaration of Independence had never been written, because it contains that declaration that all men are created equal. Mr. D. J. Theophilatos^ New York : Speaking in the House of Commons on May 10, Mr. Bonar Law stated that the Greek king has the support of the majority of the Greeks who bear arms. The Greeks who bear arms are the voters of Greece; Mr. Bonar Law's statement is therefore virtually a candid admission that the majority of the Greek people do not want a dictatorship under Venizelos, but do support the constitutional government of Greece under King Constantine. Just what has the government of King Constantine done to incur the wrath and the measures of coercion applied by the defenders of the rights and liberties of small nations to the Hel- lenic people? First, on the occasion of the third Austrian invasion of Greece's ally, Serbia, in the fall of 1915 the constitutional Greek government took the stand that the Greco-Serbian treaty, being of purely Balkan scope, did not require Greece to destroy herself by coming — futilely, let it be added — to the aid of Serbia. I emphasise the fact that this was the third invasion of Serbia, because on the two previous occa- sions when Serbia was invaded, Venizelos was prime minister of Greece, and as prime minister held that the Greco-Serbian treaty did not require Greece to come to the aid of her ally Serbia in any save a purely Balkan conflict. No one in Greece except Venizelos main- tains that the Greco-Serbian treaty required Greece to destroy herself (344) No. 2] SMALL NATIONALITIES I53 in the fall of 1915, and even Venizelos himself maintains this thesis only as a purely political argument, when it is a policy for whose failure he need not take tlie consequences. One further point, however, in the matter of this treaty. Treaty ot no treaty, King Constantino was ready in the fall of 1915 as he had been in the spring of that year, to fight against Bulgaria or Turkey or both, under the conditions laid down by the Greco-Serbian treaty it- self—that is, with Serbia in a position to confront the Bulgarians with 150,000 men. Unfortunately, Serbia's greater allies had left her virtually without assistance so that she was in no position to fulfil her part of this contract. King Constantine was so ready to fulfil Greece's part that he was willing to have France and Great Britain take over Serbia's share and supply the required 150,000 men. This they agreed to do, and Serbia therefore refused to make a sep- arate peace with Austria. Greece mobilized to be ready to add her strength to that of France and Great Britain in defense of Serbia. Then what? France and Great Britain actually sent to Saloniki not 150,000 men but 38,000, and the British portion of this insignifi- cant force was without orders to leave Saloniki for Serbia, nor did it ever march into Serbia. Had Greece entered the war at that time, she too would have been crushed by the German impact. Serbia would not have been aided, nor would the Allied cause have been forwarded; but, on the contrary, Germany would have had 50,000 square miles of Greek territory to add to her conquests. So much for the the Greco-Serbian treaty. Now for the allegation that King Constantine has violated the Greek constitution. That is not the most liberal charter in the world; the Greeks themselves complained bitterly of its illiberality when Great Britain, France and Russia forced it upon the Hellenes in 1832, and they have liberalized it many times since, on their own initiative and without either the assistance or the prompting of the so-called protecting powers. But even today the king of the Hellenes cannot violate it, because article twenty nine of the document itself definitely states : " The person of the king is irresponsible and inviolable, and his ministers are responsible." The charge is that King Constantine violated the fundamental charter of Greek liberties by dismissing Venizelos as prime minister in October 1915. Article thirty one of the Greek constitution reads: " The king appoints and dismisses his ministers." The king was deliberately endowed with this power with the idea that he should exercise it on occasions when he felt that his ministers did not repre- sent the will of the Hellenic people, as in this very instance. (345) 154 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII On the other hand, article ninety nine of the Greek constitution reads: "No foreign army may be admitted to the Greek service with- out a special law, nor may it sojourn in or pass through the state." Yet on September 21, 1915, Venizelos, then prime minister of Greece, invited a foreign army to " sojovirn in the state," without the authori- zation of either the Boule of the Hellenes or of the constitutional sovereign of Greece — and Sir Edward Grey, in an official declaration in the House of Commons has stated that Venizelos did so. There is one other point. It is true that France, Great Britain and Russia aided Greece to gain her independence. So did the United States; but the United States does not demand on that ac- count the right to administer our internal affairs, to override our courts, to appoint our police commissioners, to censor our letters within our own coimtry, to control our railways and our ports. The exercise of such powers is not compatible with the independent sovereignty of any country, large or small. These things are being done in Greece today — in the name of democracy! It is against just such action on the part of the Allies that we Greeks, loyal to our constitutional gov- ernment, protest to America, the champion of the rights and liberties of small nations. George Whitelock,^ American Bar Association: I do not mean to attempt elucidation of the great problems under dis- cussion at this remarkable conference. Whatever I say at this juncture must be in the nature of personal observation. I must confess that I have had a great sense of hopelessness about the whole project of amicable international adjustments. A number of per- sonal incidents abroad in the last ten years had confirmed my sense of despair. I attended a meeting of the International Law Asso- ciation ten years ago in Berlin, and was a guest at luncheon in a private house, where the German oak was sympathetically inter- twined with the roses of England in compliment to British members of the association, guests on that occasion. The expressions of amity and good-will on the part of our host were charming and con- vincing. But when at a business meeting of the association he pro- tested, in what I conceived an eloquent speech, against the hard feel- ing then developing in Prussia against Great Britain, the sporadic applause by the Prussians was the first note of warning to me of the impending conflict. 1 Introductory remarks as presiding officer at the evening session, May 29. (346) No. 2] SMALL NATIONALITIES 1 55 Two years afterward I was in Budapest at another meeting of the same association. The then Prince of Bulgaria was there for con- ference with the late Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary concerning the proclamation of himself as czar of Bulgaria. The purpose of the prince's visit was unknown. I sat opposite him at the opera, and after studying him for four hours, said to myself, " You will never do anything in this world" — so dull he seemed. But within a few days I saw him at Sofia on his return home, and within a week he had proclaimed himself czar. Thiis opened the wonderful drama which was staged thereafter in the Balkan peninsula, a drama whose final act is the tremendoiis war now prevailing in Europe. Then five years ago I went to Paris, where I met a friend who had once declared his determination to devote the rest of his life to the cause of international peace. On this occasion he told me of the ef- fective arrangements being made among the different nations of the world to ensure the success of the cause. He was convinced that there would never be another great outbreak of war. His was not the vision of the prophet. Two years later I prepared an address for delivery in September 1914 before the International Law Association at The Hague. It was actually printed, but the contemplated meeting in the Peace Pal- ace was abandoned and an angry cannonade was resounding across the border on the date fixed for my address. And so I have felt despondent about the whole subject. The war is actually upon us; that war has made the eternal topics once more current. We are back again to consideration of fundamental psychological truths. War and its avoidance is one of those topics. Whatever may have been my past sense of hopelessness, the words of wisdom and moderation to which I have listened at this meeting, like the sense of patriotism here prevalent, are full of encouragement for the future. It is time to shake oil the old American apathy and indifference to the affairs of the world beyond the seas. We are beginning to do it now. It is our function to help America realize that the day of apathy is gone ; that we too are in the gigantic struggle ; that we are a part of the great world, and may never again cease so to be. President Butler has truly said that we must learn to give up the habit of parochial thought, and think internationally. That is the lesson we are acquiring. When we have paid the premium of vast sacrifice on the battlefields of Europe for the insurance of American safety in future; when we have secured that safety by paying the last full measure of devotion, then our people will realize their place in the world and their responsibility to humanity. (347) DEMOCRACY AND OPEN DIPLOMACY^ OSCAR S. STRAUS Former Ambassador, Member of the Permanent Court at The Hague THE two subjects of the morning, open diplomacy, and the effect of censorship in foreign relations have a very close relationship to each other. I should prefer to entitle our subject, the need for closer relationship between the machinery of diplomacy and the will of the people. Mahan, who has written so learnedly and ably on force in international relationships, makes an antithesis between law and war. Those words describe briefly the great issue of the present world conflict whether future relationship shall be controlled by the powers of war or of law. The league to enforce peace, instead of making force and law the opponents of each other, would utilize the powers now employed in war to sustain law. The possibility of doing this will depend on how this war ends. The world cannot be safe for democracy so long as there exists one dominant or potent power under the guidance of rulers who recognize no moral obligations in international relationship. This conception is by no means new. On the contrary, it is the original imperialistic conception. In other words, it is purely and simply the doctrine of might. In this imperialistic philosophy of nations, there is no room for the recognition of any moral standard in international relation- ship. This philosophy, in its logical conclusion, leads either to world domination by a single state or to international anarchy. It is because in international relationships imperial- ism to a considerable extent continued to dominate, that we find the standard of morals between nations is so far below the same standard within nations, that we find within nations 1 Introductory Address delivered at the morning session of the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 19 17. (348) DEMOCRACY AND OPEN DIPLOMACY 157 a well-ordered system of civil society, and between nations so large an element of anarchy. This element of anarchy is especially to be noted in the low standard of morals which justified the conclusion of secret treaties between separate nations, in direct conflict with general treaties made by groups of states at the end of wars involving many countries. I refer for illustration to the Congress of Westphalia after the Thirty Years War, the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars, and the Congress of Berlin after the Turco-Russian War. The various plans for main- taining the peace of Europe broke down, first, because Euro- pean nations concealed their international engagements from the people, and second, because the international standards were such that it was not regarded as contrary to public morals for individual states to make separate treaties in direct conflict with the treaties negotiated at such congresses. The world will never be safe for democracy or for any other form of government, so long as the diplomacy of states is under the cloak of secrecy and concealment. When the chief states of the world were ruled by autocratic governments, ambassadors were sent from one nation to the other, not so much for the purpose of promoting friendly rela- tions, but more for the purpose of international spying. That has never applied to America. American diplomacy, because of its directness and openness, was often not seriously regarded; it was styled " shirt-sleeve " diplomacy. We followed that method because it was in consonance with our democratic ideals and because we were little concerned with the intrigues of European states. John Hay defined the policy of our diplo- macy as governed " by the Golden Rule and the Monroe Doc- trine." It has ever been purely mutual and defensive. Let us hope that as a result of this war it will be possible, as the President has said, to form " a partnership of demo- cracies " — a league or concert of nations. One condition of such a partnership must be good faith. In order to insure good faith there must be no secret treaties; no treaty should become effective until confirmed by the representatives of the people. The United States was the first country to establish (349) I eg conference: on foreign relations this principle by providing in its Constitution that no treaties should be binding until confirmed by the Senate, which in practice makes the Senate part of the treaty-making power. It is true that treaties are often considered in secret session, but if we are to have open diplomacy, the secret sitting of the Senate, even when dealing with treaties, will have to be abolished. It is not the machinery of diplomacy which is so much in need of reconstruction as the method of employing the machin- ery. The method should be democratized so that the people, through their chosen representatives, may have a voice in making, confirming or rejecting their country's international engagements and policies. This method is possible only among democracies. Even among democracies it will fail unless the constituent nations forming the partnership observe good faith. The observance of good faith would in a large measure be safeguarded if parliamentary ratification should be made a prerequisite to the validity of treaties and no treaties should be effective until they had been transmitted to all the other members forming the partnership. (350) DIFFICULTIES OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS' DOMICIO DA GAMA Ambassador from Brazil to the United States THE current notion that diplomacy is the art of gravely disguising facts under pleasant words is one of many careless definitions composing the precarious fund of popular wisdom. Indeed public opinion seems to thrive on general impressions and to like vagueness. The explanation of this taste for bold and unconfirmed assertions may be that vagueness encourages discussion, and discussion, not action, is one of the characteristics of democracy, of which public opinion is an essential element. Another pleading for the ill-defined and vague notions that encumber our minds came from the brilliant pen of Prevost-Paradol, when he wrote that " asses alone have only clear ideas," Now, I do not wish to cast a reflection upon the mental conditions of those who make public opinion, but it seems to me that they are too assertive, although their assertions are not less hazy and uncertain than mere guesses. Notwithstanding its constant changes, public opinion is the foundation of popular wisdom, and this leads us to be- lieve that popular wisdom is built upon error, upon unverified impressions, creations of desire and imagination. This brief aggressive preamble does not express the re- sentment of a diplomat against the popular misconception of his role and character in the comedy of world politics. On the contrary, I rather enjoy this occasion of making a few re- marks, very few and cautious, upon diplomacy as it is sup- posed to be, as it is in reality^, as it should be. It is certainly better to charge anonymous public opinion with errors of judgment than to slight the philosophical mind of our friends. 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 191 7. (351) l6o CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII And besides if there were no errors to point out, there would be no occasion for assemblies of the wise and thoughtful, no speeches full of good doctrine, no exchange of ideas about the solution of problems of common interest like those studied at this conference. Many years ago I heard that master of elo- quence, Emilio Castelar, say that from the oratorical point of view the world was becoming too good, since there were only petty evils left to be attacked in fiery outbursts of rhetori- cal indignation. He certainly died too soon, as the present times might have shown him that the dragon of iniquity is still alive and rampant among men. He would also rejoice in the number of defenders that justice and right have found all over the world, among whom the hosts of diplomacy make such a brave array. And this brings me to the point that in time of need diplo- macy may also assume the fighting mood and dare to face facts and even to call them names, an attitude not wholly in accord- ance with the popular conception of diplomatic dealings. It appears on the contrary that, being on the first line of national defense, the diplomats were the first to shoot. The exchange of courtesies of the battle of Fontenoy of old was not observed this time ; they started pelting each other with hard truths, that hurt sometimes but are seldom deadly missiles. Was this an infraction of the rule that places the diplomats among the cau- tious and courteous professional liars? No, indeed. The rule for the diplomatic agent is to speak the truth, his word being deemed sufficient to engage his government's responsibility. Truly there are some among the diplomats who permit them- selves to disguise the truth, alleging either self-defense or reasons of state, invoking that antiquated and odious theory that the end justifies the means, claiming a moral code for states different from the one binding individuals together. We know by experience the harm brought upon the world by such a strange combination of the spirit of Machiavelli, Talleyrand and Bismarck, mixed and amalgamated into a Jesuitism with- out charity. And I wonder if it would not be advisable to include in the program of the next peace conference the adop- tion of an international code of honor for the diplomatic (352) No. 2] DIFFICULTIES OF DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY i5i career, one of its rules disqualifying for the service those who might bring into it their personal habits of insincerity and deceit. We might be deprived of the collaboration of some able men who cannot play politics if they have to play fair; but then we owe to the countries we represent the sacrifice of brilliancy to seriousness and dignity, and the nations would be better served if all their agents abroad were as jealous of their personal credit as any broker at the stock exchange, or a lawyer before the courts of justice. Of course I have in mind some whom such an international code would prevent from sitting with us around a table in con- ference, although we should be glad to hav^e them on the other side of a house of congress as adversaries. The reason is obvious. Representatives of parties eventually contribute to- ward the welfare of the country by the dispute of power, but to conquer power is their first and principal objective ; repre- sentatives of governments in collective conferences or in separ- ate negotiations seek agreements that, by conciliating different interests through mutual concessions, promote good feeling between their countries and develop the spirit of international association around a common work, that to be durable must be devoid of personalism and built upon realities. This is why able lawyers and capable political men often fail in diplomacy ; they cannot resist the force of habit of winning cases or the temptation of carrying a point in a debate on an international issue. There is a well-known phrase about diplomatic vic- tories that should be written on the walls of the rooms where diplomats meet, if only as a reminder that they need to refrain from putting themseh-es and their petty ambitions ahead of the countries they represent, and the common interests that it is their mission to foster. One should not conclude that these warnings against per- sonal impulses in diplomatic transactions somehow justify the popular discredit of diplomacy as an instrument of progress and betterment in international relations. We might as well condemn engineering or medicine because some bridges fell or some people died through the ineptitude of builders or physi- cians. And undoubtedly more lives pass and more piles (353) 1 62 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII crumble through incapacity of doctors and engineers, than treaties fail by lack of proper care at the hands of diplomatic agents. Only, failures in diplomacy are more remarked, as they are transactions involving national interests and the future of the parties engaged. When we consider the importance of the stakes and the complexity of the game, playing against men, not against natural forces, the wonder is that there are so many good players in diplomacy. In fact they are di- rected from home and seldom are authorized to " use their own judgment " — a prestigious" phrase that fills the man with elation, although it never carries him very far — but informa- tion of the conditions, an eye for opportunity, and an un- prejudiced mind in dealing with other men, are precious fac- tors for the successful conclusion of a diplomatic transaction. I know that I am inscribed upon your program to speak about open diplomacy : democratic control of diplomatic negotiations, and I also know that you do not expect me to take the suggestive theme literally, and discuss it to ex- haustion. Your courteous attention should not be taxed to that extent. I will therefore only say that my experience of the subject does not encourage the hope that such control may ever become effective. There is indeed an open diplomacy for the people, through the press, when, as the saying is, we " play to the galler}^" The democratic influence upon that kind of diplomacy is only indirect. One might call it elec- toral, or magnetic — mysterious, anyhow, not open in design, dealing in expectations. Needless to say that results are of less importance in such cases; notoriety is what matters. I suppose that nobody cares for this kind of open diplomacy that easily turns into publicity and means self-advertising. The other, the real thing, does not bear much publicity while in course of preparation, if it is to make headway. Representa- tive regimes are based upon confidence. The practical rule of the division of offices and convergence of efforts would be impossible without trust. Advices coming from every quarter would paralyze any action that is not resolved to tear away fears and apprehensions from outside. Philosophically, the man of action should be deaf, because philosophical minds are (354) No. 2] DIFFICULTIES OF DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY 163 inclined to consider and weigh every objection, and the time for action is lost in consideration. There is the story of Buridan's ass to illustrate vividly the deadly equilibrium of a scrupulous mind. The other day I asked a five-year-old child with whom I am relearning life why he did not run both ways, and he promptly replied : " Because that would stop me and I want to run." A wise diplomat could not say better. Perhaps, if he had an essentially conciliatory mind, he would stop to think and try to run both ways, thus losing time and prestige. This is not intended to justify secretive diplomacy, which is or should be a thing of the past, when " high reasons of state " stopped curiosity or real patriotic interest at the door of the chancelleries. An exchange of trust is more in the spirit of democracy. Truly, discretion must be used in trust- ing, at the risk of admitting grades in a democracy. But, even if only temporarily and by representation, the will of the people has to be expressed and responded to through a limited number of advisers. By reducing this number to the moderate proportions of a council of state, we may expect an increase in executive efficiency, without impairing the prin- ciple of representative government. A measure taken in coun- cil cannot be held up to reproach as arbitrary, if that council constitutionally is an organ of national life. Nothing pre- vents the creation of such a national body unless it is the need of an amendment in our federal constitution to that effect. Through it, the democratic control of diplomatic negotiations would be insured and the responsibility of the executive shared with other organs of the will of the people. Diplomatic acts would not be open to public discussion while in preparation, but the negotiations would not be secret. And, who knows? perhaps the diplomatic agents whose functions are misunder- stood by the public and their own governments, to the extent of their being often made mere commercial agents with addi- tional facilities for information — perhaps the diplomats, find- ing recognition and support in public opinion, would finally be able to raise diplomacy to the standing and dignity to which it is entitled, being, as it is, the first line of national defense. (355) THE NEED FOR A MORE OPEN DIPLOMACY' ARTHUR BULLARD Washington, D. C. THERE is no question more important for the future peace of the world than the devising of means by which the will of the people may be made more directly and immediately dominant in foreign relations. I have read pretty extensively the advocates of the old-fashioned secret diplomacy. I find that most of their arguments in favor of undemocratic diplomacy come under two heads. The first is purely technical, and is well summed up in the early chapters of Mr. Lippmann's Stakes of Diplomacy. He points out with considerable force the difficulty of consulting the people in the rapidly moving affairs of foreign policy. While his argument on this point is a serious one, others have urged the same view in the form of the reductio ad absurdum. They have said that it is per- fectly impossible to consult every man in the street. Of course, those of us who are seriously interested in this question of democratizing our diplomacy are not advocates of any such absurdity. It is a question, like all human questions, of more and less. What we are urging, is not that our diplomacy should be absolutely democratic, but that it should be more democratic than it is. This argument of the technical difficulties in making the will of the people effective in foreign policy is the one argument which I have most often met, but there is another argument against open diplomacy, which might be called the President's argument. A great many things happen in foreign affairs which would, if generally known, stir the spirit of war. I be- lieve that the President had a profound desire to keep us out of war, and that he therefore kept from the public a knowledge 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Scieace, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 1917. (356) THE NEED FOR MORE OPEN DIPLOMACY 165 of many things which would have been immediately resented. He tried, I believe, by the use of discretion in regard to foreign relations, to preserve a spirit of peace, feeling that the stirring- up of the people would lead to war; but the answer to that is obvious — that even such guarding of the people from the spirit of war has not kept them out of war. Those two are the only serious arguments against democratic control which I have encountered. I do not believe that those arguments are the reasons. I think that the reason why our diplomacy here in America, as in the democracies of Europe, continues to operate along the old monarchic lines, is primarily one of inertia. It started that way, and nobody has changed it. It is almost amusing to read today the diplomatic corres- pondence of the world, and find what an antique tone, what an antique phraseology, has come down to us from the old days, and no one has brought it up to our modern standards. The democratization of life does not follow any uniform course. In every nation you can find out how in some aspects it is more democratic than other nations and in some aspects much less democratic. In all the democratic governments that new movement started by the great revolution has been slowest of all in penetrating the foreign office. Since the great revolution and the liberalizing of the world, forward-looking men have been interested primarily in internal affairs. The democratization which has been engrossing all thoughtful men is democratization of industry, and it is typi- cal that the liberals of the world were surprised by this war. They had been so interested in their internal problems that they did not give proper attention to their neighbors. To me that fact suggests the one hope of a better future growing out of this war. Never again in our generation will the liberals of the world be indifferent to foreign affairs. The invasion of the world has not been merely geographic; it has not been merely the overflowing across frontiers. All of our life has been invaded from the outside, all of our pet projects, all of the things for which we have been striving have been attacked from without. We have got to watch be- yond the border, and if we do, if we put the same ardor for (357) l66 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII better things into our international relations which we have been expending in this effort to improve our internal conditions, the machinery will form itself. After all it is not so much a change in machinery as a change in spirit that we need We must, and I believe that we will be interested. There is one other reason, as distinguished from argument, for secrecy in diplomacy. It is not the greatest reason, but it strongly dominates the minds of some people who are op- posed to any reform in our diplomatic methods ; and that is, the privilege of secrecy. It is a matter that we have had to fight out in our business life. Many business deals are easier to effect if you don't have to tell anybody about them. In our industrial life we have had a constant fight for more and more publicity ; we have discovered that it is not for the common weal to allow our large corporations, our large insurance companies, to operate in secrecy. Just so we shall have to insist, and as we become more democratic we shall insist, upon publicity in regard to foreign affairs. It is too important, it touches too intimately our own lives, for us to be indifferent about it. Interest means publicity. It is not only the wicked, however, who love darkness; it is also the slothful and the inefficient. There are a great many persons in the foreign offices of the world who would retire to private life if such publicity were introduced as I would like to see, and some of those persons who feel their own position rather precarious under such circumstances are among the strongest advocates of diplomatic secrecy. We cannot have efficiency unless we have responsibility, and it is a common- place in diplomatic discussion today that innumerable mis- takes have been made by diplomatic agents on both sides; but the proper ones have not been retired to private life because they have been guarded by the veil of secrecy. Of course the very foundation of any democratic control in diplomacy, as in every other branch of politics, must be demo- cratic understanding. It is not any change in the laws, nor any change in the rules governing the State Department which will bring about this better understanding. There must be a getting together, an intensive and persistent education ; the (358) No. 2] THE NEED FOR MORE OPEN DIPLOMACY iQj people must know about these things. We have already gone a long way from the provincialism of ten years ago. More people in the United States are interested in the world today than were ever interested before. Now, the government should stimulate this interest. Such conferences as this seem to me one of the greatest things that could be done for this cause of democratic control. People must understand the issue. The State Department must introduce itself to the public. It really is not beneath its dignity. The other departments in the government have done it, and the questions involved in the work of the State Department are not much more intricate than those involved in the work of the Department of Agricul- ture, which is a good example of how the departments can take the people into their confidence in regard to their work. We ought to know as much about the State Department and its problems and policies as we do about the other departments. One of the most interesting books on war that I have ever read is that of von Clausewitz. It is all centered around one idea. Von Clausewitz is constantly coming back to the state- ment that war is a movement through a resistant medium. He pictures one type of general who makes a fine and intricate plan, and then does not carry it through, because of friction. Von Clausewitz lists all sorts of things as friction, such as bad roads, unexpected rain, misinformation. The plan, he declares, is only the smallest part of the work of a great general ; such a general is the man who can grit his teeth and force his plan through the resistant medium. The same necessity for forcing plans through exists in time of peace. Life itself is movement through a resistant medium, and this is certainly as true of this campaign for democratic control of diplomacy. The friction which must be overcome is in some cases a sincere belief that it is unwise to trust the people; in some cases it is rank stupidity. If we are going k) win this campaign for democratic control, it has got to be by gritting the teeth and pegging away against the resistance. It will not do for us simply to discuss a proper method of diplomacy ; we have got to have the will to force it through. (359) A PLEA FOR AN UNCENSORED PRESS ' FREDERICK ROY MARTIN Assistant Manager, Associated Press WE may now turn from diplomatic discussion to news- paper crudities, and discuss the subject which, gauged by hours, has taken more time in Washing- ton since the declaration of war than any other. The House of Representatives is discussing it this morning and probably will be discussing it tomorrow morning. I am confident that nothing will be added to the plea for a liberal censorship that John Milton made several centuries ago. The morning topic, the need of better machinery for international negotiations, may properly include a discussion of censorship, though I ap- proach it with a plea for the minimum censorship, and hence the least possible machinery. The punster's observation that the only ship whose loss we need not mourn is the censorship, expresses the view, not only of many progressive journalists, but of many thoughtful statesmen. Eliminating from consideration the publication of strictly military or naval movements over which all recognize the need of censorship in war time, an impressive if not a convinc- ing argument may be made that that government feels that a censorship is most valuable which has the most to conceal. President Wilson's argument that " there are some newspapers which cannot be relied upon to suppress information whose publication can be an injury " can be accepted without con- tradiction as a reason for censorship if it be assumed that " injury " means detriment to military or naval progress. It was merely unfortunate perhaps, that at about the same time when the President issued the statement, the newspapers should have been told by the Department of State, or rather, through ^ Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 191 7. (360) A PLEA FOR AN UNCENSORED PRESS 169 the Committee on Public Information, that " The Department of State" — I am again quoting — "considers it a dangerous service to the enemy to discuss differences of opinion between the Allies and difficulties with neutral countries," and they added — I try to measure my words — with childish innocence, that " speculation about possible peace is another topic which may possess elements of danger, as peace reports may be of enemy origin, put out to weaken the combination against Germany." That suggestion of the State Department caused the cabinet, in its fight for unlimited censorship, to lose the sympathy of its last newspaper supporter in the city of New York, as that newspaper gave up the fight this morning. If the cabinet carried that through, you could not hold this conference. Our State Department surely could not imagine a press that would not speculate about a possible peace; at least the Hohenzollerns have not suppressed such discussion in Germany, and surely the Romanoffs did not succeed. We may, perhaps, pass this cautionary suggestion of the State Department as ill digested — it must be. Granted that a military censorship in war time is necessary, what further restriction of the press is desirable? I venture to assert that no additional precautions are desirable. I sar- castically express the hope that men holding public office will not announce that they have discovered some startling de- stroyer of submarines, and make other absurd statements. Up to date it seems to me that the greatest indiscretions committed in publicity since we declared war, were made in a speech in the Senate by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions, and by a gentleman who has the distinction of being the head of one of our advisory committees in the national defense movement. I presume to maintain then, that further regula- tion than military needs require is most likely to be injudicious. The veil of secrecy creates mistrust, and that chancellery is most generally believed which seeks to conceal the least. Such statements seem absurdly simple when made. May I state a few instances of some possible interest? When Great Britain in the first year of the war appointed a diplomatic rep- (361) I70 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII resentative to the Vatican, the censor — the censor then was like the Queen in Alice in Wojiderland — "Off with their heads! ", or like the censor in Barrie's play, dressed in black and carrying an axe, but saying nothing — the censor instructed the British press that he would not allow the publication of any comment upon this important appointment, but merely a simple announcement of three lines. Immediately the fact that there was no comment upon this unusual appointment created gossip. Men talked about it everywhere, and no less than twenty so- cieties in one county in England deemed it worthy of heated, even acrimonious discussion, and many of them passed resolu- tions condemning the censorship for such action. I talked with one of the most influential members of the British cabinet and asked him the reasons for the warning of the censor in this instance. In substance he said, " It is all incredibily stupid. Having established an elaborate machin- ery of suppression, some of my colleagues regard it as necessary to annoy and irritate as many people as possible. They may at any moment order that the prime minister's speeches be suppressed." Two weeks later, some British censor did actu- ally delete certain portions of one of Mr. Asquith's addresses which I endeavored to cable to the United States. I called it to Mr. Asquith's attention, and he laughingly disavowed any intimate knowledge of the mental operations of the censors except to say, " It must be a very trying thing to be compelled to sit still and not be able to use the only two weapons you have, the blue pencil and the scissors." Turn to the Irish situation. When the effect of the treat- ment of the Irish press is carefully considered, one may learn a great deal as to why Erin has been the crucial test of the British union. Many have believed that political conditions in Ireland have not been so bad at all times as imagination has painted them, but that the censor has merely feared to let out the truth. I myself visited Ireland when most people in London believed that revolution was rampant. Dublin, Cork, Queenstown, Belfast, were as peaceful as I had ever seen them, but the censors were then forbidding journalists to write about conditions in Ireland. (362) No. 2] A PLEA FOR AN UNCENSORED PRESS I7I Take the case of India. There were at the end of the first year of the war, countless rumors of sedition, mutiny, revolt and famine. They grew. Undoubtedly there was much truth in them. How much we did not know, but the mutiny of a hundred grew into the general supposition that it was a revolt of millions. After six months of effort, permission was ob- tained to send one trained American journalist to India, on condition that he could go where he pleased and write what he pleased, and that his articles should not be censored if they made no reference to military developments. So far as I know, he is the only foreign newspaper man who has visited India during the war. I would not wish to magnify too much the importance of his work, but I would point out that I per- sonally have not heard a rumor of sedition or famine in India since his forty articles appeared. The difference of course is immediately suggested when we think of Armenia. There are no journalists in Armenia free to tell the uncensored truth. Take a more recent instance in our own country. When diplomatic relations with Germany were severed, and of course before the declaration of war, the departure of Ambassador Gerard from Berlin was delayed by the circulation of reports that German ships had been seized in New York and other harbors of the United States, that German sailors had been in- terned, and that other similar belligerent acts had been com- mitted. We can surmise how these inaccurate reports reached Germany. But meanwhile in New York the representative of the press association in Germany which corresponds most closely to the Associated Press here, was endeavoring to send by wireless to his own country the truth, which was, of course, that ships had not been seized, that no Germans had been in- terned, and that the policy of our government had been to extend every possible consideration to the hundreds of thous- ands of Germans in this country. The naval censor held that message up for several days. He, like Mr. Asquith's censor, sat there with his blue pencil and his scissors, and he had to do something. A more recent instance: When Marshal Joffre's first an- nouncement in this country was given to lihe press, it was (363) 172 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS changed. The State Department declared that it was not re- sponsible and that the only change was made by the members of the French Commission itself. The General Staff made a similar announcement. Both announcements were true, but they did not give the whole truth. I have compared the French text of the Marshal's remarks as cabled to France within a few hours of the completion of his remarks, with the version given to the American press after the change had taken place. Somebody had suggested a change. It was a stupid, if not a discourteous act. Sending American troops to France does not seem so radical a plan now as it did even a few weeks ago, and it might have been statesmanlike, even military, and surely it would have been more hospitable, to pretend that we could understand the French language which the Marshal of France used to express his undoubtedly sincere convictions. The impairment of public confidence that goes with drastic censorship is incontrovertible. Golden Rule diplomacy and an unrestricted press, except in military matters, go necessarily hand in hand. When the Romanoff dynasty failed, the flow of truth stunned us. I could hardly credit it when there came in over the cables to our New York office, uncensored, from Petrograd, a reference to the former Czar as "the weakest of the Romanoffs," and the story of that dramatic visit to his prison which will send him down into history as the emperor who shoveled snow. Autocracy has failed there. Freedom may fail for a while, but the whole truth is now before us. There is no censorship in Petrograd. Even reckless speech may be a moderating influence, whereas drastic censorship chokes the safety valve. My plea then is simply for the least possible censorship machinery. (364) THE VALUE OF A FREE PRESS ' JOHN TEMPLE GRAVES Editorial Representative, Hearst Publications I AM delighted to hav^e discovered, as this discussion has gone forward, that the speakers are as one upon the theme with which it is my pleasure and privilege to deal, the question of the censorship upon international re- lations. Every speaker so far has advocated aii open diplo- macy, not a diplomacy of secretness, subtlety, evasion and deceit, but a diplomacy of the open hand and the open mind, the diplomacy that represents our modern times, the diplomacy that has always won and must always win, the diplomacy that was first exemplified in our own national history by Benjamin Franklin, who nev^er had a superior in the field of foreign re- lations. Representatives of the diplomatic profession have shown that the spirit of open diplomacy is the spirit of an open and free discussion of current events. The experience of these eminent and distinguished gentlemen has convinced them that directness and openness and freedom are the best means to accomplish things, and has set the seal of diplomatic approval upon the free press for which I and these other representatives of the press are here to plead today. First of all, then, I thank the diplomats who have preceded me for the splendid con- tributions which they have made unofficially but effectively to the argument for a free and uncensored press. The alien and sedition laws were the first effort made in this republic to restrain and censor the press. These laws drove John Adams from power. Abraham Lincoln was persuaded by his secretary of war, Stanton, because of the criticisms which compassed the early career of Lincoln, to adopt a censored press, and the policy came very near to losing even that great ^ Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Scieoce, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 191 7. (365) 174 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII and beloved American his second nomination. As we progress through history we shall find that this experiment has never succeeded, and has never been vindicated by its results. Today this question is before Congress. Such spendid rep- resentative Americans as Borah of Idaho, Johnson of Cali- fornia, Lodge of Massachusetts, Reed of Missouri, Knox of Pennsylvania, and Hoke Smith of Georgia are standing reso- lutely against the restricted press and restricted freedom of speech as a menace to the liberty and best development of the republic. Never before have we been in such a position toward foreign nations as we are in today. Never was it so absolutely neces- sary that we should know those nations by whose side we now fight. Here we are, a coalition of allies of different bloods, of different ideals and different aspirations, fighting an alliance of almost one race, one type and one ideal. It becomes abso- lutely imperative that we should know one another, that we should learn to see and think alike. We must get together with our allies in a better common understanding of our aims and purposes ; for mutual understanding is absolutely necessary to knowledge and co-operation. This can be accomplished not only through diplomacy but through the voice of the press, speaking for the people of France and England and Russia and America. Without mutual knowledge and understanding, there will inevitably come to this nation and to those nations, suspicion and distrust ; and suspicion and distrust, either in this nation or between nations will inevitably destroy common pur- poses and ambitions. We do not narrow this question locally. England and France experimented with the censorship. If England had known in the beginning the terror of the German submarine, if that knowledge had not been held aloof by a censored press, England would have hoarded her vast supply of foodstuffs, and would not stand today in the danger of starvation. It was only when the untrammeled and fearless voice of the North- cliffe newspapers broke over the barriers of an enforced censor- ship and told the truth, that England awoke, and awakening, set herself to work. France at last is fighting in the light of (366) No. 2] THE VALUE OF A FREE PRESS I 75 publicity and knowledge, fighting with a gallantry and un- selfish devotion that will make her for all future ages the model of gallantry and devotion. We must before long realize that we cannot have a censor- ship among this great people of ours. The pitiless light of publicity must be shed upon every scandal, that it may be re- buked, and upon every blunder, that it may be corrected. There must be no restriction upon our public opinion, because in the might of a united, well-directed and intelligent public opinion must rest the unity and the hope of this republic. I am convinced that we will not tolerate the suppression of free thought and free speech. This republic was not made for that repression. Moreover, the censorship is not deserved by those at whom it is particularly aimed, the body of Washington correspond- ents. For twenty years it has been the custom of public men in Washington to speak with boundless confidence upon the most important and serious public affairs to any newspaper man who would accept that information as given in confidence and secrecy. It is to the glory of that body of American citizens, that from that day to this no confidence of any public man has ever been betrayed. In recent instances the self-imposed censorship of the Ameri- can press has vindicated itself. The newspaper men of Wash- ington and of the country kept so secret the time of the depart- ure of Joffre and Viviani that those distinguished foreigners were safe in Paris before Americans knew even that they had left our shores. Today Balfour is going back to his home without a word as to the time and place of his departure, owing to the self-imposed censorship of the newspaper men. Now, it is suggested in this proposed censorship that we shall not discuss the conditions upon which peace will be made, our terms or the terms of England or France or our other allies. I do not believe that the American people will tolerate that. I believe that we are going into this war not as the President's war, not as a statesmen's war, but as a people's war. It is a war that is to be carried on by the people, and they have the right to know and to let the world know the ideals for which (367) 176 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS we fight, and the conditions and terms upon which we are will- ing to make peace, and upon which our allies are willing to make peace. Thus if they are too arrogant and aggressive, our conservatism may modify their arrogance and aggression, and if we are too complacent and willing, their stern resolution for the ideals for which they fight may strengthen and invigorate ours. I do not believe this free republic would endure a suppres- sion of speech in important crises. Born to liberty of thought and its expression, it would be maddening to our people to sit in silence and ignorance of great events. Have you who take journeys on railways ever been held up by an unaccount- able delay? Silence and ignorance of the cause of the trouble have made it impossible to take the matter calmly. If the cause of the difficulty is explained to you, you are quieter, simply because you know. But if you are forced to sit in ignorance, you will begin to vent your discontent on your fellow passengers, condemn the corporation, organize a me- morial of protest, or seek legal action for redress — making the germ of revolution. There is always the germ of revolu- tion in a censorship that hides fact and information in serious crises from a free people. (368) CENSORSHIP AND OPEN DIPLOMACY DISCUSSION 1 Mr. Paul U. Kellogg, The Survey: Mr. Martin has called at- tention to the effort to stretch censorship from its legitimate sphere of military facts to cover comment, and from war operations to cover the discussion of those purposes whose achievement will, to use President Wilson's phrase, " satisfy us that we have fought the war out." Yet we all know that in every nation of Europe the objects of the war and the terms of peace are being discussed. We have, in truth, been faced not only with a threat against old rights, but by a threat against that cohesion which Mr. Graves points out to be necessary among a large group of nations acting together, and against that common under- standing which will be our best security in the period following the war. In our social movements we can sometimes gauge the task before us by imagining a society organized to effect exactly opposite ends to our own. A housing reformer once visualized the fight against the white plague by imagining what the program of a Society for the Spread of Tuberculosis would be. It would hold fast to dark rooms and narrow airshafts; it would promote the construction of dumb- bell tenements and " lung-blocks ; " it would campaign for closed windows, for overwork and underfeeding. So a Society for the Perpetuation of War, or for the Unnecessary Prolongation of this War, would first of all set out to keep the people of each nation from knowing how those of every other nation felt. It would snap the cables, cut off the posts, crush the free press, and by spreading on each side the most extreme utterances of anyone identified with the other side, each would be personified to the other in its worst representatives. Thus Berlin imperialists, in order to bolster up their hold on the people by spreading a dread of national annihilation, see to it that the most savage imperialistic wing of the English press circulates un- hindered throughout the empire. And nothing would so make for weakness among the Allies as misgivings concerning their mutual commitments in war aims, such as would be provoked by hindering the free interchange of opinion not only among the governments but among the general public. 1 At the morning session, May 29. (369) 178 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII If we go back to the philosopher of the Russian autocracy, the old- time procurator of the Holy Synod, we get the key to such a policy, " You must keep Russia frozen," he said, " or it will become putrid." By that he meant that the different peoples, Poles and Finns and Cossacks and the rest, should be kept in ignorance of one another, and arrayed against one another, and racial hatreds should be fostered, so that the czar, playing them off against each other, using one to crush another, might continue to hold sway over these rast groups of people. Apply this to the war situation, and we see the need for common exchanges between all the peoples of the Allies. For the processes of democracies are the reverse of those of autocracy. The nations must understand one another; they must recognize that their objects are kindred. You cannot unite selfish purposes on the one hand and un- selfish purposes on the other without creating misgivings. The first subject on which to seek such a basis of common understanding is a restatement of terms which shall reckon with the fact of the Russian Revolution which has repudiated the dreams of conquest of the old despotism, and which shall reckon with those elevated aims stated by President Wilson on America's entry into the war. Such a state- ment of common purposes would make for national integration in this country; it would make for national strength in Russia, and it would make for a unity among the Allies. Such a fresh statement of terms, such a unity in democratic purposes freed from aims of territorial aggrandizement, such an inter- change of points of view would react powerfully upon the situation in Central Europe, f®r nothing would do more to paralyze the power of the Junker class, in their hold upon the liberal and democratic forces of Germany, than to remove the impression that the whole world is banded together for the annihilation of the German people. The laying of that bogie would be worth as much as ten army corps in bringing success to the cause of civilization and democracy. Finally, in the period after the war, this fight that the journal- ists and newspapers of nation after nation are making for the freedom of the press from a coercive censorship ought to be translated into a great claim for the security of the world for all time. With the freedom of the seas we should link freedom of communication of intelligence for the century ahead. We must make the channels of communication safe, so that the currents of democratic thought and opinion, flowing freely through those channels, can make the world safe for democracy. (370) No. 2] CENSORSHIP AND OPEN DIPLOMACY lyg Prof. Philip Marshall Brown, Professor of International Law, Princeton University: It would be a calamity if we abolished secret diplomacy, because then we should lose the lurid headlines in the newspapers. It appeals to the imagination ; behind thick curtains we can see diplomats conspiring and trying to bring troubles into the world. It is a foolish idea, and I think there is a great danger in our emphasizing it too strongly. May I call attention in that con- nection to the rare charm and the profound wisdom of the paper read to us by His Excellency, the Brazilian Ambassador? I want to emphasize the helplessness of democracy in foreign affairs. If we lead the people to believe that they are capable of deciding the great questions oi diplomacy in the market place, we are inviting disaster. Moreover, I believe in the traditional attitude of the American people, namely, confidence in their government in the administration of foreign affairs. An example of that was the Vera Cruz incident. Not many of the American people, I believe, wanted to go into Mexico at that time, and yet Congress gave the President of the United States power to go in and do whatever he thought necessary. That was typical of the attitude of the American people, that in matters of foreign affairs we are helpless, and must trust our chosen representatives. To my mind we are violating the prin- ciple of representative democracy, if we maintain the right of the American people to control foreign diplomacy directly. Perhaps, however, we are agreed while we seem to be disagreed. Several of the speakers have said that they were criticizing not the machinery, nor even the methods, but the spirit behind it all. I don't care who carries a stick of dynamite, whether it is a child or a woman or a man ; everything depends on the purpose for which the dynamite is going to be used. We should recognize the necessity for a decent reticence, a wise reserve, and a certain degree of secrecy in the conduct of all hiunan affairs. We should not criticize so much the method as the spirit behind it. In our criticism of secret diplomacy we aim at the motive which inspires the policy of governments. Mr. Dixon Merritt, Nashville, Tennessee: Since Professor Brown has spoken for secret diplomacy, it does seem a pity that there should be no defender here of the censored press; therefore I want to make that sort of advocacy for just a moment. What colonel Graves has told you of the fidelity of newspaper men is absolutely true, and it is true not only of the Washington correspondents, but of newspapers ever3rwhere. An old bishop said to me not long ago (371) l8o CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII that ever since he entered the ministry he had made it a rule to take newspaper men into his confidence, and that not a single one of them had ever betrayed one of those confidences. When you take into consideration the fact that many of these are not men but young boys, without experience, hired for fifteen dollars a week, that is a remarkable thing. So, all over the United States, there is a body of newspaper men who have been brought up to keep confidence ; but there might be a situation in which they thought they were keeping a confidence, and yet were not. I rate myself in the matter of discretion fairly liigh, and yet I can conceive of circumstances under which my zeal might get the better of my judgment. I can even conceive that Colonel Graves, in one of those bursts of sublimated impulse, might editori- ally say something not exactly discreet. I take it that no newspaper man is in favor of a drastic censorship of the sort that would abso- lutely keep the press from conveying information to readers; but I do think that even newspaper men themselves realize the absolute necessity, under some circumstances, for a reasonable and limited censorship. The real question may not be whether we shall have any censorship at all, but what sort of censorship we shall have. Edward T. Devine, Professor of Social Economy, Coliunbia Uni- versity: I am against censorship except for military matters; I am against secretive diplomacy ; and I am against the breaking-down of protective labor legislation in the interest of increased output in factories, although I recognize that all three of these things are advocated or practised from what are believed to be patriotic mo- tives. However, I believe that at the present moment the great patriotic service to be rendered by those who feel the national pulse and are in sympathy with the national purpose is nevertheless to insist that a censorship, secretive diplomacy, and the breakdown of protective labor legislation are contrary to national interests, and really injurious in their results, no matter what the motives of the people who advocate or practise them. I agree with Professor Brown that confidence in the executive is indispensable, but the question is whether that confidence shall rest upon misinformation and ignorance, or upon full information and enlightened public opinion. The distinguished Ambassador who addressed us made a nice distinction between secretive diplomacy, which in common with the rest of us he repudiated, and confidential preparation of treaties or (372) No. 2] CENSORSHIP AND OPEN DIPLOMACY jgl diplomatic matters requiring expert action, in which preparation we can agree with him as with Professor Brown that confidential action is necessary. When an important surgical operation becomes neces- sary, it is often essential to have a confidential, possibly even a secret consultation between experts, from which the patient and the mem- bers of the patient's family may wisely be excluded. But there is no reason for a lack of full public information and knowledge of all the things in regard to medicine and surgery upon which the progress of those arts and their utilization for the common welfare depend. This conference is called in order that the people of the United States may be encouraged and assisted to take a more intelligent and active interest in matters of foreign policy, in order that we may all understand better where our real interest lies in the progress of this war and in the development of our relations with Caribbean and South American countries, with Europe and with Asia. Such a pur- pose, I believe, is profoundly inconsistent with the old methods of secret diplomacy and a gagged press. Mr. Dixon Merritt: I want to endorse what has just been said about confidential preparation of treaties. I have had some little experience in corporation work, and I know that no large corporation could carry on its business, or perfect any important transaction, if the stockholders had to be apprized beforehand of what it was going to do. The stockholders should know what the condition of a cor- poration is, they should examine its books and its affairs; but when it comes to making contracts, the stockholders cannot possibly know what is going on. That is exactly the condition of the American people and our government. We have a government run by men whom we elect to represent us, and we have to abide by their action in making contracts which must to a certain extent be secret. After that is done, I believe in the books being opened for everybody to see ; but for the United States to carry on its diplomatic relations with- out having secrecy in advance, would be a physical impossibility. We should have missed some of the greatest deals that were ever made — for example, the secret purchase of Louisiana. Those things have to be done that way. Mr. Maurice Leon, New York: Public opinion in all countries has to be formed largely on the basis of information obtained by the great news-gathering agencies, and the arrangements among such agencies prior to the present war were of an inherently faulty char- (373) 1 82 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS acter. One result of these arrangements, which I will describe in a moment, was that when the war broke out, the American people were unready for it. Very few on this side of the Atlantic knew how it had come about. We had newspapers of larger dimensions than those of any other country; they were filled with news acquired at a great deal of expense ; yet much of the foreign news had come to us through channels that made it actually worthless. The fimdamental defect in news-gathering arrangements, briefly, was this : Each of the six great news agencies of the world had been given by the others full sway in its own field. It was a sort of gentlemen's agreement under which each agency relied on the others for all news of events occurring in the territories of the others. In addition, the German agency furnished all news which origin- ated in the Balkans. When you bear in mind the fact that the Great War was planned in Germany and was started precisely in the Balkans, do you wonder that the American people were asleep as regards its causes? Furthermore, the great German agency through which we received all our German and Balkan news had created a network of agencies covering all the smaller countries of Europe. The so-called Swiss agency in Switzerland, the so-called Rumanian agency in Rumania, the so-called Telegram agency in Sweden, and so on, were really branches of the German agency. This was the way that particular gentlemen's agreement was kept by the Germans. When the war broke out, a German consi^lar offi- cial took charge of the Scandinavian agency, and controlled every- thing which came from there. Some of us now realize that it is important not only to read news, but to determine where it comes from. With regard to international news, as with regard to inter- national finance, however, most people do not actually go beneath the surface. So-called information bureaus established by one country in an- other have been another German weapon of deception and intrigue. The best principle for interchange of news is that prevailing be- tween the United States and its present Allies, ever since the first months of the war, under which American correspondents have fur- nished all the news that has come to us from Allied countries and vice-versa. Our own observers abroad did much to make us realize that our fate was at stake in the world war. (374) PLANS FOR WORLD ORGANIZATION ' JAMES BYRNE New York ^^ TN every discussion of the peace that must end this war," I said the President in his address to the Senate on January 22, 191 7, " it is taken for granted that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power, which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe will ever overwhelm us again." Mr. Balfour in the note supplemental to that of the Foreign Office in reply to the President's letter to the powers at war, on December 18, 191 6, gives as one of the conditions of a durable peace " that behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities, some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor." Viscount Gray in a speech on October 23, 1916, said: If the nations after the war are able to do something effective by binding themselves with the common object of preserving peace, they must be prepared to undertake no more than they are able to uphold by force and to see when the time of crisis comes that it is upheld by force. What is the end for which we have been summoned to battle? It is the same for which the delegate from Corinth called upon the allies of that city to enter upon one of the Peloponnesian wars: Vote for war; and be not afraid of the immediate danger, but fix your thoughts on the durable peace which will follow. For by war peace is assured, but to remain at peace when you should be going to war may be often very dangerous. The tyrant city which has been set up in Hellas is a standing menace to all alike; she rules over some of us already, and would fain rule over others. Let us 1 Remarks as presiding officer at the afternoon session, May 29. (375) 1 84 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII attack and subdue her that we may ourselves live safely for the future and deliver the Hellenes whom she has enslaved. Lord Bryce has told us that if the opportunity which the close of the present conflict will offer for the making of laws to forbid future wars be lost, another such may never reappear; and Mr. Balfour has said that the contrivance of the machinery for enforcing methods of carrying the general scheme into ef- fect, will tax to its utmost the statesmanship of the world. The people must be convinced that the opportunity will not be lost, that the machinery will be contrived, and contrived before it is too late; they must be convinced that if they win the war they will not find when the enemy is in their power that their lead- ers are only beginning the work of preparing for peace. Many plans of world organization have been proposed for making this " the war that will end war." President Wilson in his letter of December i8, 191 6 to the belligerent nations, says that " the nation is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to enforce peace and justice throughout the world," and in his address to the Senate on January 22, 191 7, he says: Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind. Ex-President Roosevelt in a paper written in the first months of the war proposed a plan of a league which he felt would be " a working and realizable Utopia." All civilized nations able and willing to use force shall join in a world league for the peace of righteousness. The principle of this plan is that the civilized nations should by compromise and approximation to justice agree upon some living basis and then scrupulously observe the terms of that agreement. The rules for the league would have to accept the status quo at some given period, " for (376) No. 2] PLANS FOR WORLD ORGANIZATION 185 an endeavor to redress all historical wrongs would throw us back into chaos." The League to Enforce Peace, of which ex-President Taft is the head, proposes a league of nations binding the members to agree upon a plan whereby the league does not undertake to compel performance of the judgment of the judicial tribunal or the adoption of the recommendation of the court of con- ciliation, nor does it undertake to forbid any member after the making of the award or recommendation to go to war over the matter in controversy. All that it undertakes to do is to use pressure, and if necessary military force, against the member who does not live up to its agreement to have its claim sub- mitted and passed upon by tribunal or conciliation before going to war. The World Court League differs from the League to Enforce Peace only in the respect that it does not propose to use pres- sure or force even in the limited cases in which the League to Enforce Peace provides for its use. One of the leading exponents of the purposes of the World Court League says: There is good hope that an international executive may be developed and there must, of course, be a constabulary or police force large enough to keep order and to represent the power and the majesty of the united nations of the earth — there will be no more suggestion of war in this than there is in the existence of municipal or state police. Many extensions of the purposes of a league to enforce peace have been proposed. Mr. H. G. Wells, for instance, says it is all very well so far as it goes. But so far is not enough. It ignores the chief processes of that economic war that aids and abets and is inseparably a part of modem international conflicts ... We must go further and provide that the international tribunal should have power to consider and set aside all tariffs and localized privileges that seem grossly unfair or seriously irritating between the various states of the world. It should have power to pass or revise all new tariff, quarantine, alien exclusion, or the like legislation affecting international relations. Moreover, it should take over and extend the work of the Inter- (377) 1 86 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII national Bureau of Agriculture at Rome with a view to the control of all staple products. It should administer the sea law of the world, and control and standardize freights in the common interests of mankind. Without these provisions it would be merely prevent- ing the use of certain weapons ; it would be doing nothing to prevent countries strangling or suffocating each other by commercial warfare. It would not abolish war. Then there is the proposal for a world parliament by those who believe that the League to Enforce Peace and the World Court League provide too much for the settlement of con- troversies and too little for their prevention and that a world legislative body is at least as important as a world court. All the plans which I have now hastily run over are those of men who think there should be some form of world organiza- tion which did not exist before the war. There are, on the other hand, many men whose position is that the relations of the nations of the world should go on as if there had been no war and that there should be no league of nations, certainly no league entitled to call upon its members for military or economic pressure to carry out its commands. The general feeling uniting men of this class is that expressed in the comment of Castlereagh a century ago upon the proposals of Alexander for a European league, that a limited alliance for certain definite purposes is one thing, a universal union com- mitted to common action under circumstances that could not be foreseen is quite another. The oflf-hand opposition usually heard to such leagues as President Wilson or Mr. Roosevelt or Mr. Taft have suggested is that men and money should not be spent on " European or Asiatic quarrels in which we have no concern." The thought-out objection to such leagues comes from men who, while quite aware of the force of the argument that in the future there will be no European or Asiatic quarrel " in which we have no concern," cannot even in the face of the great events of the last three years change the mode of thought of a lifetime. They were familiar before the war with proposals similar to those now made for leagues of nations and alliances of great powers for the purpose of controlling the world in the interest of peace, and they made up their minds (378) No. 2] PLANS FOR WORLD ORGANIZATION 187 then that it was not by such means, if at all, that the objects aimed at were to be attained They are convinced that with- out radical experiments in world organization there will be after the war a very great opportunity to improve the re- lations to one another of the nations of the world. They be- lieve that the internal changes in European countries and the greater uniformity among them of political institutions and ideas will make it difficult to hurry a country into war un- less its people really wish it; and they believe that the people everywhere are even wearier of war than they were at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and for many years will wish only for peace. They believe too with the English jurist, W. E. Hall, who foresaw this war nearly thirty years ago and said that while it would be unscrupulously waged it would be followed by increased stringency of law. In a conununity, as in an individual, passionate excess is followed by a reaction of lassitude and to some extent of conscience ... it is a matter of experience that times in which international law has been seriously disregarded have been followed by periods in which the European conscience has done penance by putting itself under stricter obligations than those which it before acknowledged. Anyone who has followed in the most casual way the dis- cussions of the plans which I have mentioned, knows how far from being understood they are and how great are the differ- ences of opinion as to the consequences which would follow from the adoption of any one of them. But it is of the utmost importance that they should be clearly understood and that there should be, when the time comes for action, as united a public opinion as possible in favor of one of them. (379) FUTURE PAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS I. THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN II. THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND PAN- AMERICANISM HI. MEANS TOWARD PAN-AMERICAN CO-OPERATION COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN ' EDWIN M. BORCHARD Professor of Law, Yale University THE United States emerged from the Spanish- American War a world power. Something like a century later than England, we have experienced the same evolu- tion from the agricultural to the industrial stage, and thence from the mercantile to the financial stage. With these larger responsibilities, and our transition from the status of exporters solely of raw materials to exporters of manufactured products, came the quest for world markets and our competition with other manufacturing countries. Instead of having to engage in a struggle for distant artificial markets against seasoned nations who had already staked out their colonial and com- mercial claims, geographical accident has placed us in close proximity to natural markets in the western hemisphere in which our political, military, commercial and financial inter- ests combine to give us a predominating influence. The command of trade routes has always been one of the stakes of diplomacy and the present world catastrophe in its essence is very largely due to the effort of an established power to prevent a new competitor from laying out a new route to the Near East. With the opening of the Panama Canal, the Caribbean has been raised again, as it was three centuries ago, to a commanding position among the trade routes of the world. All our interests, economic and political, merge in keeping this region as an American sphere of influence for the peace of the western hemisphere and for the welfare of the people of the United States. The success of our Caribbean diplomacy will be measured by the ultimate political stability we can bring into 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 191 7. (383) 192 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII that troubled region, the expansion of its foreign trade, the development of its natural resources and the greater investment of American capital in its local enterprises. We must frankly recognize that the rights of small states and of government b}^ the consent of the governed, of which we have recently heard so much, have never been a consideration or factor in our Caribbean policy, nor has the social regeneration of a backward people, who constitute the bulk of the population, yet had any tangible manifestations. The Caribbean is, roughly speaking, bounded on the east by the Windward and Leeward Islands and the Bahamas, with certain other British possessions, and a few French and Dutch possessions; on the north by a long stretch of large islands, including Porto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Cuba ; on the west, by the Central American countries ; and on the south, by Panama, Colombia and Venezuela. The region has certain characteristics in common which have had an important influence on its relations to the United States. It has been the world's most prominent storm-center of revolu- tionary turmoil. Literature has immortalized some of these states as the domicile of the professional revolutionist and dictator. Most of them are democracies in name only. The chronic disorders from which some of them have suffered first made necessary that administrative or financial control which we have found it expedient to exercise, for example, in Nicaragua, Haiti and San Domingo. Again, the majority of them are agricultural countries of one or two principal crops of some foodstuff, secondary in nature rather than basic. For example, cane sugar, of which the Caribbean countries are the greatest exporters, is the main resource of Cuba, Porto Rico and some of the British colonies. Bananas are the staple product of Jamaica, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba and other countries. The bulk of the sugar and banana industry is in the hands of American capital, and it naturally finds its principal market in the United States. Fifty per cent of our sugar and practically all our bananas come from the Caribbean region. Coffee, which is grown principally in Haiti, San Domingo, Guatemala, Colombia and (384) No. 2] COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN 153 Venezuela, goes mainly to Europe in normal times. The region is, furthermore, a source of supply for some of the world's best tobacco, cacao, asphalt, cotton and minor products. The mineral deposits of Central America have been only slightly developed; and the substitution of oil for coal as the great motive power is bringing to those countries the romantic quest for oil — with considerable success in Venezuela and some other countries. Many of these products, particularly sugar, bananas and oil, or enterprises like railroads, can be profitably exploited only by vast corporations, who control by concession or other- wise large areas of land, transportation systems, both rail and water, and an immense supply of cheap labor. Such commer- cial control of the sole or principal natural resource of a weak country leads easily to political control of the functions of gov- ernment, the danger of which the United States has not been slow to recognize. It is only a short step from private investment in a railroad or in a large concession for the exploitation of a weak country's important resources to the exercise of a sphere of influence by the home government of the investor; and the sphere of influence easily merges into political control. Hence the adoption by the United States of its Caribbean and par- ticularly its Central American diplomacy of encouraging American enterprises, which would promote our political in- terests. We have discouraged the pre-emption of special inter- est by European concessionaires, and have obtained a consider- able measure of recognition for our policy from European and Central American governments. The danger of a foreign investment becoming political and bringing about international complications has led the United States, in certain countries where our interests would be seriously afl'ected, to seek to con- trol the amount of debt those countries may contract and the character of concessions they may grant to foreigners. Naturally such a power must be equitably exercised to re- ceive permanent recognition. It is not generally known that many a foreign concession in Central America or the Caribbean is first submitted unofficially to the State Department to avoid subsequent interference on the ground of infringement of our (385) 194 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII political prerogatives, or — in our character of trustees for our weaker neighbors — because it takes unfair advantage of an exploited country. The foreign investor thus avoids the speculative risks of former days, the Caribbean country is saved from oppressive exploitation or its own improvidence, and the United States avoids any impairment of its sphere of influence or any tempta- tion of foreign governments to call into question the Monroe Doctrine. The Lodge resolution, designed to keep harbors on the American continent free from foreign control, merely em- phasizes the economic interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. It will be recalled that our disapproval of the Pearson oil con- cession in Colombia induced these important British interests to withdraw from the field. On several occasions, our State De- partment has refused its approval of plans for the refunding of the debt of Honduras, when combined with exorbitant demands for concessions for railroads, public lands, mines and other privileges. In practically all the countries bordering the Caribbean, except certain British and French colonies, the United States constitutes the natural market for the greater part of their exports and in turn furnishes them with the larger part of their imports in basic foodstuffs and manufactured articles. Except in the case of Cuba and Porto Rico, we have not suf- ficiently adjusted our tariff to derive the greatest benefit from the geographical proximity of the Caribbean countries. The Canadian preferential tariff of 191 3, which has drawn many of the British West Indian products to Canada, and the French-Haitian reciprocity treaty indicate that other coun- tries have been alive to the advantages of a profitably adjusted tariff in countries that for them can hardly be called a natural market. Our growing interests in the Caribbean have imposed upon us important police duties in the maintenance of order in that frequently troubled region. Its strategic importance has re- sulted in a constant increase in our naval bases, which now include Key West, Guantanamo, Porto Rico, St. Thomas, Panama, the Bay of Fonseca, and will undoubtedly, notwith- (386) No. 2] COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN ig^ standing the protestations of the present administration, in- clude Mole St. Nicholas in Haiti. With the extension of American control from the Cuban and Porto-Rican legacy of 1898 to the Haitian protectorate of 191 5, which policy has placed so many countries of this region under the more or less protecting aegis of the United States, the political stability of these countries has steadily improved. Foreign investment cannot be attracted to, and will not thrive in an atmosphere of political unrest. Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti and San Domingo have therefore repelled what they needed most in their development, namely foreign capital. It has thus been the principal problem of the United States to bring about such a condition of financial and political stability that capital would be attracted to the Caribbean field. Our interposition in the matter has in each case been occasioned by some special circumstance or opportunity which required prompt action and which was then extended to include the larger aims which have remained fundamental principles of our Caribbean policy. The mainten- ance of the Monroe Doctrine was only an incidental motive of our intervention in San Domingo, Nicaragua and Haiti. Com- mon prudence and the promotion of our interests and those of our weaker neighbors would have prompted the same course. All the countries of Central America have heavy debts on which, at times, they have been unable to meet interest and amortization payments. Honduras, indeed, with its debt of $125,000,000, is hopelessly bankrupt and will never pay the principal of its debt. Refunding operations, with a scaling- down of debt, have been frequent in other countries. Their political weakness, the need of money on any terms, and the impecuniousness of successive dictators, caused large loans to be contracted at amazing discounts in price and high interest rates, for which the debtor countries realized but little. For example, the bulk of Honduras's debt was contracted for rail- roads, and today the country has but a few short " streaks of rust " to show for it. Between European bondholders and concessionaires a very considerable foreign influence has often been exercised. (387) ig6 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII Friction arising out of pecuniary claims has frequently oc- curred between the foreign interests and the local government The. demands of these foreign claimants, insistent upon satis- faction, have compelled the United States to interpose between the foreign claimant government and the weak defendant gov- ernment in the character of a self-appointed amiable composi- teur, or receiver in bankruptcy. The Venezuelan claims of 1903 are still fresh in mind. In 1905, when the foreign debt of San Domingo had risen to $32,000,000 and her credit was destroyed, the pressure of foreign claimants became so great (accompanied as it was by war vessels) that the Dominican president turned to the United States for relief from the situ- ation. Our own interests in a satisfactory adjustment of the difficulty led us to effect a composition with creditors, negoti- ate a refunding loan of $20,000,000 in the United States, and establish by treaty an American receiver of customs, who col- lects the revenues, sets aside a certain amount for the customs administration and the payment of interest and amortization of the debt (at least $1,200,000 per annum) and turns over the balance with certain deductions to the Dominican government. By this means the public revenues are placed out of the reach of the revolutionaiy despoiler or the dictator, and the primar}' motive for revolution is removed. In Haiti, a succession of revolutions and counter-revolutions which brought into power, in a period of a few years, eight successive presidents, finally resulted in such disorder that the French landed marines in 191 5 to protect their interests. This foreign action compelled the United States to take immediate control of the island and the government — incidentally, it would seem, without any constitutional warrant on our part. The inability of any Haitian president to survive without the support of the United States persuaded Haiti to accept a treaty which virtually established an American protectorate in Haiti for twenty years, and leaves that country with only the shadow of sovereignty. No such all-embracing treaty had ever before been concluded by this countr}^ The United States not only undertakes to collect the revenues, but through a financial adviser it may practically determine what those (388) No. 2] COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN 19; revenues shall be, for they cannot be modified without our consent; as in the case of Cuba under the provisions of the Piatt amendment, Haiti cannot increase its debt without the consent of the United States nor contract any debts unless the ordinary revenues are sufficient to pay interest and amortiza- tion for its final discharge; the police force is under American control ; the United States may at all times intervene to pre- serve order; and the United States undertakes to aid in the development of Haiti's natural resources. Here again an opportunity has been presented to divert to the United States the advantages in the rehabilitation of Haiti's finances. Haiti's debt record is comparatively good. All three of her foreign loans, of 1875, 1896 and 1910, were floated in Paris and are quoted at prices yielding about seven per cent. But the assignment of special revenues for specific purposes now hampers the financial administration, which would be re- lieved by means of a new external loan. This could be ef- fected in the United States on terms advantageous to Haiti (and this country would undertake the negotiations on her behalf), because United States control in the island is the assurance upon which the American investor will take the loan and be satisfied with a moderate yield. The unratified treaties of 191 1 with Nicaragua and Hon- duras contained similar provisions looking to the financial re- habilitation of those countries. The recent treaty concluded with Nicaragua gives her sufficient money to meet her pressing foreign claims, which threatened a serious test of the Monroe Doctrine, and gives the United States supervision of Nicara- guan revenues for ninety-nine years. Porto Rico, Cuba, San Domingo, Nicaragua, Panama and Haiti are therefore, in varying degrees, under a financial and ad- ministrative dependency upon the United States. Results have shown that order has never been so well preserved, production so highly stimulated, foreign commerce so carefully fostered and the investment of capital so successfully encouraged. Not- withstanding the rather uninformed criticisms of " dollar diplo- macy " at the beginning of the Wilson administration, the constant object of our Caribbean policy has been " to sub- (389) Iq8 conference on foreign relations [Vol. VII stitute dollars for bullets, " to create in those countries a material prosperity to which their great natural wealth entitles them. It is a function of government to guide foreign investment into channels where it shall be of greatest national benefit. The immense trade balance of nearly six billion dollars which has accrued to us in the short space of less than three years has effected a revolution in our financial position. To meet this enormous debit, foreign nations have sold to us about three billions of their government obligations, and over two billions of our foreign-held railroad, industrial, public-utility and municipal securities, besides paying one billion in gold. We have become a creditor nation and a permanent power among the world's bankers, with a resulting responsibility of making our contribution to the development of the resources of the world. In this undertaking our government assumes an import- ant function. The Caribbean countries will henceforth be directed to the United States, and not to Europe, for their loans. In several cases, our government has already taken a guiding hand in the negotiations. Conferences for the adjustment of the debt of Nicaragua, Haiti and San Domingo have taken place, not in those countries, nor in the offices of New York bankers, but in the Department of State and the Bureau of Insular Affairs. This process is bound to go on, and all signs point to a further control by the United States in the financial rehabilitation and the political and economic guidance of other countries lying between the southern boun- dary of the United States and the Panama Canal. Capital will be directed to finance the substitution of a gold-secured currency for the present unredeemable paper currency, from which Colombia, Honduras and Guatemala suffer particu- larly; to the improvement and sanitation of seaports; to the exploitation of economic resources ; and to the investment of straight banking capital, for with immense discount rates, lack of adequate credit facilities, prohibitive rates for real estate loans, and the absence of any long-term accommodation, the expansion of commercial enterprise, which is justified by the great natural wealth of those countries, is seriously hampered. (390) No. 2] COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN 199 The Caribbean policy of the last twenty years, which has begun to afford a measure of guaranty against political dis- order and has laid the foundations for material prosperity in a normally disturbed region, should now be directed toward the encouragement of American capital to invest in those countries, with its resultant benefits to all interests concerned. For the United States, particularly, this policy will continue to pro- mote our political and economic well-being in a region which now more than ever has become our natural sphere of influence. In closing, it should be frankly admitted that the policy on which we have so successfully embarked is economic imperial- ism. We must be prepared, in supporting it, to encounter the dangers and risks involved. If it is some day challenged by other powers, sacrifices will be incurred in maintaining it. Nor should we be unduly shocked if other powers resort to the same policy in other parts of the world. A better under- standing of the underlying currents and cross-currents of economic forces will do much to explain and, therefore, more equitably settle modern world problems. (391) THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE RETENTION BY EUROPEAN NATIONS OF COLONIES IN AND AROUND THE CARIBBEAN ^ WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD Professor of History, Columbia University EAST and south of the United States of America stretches a long chain of insular and continental areas belonging to Great Britain, France and the Netherlands. One end of it is anchored in the ocean, 580 miles east of North Carolina; the other is wedged into Central America, midway between Florida and Texas, 450 miles to the southward. Starting at Bermuda and extending down to the north coast of South America, the chain runs through hundreds of islands, which if pieced together, would about equal Connecticut and New Jersey combined, thence through the Guianas, a region much larger than California, and around to British Honduras, a territory not far from the size of New Hampshire. The entire Caribbean area would just about fit into the New Eng- land and Middle Atlantic states, plus West Virginia. In these dependencies of island and mainland live some 2,750,000 people, about as many as Indiana contains in an area less than one fifth as large. A more extraordinary mix- ture of races, colors and religions, a more singular juxtaposition of oriental and occidental, of folk from Europe, Africa, Asia and the South Sea Isles, all brought face to face in America, it would be hard to find anywhere in the world. Beneath the thin crust of a few thousand whites, of British, French, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese origin, are massed millions of negroes and mulattoes, hundreds of thousands of Hindus, tens of thousands of Javanese, and thousands of Chinese, Siamese and 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 191 7. (392) EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 2OI Indians. Here are black, brown, red and yellow Christians, Mohammedans and Jews, devotees of Brahma and Buddha, followers of Confucius, and worshippers of nature, transplanted from Africa and Asia, made dwellers in America, and yet owning allegiance to European masters. The future of these lands and peoples is a matter of vital concern to the United States. The reason for it lies in the observance of the sound national principle that small areas located near the territory of a great power should belong to it, rather than to a distant country. Were such areas actually independent states having a strong national life, states whose achievements had long since won the respect and recognition of the world at large, as is true of several of the small coun- tries of Europe, the principle, obviously, would be altogether inapplicable. Where, however, these conditions are not ful- filled, as in the case of the chain of insular and continental de- pendencies in America, extending all the way around from Bermuda to British Honduras, inclusive, the principle seems clearly befitting. In its application to this collective territory three parties are concerned, and three sets of interests would have to be adjusted. The parties are the United States, the present European owners, and the colonial inhabitants them- selves. The interests have to do with the position of the United States as the chief among American nations; with the strengthening of the bonds of friendship between this country and Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, and with the welfare of the dependent peoples in question. The Caribbean Sea is the gateway to the Panama Canal. Until recently there were four links in the European chain across its entrance. One of them has been acquired through the purchase of the islands from Denmark. Sooner or later the other three links must pass into the possession of the United States, and the Caribbean Sea be made into an American lake. Manifest destiny, the natural course of things, or whatever the term that may be used to mark the tendency of great powers to round out their defensible frontiers, will deter- mine the matter in any event. If so, it behooves American diplomacy to start taking stock of the future. In the Carib- (393) 202 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII bean region, and wherever else in fact American interests are vitally concerned, the United States should adopt as soon as practicable a definite policy, and abandon once and for all the drifting opportunism that only too often in recent years has characterized our foreign relations. Now, just as there are three parties and three sets of inter- ests involved, so there are three circumstances that should de- termine the attitude of the United States toward the retention by European nations of colonies in and around the Caribbean. The first circumstance is, that we need those areas ourselves; the second is, that the European owners do not; and the third is a natural consequence of the two preceding, namely, that the owners ought to turn them over to us for the good of all concerned. Geographically the Caribbean colonies, using the expression broadly, belong to the American continents. Because nature happened to separate them by water is no reason why nations should separate them by claims, from the region of which they are properly a part. Because of their nearness to the territory of the United States and to the Panama Canal, and because of their remoteness from the territory of their possessors, this country has, and ought to have, a paramount interest in their destiny, both for its own sake and for theirs. Naturally and strategically a part of the United States, they are a potential menace to its welfare and security so long as they remain un- der European control. At this point the objection may be raised, that neither to the United States nor to the Panama Canal is the slightest danger likely to arise from the fact that the colonies are the property of Great Britain, France and the Netherlands. The present relationship of this country to the two great powers in question, and our historic friendship with France above all, are a guaranty sufRcient in itself to ward off any apprehensions about the future. It is inconceivable that either of them would ever attack the United States. In reply to these contentions one may freely admit that, if no possible danger could exist that the Caribbean colonies would ever be used as a base of hostile operations against this (394) No. 2] EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 203 country, they might be left in the hands of their present owners. Obviously, however, this assurance cannot be guaranteed, no matter what the sentiment now prevailing between the United States and the three European nations in question. " It is a maxim, founded on the universal experience of mankind," wrote Washington in 1778, "that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interest; and no prudent states- man or politician will venture to depart from it." Inter- national agreements and understandings are too easily changed under the pressure of new circumstances to justify a placid confidence in the notion that the hopes and desires of today are bound to become the absolute certainties of tomorrow. It was inconceivable that the Great War and all its horrors, with all the fundamentar readjustments it has wrought in ideas, relationships, values and sympathies, could have happened. The inconceivable has happened, and will continue to happen just as long as men and affairs in this world are subject to change, with or without warning. But surely the United States need not be afraid of the little Netherlands, Neither was it afraid of little Denmark, yet it bought the Danish West Indies, nevertheless, for motives of prudence and a consider- able sum in cash ! Though we feared nothing from Denmark, of course, we could not be sure but that some power stronger, and in a position to be more ambitious, than that worthy bit of Scandinavia, might become interested in insular real estate near the American coast. Preparing for things possibly even- tual, therefore, is a safer and wiser practice than dreaming about things presumably inconceivable. The Panama Canal, be it said, was not constructed as an evidence merely of American facility in severing continents and uniting oceans. Neither was it built solely as a convenient economizer of time and space for the world's commerce. It is an American highway put through by American brains, Ameri- can labor and American money for the general good of man- kind in time of peace, and for the specific good of the United States in time of war. With the freedom of the seas it is free and correspondingly neutral ; but so long as it is easily open to attack from islands and continental areas near by, w^hich (395) 204 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII belong to European countries at a time when the seas happen not to be free, it is neither neutral nor properly subject to neutralization. The Caribbean areas resemble a huge pair of dividers or pincers, between the points or nippers of which are thirty de- grees of latitude and thirty-eight degrees of longitude, and the head or handle of which rests on the Guianas. To be sure, we have certain islands lying in the region which can obstruct any tendency on the part of the dividers or pincers to close down on American land or American water; but obstruction is not by any means so effective a safeguard against seizure or compression by the big pliers, as would be our downright ownership of the pliers. Here again it might be suggested that, instead of seeking to obtain possession of the Caribbean colonies as a measure of strategic defense for the Panama Canal, the United States should endeavor to ward off foreign cupidity by havisg the waterway neutralized. Such a suggestion, however, coming in the light of recent experience in the eastern hemisphere, takes on the garb of the things that were supposed to be in- conceivable. Neutralization as applied on the continent of Europe, certainly, has been honored far more in the breach than in the observance. And in the case of the Suez Canal, which was guaranteed, by solemn international agreements in 1888 and 1904, open to the ships of all nations alike in war and in peace, neutralization since 19 14 has not been especially noticeable. German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turk- ish vessels have found it quite impracticable as a neutral route to India and beyond ! Until that happy day shall dawn, therefore, when freedom of the seas is something more than a rhetorical expression, when it has actually the same meaning in war that it has in peace, and when the neutralized Suez Canal stays neutralized in both periods, then it will be feasible to discuss the neutralization of the Panama Canal. By that time, let us hope, the stars and stripes will wave over the European colonies in and around the Caribbean ; and we shall not have to worry about the safety of our southern waterway. (396) No. 2] EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 205 But the people of the United States have something more to consider than their territory and their canal. Nature aad history have appointed us protectors, under the Monroe Doc- trine, of twenty sister republics in America. Prudence and foresight, accordingly, require that anything in the shape of a potential danger to them or to ourselves ought to be removed in peaceable fashion, whenever a suitable opportunity offers itself to that end. Valuable though the West Indian region may have been for economic and political reasons to Great Britain, France -and the Netherlands, it ceased long ago to occupy an important place in their national affairs. No elaborate demonstration is needed to show that what was of service to them in the eighteenth century is of small account today. At that time the United States was a tiny republic whose chances for per- manence and development were thought highly doubtful ; now it is one of the great powers of earth. It holds, furthermore, a unique position, in that it has become altogether the para- mount nation in one hemisphere, whereas its fellows contend among themselves for supremacy in the other. This status of leadership in the New World the United States is bound to maintain, in the interest of the Americas at large no less than in its own. The Monroe Doctrine laid down three fairly definite prin- ciples that constitute a special phase of our relationship to the Latin American countries and to the powers of Europe and Asia. As properly interpreted and expanded since their enunciation in 1823, they have been made to forbid the trans- ference of territory owned by an American republic to a non- American country, and to forbid even the temporary occupa- tion of any part of an American republic by a non-American country on any pretext whatever. All this has been done in the interest of the pax Americana, of an intercontinental peace that shall keep the Americas free from an extension to them and among them of troubles born of Europe. For the welfare of the United States and its sister republics American soil is not available for future European or Asiatic colonization. Now, as the centennial anniversary of the (397) 2o6 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII Monroe Doctrine draws near, the change in circumstances to- ward the close of a hundred years would seem to justify us in seeking to have the peace of the Americas further assured. This can be done through a friendly agreement with the countries concerned, whereby the future retention by European nations of colonies in and around the Caribbean shall no longer be a source of possible disquiet, either for ourselves or for our Latin American neighbors. Instead of causing the Monroe Doctrine thereby to be abandoned, or even ignored, as some objectors might urge, such a procedure as the one suggested would, on the contrary, carry it out to its logical conclusion. By the actual terms of the doctrine the European colonies in America existing at the time of its pronouncement were to remain in the hands of their owners; but the underlying presumption must have been that this retention was a temporary matter, and hence subject to discontinuance whenever feasible. If this be true, the acquisi- tion of the Caribbean areas in question by the United States would serve to round out the Monroe Doctrine by making its basic idea, that of the eventual exclusion of non-American political power over American soil, a reality, and the thought of "America for the Americans," an accomplished fact. That the retirement of the European nations from the Carib- bean and, in consequence, their replacement by the United States, might intensify the fear of " Yankee imperialism " among the Latin American republics, is possible in the case of those lying in that sea, or bordering upon the western part of it, but highly improbable so far as the countries to the southward are concerned. The insular republics, certainly, and some of those in Central America, have already lost their independence in some degree, as the process of financial, police and sanitary control, along with the extension of the commercial influence of the United States, goes, glacier-like, slowly onward. Were the European colonies in their neighborhood to be acquired by this country, the effect, conceivably, might be that of giving an impetus to the present policy of establishing quasi-protec- torates over the republics in question, as the most suitable (398) No. 2] EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 207 means of providing for their welfare and security. On the other hand, the great progressive Latin American states, those possessing the elements needful for an efficient national de- velopment, have no reason to worry about the outcome of this particular phase of manifest destiny; nor is it likely that, in any essential respect, they would feel much concerned. Apart from sentimental considerations, more or less vague, arising out of the relationships of colonial times, they have comparatively scant interest in the affairs of the small, backward republics of Spanish or French speech lying in and around the Carib- bean. For the insular and continental dependencies of Great Britain, France and the Netherlands in the same area, to which no such considerations are applicable, their concern would be much less still. Indeed, if the United States were to obtain these dependencies in peaceable fashion, the chief Latin American nations might be inclined rather to approve the ac- tion, as a final step in realizing the fundamental concept of the Monroe Doctrine to which they subscribe. The United States, moreover, has associated itself with the Allies in their war against the Central Powers. Repre- sentatives of Great Britain and France have besought our aid in ships, men, money and supplies. If they, in common with their supporters in Europe and their Far Eastern ally, Japan, are waging the war wholly for altruistic purposes, if they expect no advantage, other than the knowledge that liberty, democracy, humanity and civilization shall have been won for the world at large, then the United States surely can afford to imitate their example. On the other hand, if Great Britain and France are to derive material compensation from a victory rendered certain by the opportune aid of the United States, it is only fair and just that, in accordance with terms acceptable to all parties concerned, they turn over their Carib- bean possessions to this country as a fitting token of gratitude for our support. In the case of the Netherlands the precedent already set by the purchase of the islands from Denmark could be applied to the acquisition of the Dutch territories. At this point, how- ever, a financial caveat must be entered. Preliminary to our (399) 2o8 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII participation in the war we paid Denmark $25,000,000 for 138 square miles of insular land. Since the Dutch West Indies spread over 46,463 square miles, were they to be ac- quired at the same rate, as a possible outcome of the war, they would cost about $8,500,000,000, w'hich is somewhat more than we could afford! Accordingly, whenever the moment for negotiation comes, we shall have to arrange for a different basis of adjustment, as for example, one determined by the amount of the subsidies which the Dutch government has to pay each year into the colonial treasuries. Returning to the consideration of the British and French aspect of the matter, one meets with two classes of objections. Some wall assert that it is unfair to take advantage of Great Britain and France, distressed by the devastation of a war waged, not alone in their own behalf, but in defense of the United States as well. Whether in fact they have been de- fending this country, must be left to the verdict of history when the war is over. Many of us, at all events, believe this to be true. On the other hand, it is probably just as true that, without the aid we have already furnished and shall continue to furnish. Great Britain and France could not have defended themselves alone, to say nothing of the United States. To pledge the colonies in and around the Caribbean, accordingly, as a return for aid extended, is not to take advantage of na- tional distress; it is a plain business proposition, like the ex- tension of the aid itself. Other objections to the plan proposed will maintain that, even if Great Britain and France should receive ample com- pensation in territory and money as the rew^ard of victory, that is no reason why the United States should do so. Our aims, they will assert, are and ought to be purely idealistic, and hence free from material considerations of any sort. Let the Euro- pean nations and Japan take what they can get; as for our- selves, we shall take nothing. Unfortunately for the force of such a contention, however, this grimly practical world is not run on the basis that virtue is its own reward. Sentiment and emotion may shape the thoughts of individuals amid the multi- tudes, but they do not determine the course of action followed (400) No. 3] EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 209 by the soldiers in the field, and by the statesmen seated around the green cloth table, who are called upon to decide what is best for their country. If the European nations and Japan are to secure means for their material advancement as a result of this war, the essential interests of the United States require it to obtain similar advantages for itself. Assuming that these objections have been overcome, four more of them are likely to be encountered. In the first place, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands would never be willing to turn over their colonies in and around the Caribbean to the United States, no matter how much we may want them to do so. Second, the colonies are better off in their present situation than they would be under American direction. Third, we have no desire, either to increase the burden of our race problem by trying to govern two millions and more of colored peoples, or to enlarge tasks already great enough, by the duty of protecting a large number of scattered islands and parts of continents. In the last place, areas so famous for earth- quakes and hurricanes are probably not worth the trouble and expense needful for their acquisition. Of these objections, the first is a pure assumption; the second is like unto it; the third ignores what we have done so successfully both in Porto Rico and the Philippines ; and the fourth is erroneous. As colonization is carried on today, the real test of the right of a European nation to retain control of American territories, like those in and around the Caribbean, is deter- mined, not alone by their actual utility to the nation in ques- tion, but by the amount of service thus rendered to their in- habitants. For many years past Great Britain, France and the Netherlands have centered their oversea activities in the eastern hemisphere, in Africa, Asia, Australia and Polynesia. The islands and parts of continents they hold in the Caribbean region are little more than relics of ancient grandeur, burden- some rather than a source of advantage. No sentimental value worth mentioning attaches to these areas. Few Englishmen, Frenchmen or Dutchmen reside in them longer than is neces- sary for commercial purposes. Possibly the colonies may have some strategic value to their owners as naval bases. If so, (401) 2IO CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII against what power? This is an obvious question that has an obvious answer — the United States. In that case no doubt re- mains as to our duty in the premises! Practically all the Caribbean colonies have fallen long since into a state of absolute or relative neglect. Their population either crowds the means of subsistence or tends steadily to fall off. That any of the areas flourish at all is due mainly to their connection with the United States and to the intro- duction of Asiatics for work on the plantations. The trade of the British possessions with this country is worth upwards of $4,000,000 a year more than that with Great Britain itself, and if British Guinana is excepted, more than $13,000,000. In the case of British Guiana the reason for the larger amount of commerce carried on with the mother country is found in the labor of Asiatics. Both here and in Jamaica, as well as in the French and Dutch colonies, the practice of using orientals pre- vails. However legitimate the bringing over to America of Hindus, Japanese, Siamese and Chinese by the tens and hun- dreds of thousands may seem to the British, Dutch and French owners of the Caribbean region, it is altogether opposed to the principles which the United States has steadfastly championed in defense of the American workingman. Legitimate it may be in point of law, though not in point of morals; for its ob- ject is, not the advancement of civilization in the areas con- cerned, but solely the exploitation of them by the agency of cheap labor. Railroads, furthermore, almost unknown in the islands, are relatively much scarcer still in the continental sections. British Guiana, which is somewhat smaller than Oregon, has 971/2 miles of railway, run on three different gauges; British Honduras has 25 miles; Dutch Guiana, about as big as New York — for which, by the way, it was exchanged back in 1667 — has 104 miles, whereas French Guiana, a bit larger than Maine, has no railways at all. Both the French and the Dutch colonies show a declining commerce and they are dependent, also, for their financial existence upon annual subsidies fur- nished by the home government. To recognize therefore that, economically at least, the British territories already form (402) No. 2] EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 2II part of the United States, and to relieve the taxpayers of France and the Netherlands of the burden of meeting the deficits of their backward dependencies in America, would not seem on the face of it an unwelcome act. Nor is this all of the story. None of the British colonies in and around the Caribbean enjoys self-government in any- thing like the measure of it accorded to Canada and Newfound- land. So far as the privilege is granted at all, the people thus favored stand more or less on a level with the inhabitants of India. In the French and Dutch areas the situation is worse. Even if the French colonists are represented in the home par- liament, the representation is illusory rather than otherwise, whereas the folk under Dutch rule have to depend on what the good queen sends them. Whatever the amount of attention, also, given to education in the British possessions, it is pitiably scant among their French and Dutch neighbors. In partial compensation for the drawbacks, however, many of the in- habitants speak English after the American fashion, and use dollars and cents more commonly than they do pounds, shill- ings and pence, francs and guilders ! Given these circumstances, it seems clear that, taken as a whole, the colonies in and around the Caribbean are a loss to the European nations that own them, and a detriment to the people who live in them. Were they to be made, instead, a part of the United States in the political sense, as essentially they already are a part of it in the geographical, linguistic and economic sense, their lot would be a happier one, and so would ours. Were they to be included in the American union, there is every reason to believe that the benefits which have followed the American occupation of Porto Rico would be extended to them also. What we have accomplished in nineteen years for the material, mental and moral advantage of that island and its American citizenry, needs no expatiation here, for the evi- dence is too well known. If the destinies of the Caribbean colonies, therefore, were committed to our charge, we could assure to their inhabitants an interest in their welfare which -— — "i the countries now ruling them cannot possibly display. (403) 212 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII And what have the Caribbean islands and the mainland to offer us? They have many an excellent harbor. They afford an outlet for the surplus population of Porto Rico. They are rich in the natural resources of the tropics, which we shall need in ever- increasing amount. The more these resources are de- veloped, the greater becomes the market for our manufactures. American railways in the Guianas would open to the Caribbean seaboard the treasures of the Amazon valley. Benign in climate and beautiful in scenery, the Caribbean islands have extraordinary possibilities as winter resorts. Nor are they lacking in historic interest. Among the islands and on the Spanish Main were laid the scenes in song and story of the brave old times of the pirate and buccaneer, of the age-long struggle in former days of the states of Europe for dominion in the New World. Assuming that, in view of all the foregoing, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands shall have signified a willingness to relinquish their ownership of the Caribbean colonies in favor of the United States, we might set a worthy example of our belief in the principle that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. The American people think that small nationalities ought to have the right to determine their own destinies. If their conditions are such as to make independence desirable, they should be independent; if not, then they should be permitted to choose the allegiance under which they shall live. That in any correct or reasonable sense of the term the people dwelling in the Caribbean colonies can be called " nationalities," however, is altogether doubtful. No one has ever thought of regarding them in that light; for they i>ossess few, if any, of the qualifications requisite for that distinction. Dependent they always have been, and dependent they are likely to remain, since the conditions for independ- ence are lacking. Accordingly, if the several areas they in- habit were to be transferred from their present owners to the United States by virtue of an agreement between the two parties concerned, the act in itself could not be construed as a viola- tion of the American principle of championing the cause of small nations. Yet, in order to remove any possible hesita- (4»4) No. 2] EUROPEAN RETENTION OF CARIBBEAN COLONIES 213 tion on this point, whenever the moment for the ultimate dis- posal of the Caribbean colonies arrives, the question whether they should be placed under the protection of the stars and stripes might be resolved, if practicable, in democratic fashion, by leaving it to the decision of the people themselves. That they would vote right on a matter that affects so intimately their welfare and progress cannot be doubted. (405) THE BASES OF AN ENDURING AMERICAN PEACE ' HENRY A. WISE WOOD I HAVE been asked to speak generally upon the need of better machinery for international relations, and par- ticularly upon the effect of censorship upon the relation- ships of peoples. I am committed to two principles in the conduct of American diplomacy: to the employment of non- political, permanent, specially trained men in our diplomatic staff, at home and abroad ; and to full publicity in our diplo- matic relations. Where the phrase " shirt-sleeve diplomacy " denotes the work of the ignorant and untrained I am wholly against it ; where ft designates a rugged, uncompromising hon- esty which insists upon functioning in the open, I am wholly for it. An honest national purpose publicly proclaimed, and served by educated men especially trained in diplomatic intercourse, is the highest wisdom, I am persuaded, for a democratic re- public such as ours to maintain. But today, if it is to be permitted, I should rather set aside the mere machinery of diplomacy, and enter upon a discussion of certain problems in statecraft which vitally affect our own welfare. Now that the world is plastic and we are the most courted among nations, a wise precaution would seem to dic- tate that we utilize our favored position to surround ourselves with durable safeguards of peace. An analysis of our situ- ation reveals sources of possible danger which it should be our aim to render innocuous. The Monroe Doctrine may be challenged from the east ; it may be challenged from the west, or from both directions at the same time. The canal may be invested by sea, and be taken by forces landed in its vicinity. Our west-coast Asiatic legislation may bring us into 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 29, 1917. (406) AN ENDURING AMERICAN PEACE 215 a conflict in which Alaska and Southern California will suffer, and the Hawaiian and Philippine Islands may be lost. It is practicable at the present time, I believe, for us to erect effective diplomatic barriers against all of these dangers, barriers which if neglected now it may not again in our lifetime be possible for us to set up. In August 1823 Canning, for Great Britain, wrote as fol- lows to Rush, the American minister, concerning the then recently revolted Spanish colonies in America : We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference. If these opinions and feelings are, as I firmly believe them to be, common to your government with ours, why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other, and to declare them in the face of the world? If there be any European power which cherishes other projects, which looks to a forcible enterprise for reducing the colonies to subjection, on behalf or in the name of Spain, or which meditates the acquisition of any part of them to itself, by cession or by conquest, such a declaration on the part of your government and ours would be at once the most effectual and the least offensive mode of intimating our joint disapprobation of such projects. ... Do you conceive that under the power which you have recently received, you are authorized to enter into negotiation, and to sign any convention upon the subject? Do you conceive, if that be within your competence, you could exchange with me min- isterial notes upon it? Nothing could be more gratifying to me than to join with you in such a work, and I am persuaded that seldom, in the history of the world, occurred an opportunity when so small an effort of two friendly governments might produce so unequivocal a good, and prevent such extensive calamities. To this Rush replied : Making these remarks, I believe I may confidently say that the senti- ments unfolded in your note are fully those which belong also to my government. ... It does not aim at the possession of any portion of those commxmities for or on behalf of the United States. It would regard as highly unjust and fruitful of disastroiis consequences any attempt on the part of any European power to take possession of them by conquest or by cession, or on any ground or pretext whatever. (407) 2l6 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII Four months later, on December 2, 1823, President Monroe enunciated the Monroe Doctrine. Upon the announcement abroad of this momentous decision by the United States, Lord Brougham declared: The question with regard to South America is now disposed of, or nearly so, for an event has recently happened than which no event has dispensed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude over all the freemen of Europe; that event, which is decisive on the subject in respect to South America, is the message of the President of the United States to Congress. While the Monroe Doctrine has since been little more than a declaration of intention. Great Britain has been its consistent friend, and no other nation has undertaken seriously to chal- lenge it. Nevertheless the occasion has arrived, I believe, when we should seek to obtain from our allies formal recogni- tion of its validity. Were France, Italy, Russia and Japan now formally to acknowledge its validity, a long stride would have been taken toward the inclusion with them of the German and Austro- Hungarian empires at the conclusion of peace. In the case of Great Britain our common interests and in- clinations indicate a more far-reaching arrangement, with re- spect to the protection of the Latin and Anglo-Saxon peoples of the Western Hemisphere, and of our respective jxissessions in the Pacific. We can well afford to underwrite the security of the British possessions in this hemisphere in exchange for Great Britain's undertaking to assist us, if necessary, in the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. And we can do our- selves and the other Anglo-Saxon people of the Pacific no greater service than by undertaking to assist Great Britain in the protection of her possessions in that ocean, in exchange for her assistance to be rendered us in the protection of our own possessions lying therein. Were such an arrangement with Great Britain to be consummated, anxieties with respect to overseas invasion would disappear from the Latins and Anglo-Saxons of our own hemisphere, and from the Anglo- Saxons who are settled about and within the basin of the Pacific. (408) No. 2] AN ENDURING AMERICAN PEACE 217 Coming now to matters which, though of lesser magnitude, are important in the scheme of our defenses, there are two which demand prompt consideration. The first affects the security of the Panama Canal, concerning the military and commercial value of which to our country no American needs to be informed. At present the zone must depend for its de- fense, first upon our fleets, and second upon its contained garrison. Our fleets having been defeated, and the canal in- vested by a transported army working toward it from the sides, we should be powerless to prevent its capture. Between our- selves and the zone there is no proper means of overland transport. It is unthinkable that we should permit so invaluable a national asset as the canal to be so inadequately assured against seizure or destruction. Of the projected Pan-American Rail- way there has still to be completed between the United States and the canal zone approximately only 550 miles. The prompt completion of this railway by American capital should be im- mediately undertaken as a defensive measure, and the Ameri- can government, by means of liberal subventions, should ef- fect arrangements with the countries through which it passes, under which we shall be permitted to transport troops and sup- plies in the event of war between the United States and a nation foreign to the Western Hemisphere. The second lesser matter deserving immediate attention concerns the peninsula of Lower California. This tongue of land projects downward from the United States like a human vermiform appendix, and like the latter is an extremely dan- gerous appanage. Behind it, within its inaccessible interior, and along its Pacific Coast, are many hiding places which may, upon uncomfortable occasion, become points of infec- tion endangering our contiguous territory. Lower California is so remote from the Mexican mainland, is so slimly attached to it, and so inaccessible from it, that neither in times of peace nor in times of war can the Mexican government assure its not being made a base for hostilities against us. The Mexican government has but little inter- course with this peninsula, and draws from it only a small (409) 2i8 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS revenue, if any. It is possible, therefore, that the Mexican government would be inclined to consider the sale of Lower California to the United States, in exchange for the moneys so urgently needed by it for the rehabilitation of Mexico. The United States would be well advised to add to its long list of fortunate purchases this fertile pendant of contiguous territory, and thus foreclose possible untoward eventualities. In conclusion, our diplomatic duties of the moment demand of us the most skillful employment of the opportunities which lie open to our hand, in order that we may insure ourselves and our neighbors an enduring peace. The projects herein outlined, I am convinced, are those most certain, if carried out, to rid our future of the alarms of war. (410) THE WEST INDIES Mr. Irving Bush,^ New York : The West Indies have been until very recently entirely a foreign land to us. Our idea has been like that of the small boy who was asked by his teacher, " Who was the first man? " He promptly replied, " George Washington." " No," said the teacher, " it was Adam." " Oh, well," answered the boy, " you include foreigners." Our point of view on all these matters has been provincial, and perhaps that is even more strictly true in New York than in many other parts of the country from which you gentlemen come. New Yorkers know only that somewhere to the west of us lies the country called New Jersey, and a few of our bolder spirits have penetrated its wilderness ; but beyond that we are lost. It is particularly fortunate, I think, that a conference of this kind is called to bring us into a larger realization of our opportunities and obligations in dealing with foreign affairs. We are to discuss this morning that land of mystery, that sea dotted with sunlit islands called the Caribbean. I have always believed that the islands of the West Indies were of great value. My first knowledge of the West Indies was derived from reading works of literature describing those gentlemen who always have dark mustaches and shiny patent leather boots and who ride the Spanish Main under the ensign of the Jolly Roger; I have been surprised many times in looking at pictures of the West Indies to see that they are not as I have pictured them, with their entire surface covered with treasure chests, and with olive trees creeping out between the crevices. Today the West Indies are becoming a reality and not a mere dream in our life and thought, and we need to understand actual conditions in the islands. 1 Introductory remarks as presiding officer at the morning session, May 30. (411) OUR RELATIONS TO HAITI AND SAN DOMINGO ' OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD President, New York Evening Post Company THE highmindedness with which the United States, ac- cording to the utterances of President Wilson, has entered upon the war against German militarism has made it necessary that we must conform to the idealism thus expressed in all our relations with other nations and particu- larly those affecting Haiti and San Domingo. If we are to live up to the words of President Wilson in his war message that " the world must be made safe for democracy " — safe, let us hope he meant, even from Americans — we must seek with complete unselfishness to establish in these two republics true democracy as against the autocracy of despotic or military control. Mr. Wilson has said, also, that we desire no con- quest and no dominion. This commits the nation definitely to a policy of no annexation or conquest. But that is not enough, because these republics are so weak, as compared with our giant strength, that it is necessary that we should base our policy toward them upon the highest ethical standards and without any thought as to personal profit for the United States as a result of our actions. Have we in our relations with these sister republics thus far borne ourselves in accordance with President Wilson's exalted words? Let us see what has happened. San Do- mingo, after an independent existence of seventy-two years as a republic, has been taken over by force by our government; while of the independent government of Haiti, a Negro re- public of a hundred and twelve years standing — during which time no foreigner was ever attacked or injured, no white woman ever assaulted, and no legation ever violated save once — only a 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 191 7. (412) HAITI AND SAN DOMINGO 221 toppling shell of a government, which may crumble at any moment, remains. My appeal is for a definite declaration of intention as to these and the other republics, because there could be no more fitting time than this when the United States is entering the world war for the avowed purpose of driving out despotism, crushing autocracy and upholding the rights of smaller nations, and because a declaration of intention is vitally needed, if we are to hold the full confidence and friendship of Latin America. Plainly, we are drifting in the Caribbean. Our influence is extending rapidly and by the deliberate acts of both the dominating political parties, and yet nothing is being done by reason of a deliberate national consciousness or a declared policy. In neither of the last political platforms is there any statement of a belief that the United States should go on deliberately extending its influence in the Caribbean, or any reference whatever to Haiti and San Domingo. If this is manifest destiny, it is an extraordinary voiceless destiny ; if it is an unconscious national drift, it has all the foreboding and the terrifying silence of the irresistible glacier. The American electorate has never voted upon it. It has alter- nately applauded the " taking " by force and trickery of Panama and the violation of a treaty with a small nation with which we were at peace, and the Mobile speech of President Wilson in which he declared to the sister republics to the south of us that: " I want to take this occasion to say, too, that the United States will not again seek to secure one additional foot of territory by conquest." In his dealing with the sorely tried republic of Mexico he nobly lived up to this doctrine, despite the bloody blunder of Vera Cruz. On the other hand, we have just witnessed the purchase of the Danish West Indies at a fabulous price, " addi- tional territory " to the south of us, without its calling forth any noteworthy comment in press or public or in Congress, either for or against the proposal. In 1907 we took over the administration of the San Do- mingan customs houses by treaty, solely in order to get her out of debt and to prevent revolutions by safeguarding the (413) 222 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII customs-house receipts, which were the chief booty of the periodic revolters. At first it seemed to work well, but then revolutions began again and it was openly said that the trouble was that we had not taken enough power for ourselves. Next, a treaty was forced upon this unwilling people, by shutting off their revenues, and thus compelling them to surrender to us their last shred of independence. When the govern- ment fell by reason of inanition, we placed a naval dictator in charge, in the person of Captain Harry S. Knapp, who began his reign in the name of the American democracy by sup- pressing the native newspapers which criticized his acts and by installing a censorship all his own that forbade even the news- papers in the United States to receive a single word that was not edited by himself. This autocratic ruling lasted only until the press of this country laid the facts before Secretary Daniels, when the order was promptly revoked. But the native newspapers with one exception, the Listis Diario, having no one to speak for them in the seats of the mighty, have " stayed dead." Captain Knapp's cabinet consists of naval officers and marine officers ; and there is no congress, no free press, no effective force to hold him in check. Foreigners are gobbling up the best of the cane lands. In Haiti we have forced a convention on a free people by giving them their choice between a treaty surrendering to the United States the collection and disbursement of their customs receipts, and the creation and control of a constabulary. When they had signed the convention, we then imposed upon them a military occupation, and have refrained from paying the interest on their foreign and domestic loans while using $95,000 a month of their income to pay the costs of our oc- cupation, which the Haitian people detest — particularly our rigid martial law. It is only just to say that this policy was entered upon by our State Department with real intent to be of service, because it felt that the country was in chaos and anarchy and that the foreign bondholders through their gov- ernments would soon insist that either the United States should make order in the republic or let some outsider do it, I am not here to impugn motives but merely to record facts, and the (414) No. 2] HAITI AND SAN DOMINGO 223 fact is that the government and the people of Haiti who al- ways paid the interest on their foreign loans, are now on the point of bankruptcy and their government is on the verge of being broken down by us, while the Washington authorities delay the payment of interest on all loans and the refunding of the total indebtedness which, despite years of revolution, is only $32,000,000. They take pride, and justly so, that our marine officers have created a splendid gendarmerie of sixteen hundred men, have built and repaired a number of roads and given the peasantry a sense of security which has not been theirs for years. If there was chaos, that is at an end and there is that much clear gain. But granting, for the sake of argument, all that may be urged as to the necessity of our intervening in these two republics, what then? Are we sailing by any chart? What course have we laid out? Is there any definite governmental aim? If so, it has not been stated. Neither the Republican nor Democratic platforms of 1916, I repeat, made the slightest reference to either republic or our relations to them. Is there any social or educational survey of the republics on foot? None. Is there any recognition of the necessity of differ- entiating between the Haitians, who are French in culture, and the San Dominicans, who are Spanish in culture? A proposal to send a privately financed American commission to Haiti was spurned a year ago by the State Department as likely to hurt the Haitian feelings if it should undertake a study of the under- lying economic and social causes of the unrest of the past — those feelings which, we are told, were in nowise disturbed when we forced the surrender treaty upon them ! There is no definite national declaration as to how long we shall stay, how often we shall renew the treaties, or whether we shall ever let go. Neither President nor Congress has spoken on this point, nor as to whether we hitherto non-militaristic Americans should or should not govern these countries by military officials. If they are to be militarily governed, then by what branch of the service? Porto Rico and the Philippines are under the War Department; the other nations in our tutelage are under the Navy. The Bureau of Insular Affairs is not yet trusted with (415) 224 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII the Virgin Islands; until the war permits a more leisurely arrangement, they are to be governed by an admiral on a makeshift basis. All question of a serious taking of stock is deferred. We shall not know just how much of industrial bankruptcy and depression and human backwardness we have purchased in the Virgin Islands until peace returns. And then? Then it will surely be time to exalt the whole question of the government of our permanent and temporary wards of whom the bulk of our people are so ignorant, to a position in which it shall have the attention it needs and deserves. But how shall it be done? It is not merely a question of deciding whether the islands are to have military or civilian government; whether we shall not follow the example of England in Egypt in letting the natives carry on their own government under the oversight of a diplomatic agent- resident in the manner of Cromer. It is not only a question of deciding whether Haiti and San Domingo are to be governed merely for the purpose of keeping order for a term of years and getting them out of debt, or even whether they are to be scientifically administered in order that their peoples shall really be trained in the art of self-govern- ment and be taught to walk, so that when we withdraw they shall not stumble and fall again. Far beyond this, first and foremost of all, is the question. What is it we have in our minds and hearts for them? Are we to be guided wholly by philanthropy, by the desire to help these small nations to an independent existence, as we are praying for independence after the war for Greece, Belgium, and Servia, or is their proximity to us, the wealth of their remarkable economic re- sources and their trade relationship to us, to give to our spec- tacles another hue as we look upon them? Shall the country remember what Mr. Wilson has said : " It is a very perilous thing to determine a foreign policy in the terms of material interest? " Shall the nation say with him : " Morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us (in our relations with other nations) and we must never condone iniquity " — iniquity even in our own attitude and policy? (416) No. 2] HAITI AND SAN DOMINGO 22$ Shall the noble words of Wilson at Mobile apply only to conquest in war, or shall we make them a similar self-denying ordinance against that form of conquest which has given us practically complete control of Haiti and San Domingo, hap- pily with but little bloodshed, but a control none the less as complete as if we had let General Pershing march to Mexico City and let him take over the whole government of Mexico? Many Americans have been killed in Mexico and much Ameri- can property damaged; no such charge lay against Haitians or San Dominicans. Is the difference in our policy towards them wholly due to their difference in extent of territory ? Is there to be farther intervention of this sort to the south of us, dependent upon haphazard act or as the result of a well thought-out policy? Surely, we can all agree that the vital importance of these relations not only as to those directly af- fected, but in their very great effect upon our trade and poli- tical relations with Central and South America, dictates that the administration of these wards should be in the hands of a cabinet officer, and each dependency, temporary or permanent, represented as are Porto Rico and the Philippines by delegates to Congress. Perhaps it may be well, even, to establish a House of Colonial Delegates, in order that their special problems may profit by mutual interchange of ideas and of experiences. In other words, the question before us is whether we are really going to set ourselves down to the task of governing well, according to the highest American tradition, these peoples who have no desire whatever to be governed by us and prefer to be poorly governed by themselves so long as they may have self- government and independence rather than be governed by out- siders whose culture and point of view in every fundamental are so alien. Shall we or shall we not live up to the standards set for the nation by President Wilson? (417) OUR CARIBBEAN POLICY ^ PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN Professor of International Law, Princeton University DURING the fifteen months that I was charge d'affaires in Central America, I had on my hands two wars, two peace conferences and three revolutions, involving five republics. For the space of twenty-four hours on one occasion, the government having fallen, I had the distinction of being a dictator. During that day I enjoyed the preroga- tives of a president, including that of being shot at. So you will realize that I speak out of practical experience concerning these countries. As a point of departure, I think you will all agree that the United States is vitally interested in the countries bordering on the Caribbean. Irrespective of the Monroe Doctrine, the Panama Canal has of course given us a profound interest in these lands. Next let us take up the actual situation. As to Cuba, you will recognize that our relations with that state are clearly and satisfactorily defined. We may claim with pardonable pride that our attitude toward Cuba has been entirely equitable. In Mexico we must recognize a neighborhood problem, and no question at all of the Monroe Doctrine. Unfortunately, our relations with that country are not clearly defined. Apart from what I recognize to be the ideals of the present adminis- tration, I am convinced that our policy in Mexico has resulted in making confusion worse confounded. Moreover, we enunciated a most dangerous doctrine in stating that we should refuse to recognize any government founded on violence. The implication of that is clear; if we do not recognize a government founded on violence, then we 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 19 17. (418) OUR CARIBBEAN POLICY 227 must see to it that there is a fair election in the countries to which our declaration applies; and we should know that it is impossible to guarantee a fair election in those countries. Per- haps we might look a little nearer home to certain of our own states in that respect. That doctrine constitutes an insidious form of intervention in the affairs of those countries. It was resented, and I think justly resented, in all Latin American countries, as well as in Mexico. In addition, our policy in Mexico is open to serious criticism, because it was based fun- damentally on no intention of protecting Americans. In regard to Colombia, I will say only this: irrespective of differences of opinion on the Panama Canal question, we should recognize that this is a question not merely of conciliating or humoring a sister republic, but of doing the right and just thing. In regard to Central America, we have had an evolution of policy. I was there while the policy was in transition. For a long time we held off and acted simply as a friendly media- tor; but in 1907 that policy was fundamentally changed, be- cause we found that mediation got us nowhere. In this con- nection I should like to pay a personal tribute to President Roosevelt. In all the time that I served under him in Central America, he never wielded the big stick over those people. On every occasion, even against the wishes of those of us on the ground, he tried every possible means of conciliating them and avoiding offense to their sensibilities, in order to com- pose their differences. In 1907, on Mr. Roosevelt's initiative, a conference of Cen- tral American powers was held in Washington, and the Central American Court of Justice was established. This action really gave the United States a moral right to intervene in the affairs of Central America, to prevent revolution fomented in one state against another; and it has resulted in the suppression of revolution. Then came the era of " dollar diplomacy." We should be -\£ery careful how we define dollar diplomacy. If it means that we want to get countries into debt to us in order to have a strong hold over them politically, it is a very insidious policy. (419) 228 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII When we speak of "substituting dollars for bullets," let us remember that many of those men down there would much rather face the bullets than have their country fall into the hands of international loan sharks. For a time our admin- istration followed a policy that I believe open to some criticism. The feeling was that if we could only get hold of the resources and the wealth in those countries revolutions could be sup- pressed. The purpose was honorable, but the method was open to question. In regard to Nicaragua, for example, the result has hardly been happy. I will only call your attention to the single fact that but for the presence of our marines in the capital of that country, the government would fall immediately. There has been no free election or free expression of opinion in Nicaragua since the day the United States first maintained a government in power by the presence of marines. The result of this is diastrous to our prestige ; and Central American unity, which has been the dream of the finest minds in those countries, has been seriously retarded. I should like to see the United States, instead of interfering in the affairs of each one of these states, do the large, generous thing by helping them together back into the union where they once were, and where they right- fully belong. I will now proceed to some general conclusions : First of all, we are bound to help the less-favored nations. We cannot turn a cold shoulder when certain nations are in a backward condition where they need help. The first thing we must recognize is our obligation and duty to help those coun- tries that need a friend. Second, we are in duty bound to protect American inter- ests. There can be no argument about that. We encourage Americans to go abroad, and we ought to go with them. The protection of nationals abroad is an international function. If the civilized nations of the world did not insist on decent be- havior on the part of certain nations, those nations would in- evitably relapse back to barbarism. Third, we are bound to prevent foreign intervention in those countries. We must make certain that legitimate foreign (420) No. 2] OUR CARIBBEAN POLICY 229 interests are adequately protected; but, at the same time, as some of us know intimately from experience, we have to be vigilant to circumvent foreign intrigue. The United States must recognize that the dominance of the motive of national self-interest throughout the world must always put us on our guard against intrigue in a region of such vital significance to us. Fourth, there are times when the United States is bound actually to intervene by force to restore and establish order. When things go all to pieces, when nobody's life is safe, when property is in danger, and when there is no one with power to establish order for any length of time, it is necessary for the United States to act, and to act promptly. Fifth, we must assist in the financial rehabilitation of certain of these countries. That means that loans will not be made to those countries except on good security, which specifi- cally means, of course, a lien on the customs receipts. Such a policy must be based eventually on this principle — that the United States will never be party to any such financial opera- tions until it has had an opportunity to determine beforehand by an impartial commission the exact obligations of these peo- ple, the state of their financial resources, in other words, their solvency. Sixth, there are other cases where the United States can do wonders simply by its moral support. Many men in these governments have a hard time trying to do the right and just thing. At such times the United States is bound to give its moral support. Another point, touched on by Mr. Borchard, is that at times we have to exercise moral restraint when the government is tending in a direction inimical to its people's own best interests. The United States at times can exercise a restraint through the right persons in a way which does not give off"ense, and which really in the long run results in securing the gratitude of those concerned. Lastly, we must encounter great criticism. We need to have certain dangers and criticisms pointed out ; but criticism should be centered on the question of policy itself. Any policy (421) 230 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS that we follow should be scrutinized closely, and should be challenged at times; but when it comes to method, I think we should be chary of criticism. For we cannot apply in those countries the methods we should use for our own conditions. We hav^e to deal with peculiar local situations that require peculiar methods ; and if we are conscious of having the right policy, we can afford to be very charitable when it comes to a criticism of methods. The United States cannot expect to satisfy all Latin America. Certain of my friends here from these countries will recognize the truth of what I say, that with the best of intentions it is excessively difficult to reach a perfect understanding between our different races. Many of us who have lived in those coun- tries know how easy it is to develop points of friction ; but by following in our dealings with those people a vigorous, firm policy that we believe to be righteous we can earn their re- spect. We must ask these countries at times to be patient and charitable with us, if our policy seems to be a blundering one. They credit us at times with having more cleverness than we have, and think that we are following a carefully thought-out policy. We do blunder, of course we blunder, because we do not always have a definite policy. And yet we as Americans may well be proud, on the whole, of American conduct toward the countries of the Caribbean. I maintain that it has been an altruistic pursuit of international as well as national interests. Our motives in that part of the world are really calculated to bring about a higher state of securit)^ and world order, a better condition of affairs in those republics themselves and a condition of affairs acceptable to the rest of the world as well as to ourselves. (422) THE CARIBBEAN QUESTION DISCUSSION 1 Professor Albert Bushnell Hart, Harvard University: The proximity of the Caribbean region to the United States, and the fact that it completes our zones of naval protection, make it highly likely, in fact almost certain, that the influence of the United States in that region will be enlarged instead of reduced, and that our policy will probably look toward the final incorporation of all those islands into our empire. On its face this policy seems to accord with the usual trend of colonial expansion. Our present area includes a north temperate belt and a south temperate belt; but we have lacked a tropical area such as Great Britain and France and Italy enjoy. Here it is at our doors. The question, however, is larger than material benefit. Expan- sion of our territory and influence seems to be in the temper of the American people. For weal or woe, ever since 1898 we have been following that road. The last three presidents have deliberately enlarged the influence of the United States in the Caribbean region. It seems written in the book of fate, that gradually the possession of those regions will pass from European to American h^ids, by consent of the two groups of nations concerned. When we face these probabilities, we must also face the price that we shall have to pay for this Caribbean policy, to which the administration has been committed for the last twenty years, which has been sanctioned by repeated ratifications of treaties by the Senate, against which there seems to be no organized opposition in the House of Representatives, and which is not much condemned in the press. In the first place, we must deny ourselves the use of some very agreeable terms, such as " the twenty-one American republics." There are no longer twenty-one, because five of these so-called republics are dependencies of the United States. Cuba is no more independent than Long Island. The island of San Domingo, with its two Negro republics, is no more independent than the state of New York. Nicaragua and Panama are only nominal republics, and 1 At the afternoon session, May 30. (423) 232 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII nominal sovereignties. Every one of these five " powers " is as much a dependency of the United States, subject to its ultimate will and not to the desires of the people of the country concerned, as is Burmah, or Hong Kong, or British South Africa, or the Cape Colony, to the will of Great Britain. There is no use deceiving ourselves with words. If we are to have a Caribbean empire, we must get it by destroying the republican independence of the powers concerned. Professor Shepherd asserted that we might buy the islands and make them independent. Are we beginning that course by destroying the independence of the islands that we have not bought? In the second place, we must make up our minds that if we ac- quire these islands we shall eventually have practically to annex the whole of Central America. Already we control the so-called republics of Panama and Nicaragua, and we are in negotiation with Honduras and San Salvador in the same direction. The whole group of the six Central American powers are in the same boat ; and if it is right and necessary for us to appropriate to ouj needs two of those countries, it is clearly right and proper to complete the whole thing. When this is done, what about Mexico? Present conditions create a terrible pressure upon the United States to make good the old saying of President Hayes that a Panama Canal is a part of the " coastline of the United States." A Caribbean empire more than doubles the pressure for the annexation of Mexico, a tendency which [, personally, seriously and devoutly reprehend. Next, we shall have to adapt the Monroe Doctrine to a new and perplexing situation. We shall never forsake the Monroe Doctrine ; it is a vital principle, because it fits with the circimistances of the modern world ; but so far as the Monroe Doctrine was ever intended to stay the conquest of Latin America, so far as it stands in the way of intensifying our relations with our neighbors, we must admit that it no longer applies, if we are to establish a Caribbean empire. Professor Shepherd's reasoning that these neighboring regions naturally are outliers, attached to the United States, if good for the Caribbean, is no less cogent to the Philippine Islands. Both have close geographical relations to great naval and military powers ; our policy in the Caribbean, if founded on a great geographical prin- ciple, gives equal rights to Japan and other Asiatic powers as to Lslands that lie in their neighborhood. In the next place, we have to reckon with that troublesome Declar- ation of Independence, which was so annoying in slavery times. When we say at the present moment that we are at war for demo- (424) No. 2] THE CARIBBEAN QUESTION 233 cracy, we mean that we are defending the principle that govern- ments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed ; what we actually do, by the extension of our empire, however neces- sary and inevitable it may be, is not to apply that splendid principle, but to create two different kinds of states. We set up a variety of small dependencies, hardly one of which we should be willing to admit as a state in our own nation. If by any possibility Mexico were included, a great Caribbean policy would keep in permanent subjection about twenty-iive million people, who must take their decisions from Washington. We talk about treaties with Santo Domingo and Haiti and Nicaragua, as though the people there had any real representation. Those treaties are actually made with per- sons who, for the time being, have arrogated to themselves the gov- ernment of the little countries. We do not reach the people with our negotiations; we do not seek to reach them. How can other Latin American neighbors look upon this process without feeling that we are declaring the Anglo-Saxons the ruling force of the earth, and relegating the Latin Americans to an inferior place? Further — and it is a point of great magnitude — how many people in this audience, in case we should acquire the whole Caribbean region, would go down there to live, and identify themselves with the region? Not one. You cannot make an integral part of the empire of the United States out of regions to which a few visitors, traders, what not, go and stay for a short time and come back again. That is not colonization. It is what the British have done in India; what the French have done in Annam; and that is why their Asiatic colonies will eventually break down. They are not genuine colonies ; they are simply benevolent despotisms. We also can be benevolent. The United States means well ; it has dealt well with Cuba and the Philippines. When I was over there nine years ago, I discovered they were carrying on a great big Sunday school, and the only trouble was that the children do not want to go to school. Whatever we do in the Caribbean, we must make up our mind to one fact in our relations to the twenty-five millions of people in that part of America. There is not one of those nations that would not rather be misgoverned by its own people than well governed by the United States of America. Mr. Cyrus F. Wicker, New York : It is difficult, within the limited time, to choose specific subjects from the great number of interesting points that have been presented to m this morning. We who have (42s) 234 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII followed the addresses of this meeting must realize, as perhaps never before, the vast importance of the political and economic relations of our nation with the countries bordering upon the Caribbean. Our relations with those countries are no longer academic ; they are very real and vital. As we are speaking, there is a living treaty, a binding obligation, or an active controversy going on with every one of them. We have introduced an American protectorate in Haiti and there are American marines in Santo Domingo. Porto Rico is an insular possession of the United States; Cuba is our ally in the war, and we have purchased the Danish West Indies. With Colombia we have a long-standing and still unsettled controversy, based on the acquisition of the Panama Canal, which is the keystone of our Caribbean policy. Finally, turning northward, we are a distant party to the controversy between Costa Rica, Honduras, Salvador and Nicaragua over a treaty which our country has just concluded with the latter, in respect to a second inter-oceanic canal. All of the problems relating to these countries come to me with a very peculiar emphasis, and in many instances relate to personal experience. These are the countries where I have lived and from which I have just returned after four years of diplomatic service in Panama and, more recently, in Nicaragua. Having lived in inti- mate relations with both canal routes I feel inclined to lay a special emphasis, in every question that confronts us in the Caribbean, on the importance of transportation and trade routes, for I believe that in the development of these avenues of commerce lies our most im- portant field of relationships with the Caribbean countries. A glance at the map will show the importance of Central America and the islands of the Caribbean as the future trade routes of the world. It is almost certain that within a few years the great bulk of the trade between East and West must pass between or over several of these neighboring countries. The Panama Canal has been built ; but experts believe that, whether through failing water supply or lack of capacity to handle the enormous tonnage required, it may within a few years prove inadequate. We have always been looking for other routes, and the best and only other possible route is that across Nicaragua. Up to 1902, this route received a majority of the favorable reports of canal commissions ; it occupies a more advantageous position than Panama as to both location and climate, being eight hundred miles nearer (or three days sailing distance shorter) between New York and San Francisco. It will very probably be built by the United (426) No. 2] THE CARIBBEAN QUESTION 235 States within the next thirty years. Nicaragua, controlling this route for the greater part of its length, has the natural advantage of possessing a great lake in the interior, one hundred and sixty miles long, reaching to within only eighteen miles of the Pacific and con- nected with the Atlantic Ocean by the broad and navigable river San Juan. We negotiated for many years with Nicaragua for the right to build this canal, dviring which time Nicaragua and her neighbors were frequently in conflict over the adjustment of their respective claims. Finally at the close of a war, in 1907, there was called, on the initiative of the United States, acting in co-operation with Mexico, a peace conference to which delegates from all of the five states of Central America were invited, which not only concluded terms of peace but also established a Central American Court of Justice, to meet in perpetual session at Cartago, in Costa Rica, which court was authorized to hear and determine all causes of complaint between these states and, under certain conditions, between any one of them and an outside nation. Shortly after this our treaty with Nicaragua was concluded, following a revolution in which we intervened and established a government under which peace and order are main- tained by the presence of American marines. This treaty with Nicaragua, known as the Nicaraguan Canal Treaty, grants to the United States, in return for the payment of three million dollars, the exclusive right to build an inter-oceanic canal across Nicaragua. It also grants to the United States the right to establish a naval base on the Nicaraguan shore of the Bay of Fonseca, opposite Honduras and Salvador, and the ownership of Great Corn and Little Corn Islands, in the Caribbean. Unfortunately, immediately following the ratification of this treaty, the Republic of Costa Rica brought suit in the Central American Court of Justice against Nicaragua on the groimd that the latter had not respected Costa Rican rights in concluding and ratifying the canal treaty with the United States. The court by a vote of four to one, Nicaragua alone dissenting, declared in favor of Costa Rica. In the meantime Salvador also brought a suit against Nicaragua in the same court on the ground that her sovereign rights were affected by a treaty which would permit of the establishment by an outside power (the United States) of a naval base, which, al- though on Nicaraguan territory, would dominate the entire shore line of Salvador on Fonseca Bay and her principal seaport, La Union. Again the court held against Nicaragua, and again Nicaragua re- (427) 236 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII fused to abide by the decision. The court is now threatened with dissolution on the ground that its authority has been disregarded and its prestige impaired. Of course, these canal rights are very valuable to the United States. In fact Nicaragua is possibly more important to us than all of the other Central American states combined. There is not the slightest doubt that the establishment of a United States naval base on Fonseca Bay would insure a greater measure of peace and commercial prosperity to all of the surrounding states. Before an- other controversy similar to that of Panama and Colombia has arisen, I believe we should regard this important Central American situation from the point of view of an interest jointly with others in the rights desired ; that we should seek to uphold the authority of an honorable and important institution for the creation of which we stood sponsors before the world, and that we should prevent the creation or con- tinuance of an unnecessary controversy which it is well within our power to adjust by joint action with all of the countries involved. This is but one of the problems that immediately confront our nation in its relations with the countries of the Caribbean. As a nation we have had almost as many policies with regard to the coun- tries adjacent to our shores as there are countries themselves. Some of these policies we have drifted into; and others have been the result of settled and directed purpose. But we all feel that we can- not look forward twenty-five years and expect to see the relations of our country to the nations surrounding the Caribbean remaining exactly the same as they are today. Twenty-five years from now some new order of relationships is bound to exist; and it is our privilege today to discuss what the nature of those policies may be and to set ourselves toward working them out. Fortunately, two such programs for a really national foreign policy with regard to the countries of the Caribbean have been outlined to us this morning. One is to leave them alone; to retire absolutely from active inter- ference from their internal and external affairs. They other is its opposite, and has been urged with great ability ; namely that as the inevitable destiny of the United States, we should acquire all of the neighboring territories, purchasing from their European owners those which are dependent, possibly in return for money loans to the nations now at war, and binding the rest to us by treaty under an x\merican hegemony. Both programs have their advantages; prob- ably neither is attainable, because under the pressure of the world war we are beginning to realize that as a factor in this v/orld's (428) No. 2] I'HE CARIBBEAN QUESTION 237 destiny, absolutism, whether of nations or individuals, must go. In like manner, the failure of the concert of Europe has shown that a carefully planned balance of power between nearly equal states is also unable to insure a lasting peace. In the declaration of mankind against world domination by a single power or group of powers the United States has now taken its full and proper part on the side of a democracy of nations, and there remains one hope, growing stronger with each new expression of international understanding and co-operation, that out of this conflict will arise a new order of international relationships based on international organization. In such an organization we must see that small nations as well as great shall find opportunity for national expression and a full measure of protection. The great nations will, as before, control the destinies of the world ; but more and more the need is apparent for some recognizable and satisfactory position for the small nations, which will preserve their integrity and individuality but which would at the same time remove them as incentives to war among themselves or between their neighbors. Such a position, wholly outside of the realm of war, is found only in a state of perpetual neutrality or neutralization. Neutralization is yet a new idea, scarcely more than a century old. First applied by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, in the neutraliza- tion of Switzerland, it is today regarded without question as part of the public law of Europe. It has been made to cover a multitude of objects — states, territories, cities, provinces, islands and canals. Four entire countries have been neutralized, three of them independ- ent states of Europe, and one a union of dependent states in Africa. Switzerland, Belgium and Luxemburg; Cracow; Corfu and Paxo ; Savoy; the Basin of the Congo and the Suez Canal have all been placed in more or less permanent neutrality. A little known in- stance has already occurred in America, and among the countries of the Caribbean, in the placing of Honduras in a state of absolute neutrality for the duration of a ten-year treaty, in which position she is guaranteed by the action of the other Central American states. Arising from the desire to separate hostile neighbors, the early states to be neutralized were buffer states, barriers liable to be traversed by the armies of both belligerents in time of war. With the century, however, the doctrine has developed new and poten- tially more effective powers in the furtherance of international peace. Where once entire states were neutralized, provinces and colonies may now be placed in a similar position and forever removed as the (429) 238 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII fruitful causes of war or occasions for armed peace. Neutralization diminishes in effect the chances of war between states by removing the most envied territories and the most important strategic positions from the aims and ambitions of international aggressors. To the smaller states neutralization under international organiza- tion offers the promise and guarantee of integrity, independence and the peaceful pursuit of national aspirations. Neutralization creates in no sense a protectorate — protection implies security at the loss of both internal and external sovereignty — but the state placed in per- manent neutrality loses no part whatever of its internal sovereignty and only so much of its external freedom of action as may, by its exercise, endanger the very continuance of its peaceful relations with its neighbors. Neutralization is not an affair between guardian and ward, but an international act, an agreement of mutual obligation and understanding between fully sovereign states, undertaken in the interest of them all. Is such a condition possible, a division of the world into two groups, one of powerful nations, guarantors and guardians of peace, and the other embracing all the rest of the civilized world, small states, territories and colonies, all confirmed by contract in perpetual peace? It may not be attained at once; but the idea is practicable, and the growth of the principle of permanent neutrality has been steady and sure, until through its means have arisen possibilities for friendlier world relationships, undreamed of by early statesmen. It may be contended that neutralization will not be maintained in the future, that it will fail ; and the case of Belgium is cited. The case of Beligiun is not the failure of neutralization but a supreme example of its justification. Power can not prevent a country from being invaded any more than a policeman can prevent an assault or a fireman can prevent a fire. But resistance can be aided, the in- vasion can be turned back, and swift punishment can be meted out to the invader. The fact that England entered the war with all her power to relieve invaded Belgium, and the stern conviction of a united world that this war will not be concluded until restitution has been accomplished, reparation made, and adequate punishment meted out to the invaders, is the strongest possible security for the sanctity of neutralized territory for all time to come. Neutralization is a remedy lying ready to our hands in removing not only the causes of war but also the intolerable burdens of armed peace. There is no loss of honor to a state in accepting neutraliza- tion and no occasion for shame in granting it to colonial possessions. (430) No. 2] THE CARIBBEAN QUESTION 239 Free and independent states may ask for and receive permanent neu- trality as freely as did Switzerland a century ago, and every state may have the opportunity of expressing its desire before one of the many international conferences now so frequently smnmoned in the furtherance of peace. The part which may be played by the United States in the future of permanent neutrality is important, but its possibilities are not restricted to our nation alone. The countries of the Caribbean may propose it for one or all of the separate states, and in so doing confirm before the world any principle of permanent neutrality to which they wholly give their support. The result in the furtherance of international peace would be inestimable ; it is also within our power to achieve it. The solution of these problems, which properly lie within the realm of political relations, and are worthy of the deepest consider- ation, is probably not at this time imperative. I turn, therefore, very briefly, to an immediate and vital subject not yet, as I believe, touched upon at this convention. I refer to the problem of co- operation in the survey, conservation and distribution of that vast supply of unutilized food stuffs available in Latin America, and would seek to discover how best we can call upon our Latin American neighbors, particularly those lying in close geographical relation to our shores, in meeting this problem by utilizing their abundance of life-sustaining food. This nation is engaged in the most gigantic struggle the world has ever known, wherein all resources are enlisted. It is no longer a matter of army against army, but of nation against nation — where materials, labor and wealth are all called on to insure victory for democracy. Without co-operation not only within the nation but among the nations we cannot succeed. The countries of Latin America have offered their military strength to the extent of their ability; but we are facing a problem vaster and more vital still — the problem of food supply. When I speak of calling on the countries of the Caribbean to take stock of their resources and join with us in the production and proper conservation of food I would avoid the chances of misunderstanding or misinterpretation. Speaking from a personal knowledge of the countries in which I have lived, I know that Central America can- not supply the foods which we commonly think of as necessities. The countries of the Caribbean are importers of our natural food stuffs such as wheat and corn and beans, and are suffering from lack of these at this time. We cannot call on Central America and the (431) 240 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS islands of the Caribbean to supply the Allies with the foods that they need; but we can call on them to supply the world with the foods which they do grow and which they now throw away, in amounts be- yond all calculation. A little capital, a little organization, and the constantly ripening new crops could be harvested and used. I could speak of cocoanuts or of bananas, thousands of bunches of which, being perishable, are thrown into the sea weekly, because there are no ships to carry them. Yet the banana has a food value nearly equal to that of wheat, and an acre in bananas will produce twenty times the food quantity of an acre in cereals, at a fraction of the cost. There are also natural fruits that perish by the million bushels and could be fed to pigs ; all of which are lost through lack of organization. It is not of the profits that I am speaking, but of the food for which Europe is starving, and which we in this country are making unprecedented efforts to supply. The food is there, and within a few days of our shores. A survey and an efficient organization of the wasted food supplies of Nica- ragua alone, would feed our armies and leave an abundance for Europe. The governments of the Central American countries are aware of their food resources; but they can do nothing. They lack capital, credit and labor, under our vague distrust of the stability of all things Latin American. The stability of governments in the islands and shores of the Caribbean is, under the existing treaties and policies of the United States, much greater than is generally believed; but apart from that there is a very real stability in the existence of food. I suggest, therefore, that this conference most seriously consider the advisability of co-operation, now, by ovir government, with the governments of the nations of all Latin America in the survey and conservation of the valuable food resources of the respective nations and, if the results appear adequate, that we as a nation offer the capital that may be needed to save from waste and utilize these food resources and at the same time supply the organization which in great part those countries have never known. (432) THE CARIBBEAN QUESTION Mr. Edwin E. Slosson, The Independent: All the speakers seem to be agreed that the dependencies of European powers in this region will fall ultimately to the United States but some of them are appre- hensive about the manner in which this transfer may be accomplished. We are fortunate in having a recent exhibition of a model transfer of sovereignty in the case of the Virgin Islands. Here there was no question of the propriety of the transfer, no taint upon our methods of American expansion. I was in the Danish islands some months before the question of their annexation to the United States was brought up, and I found the people there intensely desirous, as they have been for more than a generation, to be taken over by the United States. Porto Rico, within sight of the Danish islands, is such an excellent example of American rule that the people of the Danish islands were more than ever anxious to come under the American flag. This feeling is not confined to the inhabitants of the Virgin Islands, but extends to the natives of various other islands, even the British islands of the West Indies. Something has been said about the need of democratic control of such transfer. Let me show what was done in the Danish islands. The people of Denmark voted for it. The American Senate voted for it; the people of the islands voted for it in mass meetings; the Negroes voted for it — ^Negroes cannot vote in some states in the Unted States ; and the women voted for it. Some of our own states still disfranchise half of their population. There is thus greater democracy in the Virgin Islands than in some of the United States, and we hope that it will remain. Some have objected to paying twenty-five million dollars, but the price per acre figures out not much higher than the seven and a half million dollars offered for the two smaller islands by Lincoln, Seward and Grant, although the price of tropical real estate has risen greatly since those days. Some say that we want the islands, but not the inhabitants. That is an absurd objection. We are already getting the inhabitants. The Negroes have been flocking to the United States in hundreds and thousands from all the islands of that region, and they will come increasingly unless we annex the islands. In fact, when it was rumored that the United States was not going to buy the Danish islands, the people there organized a movement in which they pledged (433) 242 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII themselves to migrate in a body to the United States if America re- fused to pass the purchase bill. In spite of our injustice to the Negro, many of the people of the West Indies would prefer to belong to the United States, and in the interests of democracy we have no right to compel them to remain under allegiance to alien monarchistic, European powers. Mr. Moorfield Storey, Boston, Massachusetts: As I listened to the first two papers this morning, I could not restrain a feeling as to how completely the atmosphere of this conference has changed. For some days we have been considering carefully how the rights of small nations and the rights of human beings can be preserved. The first two papers frankly pleaded the rijghts of necessity, and nothing else. We want those islands ; they are useful to the United States ; we are sure to get them ; and we are going to get them — that was the theory. I was much struck with the phrase in the first speaker's speech about our duty as trustee for our weaker neighbors. I was reminded of the rules for trustees stated by a leading trustee in my native city. The three things, he said, which a trustee must always bear in mind are: first, the safety of the trustee; second, the convenience of the trustee; and last, the compensation of the trustee. That is my fear with regard to the trusteeship which we propose to claim over these weaker neighbors. I recall the remark of a woman friend, and I think it will go home to every woman in this meeting. She said that a young woman generally preferred her own imperfectly conducted menage to the more absolutely perfect housekeeping of her mother-in-law. One of my friends here today said that he had noticed all through this conference the absence of world honesty. It is for that that I rise to plead. If we are going to do these things, if it is our right to decide for ourselves whether these people are fit to govern themselves, if it is our right and duty to say when we will step in and govern them and hold them indefinitely, not as members of the American republic, but as dependencies, let us say so frankly. Let us state this as our policy, but let us not next day tuni around and say that revolutions in the Balkans do not justify any interference by neighboring powers. Let us not say that proximity to the coast of America dictates the destiny of these islands, while proximity to the coast of Asia does not interfere with our claim to the Philippines. If we are going to ignore the rights of small nations on this side of the water, let us ignore them on the other side also. The argument (434) No. 2] THE CARIBBEAN QUESTION 243 which Germany can put up that Holland and Belgium are necessary to her, the argument that Austria needs control of the Adriatic, are just as strong as our claim that we have the right to take these islands a;nd govern them. I cannot help feeling that if we get these islands and Mexico and Central America, we should make the same argu- ment as to the lands north of us. We own half the Great Lakes — why not all of them? The distinction is obvious. The peoples to the south of us are weak, while the people to the north are strong. Are we going to make that distinction in our policy? If so, let us be decent and honest about it. I stand here to plead for honesty and not hypocrisy, to assert that we should not be anxious about Serbia and Greece, and nevertheless try to persuade ourselves that we are acting as " trustees " for our weaker neighbors to the south. Mr. Phanor J. Eder, New York: I am very thankful to Mr. Storey, as his remarks are the best introduction to the few points that I have to make. His chief point is that we do not take certain nations because they are strong, but do have our eye on other countries that are weak, and that we do wrong in making a distinction between the weak and the strong. Of course, we all agree with him that we must do away with hypocrisy, but there is one distinction that we shall have to make in our policy. That is not the distinction between the strong and the weak, but between those nations, possessions and islands which can govern themselves, and those which cannot. You will have noticed that the gentlemen here who have spoken on behalf of what we can frankly call an imperialistic policy are gentlemen who, like myself, are acquainted with actual conditions in the Caribbean countries from having lived and done business there, and who know just what the facts are. The others, the mere ideal- ists— Mr. Storey I will have to include in that category, and Mr. Villard — are men not personally acquainted with fever conditions and feverish people. We are obliged to recognize that some of the Indian and Negro nations of the Caribbean are not fit to govern themselves. If we do not see to it that property and life are safe in those countries, other nations as powerful as the United States will. For the sake of the people there we cannot abdicate our duty. We have to recog- nize that the principle of governing only by the consent of the gov- erned can apply only to those who have some articulate means of expressing their consent. In many of these countries the great mass of the population have no means of expressing consent or non- (435) 244 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELA TIONS consent. Of course, I recognize that we have to go in there and govern them against their consent, because a small fraction among them that do express their political opinions are hopelessly against the United States. In the Latin American countries and the Caribbean zone they do not like us, and there is no trying to dodge that issue. The only policy that we can follow is to try and conciliate them, and to inculcate a love for democracy by doing our duty in helping them to govern themselves. That can be done by giving them the largest measure of democratic govermnent of which they are capable, and by exercising such a control over the most fundamental points of gov- ernment as we do in Cuba. The system has worked in that island. Mr. Leon C. Simon, New Orleans, Louisiana: I hail from New Orleans, where we are face to face with the problems and conditions involved in the relations of this country to the Caribbean islands and countries. One thing that strikes many of us is the lack of any uni- form policy toward these countries and these islands. We have a certain policy in Cuba, another in Haiti, still another in Santo Do- mingo, a totally different one in Porto Rico, a yet different one in the Virgin Islands. In Central America we have still a different policy or lack of policy. We are governing Nicaragua against the consent of the governed, while in Costa Rica we proclaim the doctrine that if any president is evicted by force we will not recognize his suc- cessor. I will pause here to remind you of what has already been said, that if we are not going to recognize eviction by force, we certainly should guarantee the fairness of elections; otherwise our position is an impossible one. Our policy in Mexico is entirely different from our policy toward any of the other countries. What is most necessary for us is to try and evolve a policy, what- ever that policy may be. If we want to go on the present theory that the world should be made safe for democracy, we must make up our minds what we mean by that phrase. Do we mean safe for democracy in Europe and safe for the same kind of democracy in the Caribbean Sea, the one where our intertsts are not affected, and the other where they are affected? Let us be honest with ourselres, and let us above all come to some conclusion. Let the American people who have business interests in the Caribbean, as well as the inhabitants of its islands and mainland know what our general policy is to be. When we get that general policy, then let us go ahead and do the things that are not only in the interests of this country but in the interests of the people themselves, on the basis of our plea for democracy and of the position in which we stand for democracy. (436) THE UNITED STATES AND PORTO RICO ^ SAMUEL MCCUNE LINDSAY President, Academy of Political Science THE peoples of the republics of North and South America, notwithstanding the great differences in climate and physical environment which characterize the territory they inhabit, have an essential basis of unity. We assume this much at least in all our discussions of the varied problems of our political relations with one another. It is implied of course in the Monroe Doctrine, whatever scope we give to it. Yet little has been done here or elsewhere to analyze the factors of that unity of purpose, of ideals of in- stitutional life, which we here in the United States assume to be an essential element of every true democracy. We have neglected great opportunities that lie at our door to cultivate international relations, mutual regard and understanding be- tween the republics of the western hemisphere. It was my privilege and pleasure to serve in the early days of American civil government in Porto Rico as commis- sioner of education for Porto Rico. I lived there for three years and I came to know the people intimately and to realize something of their ambitions, especially as re- vealed in their eagerness for educational opportunities. Through those associations and other relations with Central and South America I have come to know also something of the distrust, the suspicion, the antagonism that exists all through Latin America with respect to us here in the United States of America. As has been pointed out by several speakers at this conference we have aroused this feeling of suspicion partly because we have had no settled policy in our political dealings with South America. Naturally, without any defined purpose 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 191 7. (437) 246 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII in playing a dominant role in the political ckvelopnient of the western hemisphere, suspicion has been aroused that there may be ulterior motives behind everything we have done. The closer relationships which we now feel are so desirable must be based, of course, upon a great many different founda- tions. First, there is the foundation of commercial intercourse, which is perhaps in a fair way to take care of itself. Our business men in America are not so indifferent as they were formerly to the advantages of closer commercial relations. They are not so blind as formerly to the business advant- ages of transportation facilities and other instrumentalities of trade and exchange between nations, upon which suc- cess in commerce is necessarily based. There are also hopeful signs in the direction of intellectual and educational co-opera- tion. Our universities are exchanging professors. Delega- tions of educators are coming from the various countries of Central and South America from time to time to visit and study our institutions at first hand, and report back to their own countries the results of their observations. We are send- ing delegations to international congresses, also delegations to visit the various countries of South America to express in this way our interest, and what is even more, to develop in our own people a better knowledge of the aspirations and the civilization of these countries. These are significant signs of a new and better internationalism. There are also not lack- ing signs of progress in the direction of co-operation in the tasks of government, in international undertakings, in the expression of mutual sympathies, and in concerted action with respect to affairs that concern us all alike. Upon these foun- dations important developments in the evolution of democracies in the western hemisphere will doubtless take place. On our part we have failed to give to the peoples of South America any adequate expression of the idealism of the United States, and our people have failed also to understand the ideal- ism of Latin America. Intellectual co-operation and associa- tion is the most urgent and pressing need and promises greater results in stable political relations than even the growth of commerce, important as that is. We have had since the es- (438) No. 2] THE UNITED STATES AND PORTO RICO 247 tablishment of American government in Porto Rico an excep- tional opportunity to develop in that island an experimental station, so to speak, for the cultivation of international relations, co-operation and interpretation of the common ambitions of Latin and Anglo-Saxon Americans. Porto Rico lies at the gateway to the Panama Canal, a gateway through which the commerce of Europe must pass in going through the canal to the Pacific. It is one of the most beautiful semi-tropical islands in the world. There are no flaws upon our title. The .people of Porto Rico welcomed our entrance there. Their leaders — and they had leaders, not merely a small group of people who had usurped power, but real leaders of the in- tellectual life of the islarid — welcomed our entrance, welcomed our political domination. They saw in our institutions the hope for a great future for their island. We have already done very creditable work in the building up of the founda- tions of a free, independent government in Porto Rico. We have invited the co-operation of all the native elements in the government. It is a government of the people of Porto Rico. It is true that the governor of the island is not elected by the people but is appointed by the president of the United States. Certain other officers are appointed, but the whole spirit of co-operation has been well exemplified there, and the results have justified our hopes in illustrating what American institutions can do when brought into close relationship with the special problems of Latin American civilization. It is there that we are gradually moulding the local institutions that represent the amalgamation of Anglo-Saxon law and Roman law ; it is there that we are gradually building up and strengthening the representative local institutions of govern- ment. Progress in municipal government has been the most remarkable part of all the progress that has been made in Porto Rico. It is there too that we are making the greatest progress in education. The population numbers over a million people, eighty-five per cent of whom were illiterates with al- most no elementary school system when American government was inaugurated. The financial resources of the island were meagre compared with the needs and costs of government; (439) 248 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII and yet there has been built up a substantial elementary -school system, supported out of the revenues of the island. There has been an endeavor to build up higher education, and it is one of the greatest neglects that we have been guilty of that we have not seen the opportunity for a larger and wise invest- ment in that direction. There was established fourteen years ago by act of the insular legislature of Porto Rico the Univer- sity of Porto Rico, planned on the scale of a great American state university. Provision could be made only for a very meagre beginning in working out that plan. It was hoped by those interested at that time that this enterprise of an American university might appeal to American philanthropists, that there might be established there what is one of the greatest needs of the whole South American continent, a great school of medicine, that could be made the basis for the development of more effective public sanitation and public health work which is so much needed throughout all the countries of Latin America. There is also great need for a school of law, where the legal institutions and the political sciences could be studied and cultivated by the greatest scholars of North and South America coming together in such a school. There is also a great opportunity for a school of agriculture. I might go on indefinitely with all the departments of a real university and show an equal need and opportunity for all, especially for a school of business, a school of liberal arts, and a school of science. As the United States moves out of her provincialism and takes her place in world affairs there is no step at this moment where an expenditure of a hundred million dollars would give a greater return for all future time than in making Porto Rico a model of all that is best in American govern- ment, education, sanitation and industrial regulation, and a model experiment station in testing and working out the adaptation of these things to all that is best in the life and in- stitutions of a Latin American population. The United States has given little or no financial aid to Porto Rico and the island thus far has had to pay its own way. An expenditure of twenty-five or fifty million dollars on the educational institu- tions alone of Porto Rico in a way that would bring together (440) No. 2] THE UNITED STATES AND PORTO RICO 249 in that island in intellectual co-operation the leaders of thought and of political life from all the republics of the western hemi- sphere would be an excellent investment. It is not until we awake to the opportunities that we have neglected and ignored, and begin to realize that it will pay us to make an investment in cultivating friendly relations and building the foundations of mutual understanding and co- operation between the republics of the western hemisphere, that we as a nation shall really be alive to the great political questions which we are discussing in this conference, especially those that have to do with our policies in the Carribean and in South America. The intellectual as well as the material re- sources and wealth of the United States must be mobilized and made serviceable for our common needs if we are to bring the Americas together. (441) DRAWING TOGETHER THE AMERICAS^ ROGER VV. BABSON Wellesley Hills, Massachusetts THE social, commercial and financial development of the Americas awaits two things : first, mutual understand- ing; and second, world organization. Differences in Social Ctistoms On one of my trips to Latin America a fine Illinois family, consisting of father, mother and two daughters, was aboard the ship. The daughters, refined and educated girls, for whom we all had the greatest respect, often went about alone when we landed for a day or two at some South American port, as their parents were not very strong. Gradually it was noticeable that none of the Latin American passengers would associate with them, and after a time we discovered the reason. Latin American girls are so closely chaperoned that the freedom which our women have is not understood, and our fellow- passengers could not believe but that these girls must be bad women. This trivial incident illustrates our need for paying greater respect to the customs and feelings of those people. It shows how easy is the question of misunderstanding on both sides. It is one of the many misunderstandings which are now keeping us apart from our Latin American neighbors. Religion and Social Exclusiveness I was in Panama during February 191 6 at the time of the Congress on Christian Work in Latin America. During that time I had a long conference with Dr. Porras, the president of Panama, who was generally supposed by the delegates to be their violent enemy. He explained to me that such was not the case. Said he: 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 1917. (442) DRAWING TOGETHER THE AMERICAS 251 Owing to Panama's convenience to all the countries of North, South and Central America and, in view of its temperate climate, the people of my country welcome to Panama conventions of all kinds. But if the good men and women of the United States want truly to help Latin America, they should not attempt to proselyte our people. Latin America is a solid Catholic country and must be helped through the Catholic Church. Talk with our priests, confer with our bishops, go to Rome if necessary; but don't tell our people that our religion is no good. If the people of your great United States ever hope to draw together the Americas, you must work with us and through us. If we really desire to aid Christian work in Latin America let us call a conference not of a few Protestant missionaries, but of the Catholic bishops and their delegates, who know and control ninety-five per cent of the people of South and Central America. When we do this our missionary societies will build hotels, operate hospitals, and work for and with the Catholic Church. Not until then will the people of the United States be respected in Latin America. So long as we talk freedom and at the same time try to proselyte their p«ople, they think we are mere hypocrites. But this again is a misunderstanding of North American exclusiveness. I recently asked a prominent Colombian gentleman why the people of the United States are looked upon as hypocrites by so many of the people of South America, and he at once replied : Because you stole the Panama Canal zone from us and are now going to war to help France get back Alsace and Lorraine. We don't back up Germany and Austria in this wicked war ; but, if you make Ger- many and Austria retvirn their conquered territories, we hope you will be considerate and return what you have secured in the same way. We were very much frightened when you stole Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and California from Mexico. This last act of yours, giving Colombia the double cross, convinced us and our neighbors that you are a hypocritical, unfair and dangerous people. Hence, we want nothing to do with you. We don't feel easy with your people in our country. We are suspicious of you all. (443) 252 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII When I remonstrated, he answered: Well, if your young people are down here to be of real service, why are they so exclusive ? Why do they stay for only a year or two and then leave for home? Why do they keep by themselves and refuse to mix with our people? Certainly the actions of you North Ameri- cans down here look very suspicious. Once more suspicion is due to mutual misunderstanding. To a slight extent there is ground for misunderstanding. Until recent years many of the North Americans who went to Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala were men who had com- mitted crimes in the United States and had fled to Central America to escape punishment. Therefore we cannot blame the Latin Americans for disliking us. Opinions are like mer- chandise in being judged by sample. Certainly we have sent some pretty poor samples of the United States to Central and South America. I think that we are not sending such men now. The representatives of our great corporations in Latin America today are fine specimens of manhood. I honor and respect them greatly. If the people would only learn to know these men, one element of misunderstanding would disappear. Errors in Diplomacy Another cause of misunderstanding in Latin America is our uncertain and inconsistent diplomacy. This is not a criticism of the Wilson policy. The " dollar diplomacy " of the Taft administration was disliked even more, while President Wil- son's Mexican policy is favorably commented upon throughout Central and South America. The inconsistency of our diplo- macy is what troubles Latin Americans. An official of one of those countries said to me : " Why do you keep United States marines in Nicaragua and practically run the Nicaraguan gov- ernment, while you preach democracy and the right of small countries to settle their own affairs? " Latin American respect for our diplomacy is also lessened by our bluffing. We go too far to begin with and then back down. We are disliked for both things by people who are naturally proud like ourselves. When we threaten them or attempt to dictate to them, they dis- (444) No. 2] DRAWING TOGETHER THE AMERICAS 253 like US at the start. Then we hurt ourselves by not making good our threats. We ought to interfere as little as possible, but when we make a just request, we ought to insist upon its execution. Our policy has often been the very reverse of this. Again, we have been unfortunate in some of our diplomatic appointments. Our consular service is splendid. The "career men " in the diplomatic service are admirable fellows. It is a shame that a rich coxintry like ours does not pay them more. The idea, however, of appointing a man who has never been out of the United States as minister to some Latin American country because he contributed liberally to some campaign fund, is absurd. The situation in this particular, however, has improved. I am sure that the appointments of each adminis- tration are an improvement upon those of the preceding. But our entire system of appointing foreign ambassadors and ministers is absolutely wrong, and these men are the first to admit it. The fact that we are so lavish in our " pork-barrel " expenditures and so stingy with our diplomatic and consular service, is absolutely incomprehensible to Latin Americans. They look upon us as hypocrites for preaching world peace and Pan-Americanism while we are willing to pay so little to the faithful men in these foreign services upon whom our future peace largely depends. Our Bad Merchandisijig Many Latin Americans misunderstand us for the way our merchants and manufacturers use their countries as dumping grounds only. When business is poor in the United States, our people send salemen to South and Central America to sell their excess goods. The salesmen succeed and the goods are liked after our southern neighbors have become acquainted with what yards and inches, bushels and pounds, mean. (You understand that in many ways Latin America is much more up-to-date than we are. They use the metric eystem, for in- stance. They do not permit a few selfish tool manufacturers, with friends on congressional committees of weights and meas- ures, to hold up what would be a real benefit for the entire country.) (445) 254 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII Every period of depression is followed iJy a period of pros- perity, and by the time that Latin Americans become accus- tomed to our goods, the manufacturers of the United States no longer need foreign markets. The home demand takes all their product, and South or Central American orders are, in consequence, not filled. Our manufacturers, indeed, sometimes do not trouble to answer, thinking they can make their Latin customers believe that the orders of the latter never arrived. Such occurrences irritate these people greatly. Germans and English are, in consequence, much more popular than, are our people. The German puts his foreign customers even before his domestic trade. It is impossible to create and hold foreign trade on any other basis. Owing to the close family ties of South Americans, a single offense committed on the part of New York merchants may lose the business not only of a single customer, but of a con- siderable portion of the entire white population of a city, and through his family connections the offended merchant may boycott every concern in New York. The Color Qtiestion The attorney general of one of the Latin American coun- tries recently sent his son — whom we should call a mulatto — to the United States for a technical education. Upon his ar- rival at one of our southern ports he went to one of the hotels and there was refused admission as a Negro. Although he was received with more courtesy after his arrival in Baltimore, where he came to study at Johns Hopkins University, he was finally made so uncomfortable that he left for New York and returned to South America on the first boat he could get. His father then sent him to Berlin. In Germany he was received at the best hotels, was allowed to travel first class on the best trains, was given every courtesy possible, and was treated as a distinguished Latin American. The father of this man takes no stock in our talk about liberty and equality, or demo- cracy versus autocracy. Do you wonder that he prefers Ger- mans to Americans? Do you wonder that when our people are involved in cases before him as attorney general he is pre- (446) No. 2] DRAWING TOGETHER THE AMERICAS 255 judiced against them? Are not he and his friends justified in disliking the United States? I am not criticizing our South for their treatment of this young man ; if his father had been brought up in Mississippi, he would understand it all. I do say, however, that before Latin Americans will ever take us seriously, we must revise our treatment of the colored race. Not only are our people prejudiced against color, but they fail to understand the psychology of the Latin American natives. A young engineering graduate ordered fifty wheel- barrows for use in Nicaragua. He was told that wheelbarrows are not used by the people of Central America. He insisted on sending them. The wheelbarrows arrived before the en- gineer, and he found that the natives had taken off the wheels, knocked off the handles, and were carrying the bodies of the wheelbarrows on their heads. He was greatly vexed, and at- tempted to punish the natives by taking the cost of the wheel- barrows out of their pay. With what result? He was driven out of the country, and a German engineer who was willing to adapt his ways to the native customs was hired in his place. The European War Then of course the leaders of Latin America believe that this great European war has two sides. They believe that in reality two wars are being fought : one war is being waged by England and France for political democracy and political free- dom ; while the other war is being waged by Germany for economic democracy and economic freedom. In the fight for political democracy, Latin America is with the Allies ; but in Germany's fight to break down the bars and secure the fruits of her own economic efficiency, Latin America is sympathetic with Germany. The Latin Americans know the superiority of German commercial service to the service which we give them, and they do not want to be dependent upon us. Latin America will consider a political Monroe Doctrine, but not an economic Monroe Doctrine. Necessity of World Organization This brings me to the second part of my subject — world organization. Such an organization is absolutely essential for (447) 2 56 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII drawing together the Americas. We must learn to understand one another; but mere understanding is not enough. Chaos and anarchy in international affairs are even worse than in national affairs. The Americas can never be drawn together so long as each nation is free to legislate against the interests of other nations, or to consider only it own selfish ends. More- over, the policy of "America for the Americans " will never be practicable. Organized Pan-America will be a success only when it includes the entire civilized world. The Monroe Doctrine will never be safe until, as President Wilson has so admirably suggested, it is extended to protect the entire world as well as the western hemisphere. Our own interests in Latin America will never be secure until the interests of Great Britain, Germany, Japan and the other nations are likewise secure. Nations are simply masses of human beings. To win the respect of a nation, we need apply the same methods as to win the respect of a neighbor. And what are these methods? What is the law of like and dislike? Why, the very words themselves tell the story. Like reacts as like; while dislike reacts as dislike. Respect reacts as respects, while disrespect reacts as disrespect. Treachery reacts as treachery; while service reacts as service. All we need to do in order to win the people of Latin America, or of any other nation, is to apply the Golden Rule. We must do unto the people of other nations as we would want them to do unto us were we in their place. Respect for ourselves can be secured only by our respecting others. Others have confidence in us only as we put confidence in them. Such progress can be developed only through organization. What the War Teaches The great lesson of the European war is the value of eco- nomic organization. The nations are coming out of the Euro- pean conflict in the order of their powers to organize and produce. Organization in agriculture, industry, and other phases of economic life will win this conflict, not military strategy. Captains of industry are in demand today even (448) No. 2] DRAWING TOGETHER THE AMERICAS 257 more than army captains. Germany's submarines would do her no good, were she not organized to be self-sustaining; neither would they do England any harm, if England were organized to be self-sustaining. The class struggle within the nations will also be settled in the same way. Sympathy will never be a factor in drawing together capital and labor, any more than in drawing together the Americas. The side which produces the most is the side which will win. The union card may now help the worker, and a membership in the Union League Club may temporarily be of use to his employer; but their children will sink or swim in accordance with what they produce and distribute. New legislation which removes trade and labor restrictions is a forward step ; but all legislation which adds new restrictions in the interest of either capital or labor, or in the interest of any one race or continent, is a step backward. Artificial barriers always result in weakening the very classes or race which such legislation attempts to protect. An equal chance is all that we can give any person, class or nation ; but such a chance they must and will get. Furthermore, not until they do can there be any permanent peace. In my statistical work, I can take sides neither with the employer nor with the employee; neither with the North American nor with the South American. My work is simply to point out that the groups and individuals with the most ambition, enterprise and originality to produce are the ones who will ultimately come out on top. Neither need you take sides with either the free traders or the protectionists as such. You should make it clear, however, that the nations can never be drawn together so long as one nation can discriminate against the trade and the people of any other nation. I go further and say that the so-called economic conference re- cently held in Paris by the Allies was a crime and a disgrace. The real causes of war are economic, and the international relations of the future must be worked out on economic lines. This means that the seas must be under international control ; that there must be no discriminatory tariff, immigration, or other unfair laws; and that men and property, when outside (449) 258 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII their own countries, must be under the joint protection of the nations, assuring equal security and opportunities to all. Statistics clearly show that under present conditions war is inevitable, and that it can be abolished only gradually by de- veloping more democracy and equal opportunity in and among all nations. Only as it gradually becomes unnecessary for each nation to assert independently its own rights and privileges will the causes of war be eliminated. Peace depends upon the assurance to nations and individuals of the fruits of their own economic efficiency without resort to war. Then we shall not need to draw the nations together. They will automatically draw themselves together. The fundamental difficulty with commercial relations be- tween the Americas today is lack of organization. The ulti- mate solution must come about through a proper organization of the nations. The fundamental difficulty between the United States and the German people today ( I do not say the German government) is due to lack of world organization. The ulti- mate solution must come about through a proper world organi- zation. What are we doing to bring that about? We have appropriated billions to destroy the world and hardly a cent to organize it. Let not the present world war, waged in the name of liberty and democracy, end without some practical organization of the world. Let not our sons and brothers go to their death on the battlefields of France and Mesopotamia, let them not leave these shores, without our great president's constructive message call- ing for world organization ringing in their ears. Let us not be content to talk vag-ue words such as liberty, freedom and democracy ; but let us explain how the world can be organized so that it will be " safe for democracy." Such organization means a world government under which the people of each nation will be free to govern themselves so long as they do not block the peaceful growth of other nations. It means a world government which will : ( i ) assume the great war debts of all the nations in exchange for their excess armaments; (2) regulate shipping, mails, cables and other means of communication between nations so as to guarantee (450) No. 2] DRAWING TOGETHER THE AMERICAS 259 to each the freedom of the seas; and (3) have a veto of any discriminatory tariff, immigration, colonial or other foreign policy of the separate nations such as would lead to war. It means a world government built like the present great re- publics, getting its income from a uniform tax on trade, and operating along lines upon which the leaders of all the great nations are already agreed. For a statistician I have perhaps read a peculiar paper on drawing together the Americas. Experience with Latin America, however, has convinced me that the great problem before us is not financial or commercial, but rather psychologi- cal and political. My diagnosis may not be correct; but it is honest. Therefore I must present it to you in this way. As I said in the beginning, to draw together the Americas, two great things are necessary, mutual understanding and world organization. (451) COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL AGENCIES OF PAN-AMERICAN UNION ^ JAMES CARSON Former Associated Press Correspondent at Mexico City I FEEL very deeply on the question of the drawing together of the Americas. Perhaps because I lived ten years of my life in Latin America and learned sincerely to love that section of the world, or perhaps because I was charmed with the exquisite music of the Spanish language, or that I count my friends from Chili, Argentina and Brazil up to Mexico ; perhaps for any or all of these reasons I rather exag- gerate the importance of the drawing together of the two Americas, but it is to me an exceedingly important question. Sometimes when I lived in Latin America I used to writhe, because I thought our country had approached so blunderingly some of the questions which arose. I fancied I was in the position of a man who could not see the forest for the trees ; but since I have left Latin America I have gotten my per- spective, and I think I was right to the extent that we have made many unfortunate mistakes in our dealings, both com- mercial and diplomatic, with Latin America. I should like in passing to say a word concerning the char- acter of our citizens in Latin America. I have American friends in the colonies of the principal cities of every one of those countries. I have lived in the American colony in Mexico City. I have visited in the American colonies of Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Valparaiso, Buenos Aires and Lima, and I have never found a finer body of Americans than are today living and representing us in South America, Central America and Mexico. I know that every one of my friends was travel- ing under his own name while living in those parts ; I know 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 1917. (452) AGENCIES OF PAN-AMERICAN UNION 26 1 that every one was a loyal, good American, and I am sure I am proud of every one of them. These are the men who are doing more today than our diplomats in bringing the two Americas together. Let us honor them. The drawing together of the Americas has been a subject of particular interest in the business and political circles of our country for the past three years. In 1914 the shock of the Great War threw our South American neighbors into a closer relationship with us than had years of oratory and treaty mak- ing. This world conflict rudely snapped commercial, political and intellectual ties which had been centuries in the making. It literally tore South America away from Europe. Not until this upheaval did even the well informed of the northern con- tinent realize how little we counted with the South Americans, how completely they were dominated in the intellectual, poli- tical and commercial fields by the Europeans, But the war did more. It awakened many American busi- ness men whose interest heretofore had been bounded by the demarcations of their particular districts or states, to an almost romantic interest in South America. Here was a land of promise; here lived 80,000,000 people able and eager to buy our products ; here was an El Dorado which kind fortune had thrown into our lap. A certain few who knew deprecated this ultia-optimistic attitude. None better than they, who for years had been skillfully, scientifically and conservatively de- veloping this field, knew of its importance; but they suffered none of the illusions of the uninformed, the consequences of which for a time threatened to endanger these very ties of close political and commercial relationship for which the newly interested were shouting vociferously. This unpreparedness on the part of the ignorantly well-in- tentioned for a time caused a reaction. They complained that they had been deceived, that the market was non-existent or that its possibilities had been grossly exaggerated, that Pan- Americanism was a myth, and that a community of interests and a real spirit of fraternity with our southern neighbors was the dream of a doctrinaire. To this unfortunate element was added another one, happily small; a few unscrupulous men (453) 262 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII deliberately took advantage of South America's needs to send inferior goods to that market. This time the wail came from the other side, fostered by our European trade rivals, who for years have lost no opportunity, through subtle publicity cam- paigns, to misrepresent the American business man, his meth- ods, his ideals and his country, to the South Americans. Time has practically eliminated the unscrupulous; the un- knowing well-intentioned have learned, are learning, or have dropped out. What concerns us now in this question of the drawing together of the Americas so far as commercial and financial facilities are concerned is, shall we be able to hold what we have gained by the accident of the Great War? What is the South American market? How are we regarded as a people and nation by our southern neighbors, and what effect have these opinions had on our commercial and financial re- lationships in the past and how vital are they to the future? What are our European rivals doing to offset what we have won? Has our diplomacy helped or hindered? It is of vital importance that we know the truth about the South Americans and that they really know us before there can be any real drawing together, either political, economic or intellectual. How divergent are the views may be indicated by the recent utterances of a professor of economics at Cornell University and those of a widely known advocate of Pan- Americanism. The former said : In trying to develop trade with the South American countries we are " barking up the wrong tree." We have been led by the lure of Pan- Americanism, which like the Monroe Doctrine, is a devitalized formula. The term pan- Americanism has bemused us ; we have been attracted by the word America just as we were fascinated by the word republic when used to designate the military autocracies to the south of us. Any ground we have gained during the war cannot be held per- manently; the reason why formerly we have not sold our products in South America being exactly the reason why in the future we shall fail to do so : we do not produce the things that the South Americans want and we do not want the things they produce. The things that we want to buy, Europe, not South America, is willing to sell ; what (454) No. 2] AGENCIES OF PAN-AMERICAN UNION 263 we want to sell, Europe, not South America is able to buy. THe exports of South America, like our own exports, rightly go across the Atlantic to Europe. Therefore, South America is our competitor, not our customer. I am not sure that the writer has been quoted accurately, as I took his statements from a published magazine article, but I am sure that what he is reputed to have said is as wide of the mark as the most visionary dream of any uninformed manu- facturer. His is one side of a picture. Listen to the Pan-American : South America with its eighty millions awaits the enterprise of the American manufacturer and merchant. The day is coming when the ships of the countries of both continents will make the north and south ocean routes as busy and as important as the trans-Atlantic lanes of today. A market, the immensity of which is not yet real- ized by the American business man, is within his grasp. Will he take advantage of this unparalleled opportunity? Somewhere between this statement and the other lies the truth, and it might be said in passing that this point is not near either extreme. Population is not a safe guide when esti- mating the potential markets of South America. It is in- correct to classify the South Americans as our competitors, and it is no less inaccurate to maintain that we have not for sale what the South American wishes to buy, or that he does not produce what we purchase. The diagnosis of the professor is wrong. Such ills as affect North and South American rela- tionships have been in the past and are today psychological rather than economic. The last report of William Henry Robertson, consul gen- eral at Buenos Aires, informs us that for the first time in his- tory the United States in 191 6 became Argentina's chief supplier of merchandise, a place held previously by Great Britain, with Germany second. At the same time the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce announces that our trade with Latin America has reached an average of $170,000 a day. While it is true that a large part of this enormous growth in trade is due to the accident of war, and that it will continue (455) 2^4 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII to increase during the struggle, and for a very considerable time after its termination, it is not true, it seems to me, that the proclamation of peace will witness any great turning of the South Americans to their old mother, Europe, provided we in the United States handle the situation understandingly, which in this case means sympathetically. We have the goods, we are rapidly and admirably creating the facilities both in the matter of banking and transportation. What is wanting is a fundamental understanding of each other on the part of the two peoples. We must know their history, ideals and aspir- ations. I mean the clash of Latin and Anglo-Saxon ideals, for of course there are many peoples in Latin America. Only with this comprehensive understanding of the market shall we hold and enlarge our present position of commercial supremacy, and what should be its corollary, sincere friendship. They must unlearn their conception of the Yankee. The latter is fully as important as the former to us in this question of the draw- ing together of the Americas. We have had years of banqueting and love feasts. They have served their purpose in a measure, have done some good; but to make this sort of thing the principal effort in our future endeavors to draw together the Americas, will be positively dangerous, not only commercially but politically. This was forcibly brought to my attention during a recent journey which carried me through the principal countries of South America. While in Buenos Aires I talked with a brilliant young jour- nalist who knows us thoroughly, having taken a degree in one of our universities here. The conversation drifted, as it always does on such occasions, to Pan-Americanism. My companion was somewhat cynical, though disposed to be decidedly friendly. Finally he said, " What is the equivalent in Spanish for ' bunk ' ? " Somewhat startled I answered that I knew of no such word. " Well," he replied smilingly, " we shall have to coin one down here unless Pan-Americanism is going to mean more than banquets and oratory." When I crossed the Andes into Chile, I sought to draw out my new-found acquaintances there to ascertain if there was any necessity on that side for the minting of a new word. Behind (456) No. 2] AGENCIES OF PAN-AMERICAN UNION 26$ the barrier of the exquisite music and courtesy of the Spanish language, I thought at times I could discern something of this longing for a Spanish equivalent for our inelegant, though ex- pressive word. Likewise in Peru I found that many of the banquet flowers, oratorical and otherwise, were beginning to pall. Therefore I say I believe the time for talking has passed ; we must be doing. What can we do? First we must combat the campaign of our trade rivals who for years have persistently sought to dis- credit the Yankee (we are so known everywhere in South America). Our first great work is to convince the South Americans that we have no imperialistic designs. This task is perhaps greater than you realize. While the well-informed among the South Americans com- prehend our real intentions, even in them there lurks the germ of suspicion which becomes active on every possible occasion. This is due to our acts in the past and to the persistent pro- paganda work which the Germans in particular, and our other European trade rivals in general, have for years kept up in the newspapers and magazines of those regions. They have kept the spectre of possible Yankee domination and alleged im- perialistic designs constantly dangling before the eyes of the South Americans. No matter how reassuring our words may be today, it is only fair to the Latin Americans to admit that our acts in the past have been otherwise. Examine them even cursorily, and it will be seen that from the day when we acquired Louisiana in 1 81 3, after Aaron Burr and others had decided to take it in the event of Napoleon or Spain refusing to sell, to the present year of our acquisition of the Danish West Indies, our record has been one of consistent expansion. In the intervening hundred years we purchased Florida after secretly occupying the terri- tory with our military forces ; allowed Texas to annex herself to us; took by conquest the immense territory then known as California ; advocated the annexation of Cuba during the ad- ministration of President Johnson, in the name of the laws of political gravitation which threw small states into the orbit of the great powers ; demanded the seizure of Santo Domingo, as (457) 266 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII a measure of natu)nal protection, during the term of President Grant; enunciated the principle of the sovereignty of the United States in the western hemisphere during the tenure of Secretary of State Olney, when a break threatened between England and Venezuela; annexed Porto Rico; seized the Philippine Islands, Guam and one of the Marianne Islands; and acquired the canal zone. All of this great territory is Latin in language, religion and tradition. Is the record on its face imperialistic or anti-imperialistic? Our European rivals have utilized to the full this ammuni- tion and are continuing to do so. When I was in Rio de Janeiro during September of last year I read an article several columns in length on the editorial page of the Jornal do Com- mercio, the leading periodical in Brazil and one of the most influential newspapers in South America. It treated of the Monroe Doctrine, attributing that instrument to the English statesman Canning, and pointing out that in its present shape the historic document was the false and distorted product of North American jingoism. The article cited a dinner given by Secretary of State Seward, in which the Secretary was made to say in an after-dinner speech that the South American continent was shaped like a ham, which reminded him that Uncle Sam was fond of pork. The hand of the foreigner was so plain in this that its authorship could almost be fixed. For years scores of stories of this character, and others at- tacking the integrity of the American business man and the ideals of his government, have continuously appeared in the press of the different countries of South America, until the man on the street couples everything Yankee with selfishness, sordid- ness and dollar chasing. Our only virtue in the eyes of the average untraveled South American is that of bigness. El Coloso del Norte they call us, and that generates fear, as well as admiration. Our first great work in the drawing together of the Americas should be to erase this European-painted picture, and, through proper and persistent publicity, indelibly stamp the truth. This work should be undertaken on a large scale, should receive the moral, and, perhaps the material, support of our (458) No. 2] AGENCIES OF PAN-AMERICAN UNION 2,67 government, should be fostered by our great industrial organi- zations, and should in part be carried on under the auspices of such institutions as the General Educational Board or the Rockefeller or Sage Foundations. It has many angles and must extend over a period of years. Not only must an intelligent and comprehensive press cam- paign be conducted by those fitted with a knowledge of the language and the psychology of the Latin, but greatly enlarged arrangements should be made for the encouragement of the attendance of South American youths at our universities, col- leges, schools of commerce and engineering, through the offer- ing of scholarships and otherwise. This feature seems to me of supreme importance. In clubs or on railway trains and aboard steamers during my recent trip through South America, I frequently met men who had attended our schools here, and I always found them champions of the United States. To the father, the outside world revolved about Paris in most cases, though London sometimes was the font of culture and worth- while things; but the son who had received his education in the great republic of the West was in every case a Yankee mis- sionary, a priceless publicity agent. Illustrated lecture tours by those who really know both peoples and languages will help in this publicity work, as will also the business agent who represents us in the field. This effort is necessary for the real and lasting drawing together of the Americas, but before the ground can be so prepared we must have the men to do the work. Some splen- did and praiseworthy pioneering has already been done by our great industrial and banking organizations, notably the Na- tional City Bank; but up to a short time ago even that institu- tion was encountering great difHculty in securing properly qualified men to carry on the American campaign comprehen- sively, though it is systematically educating them now as rapidly as possible. I visited the branches of this bank in Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, Buenos Aires and Val- paraiso, and in each place I found Germans or Englishmen in charge or occupying positions of large responsibility — not the (459) 268 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII most desirable men for the drawing together of the Americas from the standpoint of the United States. Up to a comparatively short time ago many American houses were selling goods in South America through English and German agents. If we are to hold the field we must have properly trained American representatives on the spot. We cannot continue to employ trade rivals and permanently win either friendship or markets. Before we can properly export goods we must export properly trained men. It is not enough that the men who are to conduct this work, either from the actual business end, or from the publicity angle, should know Spanish or Portuguese, they must know the people and the " whys " of the people. It is quite true that there is nothing mysterious about South American trade. The same business principles apply there as in other parts of the world. The old cry against the Americans about poor packing and arbitrary credit arrangements has lost reasoa during the past two years. In these particulars we are today equal to Europe or ahead of her. The method of getting and holding business, however, requires the most esoteric knowledge. The psychology of the Latin is not that of the Anglo-Saxon, and without a knowledge of the springs of character it is impossible to fathom motives, forecast actions or permanently maintain close relationships. The Latin American is the offspring of the Spaniard of the heroic type, or the meditative Portuguese who once dominated this earth. It is impossible to understand him or explain his character unless we go far back into the days of Spain and Portugal and follow the molding influences of a colonial regime marked by tyranny, jealous exclusiveness and fana- ticism. Today, says Garcia Calderon, despite the invasion of cosmopolitanism, the old life persists in cities as important as Lima, Bogota, Quito and many others. » The same little anxieties trouble mankind, which no longer has the haughty moral rigidity of the old hidalgos. Belief, conversation, intolerance — all retain the imprint of the narrow mold impressed upon them by three centuries of the proudly exclusive spirit of Spain and Portugal. The old life, silent and monotonous, still flows past the ancient landmarks. (460) No. 2] AGENCIES OF PAN-AMERICAN UNION 269 When it is realized that individualism is the basic note of Spanish psychology, an Iberian characteristic which has all the force of an imperious atavism; that the present-day Latin American is the product of that fierce strain of religious fana- ticism which the Moors brought into Spain, and the assertive love of self-government expressed in the charter of Leon in the year 1020, antedating the Magna Charta wrested from King John, thus making liberty and democracy of more ancient date in Spain than in England, our American business man will be more tolerant in his judgment. Let us have our young men preparing for this South American trade study Spanish and Portuguese by all means, but let them not neglect the pecu- liarities which constitute the genius of the Latin Americans. A study of the meaning of the lives of such men as Bolivar, San Martin, Franciso de Miranda, Paez, Balmaceda, Santa Cruz and others will prove a real business asset and an invaluable aid in the work of the drawing together of the Americas. In this connection it might be practical to suggest to educators the compilation of such a book of biographies for the use of stu- dents in the Spanish classes of our high schools, universities and colleges of commerce. There is another weak link in the chain we must forge for the drawing together of the Americans. I refer to the lack of direct telegraphic facilities with a very large section of South America. At the present time a message destined for any point on the east coast north of Buenos Aires must be sent via London or down the west coast via Colon to Valparaiso, then overland across the Andes to Buenos Aires, where it is relayed over a British line to destination. The situation in Brazil is such that our American ambassador cannot communicate with his government except through the use of lines owned and operated by British companies. There is but one direct east- coast cable connecting North and South America, and that is owned by France, and has its terminal point at Para. Great Britain absolutely controls the situation in that a concession gives it the exclusive right until 1933 to connect any two points in Brazil by cable. (461) 2 70 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII Thanks to the stimulus of the war we probably shall emerge from the struggle with a real merchant marine, despite the activity of the German submarine. General Goethals promises 3,000,000 tons of steel shipping in eighteen months; the ship- ping board speak of a thousand wooden vessels. However this may be, we must be of one opinion that the after- war struggle for foreign trade will be the sharpest and keenest the world has yet seen. With a thoroughly awakened England made effi- cient as never before, a Germany hungry for the trade she has lost, and a France sharpened by her recent great trials, we shall need all that we have of money, ships and brains. Two markets exist in South America, one for goods, the other for capital. The first is limited. Although the con- tinent has a population of 80,000,000, the Spanish heritage has left more than 60,000,000 of these in a primitive state which for years will exclude them as prospective customers. The others want and are willing and able to pay for the best; our merchants should thoroughly realize this. The second market is unlimited. Only those who have traveled throughout South America realize the stupendousness of the undeveloped ma- terial resources. Let it be said that though we have a knowl- edge ever so esoteric of the character of the Latin American, and though we gain his sincerest friendship, American capital will not flow plentifully southward unless assured of fair treat- ment. Our diplomats must be men trained broadly, our State Department must apply a sliding measuring rod to fit the psy- chology of each situation as it arises. We have been hearing a great deal lately about the opportunities for American trade in China, Russia, Australia and South Africa as well as in South America. We are told that to develop these opportuni- ties is a national obligation and a patriotic duty. If American trade anywhere in the world is developed it will be due finally to individual effort. It will occur because individual Ameri- cans, operating alone or through private corporations, invest their capital in foreign parts, buy foreign securities, build ware- houses, establish branch offices, send salesmen and resident agents. This is legitimate enterprise and the men who have the courage to initiate it must not be classed by the press of our (462) No. 2] AGENCIES OF PAN-AMERICAN UNION 271 country or by our government as piratical gamblers engaged in exploiting foreign peoples ; nor must they be told that they have taken long chances in the expectation of winning large profits, or that their motives are purely selfish and that they are therefore entitled to no consideration. Will American trade in South America, or anywhere else, ever be developed except through the selfish desire of individ- uals to make a profit? How can American capital and enter- prise in South America or in the United States of America construct railroads, build mills, erect packing houses or fac- tories, open up mines or sell goods without exploiting the coun- try, that is, without making a profit out of it? (463) BRINGING THE AMERICAS TOGETHER^ L. S. ROWE University of Pennsylvania; Secretary-General of the Internationa* High Commission IT is a sad comment on human insight that we should have required the devastation of a great war and an imminent national peril to open our eyes to the possibilities of in- ternational co-operation in the fullest and broadest sense. Dur- ing the Pan-American Financial Conference of 191 5 — at a dinner at which the ministers of finance and the leading finan- ciers of all the countries of Latin America were present, the then Secretary of State of the United States startled his hear- ers by speaking of the possibility of close financial co-operation between the United States and the republics of Latin America, and even formulated a plan under which the United States would lend its credit to the sister republics in order to enable them to secure funds at more reasonable rates and to protect them against the exactions of private bankers. The surprise was perhaps even greater when one of the leading financiers of the United States, a man of real statesmanlike grasp, while reserving a final opinion, upheld the feasibility of the plan and its deep international significance. The difficulty has been that we have been accustomed to re- gard peace as a purely negative condition, not associating therewith any positive form of international organization or in- ternational co-operation. This period is now over, and we may confidently look forward to a future in which international co-operation for specific purposes will cover a field far broader than any which we have hitherto known. We shall emerge from this war with a new vision of what international co-oper- ^ Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 191 7. (464) BRINGING THE AMERICAS TOGETHER 273 ation means. America's contribution to the maintenance of a durable peace will depend, to a larger degree than we are ac- customed to think, on the examples which we shall set in the adjustment of the relations between the republics of this con- tinent. The international policy of the American continent must not only be dominated by the utmost good faith, but must set new standards of international helpfulness. I am con- vinced that ten or twenty years hence, we shall regard as both primitive and inadequate the traditional attitude toward gov- ernmental co-operation in the solution of the domestic problems with which the nations of America have to deal. The President of the United States has said that we are the champions of constitutional government on the American continent, and we are certainly deeply and vitally interested in its development. This does not mean, however, that we are to insist upon any particular type of government or any special plan of political procedure. What we are interested in, both for ourselves and for the other nations of the American con- tinent, is the growth of a true political and industrial demo- cracy. For the attainment of this great end, the republics of the American continent must be prepared to assist one another in ways other than mere verbal expressions of good-will. Democracy means something more than a governmental sys- tem ; something far deeper than the election of public officials ; something far more significant than a particular type of written constitution. It means, in the last analysis, the solution of cer- tain basic industrial and social problems such as the elimination of peonage, the governmental guarantee of a minimum stand- ard of life to the masses of the working people, a well-organ- ized system of protective labcw legislation, an agrarian system based on a numerous land-holding class, an educational sys- tem open to all on terms that are really and not merely nomin- ally equal. If the democracies of America are to unite for common purposes, they must understand one another, and this under- standing must involve far more than the absence of friction between the governments. It must include a real understand- ing by the people of common aims and purposes. Lack of un- (465) 274 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII derstanding is the most fruitful source of distrust, and on dis- trust no community of action can be based. In the solution of their internal problems, the republics of America can be of great mutual service, placing at the disposal of one another not only the results of their experience, but the services of those who are able to assist in the solution of these problems. Be- yond all these concrete problems there loom up vast possibili- ties of financial co-operation. It is altogether likely that after the experience through which we are to pass in the course of this war, we shall no longer hesitate to come to the assistance of those countries that are struggling to solve the basic prob- lems of democracy, thereby performing a two-fold service in enabling them to secure funds at reasonable rates and in free- ing them from the complications, national and international, which arise when they are dependent on private sources for such funds. This higher plane of international co-operation presupposes a closer mutual understanding of national purposes and aims than has existed heretofore. It means that we must utilize every opportunity to develop between the countries of the American continent, and particularly between the people of the United States and the people of Latin America, intellectual currents that will bring about a better understanding of na- tional points of view. We must secure for ourselves a more accurate view of the political life of our Latin American neighbors. There is a deeply rooted belief in the United States that there has been no such thing as orderly constitutional development in Latin America, We seem to accept, almost without question, the idea that the political history of these countries has been a long succession of revolutionary move- ments, and that there has been no continuity, no real orderly progress in the growth of political institutions. Nothing can be farther from the truth. It is true that there have been up- risings, all too numerous, due to personal political ambitions, but practically all the important revolutionary movements have had as deep a social and economic significance as our own Civil War. Until we recognize this fact not only will the history of these countries remain a closed book, but we shall (466) No. 2] BRINGING THE AMERICAS TOGETHER 275 continue, as heretofore, to misinterpret their political life and institutions. It is inevitable that in the course of these up- risings much should have occurred which neither we nor they approve, but this ought not to obscure the real significance of these movements. Whatever may be our judgment with reference to individual men and individual measures, the Argentine Revolution of the early fifties, the Chilean Revolution of 1890, and the Mexican Revolution of 19 10 are outward expressions of profound so- cial changes which we must at least understand if we are to be really helpful. We must not delude ourselves with the thought that the development of closer understanding between the peoples of America is dependent on the development of closer commercial ties. If further demonstration of this fact be sought, it is necessary only to study Great Britain's relations with the countries of South America. For nearly three generations she has occupied a dominant commercial position and yet during that period the cultural ties with Great Britain have not been materially strengthened. Real international under- standing and mutual comprehension are not necessary by-pro- ducts of closer commercial ties. Such understanding may be the outcome of common historical antecedents, of community of language and literature, but if these elements do not exist it is only through conscious planning and conscious effort that the national misconceptions due to ignorance can be destroyed, and the foundations laid for that closer understanding upon which effective international co-operation must rest. In no other section of the world is this concerted action so necessary at the present juncture in the world's affairs as on the American continent. The events now transpiring in Europe have again raised with renewed insistence the question whether democratic government can be carried to a high plane of efficiency in the performance of its administrative functions, and whether under a democratic regime the full force and power of a nation can, in moments of crisis, be organized for the accomplishment of national purposes. To this extent, at all events, democracy is on trial, and one of the most important factors in making this (467) 2 76 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII trial a success is to make the results of any governmental ac- complishment in any section of the continent available to all. It is not sufficient, however, that these close relations exist solely as between the organized governments of the American republics. They must be supplemented and fortified by in- numerable currents of thought and action binding together the people individually, as well as the numerous societies and or- ganizations pursuing similar purposes, scientific, civic and social. In other words, it must be America's ambition to give a new meaning to the term and to the fact of international co-oper- ation. It is an ambition which may well fire the enthusiasm of every patriotic citizen, for the example thus given cannot help but exert a far-reaching influence on international relations throughout the world. " What, then," you will ask, " are the specific means through which this new spirit can be devel- oped?" It would take me far beyond the limits assigned to me in this discussion to attempt an exhaustive analysis. There are, however at the present time open to us three or four avenues of such importance that their immediate utilization is a matter of much moment. In the first place, opportunity should be given to select groups of teachers of primary and secondary schools in all the countries of the American continent to become acquainted with the social, economic and political conditions throughout the continent. The teaching of history, geography and civics must break its present narrow bounds and become the vehicle through which the rising generation is given a continental point of view. The narrowness of instruction in history and geography in the United States is nothing less than appalling when we stop to consider the growing power and influence of the country. Second, a well-organized plan should be perfected for furth- ering the interchange of university students. Long-continued inquiries in the United States have shown that the universities of this country are ready to co-operate in such a plan. We have hardly begun to realize to what an extent university stu- dents may become the agents of international co-operation. (468) No. 2] BRINGING THE AMERICAS TOGETHER 277 Third, the interchange of professors should be made an in- tegral part of the educational organization of our higher in- stitutions. The difficulties of language are gradually being overcome, and we may now confidently look forward to the time when the results of the most advanced research will be made available to every section of the American continent. Finally, a carefully organized plan should be develof>ed to give to the graduates of technical schools opportunity for practical training and experience in great industrial establish- ments. Owing to the relatively advanced industrial develop- ment of the United States this will mean that at first these op- portunities should be furnished to graduates of technical schools in Central and South America who may wish to come to the United States. The results of an inquiry among some of the leading industrial establishments have shown that they are ready to take a certain number of such students and give to them practical contact with the great industrial processes. Men so trained will in the course of time be utilized by these establishments as agents in the countries from which they come. These are but a few of the many currents of influence that can be set in motion for the purpose of bringing about a mutual understanding of the ideas and ideals that dominate the differ- ent peoples of America. We in the United States stand in special need of this training in true internationalism, because of all the peoples of the American continent, the people of the United States, in spite of their cosmopolitan make-up, give evidence of a surprisingly limited capacity to understand a point of view different from their ow^n. This shortcoming of the public mind is a real na- tional menace. It must be eliminated if we are ever to make our influence felt for higher and better things. Our great difficulty has been that our national mind has not advanced at the same pace as our national influence. A nation may take itself too seriously, but it can never exaggerate the importance and seriousness of its mission. The difficulty in the United States is that we have taken ourselves somewhat too seriously, yet we have failed clearly to visualize the importance of our international mission. In this respect we can learn much from (469) 278 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS our sister republics. What President Butler has called the international mind has developed far more rapidly in the other countries of America than in the United States. We must bring our thinking in this respect up to a level with that of our southern neighbors. By so doing we shall forever destroy any misconceptions that may exist with reference to what the United States shall stand for in the development of international relations. (470) THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY^ ALBERT SHAW Editor, American Review of Reviews THE power and persistence of ideas lie at the base of all historical movements. Policies have a tendency to form themselves around doctrines and theories, and in due time precedents begin to support policies and to reflect credit upon doctrines. The Monroe Doctrine has run some such course, until now the tendency has been to glorify it as well as to accept it. In order that hope may not die within us and that pessimism may not paralyze our power to press forward, we are compelled to believe that the millennium is about to dawn, that the great war of nations will end in the near future, and that in the happiness of a world peace we shall somehow find solutions for all the problems hitherto unsettled. I like to indulge in these rosy, optimistic dreams, although I have observed too much and studied too widely to suppose that in plain reality a great war will have enlightened all under- standings, chastened all spirits, and made everybody at once right-minded and true-visioned. We shall continue to live in a world that is highly unequal in its stages of development. Some parts of the world will be much more unfinished than other parts. The future will have very difificult questions to deal with that are not involved in the present war. Nevertheless, if many great things that we deem righteous and just can be established at the end of this war, the future course of progress and civilization will be ren- dered accordingly less difficult. We shall have our western- hemisphere problems, but we shall also, I hope, have found improved ways of dealing with them. 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 191 7. (471) 280 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII I should like to say a few words upon the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to a far larger doctrine that had been earlier proclaimed and that persisted in the convictions of some of the men concerned with the Monroe Doctrine's formulation. The political teachers of the eighteenth century, who were the mentors and prophets of the revolutionary period, not only proclaimed their doctrines of the rights of man and of political and social democracy, but they also held firmly to the doctrine of world organization. Europe lost the great vision and en- tered upon a period of unrestrained nationalism after the col- lapse of the Holy Alliance. But the American leaders, notably Jefferson, kept alive both parts of the great conception of the revolutionary reformers. That is to say, the authors and de- fenders of the Declaration of Independence not only stood for democracy, but also believed in the confederation of democratic sovereignties and in the abolition of international conflict. Thus our American union of states was consciously built upon both parts of the great conception of a reformed political life for the world. The first part was the democratic rule of communities, and the second part was the confederation of sovereign states. In both parts we have made a marvelous suc- cess of the practical demonstration. This success was based not merely upon the doctrines themselves, but also very greatly upon wisdom and generosity at moments of crisis. Two great steps stand out among others. Hamilton's leadership in securing the assumption of the revolutionary debts of the states by the confederation as a whole was most admirable in its effects. Still more important was Jefferson's leadership in persuading Virginia to cede her western lands, with the result that the Northwestern Ordinance gave us a series of magnificent states while pointing the way toward creating the group of states south of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi. The concep- tions embodied in the Northwestern Ordinance have been pro- jected across the continent. They have given us forty-eight sovereign states, not by any means of equal size and import- ance, but sufficiently alike in their averages of population and resources to constitute a true and permanent sisterhood of commonwealths. (472) No. 2] MONROE DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 281 It was because of the persistence of this great conception of democratic self-government in the particular states with the common interests of them all merged in the higher structure of the confederation, and with a higher machinery of justice to deal with possible misunderstandings between them, that Jefferson could see no necessary limit to the extension of a system thus firmly based upon human equality and universal education. He expressed the opinion repeatedly that a con- federation thus formed might expect in due time to comprise the whole of North America and ultimately to include Central and South America. Canada has, indeed, had a different history thus far from that which both British and American statesmen had antici- pated until a very recent period. Yet the course of things in the Dominion of Canada has not, upon the whole, been widely divergent from that which Jefferson and others had predicted. The great northwestern areas have been divided into states, in each of which — as in Manitoba and the rest — there is now to be found a thoroughly modern and strictly democratic government, with all the attributes of autonomy. The Canadian states, from the maritime communities of the east to British Columbia on the west, are united in a confederacy that is quite in harmony with the Jeffersonian conception. So closely akin are the essential principles that control the individ- ual states and the Canadian confederation with the prin- ciples that control our individual states and our union, that there is visible an increasing harmony between the two halves of the North American continent. There is practically little more danger that Michigan will quarrel with Ontario, or that Minnesota will quarrel with Manitoba, than that either Michi- gan or Minnesota will quarrel with Wisconsin. I hope and believe, however, that in case of a quarrel, as over a boundary line, there may in due time be an authoritative tribunal as between Alberta and Montana, so that the diplomatic methods of the past that dealt with the Maine boundary and the Alaska boundary may be superseded by an institution more analogous to our Supreme Court. Suffice it to say that North America has upon the whole worked out fairly well the eighteenth-cen- (473) 282 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII tury conception of the democratic autonomy of states and the confederation of neighboring commonwealths extending over continental areas. Jefferson and the men of his time undoubtedly realized that democratic institutions could not be so easily developed where people were lacking in homogeneity or were made up of races lacking in education and unequal in economic development ajid position. Yet those statesmen of the revolutionary period had supreme faith in democracy, and they were not so contemptuous of the so-called inferior or backward races. The Monroe Doctrine was inspired by two things: first, a large vision ; and second, an exigency of statesmanship. I shall not, I am sure, be thought to touch upon matters of his- torical controversy when I ascribe the Monroe Doctrine to Jefferson in so far as the larger vision is concerned. His correspondence with Monroe affords all the evidence that one needs. For the statesmanship of John Quincy Adams I have the most unqualified regard, as also I have for the Pan-Ameri- canism of Henry Clay and those of his school. The independ- ence of Latin America was favored by our political leaders and thinkers in the United States as the great preliminary step. There were also those in Latin America who cherished the earlier ideals of the French Revolution, and who believed both in democracy and in the federation of states for the preservation of peace. It was plain enough that even with admirable paper constitutions prescribing democracy, it would be a painful task to build up the intelligent and capable body of democratic citizens without which mere paper institutions cannot give freedom or security. But Jefferson, Adams, Monroe and their contemporaries believed that Latin America would have a better future if it were free to go on in its own way creating through arduous experience the reality of a series of democratic republics, than if it were brought back under the yoke of European colonialism by the united military and naval efforts of the emperors of the Holy Alliance and the Spanish crown. It is true that the nature and the motives of the Monroe Doctrine have been construed in different ways at dif- (474) No. 2] MONROE DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 283 ferent times by statesmen in Europe, in South America. and in North America. These different constructions have been due chiefly to practical problems involving the possible application of the doctrine. It can never be rightly or fully understood, however, unless one keeps in mind not only the historical circumstances but the political doctrines and the large visions under which it had its origin. I repeat, then, that the conception of the American union of self-governing states was in no small measure the outgrowth of that still larger conception of world federation and per- petual peace that German and British thinkers, as well as French and American, were entertaining in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The Monroe Doctrine was intended to save the whole of the western hemisphere for the processes of democracy and interstate organization, for the abolition of war and the promotion of the concerns of the common civilization. I have never had much respect for that view of the Monroe Doctrine which has made foreigners think of it as a sort of Yankee jingoism. Doubtless at certain times and in certain aspects our own national interests have been involved in the assertion that Europe must not meddle in western-hemisphere affairs. We have desired to keep the western world from be- coming militaristic, and in this sense we have helped to make the Monroe Doctrine a success. From the Straits of Magellan to Baffin's Bay and the Northwest Passage, there has been no state or community that has founded itself upon the doctrine of military power as against its neighbors. For a region so rela- tively undeveloped in natural resources, and so far from ma- turity in the creation of its bodies politic, South America in recent decades has been singularly free from the din of arms. Brazil, Argentina and Chile have learned to be good neigh- bors; and there is little evidence anywhere in Latin America of the existence in any country of a party or a leadership that has in mind the securing of a dominant position as among neighbors by the militarizing of national resources on the European model. (475) 284 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII It was precisely to prevent the growth of such military policies, and to encourage friendly and helpful inter-relation- ships among the American democracies, that the men of Monroe's time took their stand against the extension to the western hemisphere of the European system of exploited colonies. The survival of that system in Cuba remained as an awful example and a standing justification of the principles that Monroe and Adams enunciated and that Mr. Canning seems to have supported. It is necessary, I think, to have this larger vision in mind in order to judge at times of the value of practical applications. It happens that the confederation of our forty-eight sovereign states becomes relatively less a confederacy of sovereigns, and relatively more a national union of subordinate parts, simply because of the great homogeneity of the older American stock and the wide distribution of our newer immigrant elements. But for these facts the states would be relatively more individ- ual and the union would not absorb power quite so easily. I am making this remark because of its relation to the future of entities that have distinct populations. Thus, Porto Rico can derive security and much economic and social progress from her place in our confederation while exercising democratic self-government according to the genius of her own people and with the enjoyment of her own language and customs. Cuba, in turn, can, for purposes of international policy, derive benefit from a limited connection with our confederacy while working out her own destiny as a self-governing people. I am of opinion that the two principles of democracy and con- federation may also secure for all of the Central American states, and even for Mexico, some advantages from special or limited partnerships in our confederation, with full freedom of domestic evolution. As respects the larger nations of South America, the Monroe Doctrine has become for them and us merely a family concern. As against European imperialistic assertions, we may indeed at times have been justified in declaring that ours was the place of leadership in the western hemisphere, and that we would make it our business to see that no small American state should (476) No. 2] MONROE DOCTRINE AND DEMOCRACY 285 be treated by any European empire as Serbia was treated in 1914 by the government at Vienna. But, as among ourselves in the western hemisphere, it was not the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine to create or set up a position of overlordship. Much less was it any part of our doctrine that Europe must find her spheres of interest and exploitation in Asia and Africa in order that we might have the western hemisphere as our sphere of commercial or political exploitation. So far as Brazil and the other larger and more stable republics are concerned, the Monroe Doctrine is to be interpreted as one of mutual help and good understanding. We seek increasing friendship with our South American neighbors, and rejoice in their progress and welfare. It is entirely in accord with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine that the Pan-American Union has been established, and that various Pan-American conferences have been held from time to time. Our interests in the European struggle were iden- tical with those which we asserted in the period of the Monroe Doctrine. We stand now, as then, for democracy, liberty, non- militarism, and friendly adjustment of all international dif- ferences. We have joined in the war against Germany, not to help one set of European powers obtain the advantage over another group of powers for selfish reasons of their own, but because the interests of all the American republics, as of demo- cracies everywhere, were imperiled by the methods which Ger- many had adopted and by the doctrines and policies that Ger- many and her allies were supporting with an organized appli- cation such as the world had never seen, of science and skill to military ends. The Monroe Doctrine was a part of that larger message of peace, democracy and universal friendship that the best think- ers of modern times had delivered to Europe and America in the latter part of the eighteenth century. With many blun- ders, but faithful in the main. North America and South America have gone forward trying to realize in practice those great dreams of democracy and international peace. Ov^er against these high doctrines, announced in the eighteenth cen- tury by utilitarian philosophers and Christian moralists alike, (477) 286 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS we are now combating the destructive and hideous doctrine of the right to dominate in the affairs of the world by unre- strained force. The object of the Monroe Doctrine was the peaceful evolu- tion of democracy in the western hemisphere. Our participa- tion in the war against Germany is in strict fulfilment of the aims of the Monroe Doctine. We are fighting for the rights of democracy and the claims of international peace. Funda- mentally, the whole of the western hemisphere, South America no less than North America, had become imperiled by the doc- trines and methods of Germany and her allies. The cause of the United States in this war, therefore, is also the cause of Brazil and the other South American republics. We are en- titled to the moral support, if not to the physical aid, of all the members of the Pan-American Union. If in this crisis the western hemisphere shall see alike, it will be fortunate indeed for the future relations of the United States with the sister republics of South America and the communities of the main- land and of the islands around the Caribbean. (478) THE FUTURE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH LATIN AMERICA FROM THE LATIN AMERICAN VIEWPOINT^ F. A. PEZET Former Minister from Peru to the United States THE tenn Latin America as applied to the twenty repub- lics of Central and South America and the Caribbean is by no means a happy one, because it tends to obliterate the idea of any distinctive nationality in connection with inde- pendent states, and merges them, as it were, into one whole. If we must be known by common appellations, why not call us according to groups following special geographic position, viz., Caribbean republics — meaning Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic; Central America, comprising the five republics of Central America proper and Panama, which geographically belongs there; and South America, which would include the ten republics that occupy the southern continent ; leaving Mexico by herself, as she cannot reasonably be placed in any of the above-mentioned groups. Following such a method, our peoples at least would not be altogether confounded in the common mind in such a way as to make us lose our national distinctiveness, a right which be- longs to every citizen of an independent sovereignty and of which he is justly proud, no matter how large or small, power- ful or weak his country may be. Today the world is fighting its greatest war for the freedom of nationalities — I may say for the existence of nationalities — for the rights of peoples who are entitled to govern themselves. Therefore the grouping together of nations, the merging of peoples even when they are ethnically of one race, and even when it is done merely as a means of classifying them, is unde- sirable. Today it is more than ever necessary that nationality * Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 19 17. (479) 28S CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII should stand out. We of the Americas have a right to assert our distinctive nationality. We must either be Americans all, or known, each of us, by our separate country's name. If we accept the generic term Latin America as applied to the twenty republics, the subject-matter that I have been asked to discuss becomes a question of such intricacy that it could not be treated intelligently in the short space of time allotted to me. By reason of geographic conditions certain territories in the world enter more directly than others into what is now known as the sphere of political influence of certain nations or groups of nations; also the relations between neighboring states are always more delicate — because more apt to be dis- turbed by trifles — than those between states far removed by land or water; and there are today what may be termed prospective strategic positions, mainland or island terri- tories that by reason of their location with respect to certam other points, military or naval, may at any moment become of paramount and decisive importance. Among the twenty republics that are termed Latin America, some have already been drawn into the sphere of influence of the United States; others have at some time had some question with this country which unfortunately left a scar or at least some soreness; others feel that they are being drawn into your sphere of influence by reason of their proximity to the pros- pective strategic positions to which I have just alluded; while others that have had no cause whatever of friction with the United States, profess a true and decided friendship for her. It will be seen how difificult if not impossible it would be to put in the same category the relations with this country of Mexico, for example, and those of Brazil or Bolivia. The future relations of the Americas will have to be deter- mined by past conditions no less than by those of the present day. The entrance of the United States into the world war has uncovered to the American continent new vistas; for this country will take part in the liquidation of the war, and in that final settlement all questions now affecting international rela- tions will have to be threshed out if there is to be any prospect of permanent peace. It is useless for nations to think that (480) No. 2] FUTURE RELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS 289 because they have taken no part in the war, or have adhered strictly to the principle of neutrality, they will not be affected by the settlement. At the final liquidation, all pending ques- tions may well be examined and passed upon by the tribunal of nations that will sit in council to solve existing problems and to make improbable, if not impossible, a recurrence of the present world catastrophe. If this war is going to decide anything at all, it is going to decide upon the future international relationship of nations. It is unthinkable that after this frightful carnage, after this wholesale devastation and destruction of the machinery of the world, the world will simply revert to ante-bellum methods and rebuild itself on the old lines. President Wilson in his recent memorable messages to Congress has declared that he stands for new world ideals; the world has applauded him for giving utterance to those sentiments, and for following them up with acts that do honor to the people he represents. Every nation, great or small, has taken note of those words and ap- plied them to itself, and has construed from them the meanings that best fit its particular case. The entrance of the United States into the conflict has therefore placed a new complexion on world relations. It has brought to them an element that will have decisive influence in all future war councils and the greatest influence at the time of the liquidation of the war. The future relations of the United States with Latin America will have to be determined by the attitude of the Latin Ameri- can countries toward the United States and her allies from now on. Whatever differences may have existed or do still exist between Latin American nations and the United States, it is gratifying to attest the unanimity and spontaneity with which the peoples of all Latin American countries have welcomed the entr}^ of the United States on the side of the Allies, and have hailed the declarations of President Wilson, as well as the stand taken by this country against the campaign of submarine frightfulness of the Central Empires. As an ardent friend and admirer of the United States, and a well-wisher of the sacred cause of the Allies, it has been most gratifying to me, enthus- iastic Pan-American that I am, to see the immediate and ready (481) 290 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII stand of Cuba and Panama, which proves their gratitude to this country; and to observe the attitude of solidarity shown by Bolivia, Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and finally Brazil. Notwithstand- ing the fact that she holds the largest individual German popu- lation in the whole of America outside the United States, and that she is indebted to Germany for much of her material development and progress, Brazil has considered it her duty to revoke her neutrality and align herself on the side of the United States for the cause of justice and democracy. Brazil takes this stand because the United States is an integral part of the American union, and because Brazil's traditional policy is one of complete unity of view with the United States, and because the sympathies of a great majority of her people are with the United States. Notwithstanding these expressions of sympathy, which are most encouraging to the spirit of solidarity, it must not be forgotten that the American continent, outside the United State, is a little world of its own, with its own problems to solve. Its own international affairs are paramount in its life,, and they are a constant menace to its peace. It is to the inter- est of all that these questions should be finally settled. In this connection I desire to repeat certain passages from a recent address on Pan-American co-operation which I deliv- ered before the University of Cincinnati : To effect Pan-American co-operation and to bring about a condition that shall be permanent, we of the Americas must be untiring in our efforts toward a Pan-American international understanding. Such an understanding to be of any real value and to serve its purposes, must be of a nature that shall hold good for all nations alike. There must not be any discrimination whatever. It must be honest and true from nation to nation, free from restrictions, reservations, loop- holes or exceptions of any kind. It must embrace all nations, the strong and the weak, the advanced and the backward, the rich and the poor, and every one of our nations must be willing to enter freely into the spirit of the thing, without which there cannot be an honest understanding. To bring this about we must first realize that there are signs already indicating clearly that before long questions; (482) No. 2] FUTURE RELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS 29I of greater importance than any of our present-day controversies will be confronting the American world as a whole; questions of such magnitude in their scope as to dwarf into insignificance all others; questions that of necessity will demand concerted action, if they are to be dealt with in a manner to safeguard the interests of all our peoples. Therefore, as a first step toward this Pan-Ameri- can international understanding, we should establish the principle of Pan-American conciliation, which implies the eradication of all outstanding differences that may now exist between any of the American nations ; the removal of all causes of future friction among them, by settlement of all present-day controversies; and the re- nouncing of all such policies and actions as are in any way harmful to third interests, and detrimental to a final settlement. Here and in the Latin American countries men have come for- ward at times as strong advocates of closer relations, and as cham- pions of the more advanced form of Pan-American solidarity. Such sentiments and ideals are voiced at all the many Pan-American gatherings. Notwithstanding this, conditions throughout the con- tinent still show us that we have not yet reached that stage of inter- national relations where we can justly and truthfully declare our American world free from the controversies and differences that embitter nation against nation, and that carry within them the seed of distrust and the germ of war. On all sides and from every nation in America arises today a cry on behalf of Pan-American solidarity. While in the abstract all desire its realization, the in- dividual nation in too many cases would withhold from the general plan of conciliation one or more specific questions which it con- siders of vital interest to its own welfare, security, political prestige or influence. Such an attitude is directly in opposition to the very essence of conciliation. From the moment that a nation withholds one of its controversies from the operation of a general plan, it nullifies the effects of the plan and destroys its scope for good. If the nations of America cannot now reach an understanding, it is because some of them do not care to surrender positions that they have acquired and that they have taught themselves to believe are essential to their future welfare, their security, or the political in- fluence that in certain determined sections they consider as rightly belonging to them. The settlement of these outstanding American controversies is absolutely essential to the future good relations of the United States with Latin America. (483) . ' 202 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII Whether we like it or not, the United States in the im- mediate future will have a greater influence than ever before over the destinies of the rest of the continent. By her entrance into the war on the side of the Allies the United States has un- questionably obtained absolute and explicit recognition of her position as the dominant power in the New World; this step means the implicit recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by all her new allies, and naturally gives to the United States a freer hand than before in dealing with all questions affecting the Americas. Possibly, and not improbably, one outcome of the war will be the turning over to the United States of all the European island possessions in the Caribbean, thus virtually making it a mare clansum although, of course, absolutely free to commerce and navigation for the world. Just as the powers that met to arrange the Peace of Westphalia and the Peace of Vienna took upon themselves not only the settlement of the questions that had immediately led to the wars they finally closed, but also of all others that were derived therefrom, or that in the interest of the contracting parties demanded ar- rangement, so will it occur in the final liquidation of the present world conflict. But as no other war has involved so many nations and so many different races, the settlement of this one will require far greater tact and diplomatic skill, in order not to leave unsettled any question that might give rise to disagree- ment or bring about friction and thus undo the good work already achieved by the ending of the war. When that time comes the great powers will be w^eary of war. They will wish only to get back to the work of reconstructing all that the years of war have destroyed, paralyzed or devast- ated. It is reasonable to suppose that they will not care to be troubled with the grievances of the smaller states, especially of those who, preferring to abide by their policy of strict neu- trality, did not take any part in the war. Not improbably the council of nations sitting at the great peace gathering will look with not too benevolent eyes upon those nations that are still harboring bickerings against one another, or bringing to the council for adjustment controversies which could be settled out of court; nations that through stubbornness or wilfulness fail (484) No. 2] FUTURE RELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS 293 to fall into line with the spirit of the time and settle their outstanding affairs in a manner conducive to lasting peace. It is not improbable, in my judgment, that the United States, and those nations that have courageously and spontaneously solidarized themselves with the cause of justice and true demo- cracy will be given a free hand to arrange the outstanding af- fairs of the Americas in a manner that shall prevent the dis- turbance of the peace of the continent. In view of this possibility, and that all who stand for better relations between the Americas should realize that the Latin American mind is very apt to regard American imperialism as a direct menace, and to construe in its own way every action of this country, it is important to know the reason for this, because the average citizen of the United States cannot understand it. A quotation from a noted South American may illustrate the point. Commenting on the growth of Yankee imperialism, as it is termed, he says : As the United States developed, there came into existence a power- ful imperialistic party to whom the subjugation of Latin America became something of primordial necessity, equal in importance with the existence of America, based on the pretext that the Latin coun- tries of the continent had not been faithful to the ideals to which they owed their origin. For such men as Polk, Seward and Roose- velt, all of South America, or at any rate a part thereof, should be annexed to the United States, because the people occupying it are unworthy of an independence the noble aims of which they do not understand. Commenting on this, he adds : It is true that many of those people, living in the throes of brutal despotisms, of criminal and hypocritical oligarchies, the victims of silent dictatorships or under opera bouffe leaders, have given motives to those inspirers of Yankee expansionism to assert, not without per- fect ground, that Latin America had forgotten the raison d'etre that had determined the recognition of its independence by the liberal and democratic nations that had tendered to its people a friendly hand at the time of the struggle for freedom against Spain. Viewing the situation thus, this writer states that with the growth of imperialistic tendencies in the north. South America (485) 2QA. CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII became more resentful and guarded toward her northern neigh- bor, developing in time an anti-American feeling which grew according as the imperialistic tendencies in the north became more apparent. Year by year the breach between the two sec- tions widened and they would have become altogether es- tranged had not a sudden change come in the attitude of the north. It became aware of the existence in Latin America of peoples more advanced in democracy ; this discovery, reacting favorably, gave life to a new sentiment in the United States on behalf of fraternal equality. Anti-American sentiment throughout Latin America is the direct outcome of what is termed by our peoples Yankee imperialism. Reduce the aggressiveness of this, and immediately a friendly sentiment is engendered, because at the root of our relations there is a real and true source of genuine amity. Let us analyze, then, the acts wherein the United States has given occasion for the Latin republics to raise a hue and cry against Yankee imperialism. If we do this, we must confess in justice and truth that the United States has acted in most instances in response to moral obligation. In most cases it has acted on the appeal of a political party or of the consti- tuted government of the country in whose territory the ag- gressive act took place. I do not refer here to the Mexican Wars, because in respect to those the verdict of America has already been passed. But let us look at the more recent events in American history with reference to what you call Latin America. In the first place, look at this country's attitude toward Cuba. I do not believe that there is any other nation in the whole world that would have acted toward Cuba as the United States acted on the occasion of the first and second interventions. I leave the verdict with all Cuban patriots. Next we have the Panama Canal incident — a most deplor- able and unfortunate incident, but one that cannot and should not be imputed altogether to the fault of the United States. Some day, even Colombians will see the truth of this. Today we are still too close to the event to be able to judge with exact and complete fairness — not on the incident as it hap- (486) No. 2] FUTURE RELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS 295 pened, but on the effect of the act itself. But even here, the fact that successive administrations, Republican and Demo- cratic, have shown their willingness to come to some sort of set- tlement on the basis of an indemnity, implies that the nation in a measure is conscious of having inflicted some harm, caused damages, and given cause for resentment. As a citizen of a South American republic with wounds still unhealed, I ask, when has a nation in Latin America that has done material harm to another recognized its mistake, offered to undo the ungracious act, and volunteered to make honorable amends ? I come next to the other Caribbean republics. I can under- stand that for many of the citizens of the Dominican Republic it must be a great mortification to have American marines in certain sections of their national territory and to have foreign intervention in their country and its affairs; but on the whole there is some good coming out of this, some good that many worthy Dominicans are likewise instrumental in bringing about ; and only time can show how beneficial this may be for the country at large. In Haiti more or less similar conditions exist. The fact that both the Dominican Republic and Haiti have expressed their sympathy with the United States in the break with Germany would prove that the experiment, however humiliating to over-sensitive natives, is perhaps sowing the seed for a harvest of future peace in fair lands where unrest through chronic misgovernment has been rampant. I turn next to Central America. To judge from the con- ditions in some of these countries and the manner in which they are developing their natural resources and increasing their commerce with the United States because peace is being main- tained in their territories, there are indications that soon the need for intervention or for military control in any of them will disappear altogether. They will have learned the lesson that full sovereignty is dependent on honest democratic gov- ernment carried on for the good of its people. Where, I ask, is the territory that Yankee imperialism has grabbed from Latin America? Where are the fetters that the United States has placed on the peoples of the nations under her sphere of influence? What is the material damage that (487) 2q6 conference on FOREIGN RELATIONS North American intervention in Latin republics has wrought? It is time that these myths with which the Latin American mind has been fed were exploded, and I am glad and proud to be here on this occasion to do this work. But do not blame Latin Americans as the originators of all these stories. In many instances they have been instigated by foreigners, by persons that have some grudge against Ameri- cans generally, or against individual Americans. One of my German colleagues in South America used to go out of his way to carry on a virulent propaganda against the United States and everything American as far back as 1908, and a German minister in Peru tried to poison my mind against this country and its people by advising me that every cent of American capi- tal invested there in Peru would mean, in time, Yankee inter- ference in my country's affairs and the losing of Peruvian independence in financial and commercial matters. Fortun- ately I had been here before, and so his advices fell on deaf ears; but you can imagine the harm that such a man can ac- complish among people whose only knowledge of Ameri- cans in not unfrequently derived from dealings with poor specimens, some of whom have left home in a hurry and gone down to our countries in the hope of getting rich quick. This type, I am happy to say, is fast disappearing from South America, though it is still to be found in Central America and the Caribbean region ; and it is to this type that this fair and great nation owes much of the bad reputation she has earned in Latin America. If the intelligent and patriotic Central Ameri- can, South American or Mexican will give himself the trouble to look into the record of the United States as a world power and to compare it with that of any other world power, he will find that no other nation, not even Great Britain, the greatest colonizing power in the world, has accomplished in so short a time so much for the people that it has taken over as the United States has done in the Philippines and in Porto Rico. The nations of the Americas are daily being brought closer together. It behooves us therefore to sink our differences so as to create a strong bond of mutual understanding and then to stand all together for the common cause of democracy. (488) THE MONROE DOCTRINE AFTER THE WAR ^ GEORGE G. WILSON Professor of International Law, Harvard University THE President of the United States on Januaiy 22, 191 7, in the words, " Perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the people of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back," proposed a Monroe Doctrine for the world. This was in the now celebrated "peace without victory " address to the Senate. The President also sa.id, " I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say," and later in the same address he asserted, " I fain would believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere." As president of the United States, Mr. Wilson's words may unquestionably and properly be regarded in foreign countries as expressing the policy of the United States government. As the head of the government of a state occupying an important place in the world, when many other states are engaged in war, the claim to be speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere is not wholly presumption. It can also certainly be claimed that a president of the United States in 191 7 has an equal right with a president of the United States in 1823 to state what American policy is, and if in 191 7 the policy of 1823 is reaffirmed, then such policy would be worthy of even greater consideration in international affairs. President Wilson on January 22, 191 7, proposing a concert of powers, government by consent of the governed, free- dom of the seas, and limitation of armament, advocated that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world ; that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 191 7. (489) 2o8 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful. Clearly, then, this recently announced American policy is for the period after the war to enlarge the scope and operation of the Monroe Doctrine. The realization of this fact is evident in foreign opinion. On January 24 Bonar Law, chancellor of the exchequer, in a speech at Bristol, said of the address of President Wilson, " What President Wilson is longing for, we are fighting for." On January 26 it was announced from Petrograd, that Russia " can gladly endorse President Wilson's communication." The part relating to the freedom of the seas found particular response in Russia. From other countries came statements that the ideals of the address were approved, but that the task involved was appalling, considering the pres- ent condition of the world. As the United States has been the supporter of the Monroe Doctrine in the past, it must doubtless be its supporter after the war. It would be reasonable to conclude that the President, speaking on January 22, 191 7, was speaking of the probable attitude of the government of the United States toward the doctrine. The principles of the doctrine would therefore be involved in the American ideas for the settlement of world diflficulties. The doctrine in its new form would cease to be narrowly American and would hav^e a world basis. If it means merely that each state should be allowed unhampered oppor- tunity for development, such an ideal would meet little formal opposition. If it means that the United States should be recognized as controlling the destinies of the American con- tinent there would doubtless be opposition. Even if expanded into the doctrine of America for Americans or some form of Pan-Americanism there might be question of world-wide approval. The doctrine may therefore be passing even now to a wider field of influence. It should be said, however, that the United States is no longer sole arbiter as to the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, as it once was, because under a large number of (490) No. 2] THE MONROE DOCTRINE AFTER THE WAR 200 treaties this government has agreed to refer differences even when relating to the Monroe Doctrine to investigation by a commission. Indeed, under these treaties disputes of every nature whatsoever are to be referred to a commission. Such treaties are operative with nearly all the great states except Germany and Japan, and with most of the smaller powers. Again, it may be said that it is to be presumed that these so- called Bryan treaties were made to be observed. The com- missions to be established in accordance with the terms of these treaties are international rather than American. Therefore under the treaties by which the United States is already bound and has been bound since 191 3, the Monroe Doctrine, if the subject of a difference with a treaty power, must be referred to an international commission. For the parts of the world now under these treaties the doctrine has had since 19 13 some- thing of the aspect which President Wilson's address may be forecasting for an area much larger than the Americas. Of these treaties there are in fact now ratified twenty or more, and about half as many more have been negotiated. If thus for half the states of the world the Monroe Doctrine may now be subjected to international standards of judgment, its purely national and American character may be said already to have been waiv^ed. The next step — the recognition by the world of the general principles underlying the doctrine as likewise sound for world policy — would not now be a long step for the United States. When the Monroe Doctrine was originally published in Europe it met with approval from liberal statesmen, who hailed it as shedding " joy, exultation, and gratitude over all free men in Europe." The reactionary Metternich maintained that it was a natural calamity following the establishment of free states. Later, Bismarck regarded it as a piece of " inter- national impertinence." At home the propositions of Monroe were received with a degree of proud self-satisfaction. By many it was regarded as giving to the Declaration of Inde- pendence a wider scope. Many other interpretations followed, and these were frequently adapted to temporary policies, but the doctrine was always regarded as a choice American con- tribution toward the well-being of the western continent. (491) 300 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII It is now proposed by President Wilson not that no Euro- pean nation should seek to extend its authority over an Ameri- can nation but " that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people." The reason for the early acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine was the physical power of the United States and the remote- ness geographically of the area to which the doctrine applied. President Cleveland in his message of December 17, 1895, stated that the doctrine " cannot become obsolete while our republic endures " and that it found its basis in " the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced." Secretary of State Olney at the same period pointed out to Great Britain that " the people of the United States have vital interest in the cause of popular self-govern- ment " and that the British policy was so threatening to Ameri- can policy and rights that his government could not permit^ " if the power of the United States is adequate," the accom- plishment of the British ends. There is thus involved, if the Monroe Doctrine is to be maintained, the existence of a power behind it which will ensure respect. In a sense the Monroe Doctrine aimed in 1823 to make the western hemisphere " safe for democracy." The President's war message of April 2, 191 7, said, " The world must be made safe for democracy." In this broad conception the United States may thus be said to be fighting for a Monroe Doctrine for the world. Experience has shown that the western hemisphere has not been " safe for democracy " at all times and that the United States has had to be ready to use force to maintain the rights of self-governing nations. Accordingly in the same message and elsewhere President Wilson has expressed the conviction that there must be " a partnership of democratic nations " to maintain their institutions. This idea had already received general acceptance among the leading nations of the world and has been more and more generally approved as the war has dragged from weeks into months and from months into years. President Wilson in his war message to Congress on April 2, 191 7, stating that his mind had not changed since January 22, said : (492) No. 2] THE MONROE DOCTRINE AFTER THE WAR 30I Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the world as against selfish autocratic power, and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purposes and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of these principles. Monroe, looking to the political system of central Europe in 1823, had taken a similar position, saying of the attitude of the powers belonging to the so-called Holy Alliance that it was impossible that they " should extend their political system to any portion of either (American) continent without en- dangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord." It is evident now that the United States does not desire alone to maintain the principles of such a doctrine as tha^ enunciated by Monroe. The President declared on April 2 that " the great, the generous Russian people have been added in all their native majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of honor." Certainly some kind of league will be needed if the principles of the Monroe Doctrine are to receive general respect. There is developing a growing opinion favorable to a sanction for international security and peace by co-operation or joint action of some kind. Whether this sanction be furnished by a league to enforce peace or by some other guaranty, it is certain that the world seems wear}' of the old system under which any ruler might, if he decided it to be for his interest, disturb the peace of the world and subdue weaker peoples. Monroe in 1823 had said of the then weaker states to the south of the United States that this government would view as " a mani- festation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States . . . any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny." These states were at that time democracies and they were small and weak. The United States placed behind them the considerable power which the nation at that time wielded, and the democratic form of government has prevailed upon the western continent. The (493) 302 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS United States by treaty agreement putting the Monroe Doc- trine to the test of fair international opinion, has in recent years shown its willingness to justify the doctrine upon its merits. Now with broader policy the United States proposes that after the war the powers of the world unite to guarantee for the larger area what it has guaranteed for the Americas — that democracy shall have an opportunity to develop without foreign intervention. The acceptance of this idea by the states of the Avorld is not yet certain. The American argument is not difficult, however. If it is good for the Americas that states and peoples should have complete freedom for self-realization, it is likewise good for the other states of the world. Of this belief the United States and other American states are now giving proof by action. While such a doctrine may imperil thrones, it builds up peo- ples, and for its extension even hostilities may be justified^ as has been officially asserted : , We shall fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts — for democracy, for the right of those who submit to an au- thority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. The United States cannot under such principles claim isola- tion as a justification for its policies, but the Monroe Doctrine if it is to survive after the war must rest upon the broader support which its fundamental character merits. It is possible that in its narrower interpretation as applied to the Americas because of their " free and independent condition " the Monroe Doctrine may still be maintained after the war, but it is to be hoped that under the broader scope of the principles of the doctrine, through a concert of the nations life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness may be permanently secure under governments deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. (494) PAN-AMERICANISM AS A WORKING PROGRAM^ ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ Secretary-General, American Institute of International Law THE entrance of the United States into the European war, the greatest of human cataclysms, gives the war a new aspect in its bearing upon both the belligerent groups. Indeed, the United States does not fight with a view to territorial increase or financial indemnity, nor in order to become an arbiter in European affairs. As President Wilson solemnly declared in his memorable message of April 2, it is the aim of the United States to defend the rights of neutrals and at the same time to serve the general interests of human- ity by preventing a country or a group of countries from exercising domination over the world, and by establishing on a new and more solid basis the community of nations. The Allied countries have accepted, without qualification the noble ends proclaimed from the beginning of the war by the Ameri- can Institute of International Law, a body composed of the most eminent publicists of the continent. The other group of belligerents has clearly manifested its determination to impose German supremacy and domination upon the whole world. Such being the new aims of the war, the countries that have remained neutral until now, especially those of Latin America^ cannot stand by with indifference in the face of a struggle that directly affects both their present interests and their future well-being. For this reason, some of these countries have al- ready entered the war on the side of the Allies ; and the others have given at least their moral support, declaring, however,, that they will remain neutral so long as their rights be not 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at Long Beach, N. Y., May 30, 191 7. (495) 304 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELA TIONS [Vol. VII violated, and that each one will defend its own rights in the event of violation. We feel that neither of these two positions meets the actual situation created by the world-wide catastrophe of today. Such neutral countries have, therefore, only a passive neutrality — that is to say a position of non-participation in the war — and not the juridical neutrality which presupposes recognition and re- spect for rights that are essential to such a neutrality, above all the right of free commerce now so entirely ignored by the belligerents, especially by Germany with her submarine cam- paign. Consequently, it has become to the interest of these countries to agree on collective and solidary action in pre- venting or checking the violation of the rights of any one of the states of this continent, for the purpose of commanding respect for their rights and safeguarding their independence — which would be gravely threatened should Germany tri- umph in this war. Such collective action would, furthermore, be in accordance with our historical traditions. In fact, a century ago the nations of Latin America strug- gled, as the United States before them had struggled, not only for their independence but for a new organization of national and of international life. Following the example of the United States, they established the state on the basis of a liberal, republican and democratic constitution, something then unknown in the Old World. They proclaimed from an international point of view (again in accordance with the United States) their acquired right to independence, thus for- bidding Europe not only to rule over them, but even to inter- vene as she does with European nations. This is the Monroe Doctrine as proclaimed in 1823, which, in consequence, is not simply a policy of the United States, as is ordinarily believed, but a principle of American international law, since it was proclaimed by all the states of the New World. The relations of the United States with Latin America, cordial as they were up to that period, relaxed with time, until even some degree of distrust was felt toward the im- perialistic policy later developed by the United States, and unfortunately under the name of the Monroe Doctrine. How- (496) No. 2] PAN-AMERICANISM AS A WORKING PROGRAM 305 ever, from the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the relations of Latin Americans among them- selves and with the United States have assumed a new aspect that is characterized by the harmony of the interests they have endeavored to cultivate. This is Pan-Americanism in its varied phases — political, economic, juridical and scientific. In the present epoch we believe that all of the states of Latin America and the United States of America should be in accord on the following points, which embrace all the problems of the present and future international situation; such an understanding would be new and perhaps greater than any other manifestation of Pan-Americanism. (i) Why has not Japan, with her powerful army, entered the war, especially when through it she has already reaped important material advantages and is permitted to exercise certain supremacy in the Asiatic continent? If the nations of America should take part in this great world war which is tending to check Germany in her onward rush for world domination, their safety requires that they shall not exhaust themselves to the point of falling under the menace of another domination. With all the belligerents exhausted in the war, the result will be that Japan, using her powerful army, can enforce her will in the future, or at least impose the conditions of peace as well as enforce her will, in any conflict that may arise wherein she may be concerned. With this in mind, there- fore, the states of our hemisphere ask for securities, that is to say, for Japan's effective engagement in the war, with all resources. (2) What will be the basis of the future International or- ganization after the victory? A new organization of the state would be needed from the outset, an organization based on nationality and democracy; a strong organization, thanks to a strength of state henceforth triumphant over an individ- ualism that has had its day; but an organization without despotism, thanks to the rejection, by democracy, of a long- condemned absolutism. Then a new organization of inter- national societ>% founded, not as it has been up to the present time in Europe, on political equilibrium, on alliances and armed (497) 3o6 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VIl peace, nor on Utopian schemes of universal federation in a league to enforce peace, because this league would be in reality similar to the European directorate or to the Holy Alliance established in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars^ the result of which was the abusive intervention of the great powers in both the internal and the foreign affairs of the small states; but an organization based upon institutions which by the very act of avoiding the hegemony of one state over others would likewise avoid their rivalry, especially economic rivalry, and bind their common interests more closely together. These institutions should, as far as possible, have their effi- ciency demonstrated by experience, especially in America where the society of nations has rested upon more stable foundations. Experience also suggests the expediency of bringing into closer relation the various unions now existing (e.g. postal, telegraph) ; the creation of a commercial and economic union for the purpose of harmonizing the economic interests of the different countries ; the improvement of the me- chanism of the Hague conferences ; the organization of a per- manent court of arbitration; the creation in Europe and in America of a continental union in which all the states of each continent might discuss their common interests, as well as the controversies of a political nature existing between them and not susceptible of judicial solution, but without imposing their solution thereof. It would be the greatest insult to present-day civilization to believe that it is not capable of dis- covering any other means of solving international difficulties- than the savage means of war. The society of the nations, nevertheless, will not be truly organized until the excessive individualism of the entities which constitute it be corrected. Its present basis, in fact, is formed by countries entirely independent and sovereign with- out any juridical tie among them and without any regard to general interest; this cannot give a real international organiza- tion as there would be no national organization in a country which would be composed only of isolated individuals without association among them. It is then necessary to obviate that trouble ; this may be done by having the countries which have (498) No. 2] PAN-AMERlCANlSM AS A WORKING PROGRAM 307 more affinity among themselves unite in partial confederations or in other similar political entities, which at the same time would be in contact with each other. The basis of the inter- national society would thus be not the isolated countries, but the groups formed by them all. Although they are part of political entities, the countries constituting this entity do not lose their independence and sovereignty, but these notions of independence and sovereignty will be modified, as in civil so- ciety the notion of individual independence is modified in favor of collective interest. The American Institute of International Law, since the beginning of the war, has been studying the question of the future organization of the community of nations as well as the question of a new basis of international law, particularly a more effective observance of its rules. (3) The meeting — either in Washington or in some other American capital — of a conference in which the solidarity of the several nations might be solemnly proclaimed, with a view to securing the freedom of the seas and to putting an end to attacks made by belligerents upon neutral commerce, chiefly when committed in American waters. An offense perpetrated against any one of these states would be an offense against all of them ; the action deemed most adequate would be adopted, and might be anything from severing relations to making re- prisals or even declaring war. Notification of the measures agreed upon could be immediately transmitted to the belliger- ent governments. In the conference above suggested, the American nations could likewise arbitrate thenceforth as to the necessary means of preparing their future economic, politi- cal, national and international life in such a way as to have perfect harmony among them all at the end of the war. Not only the American countries that have declared their neutral- ity, but also those that have become belligerents, should par- ticipate in this conference, because it is not a question of maintaining the rights of neutrality in conformity with the rules of international law, which are impossible at the present moment to follow. What the American countries should strive to obtain, at all costs, is respect for their rights even to the (499) 3o8 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII point of using force, if need be, to repel aggression, regard- less of the fact that some of those that subscribe to the meas- ures adopted with that end in view may be belligerents. If the nations of our continent should adopt this or another similar attitude, all the world would find itself virtually in a state of war; and in such an event the excess of the calamity would bring its own benefit. The world being divided into two great rival camps, it would be possible to arrive at a solu- tion which would be the beginning of a new era for the future: the reduction of armaments — the immediate cause of so much destruction — and the initiation of the reconstruction of the community of nations upon more stable bases, upon founda- tions which are at present Pan-American, as we have indicated, but which would be of a universal character in the future. In our continent, Pan-Americanism must seek new courses which correspond to the future necessities of our hemisphere and which may be, at the same time, successfully carried out. Under the international point of view, two confederations at least, should be formed : one that would embrace the five states of Central America, which has already existed more than once in the course of the nineteenth century; and the Antillean confederation, which would embrace the countries situated in the Caribbean Sea, and whose center would be Cuba. These confederations will be desirable in that they will give prestige and security to each country, and at the same time will aid in strengthening relations with the United States, and the rest of Latin America. The nations in each confederation will maintain their political independence, but dealings affecting all will be carried on with the outside world by the con- federations. From an economic viewpoint, it is essential that all the states of our hemisphere maintain a commercial bond that would grow stronger every day. When foreign merchants, however, are able to deal with the people through the confederation, and with the knowledge that the confederation is reliable, the finan- cial and economic progress of the countries will go on and the entire Pan-American idea will be aided. (500) No. 2] PAN-AMERICANISM AS A WORKING PROGRAM 309 It would be wise, also, from a political point of view, to modify the Pan-American Union, so that it could attend in due form to the general interests of the continent. Intellectually, the realization of the scheme is desirable in that it will forward the proposition of the Pan-American Uni- versity Union, which was adopted at the Second Pan-American Congress. The purpose of this union is to co-ordinate the effort and investigation of all of the universities of the conti- nent, to facilitate the solution of the great problems which will face the world at the conclusion of the war. It also will aid the development of the American Institute of International Law and kindred organizations. With this course of Pan-Americanism our continent would in reality be one of peace and progress that would play an ever more important role in the universal society of nations. (SOI) THE RELATION OF GOVERNMENT TO PROPERTY AND ENTERPRISE IN THE AMERICAS' CHARLES W. SUTTON New York THE effect of investments and concessions upon foreign relations is involved in the relations and attitudes as- sumed by governments toward the processes of pro- duction and exchange carried on by individuals and associa- tions, within and without the jurisdiction of the governments. The attitude of this government toward property and business within its own jurisdiction has always been reflected in its attitude toward the trade and investments carried on by its own citizens in Latin America. The question of what the foreign policy of the United States should be rests upon the question of the relation in both Latin and Anglo-American communities between the respective governments and the business carried on in both communities by the citizens of both. Because this conference is dealing primarily with questions of international interest, and has designated this topic in relation to international economy, it is convenient to approach the subject by considering first the general attitude of the gov- ernment of the United States toward property and enterprise in Latin America. The relation of this government to these things in the United States, and the relations of the Latin American governments toward property and business in Latin America may then be appropriately introduced. It is pertinent to review the ideas of our North American statesmen regarding the first of these considerations. In 1826, when the question was under discussion in the Senate of the United States, upon the occasion of the proposed congress of the American states at Panama, the chairman of the Senate committee reported in this connection as follows : 1 Address delivered at the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States, held under the auspices of the Academy of Political Science, at the Chamber of Commerce, New York, June i, 1917. (502) RELATION OF GOVERNMENT TO ENTERPRISE 311 The Committee on Foreign Affairs has . . . been led to inquire what the principle of our diplomatic intercourse with other governments has been. The answer is that it has ever been the policy of the United States to maintain diplomatic relations with those powers and those only with which we have important political and commercial relations. Referring to the proposed congress at Panama, he continued : Questions involving our most important political and commercial interests are to be discussed. Though the new republics there rep- resented are so many separate governments . . . they form one whole family in language, religion, law, history and present political alli- ance. From this family, as far as the enumerated circumstances go, we are necessarily excluded. Out of this exclusion springs an entire class of political and commercial relations between us on the one side, and a large family of new republics on the other.^ In this declaration of the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs at the beginning of the history of our relations with tlie Latin American republics there is clear recognition of the natural and inescapable interest of the government of the United States in property and enterprise within the jurisdiction of the Latin American states, and of business carried on be- tween the peoples of the two communities. It is tliere frankly recognized that unless we have or can acquire important com- mercial benefits thereby, relations with a foreign power are not special concerns of the national policy makers. It is as frankly admitted that the Latin American republics form a separate family from which the United States is necessarily ex- cluded by reason of fundamental and deep-seated differences in law, language, and ecclesiastical and secular institutions. It is also, however, recognized that in spite of this, commercial relations between the two communities promise to be of suffi- cient importance to warrant the concern of statesmen. The essential facts and considerations recognized by the Senate in 1826 have remained true down to the present time, and have been as fully recognized by our leading statesmen of all epochs. In fact the frankness with which our publicists 1 Document 426, Amer. State Papers, vol. 5, p. 900. (503) 312 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII have stated these facts has at times offended the people of botli our own and the Latin republics. At the time of the congress at Panama, when our diplomats were arranging com- mercial treaties with Latin America, the statesmen of these countries were at pains to assert that because the United States held in theory political principles similar to those of Latin America and because the former community had even lent ma- terial assistance to the latter in their political struggles, it did not follow that the former should therefore have any special commercial privileges. As a matter of fact representatives of the United States did not take part in the Congress of Panama. The con- cession of lands in Texas to Moses Austin led ultimately to the seizure by the United States of one half the total possessions of the Mexican republic. This country also sup- ported Great Britain as against Argentina in the contest for title to the Falklands. The attempt of the American, William Walker, to seize a part of Central America, forcibly called the attention of the Isthmian states to the possibly dan- gerous political consequences of the enterprising Yankee spirit. President Buchanan proposed the assumption by the United States of a temporary protectorate over part of Mexico. Mr. John Bassett Moore has inferred from the history of this epoch that had not the Civil War intervened our country would have carried out the policy suggested by Mr. Buchanan. It is also probable, however, that the apparent worthlessness of a large part of northern Mexico may have had some influence in re- tarding the interest of the United States. Political estrange- ment between the Latin and Anglo-American communities was in any case probably at its height about i860. Since then,, sympathetic relations have tended to increase, but are still far from being firmly established. If this is true, however, there has been no change in our statesmen's criteria of judgment regarding the foundations of foreign policy. Mr. Blaine, in an article published in the Chicago Weekly Magazine in 1882, said: The foreign policy of the Garfield administration had two principal (504) No. 2] RELATION OF GOVERNMENT TO ENTERPRISE 313 objects in view : First, to bring about peace and prevent future wars in North and South America; second, to cultivate such friendly com- mercial relations with all American countries as would lead to a large increase in the export trade of the United States. Again, in his address of welcome to the delegates to the International Conference held in 1889, Mr. Blaine said : We meet in a firm belief that the nations of America ought to be and can be more helpful each to the other than they now are, and that each will find advantage and profit from an enlarged intercourse with the others. ... It will be the greatest gain when the personal and commercial relations of the American States South and North, shall be developed and so regulated that each shall require the high- est possible advantage from the enlightened and enlarged intercourse of all.i Mr. Knox, in using the phrase " dollar diplomacy " as char- acterizing the aims of our foreign policy, apparently offended many, but he said nothing more or less than had been said and thought by our leading statesmen for two generations. In one of Mr. Root's statements upon this subject, we find a most succinct summing-up of the logical and natural aims of the United States in its relations to Latin America, and of the traditional methods by which the United States expresses its attitude toward property and enterprise : Governments may hold doors open all over the world, but if there is no one to go through them, it is an empty form, and people get tired of holding doors open as an empty form. The claims of a government to consideration soon come to be regarded as pretentious, unless there are really substantial interests behind the claims. No government . . . can make commerce to go through open doors, to avail itself of fair and equal treatment, and to give substance and reality to the theoretical increase of amity and friendship between nations. The people of the country must do it themselves, and they must do it by individual enterprise. It would be difficult to find in so few words so complete a 1 International American Conference, Reports of Committees and Discus- sions, vol. I, pp. 39-42- (50s) -.14 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII summing-up of our aims and relations, past and present, with Latin America. We have sought friendship, acknowledging that our motive was commerce. If we have not wholly failed as regards friendship, we have not made an astonishing suc- cess. Is the reason to be sought in the unlikenesses of culture, in the difficulties of the Latin American terrain, in the relation of Latin American governments to property and enterprise, in the relation of the United States toward property and enter- prise, or in some other cause more remote or intangible? The unlikeness in language and institutions recognized as determined and essential by the chairman of the Senate com- mittee in 1826, the difficulties of the terrain recognized by many who have sought to establish large enterprises in Latin America, and the relations of government to property and busi- ness, reveal a suggestive interrelationship in the modes by which the Latin American states have sought to stimulate the production of wealth within their boundaries. In order to foster individual enterprise and to increase the revenues of the state, European rulers, before colonial times, created a legal institution, the concession. This word concession, by contrast with words employed in the United States to denote institutions of the same nature and objects, measures the diverg- ence in the attitude of government toward business and prop- erty arrived at in the two communities through different se- quences of policy and economic experience since the time when business and property began to take oh their modern meaning as functions of production and exchange. It is generally considered that a concession is a peculiarly Latin American institution. The word concession has no par- ticular place in legal terminology in the United States or England. We may however employ the term concession in a generic sense as a grant by a state or government, conferring permission to engage in an enterprise which could not be undertaken without such permission. The term is so employed in Europe generally as well as in Latin America. In such a sense, therefore, the term concession includes a license to prac- tise a profession or to keep a shop, a charter of incorporation, and other privileges. The fact that the term is not employed (S06) No. 2] RELATION OF GOVERNMENT TO ENTERPRISE 315 in this country does not mean that the thing does not exist, but rather that the government's customary attitude toward it is different. All permissions or privileges granted by the state are the prerogatives of the state, but in Anglo-Saxon communi- ties these prerogatives are concealed in the words " licenses " and "franchises," suggesting freedom from a previous bondage, the gratification of a natural right, rather than the enjoyment of a favor bestowed. The spirit of laws and institutions in these communities tends to reject the idea of a favor or con- cession underlying the exercise of the enterprising faculty. It will be recalled however that up until the Statute of Monopolies most of the business of England was conducted under a policy which emphasized the idea of a favor in the bestowal of the right to ov/n property and engage in enterprise. Concessions were granted to few, if possible to selected per- sons. They were exclusive. Those which could be demanded or expected by any one upon proof of specified qualification are of relatively modern growth. In both England and the United States franchises are exclusive because they refer to the use of things and utilities which cannot be subdivided in ownership except through the device of shares of stock. The repudiation of excessive and minute interference of the state in private property and enterprise did not take place effectively in Latin America until two hundred years after it had occurred in England. But in the former communities neither the administrative institutions and laws nor the in- dustrial habits of the population permitted an abandonment of the centralized paternalism repudiated in the Declaration of Independence and our constitutional bills of rights. In most of the Latin American countries eighty-five per cent of the population was necessarily excluded from social and political equality with the remainder. Latin America had contributed a great deal to the movable funds of the world, but had re- tained little of these funds. Its wealth lay in mines difficult of access, lands impoverished by centuries of crude agriculture, acres of raw land requiring to be drained, irrigated or de- forested. These conditions continue over the greater part of the Latin American territory today. Romance and more or (507) 3i6 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII less interested propaganda have dwelt more upon the lands, forests and mineral deposits than upon the difficulties in the way of their development. Those who have understood con- ditions and who have held the balance of capital available for Latin American dev^elopment have generally known how to bargain their funds against prerogatives offered by the govern- ment. Even so, New York and London are full of memories of unfortunate Latin American enterprises. The Latin American statesmen could not have achieved any other method of economic development at the beginning of Latin American independence, than the method involved in the granting of the state's prerogatives to private individuals and corporations. The same is true today. Latin American gov- ernments must borrow funds for public improvements from bankers of foreign citizenship, and must grant greater con- cessions in proportion as their resources are difficult of ex- ploitation and their political life is unstable. There has been no escape from the concession habit, except through govern- ment ownership and operation of national resources and utili- ties. Government ownership and operation, however, con- tinue to be opposed to the spirit and traditions of American commonwealths. The habit of concessions having been, therefore, inescapable, how about the relation between concessionaire and government in Latin America? This relation, already suggested in the word concession itself, is still further determined by admin- istrative law and custom. For years before the establishment of republicanism in Latin America, government by parliament had ceased to exist in Spain or the Spanish possessions. In place of the cortes, the Consejo de Estado, and from time to time other consejos, such as the Consejo de Indias, performed legislative as well as judicial and executive functions under the guidance of the king. The consejo has remained a part of the administrative machinery of Latin American states down to the present time. Its mem- bers are usually composed of heads of bureaus and representa- tives of the professional and propertied classes appointed by the president and his ministers. Their functions are to advise (508) No. 2] RELATION OF GOVERNMENT TO ENTERPRISE 317 the minister in matters of dispute arising out of concessions and other matters. Generally speaking, however, their advice may be accepted or rejected at the pleasure of the president or his ministers. The consejo remains, as it was under Spanish rule, largely under the control of the executive, and a means of beclouding executive responsibility. The execu- tive has found it necessary or convenient to formulate his own policies without waiting for the slow and contentious processes of legislatures, and he has found the consejo a convenient means to this end. Generally speaking, judicial and legisla- tive functions relating to concessions are held in the hands of ministers assisted by consejos. Matters which concern public policy in the use of the state's prerogatives and resources, and which would in the United States ordinarily be reviewed in the courts, are thus often settled by ministerial decree. The social or anti-social result of a law may thus come to depend upon the bureaucratic attitude, which in turn may reflect the particular attitude of the executive. Finally, when cases are brought in the common courts, precedent plays a smaller part in the decision than in Anglo-Saxon countries. The fact that a certain type of case has been decided a certain way in several instances does not make legal counsel so certain as it would in the United States. Enterprise therefore is made timid by the possible interrup- tion of its development in several ways ; first, through the ad- verse report of a semi-judicial body or council of advisers re- porting to the minister of public works or internal affairs; second, by decree of the minister or executive; third, by un- certainty in forecasting the interpretation of the law. It should of course be borne in mind that these remarks are general, in so far as they refer to Latin American countries since the inception of republican government there; they do not apply with equal force to Argentina and to Mexico and Peru. Yet they have applied in full force to all the Spanish American countries during important periods of their inde- pendent history, and they indicate still the general attitude of government toward property and enterprise. Administrati*^e institutions give the balance of power in Latin America to the (509) 3i8 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII executive rather than to the legislature or the judiciary. This explains why an executive may suspend or obstruct with greater facility than in the United States, and that too without violat- ing any constitutional principle or institutional custom, grants made by his predecessor. The contrast which this situation presents to the attitude of government toward property and business in the United States is further emphasized by recalling that in the separation of powers in this countiy, the balance resides in the judiciary rather than in the executive or legislative branches. We may say that it resides in the judiciary and legislative rather than in the executive. In any event, it does not reside in the executive to the extent that it does in Latin America. The rights of a concessionaire are interpreted at once by the court, and not by any ministerial decree that can be sustained with- out regard to judicial precedent. That is, at least, the senti- ment and constant aim of all those who take part, either by vote or by the exercise of public functions, in the government. However, the Anglo-Saxon idea that property and enter- prise should be protected at any cost has sometimes led to a condition in which property threatened to become superior to government. In holding fast to the state's prerogatives, in granting them sparingly, and in jealously watching their use, Latin American governments are probably not blind to the dangers of a policy of excessive economic liberalism. To strike the happy mean is their problem as it is ours, and we shall probably go as far toward adopting their attitude as they will come in meeting ours. The contrast which I have attempted to sketch goes some way to explain why we do not make faster progress in under- standing Latin America. We have said that we want their friendship for commercial reasons. That is a fact, and that is why all industrial nations want it. We are a great in- dustrial nation. We must produce our goods with increasing rapidity to obtain low cost of production. We must sell them in the largest possible number of markets in order that none of them may be glutted. The ability of the Latin American to purchase our goods does not depend alone upon our ability (510) No. 2] RELATION OF GOVERNMENT TO ENTERPRISE 31Q to compete with other merchants offering him goods. It de- pends primarily upon his ability to produce something to ex- change for our goods. This ability to produce depends upon his ability to utilize capital, for which he must offer conces- sions. Our tendency to regard grants of the state's preroga- tives as giving to the grantee rights superior to those of the community, may not always have promised an issue between the people of Latin America and the concessionaire, but it always has invited an issue between the governments of Latin America and the concessionaire. It does not therefore indicate any unreasonable, eccentric or peculiarly cultural or racial qualities if Latin America reads more than disinterestedness in the various doctrines and policies of the United States concerning America. Suspicion in this respect has not needed to rest upon acts of conquest, although there have been such acts. It has sufficed that in the United States as in Europe there is every element of a producing and trading process which is determined in ways adverse to states that are economically weak, and that in this country vested interests are habitually protected to an extent which would make them dangerous if lodged in weaker states. Is there then any hope that property and enterprise may develop in Latin America with the participation of the Anglo- American, and without anti-social developments or interna- tional complications? It is certainly in the economic interest of both communities to recognize essential differences while striving to achieve common aims. It does not at present ap- pear to the interest of the business man in the United States to invest largely in Latin American property. It is in his ultimate interest to do so in the sense that it is in his country's interest to do so, " The claims of a government to considera- tion soon come to be regarded as pretentious, unless there are really substantial interests behind the claims." If this be true, and if private capital of the United States cannot be induced to invest in Latin American enterprises, can the government of the United States take any action that will facilitate di- rectly the transfer of capital to Latin American, enterprises? This question had already been considered by the United (5") 320 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII States government before the present international crisis. It is, however, opposed to the traditions of policy and enterprise in all American communities, and would probably not be sup- ported by public opinion, at least in Latin America. The friendship of Latin America for the United States therefore continues to rest largely on the conduct of citizens of the latter country who trade and invest in the former, on the attitude of Latin Amefican governments toward these traders and investors, and on the personal relations formed through business interests between the men and women of North and South America. The different traditions of the two com- munities, the fundamental difference of language, the intensely economic and aggressive type of man which North American conditions have produced, the ease with which economic geog- raphy has permitted the success of his enterprise — these things do not of themselves make the citizen of the United States the best fitted of all commercial nationalities to court Latin American friendship through commercial channels. This is however, the only way in which friendship can be established or maintained. Friendship is a personal relation. In the process of its establishment the business man of the United States must share with the Latin American govern- ments and peoples themselves the responsibilities for present and future events arising out of our efforts to establish com- mercial advantage. The game of commerce is played between individuals. It will not be fairly played in the dark and under auspices of secret diplomacy. Neither the seeker after com- mercial advantage nor the bureaucrat of North or South America can carry on his activities with benefit to himself and to the community in the long run without the guidance of pub-- lic opinion. One of the most effective and far-reaching in- struments of public opinion is a free press. The press is, no doubt, far from what it should be, but if we are to have a ju§t relation between government and business in America we must have a press informed upon American questions. The relation of government to property and enterprise in the United States has been adjusted by public opinion expressed in the newspapers as much as by any of the powers or institutions of '(512) No. 2] RELATION OF GOVERNMENT TO ENTERPRISE 321 government. We have said that the balance of power in the government of the United States resides in the Supreme Court; but every step forward in the adjustment of the relations of government and business exercised by that court has originated and beeji sustained in public opinion rather than in the court itself. The adjustment of such relations will take place in America through the action of a public opinion informed of the facts of industr}'- and enterprise in America through a press which makes a knowledge of these facts common to all Ameri- can communities. (S13) PAN-AMERICANISM DISCUSSION 1 Mr. Peter H. Goldsmith, Director, Pan-American Division, American Association for International Conciliation : I should like very much to have this audience in a hall without any doors, but with plenty of windows and with chairs none too comfortable, for two hours, in order to pour upon you some of the things I have to say upon this subject. I must try, however, to say them in ten minutes. Two prerequisites are demanded for whatever people do together. Always and everywhere intellectual and social co-operation must be preceded by good will and acquaintanceship. When good will is lacking between individuals or nations, no kind of co-operation is possible. When it is present, every obstacle in the way of a good understanding and a profitable interaction can be overcome. Events attest the existence among ourselves of good will toward the peoples of America. Those who have had opportunity for per- sonal observation in the other countries, and those who have pene- trated the thought of their citizens by reading, know that this good will is not a peculiar possession of our own, but that in each of the republics a commanding group of serious and patriotic thinkers shares these kindly feelings. The first prerequisite then exists. Yet mere good will, although essential, and the only possible basis of friendly international action, does not bring people together in intelligent co-operation. We have dallied for a perilously long period in the nebulous and unproductive regions of sentiment and oratory. In our international conferences we have voiced amiable feelings toward one another in well-chosen phrases ; but it is gener- ally admitted that our kind intentions have not assumed a practical form. However, the fact that a gathering of the present serious character, composed of busy men of affairs, is being held for the purposes for which this one has assembled, is evidence that we are now determined to express our good will by means of effective co- operation. Granted then the good will, both on our part and on the part of similar groups in the other countries, and a rational resolve to em- 1 At the afternoon session, May 31. (514) PAN-AMERICANISM 323 body it in practical helpfulness, what is the first step that remains to be taken? It is this: men of light and leading throughout Amer- ica must become acquainted, for intellectual acquaintance naturally and necessarily precedes intellectual and social co-operation. Partners in business cannot co-operate successfully unless they have at least a fair knowledge of each other's mental, moral and physical characteristics. In the eifort to know each other, history enters into consideration. Partners begin to judge each other upon the basis of the past. Each is concerned with the other's business career, his preparation, and his known reaction to a variety of cir- cumstances. From a knowledge of the past they proceed to the scrutiny of the present. From the past they extract information as to each other's reputation ; from intercourse they gather knowledge of each other's character. This reciprocal knowledge can hardly exist without a means of communication. It is generally conceived that partners ought to understand each other's language. The terms they employ in their contracts between themselves and jointly with others must be clear and unequivocal, and they must comprehend each other in the plan- ning and management of their affairs, if they would co-operate effec- tively, and avoid disagreement and disaster. If this be true of partners in business, that is, in a relation in which men meet upon a single plane only and for a sole purpose, how much more is it true of individuals and of states in the manifold relations of commerce, politics, society, intellect and morals? The nations of America may be conceived of as partners united, unconsciously, or consciously and voluntarily, in the vast and inter- esting adventure of creating a comfortable and beautiful world in which to develop a free, happy and peaceful humanity. Accident or destiny has linked them together, to a relative degree, by their geographical proximity, and to an absolute degree by their experi- ence, the exigencies of their previous isolation in America, their present dependence upon one another, and the similarity of their political organization and national ideals. The welfare of this hemi- sphere, if not indeed of all men everywhere, through the long future, depends in a very vital manner upon what the nations of America shall think and do in these momentous hours. Nevertheless, the intellectual leaders of the American republics are but ill prepared to meet the demands of the present situation. With good will and an honest desire to co-operate, they do not know how, becamse they are not acquainted with one another. They are (515) 324 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII kept apart by the barriers of language, distance, infrequent and un- satisfactory postal and telegraphic communication and passenger transportation, and they tenaciously hold erroneous ideas regarding one another. It must, therefore, be admitted that the situation is difficult. However, we of America are ingenious, and when in earn- est, we persevere until we accomplish our purpose. We shall yet devise a way. Nevertheless, there opens a wide chasm between latent good will, of which there seems to be no dearth, on tha one hand, and effective national co-operation between those who, by right of broad and elevated thought and kindly and patriotic motives, ought to dom- inate the councils of the nations, on the other. How, then, in view of the hindering obstacles, may we become acquainted? This problem could be readily solved if we had a com- mon language and were nearer to one another. If all the Americans spoke one language, say English, Spanish, Portuguese or French, the chief difficulty would never have existed. We should all have known each other at least as well as the people of the United States and England now know each other in spite of being separated by an ocean and the memory of two sanguinary wars. Even lacking a common vehicle of communication, we could know each other as well as the people of the United States know those of France, if we of the north had a little Spanish or Portuguese, and our southern neighbors had a smattering of English, and we ex- changed visits with each other as frequently and extensively as we ourselves are wont to visit France in normal times. However, we neither have a common language, nor have we of America been given to traveling from north to south and from south to north across the equator. It is true, we have held international congresses during these latter years, and all Americans may congratulate themselves upon the de- gree of success which has attended such conferences, at least as a means of making us acquainted with one another. Yet international conventions do not establish acquaintanceship between entire peoples. Only exceptional persons attend these gatherings, and of these but a few have sufficient command of the two principal languages em- ployed in our inter-American congresses to enable them either to understand the proceedings or to acquire that knowledge of the in- stitutions and the social and intellectual life of the countries where the congresses take place which is of more importance even than mere attendance upon public meetings. Congresses at best are neces- sarily superficial; they bring together but small groups, and they (516) No. 2] PAN-AMERICANISM ^25 partake too much of the nature of pageantry and parade to afford opportunity for that tranquil and extended interpenetration of spirit which is essential to intellectual comprehension and social intimacy. Knowledge of history, of the road by which peoples have reached their present state, of national heroes, ideals and aspirations, of liter- ature, art, the progress of the sciences, the degree and methods of education, of even so humble and commonplace a subject as geog- raphy— in fine, the establishment of a community of ideas on the part of the various groups of international well-wishers — is what is needed before there can be any co-operation between peoples. There is no short cut to acquaintanceship, however. International relations, like individual relations, to be real and enduring must be natural and not artificial, must be matured by growth, and not made to order by fiat or legislation. Whatever is the result of growth is slow. The nervous titillations of international rallies, however agree- able and spectacular, do not take the place of serious study, travel, correspondence, and earnest and extended thought. The business of getting acquainted with our kind of people in other countries is no trifle. We have lost time. Our southern friends are better prepared than we are. Our preachment regarding inter- national ignorance must therefore be addressed in the main to our- selves. We know Europe, Asia and Egyptian Africa. Europe we have known throughout our brief history because we originated there ; southwestern Asia and Egypt we learned about after a fashion in childhood as a feature of our training, since our religion came from there; and of the Far East we have known somewhat since the days when Salem shipmasters returned from China, Japan, India and the eastern islands laden with rich wares and stores of curious knowl- edge; but up to two decades ago we were densely and inexcusably ignorant regarding the peoples of our own America. Even now we who are interested in international questions and have achieved a ■somewhat broader outlook should probably be surprised to learn how limited is the knowledge of the mass of our people in this respect. Our American neighbors have a clearer and more ample knowledge of us than we hav;^ of them. It is only natural that they should have, since we are the shining mark, being larger, richer, more im- pressive, and, in a manner, pioneers in independent government. The cottage knows more of the palace than the palace of the cottage. Admitting this, our past indifference to the intellectual wealth that lies toward and beyond the equator is something inexplicable, even when we make due allowance for our necessary preoccupation in the mate- rial tasks that absorbed our energies in the past. (517) 326 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII Perhaps the burden of blame rests upon the directors of instruc- tion, who have almost totally failed to turn the attention of the young southward in their studies. It is not difficult to believe that our young people would have found as much interest and instruction in stories about Pizarro, Almagro, Valdivia, Afifonso de Mendoza, Cortes, among the conquerors and settlers, and Miranda, Bolivar, San Martin, Sucre, Bermudez, Paez, Hidalgo, Guerrero, Morelas, Sarmiento, Alberdi, Artigas, and even Lopez, among the military and political leaders of the later days, as they have in those regarding the great figures of Europe and Asia. It does not speak well for our North American international con- sciousness that those who lay so much stress upon Concord, Lexing- ton, Bunker Hill, Valley Forge, Saratoga, Charleston and York- town, should not be able to call the name of a single South Ameri- can battlefield made sacred by the blood of heroes shed in the struggle for independence. We can hardly take pride in the fact that the name of the person who was probably the greatest literary woman of America, the Mexican Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz, is not known to any considerable number of even our people of culture. To our fellow Americans of the southern countries, the names of Poe, Whitman, Longfellow, Emerson, Mark Twain, Cooper, Irving, Bret Harte, Edison and Carrel, are as familiar as those of the equally great Ercilla, Ruiz de Alarcon, Bello, Heredia, Avellaneda, Echeverria, Acuiia de Figueroa, Ricardo Palma, Ruben Dario, Oswaldo Cruz, Ameghino and Jose Toribio Medina. In respect of international knowledge, our neighbors have outdistanced us ; for they not only know Europe as well as we, but they also know us better than we know them. How shall we begin? How can we get at the minds, under- stand the point of view, penetrate the varied consciousness of the other Americans? How shall we surmount the numerous barriers? The material barriers in the way of communication — those of in- efficient telegraphic, postal, passenger and freight service — will be diminished naturally in response to the demands of economic exi- gencies. Our chief concern therefore is not with them. Our first task is in the nature of a self-preparation. We have need of knowledge. Much may be said in favor of the proposition enunciated by President Butler, at one of the dinners given in New York to the delegates to the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress last year, that the future Pan-American ought to be bilingual. It would (518) No. 2] PAN-AMERICANISM 327 be difficult to overstate the importance of Spanish for xis, and of English for the other Americans at the present moment. South of us are spread broad and rich fields of knowledge. Spanish is the sickle we need for the harvest. The increased interest in the teach- ing and study of Spanish to be observed throughout the "United States, and of English in the other countries, augurs well for the future of American relations. While, however, we are all becoming bilingual, it is of prime importance to awaken the interest of our young people in their American neighbors by including in the schemes of popular education proper courses of study upon the geography, history, Kterature, institutions and varied character of the peoples with whom destiny has linked us for future co-operation. Also much can be done by translation. Probably more North Americans know French literature by means of translation than by reading it in the original. Our libraries and homes could be ap- preciably enriched by placing in them translations of at least a few score of the noble specimens of literature produced by the Americans who have expressed themselves in Spanish or Portuguese. We cannot all go to our national neighbors, nor can we bring them to our doors, in order to establish with them a community of thought and ideals ; but books, magazines and newspapers, common- place as they are, like bread and water, air and all essential things, are felicitous instruments for bridging space, time and temperament, and these are never totally inaccessible to resolute and intelligent people of good wall. I have outlined the needs and the difficulties. May I now give you four words, as they say in Spanish, regarding some practical achievements with which I have had the honor to be connected? In addition to the many institutions which are fostering the study of Spanish here, and of English in the other American countries, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for three years, through the instrumentality of its Division of Intercourse and Education, has spent considerable sums to promote the study of Spanish and of the history and geography of the southern countries in the summer schools of more than four score important universities, colleges and normal schools in the United States. Last year the Carnegie Endowment gave to an institution of Buenos Aires a carefully selected, catalogued and equipped library of ten thousand North American books to serve as a symbol of good will, and as a permanent interpretation of the thought, feelings and activities of the people of the United States in that great capital. (519) 328 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VIl It fell to my lot, as the representative of the Endowment on the occasion of the presentation of the library, to emphasize the need of an exchange of literature between all our countries, and later, to speak in universities and colleges in six of the principal South American countries upon some of the great themes emphasized by present world conditions. Many books were collected and brought back for use and distribution in the United States. Another practical manifestation is the establishment by the Carnegie Endowment of the magazine, Inter- America, the publica- tion of which was begun in May, and which is to be issued alter- nately, one month in Spanish, made up of diversified articles trans- lated from the periodical literature of the United States, and the next in English, composed of articles translated from the periodical literature of the American countries of Spanish or Portuguese speech. This magazine is intended to overcome somewhat the barrier of a diversity of language, in order to establish a community of ideas between all the peoples of America. Another undertaking is the creation of the " Inter- America " li- brary, which is to consist of translations of a ntunber of our best books into Spanish, and of a number of the best books of the other American countries into English. Several translations have already been made, and the books will soon begin to appear. One other practical expression may be mentioned. The Endow- ment has appropriated a sum sufficient to buy and transmit con- siderable collections of North American books to fifteen institutions in Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile and Peru. Efforts will not be spared to put at the disposal of our institutions similar collections of works by Spanish and Portuguese Americans. Apart from the activities of the Division of Intercourse and Edu- cation of the Endowment which look toward the drawing together of the American peoples, the Division of International Law and the Division of Economics and History are co-operating, not only in the study of conditions that affect international rights and reflations, but also in aligning the leaders of the nations upon the basis of international law, rectitude and conscience. Ygnacio Calderon, Minister from Bolivia: When we speak of ■supporting and defending democracy in the world we do not refer simply to political organization. Supporting democracy means something more than that; it means the acceptance by the countries of justice, freedom and liberty. Those great principles have been (520) No. 2] PAN-AMERICANISM 329 put in the human soul as its eternal and invariable guide, just as the law of gravitation has been established for the orderly movement of the heavenly bodies. We have never heard of a properly managed republic starting a career of war and conquest. That is why we consider democracy the sure guarantee of peace. Morality is the first condition of hiunan relation, whether per- sonal or national. I will illustrate my idea. If every member of a partnership honestly and directly puts all his efforts into the busi- ness of that company, the company will succeed. If however, one of them forms a scheme to seize for himself the profits of the com- pany, the company may be ruined, after a career of progress and prosperity ; and simply because of the lack of honor of one partner. It is the same thing with nations. You cannot conserve the peace of the world by making wars, or by making leagues of nations to keep peace by making war. The nation that breaks a treaty acts like the partner who forgets the welfare of his company. We have a perfect example of that. Germany signed all treaties of The Hague; she signed the guarantee of the neutrality of Belgiiun ; but when her rulers thought they needed a place in the sun, she broke those treaties. And already at that time, you must not for- get, Germany had its place in the sun all over the world. Germans were accepted as the best and most desirable citizens not only in this country, but all through South America. German agents had spread their business all over the world. Even in England, many merchants and clerks in the counting houses and banks were of German origin. The Germans thought that they needed a place in the sun. Why? Because they thought they should have the direction, the supreme power of the world, and therefore they did not hesitate to turn into a scrap of paper one of the most sacred conventions among nations. When President Wilson says that it is necessary to make war in order to make the world safe for democracy, that means that we must make the world safe for good faith, for the respecting of other peo- ple's rights and freedom. It is fortunate that this country has really at heart those principles as a guide for its policy. The proof of it is what the United States has done in Cuba. According to the standards of European politics you had a right to take Cuba and hold it, but you left it. You left the country well organized, and after having given the people free- dom, left them to rule themselves. That is of the true spirit of democracy and good faith, with which the United States granted (521) 330 CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS [Vol. VII liberty to Cuba. Why was that? Because more and more the United States is coming to understand the democracy of morality, and the teaching of respect for the rights of other people. Those sentiments will go on increasing, and will, I trust, become the in- variable rule of this country. In Cuba all nations have the privilege of the open door to do business, even if there are certain treaty advantages granted mutually between the United States and Cuba. Instead of keeping the island as a colony with a dissatisfied popu- lation, you have a grateful country that acknowledges its enjoyment of independence as due to you. This was a fulfilment of the great principle that every people should choose their own government. That also is the basis of Pan-Americanism, which means simply the good faith and harmony of all the republics on this continent, the assurance that no matter what their state of development, they shall have the privilege of directing the affairs of their own country. There is a great differ- ence between America and Europe in this respect, and nothing proves this more plainly than a look backward at the history of the Old World and the New World. The combinations of monarchies in Europe have never been able to maintain peace there, because they dictate goverimiental policies simply in their own private interest. With us, on the other hand, the people have a part in everything and it is in their welfare that we are principally concerned. I have also something to say about tiie Monroe Doctrine. That doctrine, as you well know, was the declaration of a free people, notifying the great Holy Alliance of Europe that the western con- tinent had been devoted to the cause of freedom and democracy. The Monroe Doctrine was promulgated when South America was still fighting for its independence in the fifteen years' war which ended in 1825. The present stand taken by the United States is simply an extention of the application of the Monroe Doctrine. No nation in the world was originated in the same way as the United States, which was founded by men who loved freedom above everything in the world. They found in this great new world, filled with the promise of natural wealth, with its great fields, its beautiful rivers, its enormous mountains full of mineral wealth, the promised land of justice and liberty. In Massachusetts, as in Maryland and the other sections, the English colonies grew in the practice of justice and law. Therefore if the United States should tomorrow invade any other country, it would be acting contrary to the principles of those who founded this country, and the spirit in which it has been established. No. 2] PAN-AMERICANISM 33 1 It is unfortunate that some men in this country preach the doctrine. " Forward to Panama." Not only is such a doctrine contrary to your ideals, but there is no occasion for it. Merchants, speculators, miners — everybody that intends to develop honestly any kind of in- dustry is welcome. The door is open, and it is not necessary to compel that which is freely given. We to the south of you respect the rights of all, and are mindful of our duties. If your citizens can go and make fortunes there, you do not have to increase your territory. If you go after more territories, it will bring an increase of duties and responsibilities, diflficult problems of mixed races. You are happy in having here a homogeneous nation inspired by the same principles, belonging for the most part to one single race ; if you have in the South the presence of the Negro race, I will say frankly that it is a punishment for the crime of bringing those poor Negroes from their homes to make them slaves here. Before the War of Secession the politics of the United States con- tained an element of irreconcilable conflict. The selfish interest of the South dictated an increase of the niunber of slave states ; the North, on the other hand, was interested in counterbalancing the south^-n power. Hence the profound truth of Lincoln's statement that the country could not exist half slave and half free. Slavery was abolished, and we on this continent are devoted before God to the cause of freedom, security and the welfare of every nation. I hope that we shall always repudiate conquests and war, but not merely because we have treaties; for treaties can be turned into scraps of paper. Our treaties must be written in our conscience, in the very depths of our heart ; and everyone of us must know that the United States and the other countries of America alike have a respect for their duties and their obligations. The western hemisphere is and must be the home of democracy, justice and peace. (523) THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK BOARD OF TRUSTEES President Sam DEL McCdne Lindsay Vice-Presidenti Albert Shaw Thomas W. Lamont Secretary Treasurer Henry Raymond Mussey George A. Plimpton Directors Irving T. Bush Henry R. Seager James Byrne Edwin R. A. Seligman A. Barton Hepburn William R. Shepherd Charles E. Hughes Munroe Smith Adolph Lewisohn Henry L. Stimson William L. Ransom Frank A. Vanderlip The Academy of Political Science, founded in 1880, is com- posed of men and women interested in political, economic and social questions. The annual dues are $$. Members re- ceive without further payment the current issues of the Political Science Quarterly and the Proceedings, and are entitled to admis- sion to all meetings, lectures and receptions under the auspices of the Academy. Conctmunications regarding the Academy should be addressed to the Secretary of the Academy of Political Science, Kent Hall, Columbia University, or to Miss Emma S. Lake, Assistant to the President of the Academy, Kent Hall, Columbia University. 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